Unsinnig: A Reply to Hutto∗

Abstract

In the late 1930s Heidegger makes allusions to ‘the wild’ and ‘the mild’ in connection with a human liberation that he understands as a steadfast response to the claim that historical being (Seyn) makes upon us. The following paper elucidates these allusions in terms of the overturning of metaphysics that they entail.     

Death’s Badness and Time-Relativity: A Reply to Purves

According to John Martin Fischer and Anthony Brueckner’s unique version of the deprivation approach to accounting for death’s badness, it is rational for us to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous nonexistence. In previous work, I have defended this approach against a criticism raised by Jens Johansson by attempting to show that Johansson’s criticism relies on an example that is incoherent. Recently, Duncan Purves has argued that my defense reveals an incoherence not only in Johansson’s example but also in Fischer and Brueckner’s approach itself. Here I argue that by paying special attention to a certain feature of Fischer and Brueckner’s approach, we can dispense of not only Johansson’s criticism but also of Purves’s objection to Fischer and Brueckner’s approach.     

‘A Way Out’ and A Way In: Reply to Commentary

I express my appreciation for Michal Rieck's thoughtful and fully felt reading of my paper. I underline her points that the regression that an unobtrusive yet fully engaged analyst can allow, is not solely a phenomenon in work with more disturbed patients, and that the essence of this position is to be without separateness. I outline a process of the “flow of enactive engagement,” which fosters a narrative unfolding of the field of the treatment. I suggest that the flow of enactive engagement is a contemporary mutual form of enacted free association and that Rieck is correct in saying that from my perspective psychoanalytic cure need not involve the analyst's interpretation. The mutual enactment itself can be the interpretation.     

A helpful argument — Reply to K. Eichner

Das von K. Eichner konstruierte Gegenbeispiel ist logisch nicht stichhaltig. Trotzdem ist sein Einwand hilfreich. Er zeigt nämlich, daß die starke Falsifikation, die notwendig ist, um die Vorschrift des Falsifikationismus zu rechtfertigen, daß eine Theorie aufgrund eines einzigen Gegenbeispiels zu verwerfen sei, durch Beobachtungsdaten widerlegt werden kann. Auf diese Weise wird erneut das Scheitern einer deduktiven Begründung für die Falsifikationsmethodologie und damit die Gültigkeit der Symmetriethese erwiesen.     

Kane’s Libertarian Theory and Luck: A Reply to Griffith

In a recent article, Meghan Griffith (American Philosophical Quarterly 47:43–56, 2010) argues that agent-causal libertarian theories are immune to the problem of luck but that event-causal theories succumb to this problem. In making her case against the event-causal theories, she focuses on Robert Kane’s event-causal theory. I provide a brief account of the central elements of Kane’s theory and I explain Griffith’s critique of it. I argue that Griffith’s criticisms fail. In doing so, I note some important respects in which Kane’s view is unclear and I suggest a plausible way of reading Kane that makes his theory immune to Griffith’s objections.     

Ideologies,Idols (and Graven Images?): Rejoinder to Gurman and Kniskern

Three major issues raised in Gurman and Kniskern's commentary are discussed. These are (a) the suitability of established research design criteria for studying the outcome of family therapy; (b) the impact of therapist relationship factors on therapy outcome; and (c) the place of concrete or objective change measures in psychotherapy outcome research. Areas of agreement and disagreement with Gurman and Kniskern's observations are identified.     

“Evidence” on Characteristic Empathy: A Reply to Cross and Slee

This paper addresses a number of issues raised by Cross and Slee (1984) in their comment on Watson (1983). It clarifies the construct of characteristic empathy by comparing this variable with variables derived from interactive empathy. Various aspects of reliability as they relate to popular empathy measures are then discussed ad the particular version of the Indices studied by Watson (1983) is identified. Finally, there is a discussion of the extent to which the literature reviewed by Cross and Slee actually offers conclusive evidence about empathy measures.     

“A Place to Enter and in Which to Feel”: Reply to Cath,Levine, and Peltz

In this response, I clarify my argument for the utility of affectively organizing and containing work in the treatment of a traumatized child. I find myself in agreement with many of the comments of Peltz regarding the vitalizing aspects of the work and Levine’s discussion of scaffolding to promote development. I delineate my thinking in response to Cath’s queries about transference, Oedipal themes, and the value of interpretation.     

Acceptable Contradictions: Pragmatics or Semantics? A Reply to Cobreros et al.

Naive speakers find some logical contradictions acceptable, specifically borderline contradictions involving vague predicates such as Joe is and isn’t tall. In a recent paper, Cobreros et al. (J Philos Logic, 2012) suggest a pragmatic account of the acceptability of borderline contradictions. We show, however, that the pragmatic account predicts the wrong truth conditions for some examples with disjunction. As a remedy, we propose a semantic analysis instead. The analysis is close to a variant of fuzzy logic, but conjunction and disjunction are interpreted as intensional operators.     

A straight path-to where? Reply to Butterworth and Hadar

Butterworth and Hadar (1989) discussed my earlier article (McNeill, 1985) but assumed their own linear theory and overlooked my proposal for an internal dialectic of imagery and language. This has led them into a whole series of misinterpretations.     

Critique or Misrepresentation? A Reply to Timimi et al.

In rebuttal to Timimi et al., we show that their critique is not a form of reasonable scientific debate with informed, constructive criticism, but merely a misrepresentation of the existing scientific literature on ADHD apparently designed to convince the scientifically uninformed of its nonexistence and of the misuse of medications for its management. We show their argument to be based on faulty logic, selective citation, misreprensentation of individual studies, ignorance of the vast literature on ADHD, and innuendo that maligns the integrity of scientists studying the disorder. Our original International Consensus Statement on ADHD remains untarnished by this faux critique – indeed it was intended to refute just such unsupported and unsupportable criticism that often appears in the popular media.     

Reply to: A comment on and : How to investigate whether personality items form a hierarchical scale?

We reply to the comment by Meijer (2009) on our recent papers investigating the hierarchical properties of personality scale items. We conclude that Mokken scaling is an appropriate method for investigating the existence of hierarchical scales in general and, specifically, addresses the issue of invariant item ordering in polychotomous data.     

A Different Rationale for Redistribution: A Reply to Bjørnskov

First we would like to thank Christian Bjørnskov for his comments and in particular for acknowledging the contribution we make in introducing the idea that inter-country redistribution might be more effective a way of redistributing incomes than interpersonal redistribution within a country and, in general, the quality of our theoretical and indeed empirical analysis. We feel that the more critical points he makes of the paper are largely due to a misunderstanding and we welcome the opportunity to further clarify our contribution.     

There’s No Need to Rethink Desert: A Reply to Pummer

Pummer (Philosophical Review 123(1): 43–77, 2014) ingeniously wraps together issues from the personal identity literature with issues from the literature on desert. However, I wish to take issue with the main conclusion that he draws, namely, that we need to rethink the following principle: Desert.: When people culpably do very wrong or bad acts, they deserve punishment in the following sense: at least other things being equal they ought to be made worse off, simply in virtue of the fact that they culpably did wrong—even if they have repented, are now virtuous, and punishing them would benefit no one. (Pummer Philosophical Review 123(1):43–77, 2014: 43–44) Pummer offers an argument that is intended to show that this principle, along with widely-held views about personal identity, entails an inconsistent triad of propositions. I agree. But I think Pummer's argument attacks a straw man. I believe that no-one holds Desert, at least as it is stated, and that once the principle is stated correctly it is easy to see that no inconsistent triad follows from it. So, Desert does not need rethinking. It just needs to be stated correctly.     

Praying Alone? Church-Going in Britain and Social Capital: A Reply to Steve Bruce

This article responds to Bruce's reluctance to consider the decline in church-going in Britain in relation to wider changes in social behaviour, more especially the unwillingness of increasing sections of the population to participate in voluntary activity or civic engagement of any kind. It covers two points in particular: the first relates to the Putnam thesis and the particular place of religion in this; the second considers in more detail the relationship between religious belief and religious practice.     

God − Moore = Ramsey (A Reply to Chalmers and Hájek)

Famously, Frank P. Ramsey suggested a test for the acceptability of conditionals. Recently, David Chalmers and Alan Hájek (2007) have criticized a qualitative variant of the Ramsey test for indicative conditionals. In this paper we argue for the following three claims: (i) Chalmers and Hájek are right that the variant of the Ramsey test that they attack is not the correct way of spelling out an acceptability test for indicative conditionals. But there is a suppositional variant of the Ramsey test which is still stated in purely qualitative terms, which avoids the problems, and which looks correct. (ii) While the variant of the Ramsey test that Chalmers and Hájek criticize is not correct, it is still a good approximation of a correct formulation of the Ramsey test which may be usefully employed in various contexts. (iii) The variant of the Ramsey test that Chalmers and Hájek suggest as a substitute for the deficient version of the Ramsey test is itself subject to worries similar to those raised by Chalmers and Hájek, if it is given a non-suppositional interpretation.     

A Reply to Szabó’s “Descriptions and Uniqueness”

Szabó (2000) follows Heim (1982,1983) in viewing familiarity, rather thanuniqueness, as the essence of the definitearticle, but attempts to derive bothfamiliarity and uniqueness implicationspragmatically, assigning a single semanticinterpretation to both the definite andindefinite articles. I argue that if there isno semantic (conventional) distinction betweenthe articles, then there is no way to derivethese differences between them pragmatically.     

A Look Beyond the Mirror—What He Saw and I Didn't: Reply to Commentary

Altman's commentary challenged this author on both a personal and a theoretical level. On a personal level, she was encouraged to explore her knowing at one moment but not knowing at another, her own self-interest in the position of beneficiary. Thus, the mechanism of disavowal that underpins liberal racism was revisited in a more clinically oriented manner.

On a theoretical level, Altman's response invited a more refined exploration of liberal racism as it differs from blatant racism. It also facilitated a more nuanced application of Lacanian and Kleinian theory to this matter.