What Makes an Intuition a Compatibilist Intuition? A Response to Sripada

So-called “manipulation arguments” have played a significant role in recent debates between compatibilists and incompatibilists. Incompatibilists take such arguments to show that agents who lack ultimate control over their characters or actions are not free. Most compatibilists agree that manipulated agents are not free but think this is because certain of the agent’s psychological capacities have been compromised. Chandra Sekhar Sripada has conducted an interesting study in which he applies an array of statistical tools to subjects’ intuitive responses to a manipulation case, and he insists that the results of his study provide compelling evidence that people favor compatibilist views of freedom. I argue that because the case that forms the centerpiece of his study is relevantly different from the sort of cases incompatibilists have developed and because he fails to build deterministic conditions into this case, Sripada’s data cannot help settle the disagreement between compatibilists and incompatibilists.     

Is Intuition Necessary for Defending Platonism?

G?del asserts that his philosophy falls under the category of conceptual realism. This paper gives a general picture of G?del’s conceptual realism’s basic doctrines, and gives a way to understand conceptual realism in the background of Leibniz’s and Kant’s philosophies. Among philosophers of mathematics, there is a widespread view that Platonism encounters an epistemological difficulty because we do not have sensations of abstract objects. In his writings, G?del asserts that we have mathematical intuitions of mathematical objects. Some philosophers do not think it is necessary to resort to intuition to defend Platonism, and other philosophers think that the arguments resorting to intuition are too na?ve to be convincing. I argue that the epistemic difficulty is not particular to Platonism; when faced with skepticism, physicalists also need to give an answer concerning the relationship between our experience and reality. G?del and Kant both think that sensations or combinations of sensations are not ideas of physical objects, but that, to form ideas of physical objects, concepts must be added. However, unlike Kant, G?del thinks that concepts are not subjective but independent of our minds. Based on my analysis of G?del’s conceptual realism, I give an answer to the question in the title and show that arguments resorting to intuition are far from na?ve, despite what some philosophers have claimed.     

Intuition: A special kind of knowing?

It is argued that while counsellors have adopted the principle tenets of phenomenology—consciousness and meaning—they have built their work on an interpretation of intuition which is contrary to phenomenological rationale and presents it as a form of knowing which is esoteric and mystical. Phenomenologically, intuition differs from no other way in which sense is made of the world. Intuitions should then, in principle, be accessible to conscious understanding so as to allow counsellors to reflect (cognitively?) on their practice. If the process of intuition were really unknowable, then reflective practice in counselling would not be possible.     

Why Me? Why Not Me?

The decision to undergo BRCA testing is very complex and emotionally laden. This decision can be further complicated by the loss of a mother at an early age. The following personal account by a genetic counselor discusses the testing process and the struggle to accept the results and reframe one’s self-identity. The sensitive nature of this testing and the implications for other family members is explored.     

Why Homophobia?

Suzanne Pharr's Homophobia: A Weapon of Sexism may be an effective tool for women committed to overcoming their own homophobia who want practical advice on recognizing and eradicating it, although as an essay in theory it does not advance the issues. The author seems unaware that Celia Kitzinger has argued recently that “homophobia” is not a helpful concept because it individualizes problems better seen as political and begs the question of the rationality of the fear. I argue that “homophobia” has been misused but that freed of the medical model and understood in connection with issues of pride and shame, it can be a helpful concept.     

Why Intentions?

There is an influential conception of intentional agency in terms of just beliefs and desires. And there is an equally influential conception that adds intentions as separate ingredients. It remains disputed whether (1) adding intentions is really necessary, and (2) what difference that addition exactly makes. I argue that (1) adding intentions is required, but only because and insofar as (2) it makes room for a distinctively practical kind of reasoning. I critically consider Bratman's main considerations in support of adding intentions, viz., conduct‐control, inertia, and input for practical reasoning, and argue that a desire‐belief theorist can easily accommodate those. I then reconsider all three Bratmanian considerations in order to establish a more fundamental difference in terms of a robust notion of practical reasoning. Such a difference can be found if we place Bratman's considerations in the light of Sebastian Rödl's idea of a measure or order of practical reasoning.     

Why Jesus?

Jesus plays potentially a uniquely important role in relation to the world's greatest needs. To respond to the global crisis, we need historical consciousness. The source of historical consciousness is the prophetic tradition. Through Jesus the prophetic tradition became widely available and important. However, this consciousness has been responsible for great evil as well as great good, often bound up with we/they thinking and the use of violence. Jesus’ teaching of love of the enemy in principle overcomes this tendency and points to way forward.     

Why Naturalism?

My goal in this paper is to explain what ethical naturalism is, to locate the pivotal issue between naturalists and non-naturalists, and to motivate taking naturalism seriously. I do not aim to establish the truth of naturalism nor to answer the various familiar objections to it. But I do aim to motivate naturalism sufficiently that the attempt to deal with the objections will seem worthwhile. I propose that naturalism is best understood as the view that the moral properties are natural in the sense that they are empirical. I pursue certain issues in the understanding of the empirical. The crux of the matter is whether any synthetic proposition about the instantiation of a moral property is strongly a priori in that it does not admit of empirical evidence against it. I propose an argument from epistemic defeaters that, I believe, undermines the plausibility of a priorism in ethics and supports the plausibility of naturalism.     

Why cognitivism?

Intention Cognitivism – the doctrine that intending to V entails, or even consists in, believing that one will V – is an important position with potentially wide-ranging implications, such as a revisionary understanding of practical reason, and a vindicating explanation of ‘Practical Knowledge.’ In this paper, I critically examine the standard arguments adduced in support of IC, including arguments from the parity of expression of intention and belief; from the ability to plan around one’s intention; and from the explanation provided by the thesis for our knowledge of our intentional acts. I conclude that none of these arguments are compelling, and therefore that no good reason has been given to accept IC.     

When Should Consumers and Managers Trust Their Intuition?

Ambady, Krabbenhoft, Hogan, and Rosenthal (2006) demonstrated that “thin slices” or very brief observations of behavior are not only sufficient for drawing accurate automatic trait inferences, they actually improve accuracy, relative to inferences based on larger amounts of information. Too much information, too much knowledge, or too much analysis can reduce the accuracy of intuitive judgment. Who benefits most and what types of judgments benefit most from thin‐slice data? When should people trust their intuition? The answers to these questions depend on informational variables, such as feedback quality and the consequences of inferential errors (Hogarth, 2001). Evidence is reviewed suggesting that consumers and managers should trust their intuition only when high quality (frequent, prompt, and diagnostic) feedback is available and when inferential errors are consequential and therefore easy to detect.     

How Distinctive Is Philosophers’ Intuition Talk?

The word “intuition” is one frequently used in philosophy. It is often assumed that the way in which philosophers use the word, and others like it, is very distinctive. This claim has been subjected to little empirical scrutiny, however. This article presents the first steps in a qualitative analysis of the use of intuition talk in the academy. It presents the findings of two preliminary empirical studies. The first study examines the use of intuition talk in spoken academic English. The second examines the use of intuition talk in written academic English. It considers what these studies tell us about the distinctiveness of philosophical language and methods and considers some implications for evaluative and ameliorative methodology.     

Why Don't Continents Move? Why Don't People Change?

People don't change because they can't, don't want to, don't know how, or don't know what to change. The transtheoretical model provides an integ-rative model for understanding reasons for not changing, as well as readiness to change. Stages and levels of change guide therapists in their work in helping clients change. Clients in the precontemplative stage typically cannot change without special help. Those in the contemplation stage are not sure they want to change. Those in the preparation stage are afraid they do not know how to successfully change. The levels of change help guide therapists and clients on what to change.     

Why bion? Why jung? For that matter, why freud?

Bion and Jung share both a significant disjunction from reflecting on personal experience, and a commitment to connecting with a higher truth outside of personal experience; in this they contrast with the Freudian standpoint that fully engages with reflecting on personal experience, and that considers efforts to connect to a higher truth as themselves usefully thought about in terms of their personal meaning. In these aspects of their work, Bion and Jung strongly endorse a romantic and communal approach to experience, whereas Freud essentially integrates the romantic and communal with the classical and agentic.