Equality as Comparative Fairness

The goal of this article is modest. It is simply to help illuminate the nature of egalitarianism. More particularly, I aim to show what certain egalitarians are committed to, and to suggest that equality, as these egalitarians understand it, is an important normative ideal that cannot simply be ignored in moral deliberations. In doing this, I distinguish between equality as universality, equality as impartiality, and equality as comparability, and also between instrumental and non‐instrumental egalitarianism. I then characterise the version of egalitarianism with which I am concerned, which I call equality as comparative fairness. I discuss the relations between equality, fairness, luck, and responsibility, and defend egalitarianism against rival views that focus on subsistence, sufficiency, or compassion. I also defend egalitarianism against the Levelling Down and Raising Up Objections, and present several key examples to illustrate egalitarianism's distinct appeal, in contrast to prioritarianism's. I conclude by considering two common questions about my view: first, whether my ultimate concern is really with comparative fairness, rather than equality, so that my view is not, in fact, a substantive, non‐instrumental version of egalitarianism, and second, whether my view ultimately reduces to a theory about desert.     

Equality of Education and Citizenship: Challenges of European Integration

What kind of equality among Europeans does equal citizenship require, especially regarding education? In particular, is there good reason to insist of equality of education among Europeans—and if so, equality of what? To what extent should the same knowledge base and citizenship norms be taught across state borders and religious and other normative divides? At least three philosophical issues merit attention: (a) The requirements of multiple democratic citizenships beyond the nation state; (b) how to respect diversity while securing such equality and inculcating commitments to justice and norms of citizenship, and (c) The multiple reasons for equality of various kinds among political equals living in a Union as compared to a unitary state. The article responds on the basis of several arguments in favour of certain kinds of equality. All Union citizens must enjoy a high minimum level of education, and all pupils must be informed concerning the various ways of life prevalent in Europe. Furthermore, there must be standards for securing equality of opportunity across the EU, though it is difficult to measure under multiculturalism. Citizens must also be socialised to certain ‘citizenship norms’. This shared basis to be taught in schools should avoid contested religious or philosophical premises as far as possible. Yet the school system should socialise pupils to three commitments: to the just domestic and European institutions and hence the legislation they engender, to principles that justify these institutions; and to a political theory that grounds these principles in a conception of the proper role of individuals, of member states and of the Union. I also argue that equality of result is not a plausible normative requirement among Europeans, while equality of opportunity is. The paper concludes with some comments on the lessons to be drawn for ‘Global’ citizenship.     

再论分配正义——答段忠桥教授

<正>我在《哲学研究》2011年第3期发表《分配正义:从弱势群体的观点看》一文(下引仅注页码),表达了关于分配正义问题的一些观点,特别是提出了分配正义的原则。这篇文章的论证逻辑如下:首先,一种分配只有得到弱势群体的同意,它才能是正义的;其次,分配正义的原则应该把弱势     

The Place of Self‐Respect in a Theory of Justice

This essay provides a critical examination of Rawls' (and Rawlsians') conception of self‐respect, the social bases of self‐respect, and the normative justification of equality in the social bases of self‐respect. I defend a rival account of these notions and the normative ideals at stake in political liberalism and a theory of social justice.

I make the following arguments: (1) I argue that it is unreasonable to take self‐respect to be a primary social good, as Rawls and his interpreters characterize it; (2) secondly, drawing on a distinction made by Darwall, I argue that recognition respect provides a far more suitable notion of respect for a theory of justice than Rawls' notion of appraisal respect; (3) thirdly, I argue that Rawls' treatment of self‐respect and the social bases of self‐respect as empirical conceptions should be rejected in favor of normative notions of a reasonable or justified self‐respect and equality in reasonable social bases of self‐respect; (4) I argue that Rawls' notions of political liberalism and public reason provide a way of grounding a notion of the reasonable social bases of self‐respect in political ideals of the person implicit in modern economic institutions, and family relations, ignored by Rawlsians—but as central to reasonable social bases of self‐respect and justice, as Rawlsians' ideal of persons as free and equal citizens.     

Prenatal Equality of Opportunity

In this article, we defend a normative theory of prenatal equality of opportunity, based on a critical revision of Rawls's principle of fair equality of opportunity (FEO). We argue that if natural endowments are defined as biological properties possessed at birth and the distribution of natural endowments is seen as beyond the scope of justice, Rawls's FEO allows for inequalities that undermine the social conditions of a property‐owning democracy. We show this by considering the foetal programming of disease and the possibility of germ‐line modifications. If children of lower socioeconomic background are more likely to develop in a poor foetal environment and germ‐line enhancements are available only to the rich, initial inequalities between the rich and the poor would grow, and yet FEO would be satisfied. In order to avoid the problem, we propose a revised FEO principle omitting any reference to the comparison of natural endowments. Our revised FEO requires that institutions mitigate social class effect from reproduction and gestation to the greatest extent compatible with parental freedoms and the value of the family.     

Equality of whom? a genetic perspective on equality (of opportunity)

Rawls’ principle of fair equality of opportunity has been regularly discussed and criticized for being inadequate regarding natural inequalities. In so far as this egalitarian goal is sound, the purpose of the paper is to see how the prospect of radical genetic intervention might affect this particular inadequacy. I propose that, in a post-genetic setting, an appropriate response would be to extend the same rules regulating societal inequalities to a regulation of comparable genetic inequalities. I defend this stance against recent arguments from the authors of From Chance to Choice and from Colin Farrelly’s alternative of the genetic difference principle. Thanks and appreciation to Dr. Pete Morris, Noreen McGuire and Ann Feeney for their support and encouragement. My thanks also to the participants of the Ninth Manchester Graduate (Brave New World 2005) Conference in Political Theory, where a shorter version of this paper was read.     

Performatiwiteit en selfonthulling as sleutelbegrippe in Hannah Arendt se etiek van deugdelikheid

Abstract

In this paper I argue that, in a liberal society that confmes itself solely to providing free basic education, children from the higher strata are systematically subjected to developmental opportunities that can reliably be expected to give them an advantage in the process of meritocratic competition. I will show how enforcing the universal education policy can include children from the least fortunate families in the process of meritocratic competition.

I make a case for a commitment to the extensive redistributive tax measures needed to ensure truly universal education as the condition of equal opportunity. I argue that this proposal is, in fact, consistent with real egalitarians’ aim to achieve equality, and consistent with their principle of fair equality of opportunity. Providing an equal opportunity in an educational programme could possibly be an attempt to attain equality.     

JUSTICE,INCENTIVES AND CONSTRUCTIVISM

In Rescuing Justice and Equality, G. A. Cohen reiterates his critique of John Rawls's difference principle as a justification for inequality‐generating incentives, and also argues that Rawls's ambition to provide a constructivist defence of the first principles of justice is doomed. Cohen's arguments also suggest a natural response to my earlier attempt to defend the basic structure objection to Cohen's critique, which I term the alien factors reply. This paper criticises the reply, and Cohen's more general argument against Rawls's constructivism. 1     

Risk as a Consequence

Expected-utility theory advances representation theorems that do not take the risk an act generates as a consequence of the act. However, a principle of expected-utility maximization that explains the rationality of preferences among acts must, for normative accuracy, take the act’s risk as a consequence of the act if the agent cares about the risk. I defend this conclusion against the charge that taking an act’s consequences to comprehend all the agent cares about trivializes the principle of expected-utility maximization.

     

Plato's Revenge: Moral Deliberation As Dialogical Activity

In this article I offer an account of normative thought inspired by Plato's proposal in the Theaetetus that judgement is ‘speech spoken … silently.’ After arguing that force conventionalism is the speech act theory best suited for modeling dialogic inner speech, I close the article by sketching the picture of normative thought that results. Though I defend a particular theory of normative speech elsewhere, the core insights of this article can be used by other theorists as well. The arguments offered here also serve as an important step forward for the more general program of using social speech to better understand thought.     

Why 'Health' is not a Central Category for Public Health Policy

We normally think that public health policy is an important political activity. In turn, we normally understand the value of public health policy in terms of the promotion of health or some health-related good (such as opportunity for health), on the basis of the assumption that health is an important constituent or determinant of wellbeing. In this paper, I argue that the assumption that the value of public health policy should be understood in terms of health leads us to overlook important benefits generated by such policy. To capture these benefits we need to understand the ends of public health policy in terms of the promotion of 'physical safety'. I then go on to argue that the idea that 'health' is an important category for evaluating or estimating individuals' wellbeing in the normative context of social policy is confused. I then clarify the relationship between my arguments and QALY-based accounts of health assessment. In the final section of the paper, I defend this surprising conclusion against various attacks.     

Equality of Opportunity and Differences in Social Circumstances

It is often supposed that the point of equality of opportunity is to create a level playing-field. This is understood in different ways, however. A common proposal is what I call the neutralization view: that people's social circumstances should not differentially affect their life chances in any serious way. I raise problems with this view, before developing an alternative conception of equal opportunity which allows some variations in social circumstances to create differences in life prospects. The meritocratic conception which I defend is grounded in the idea of respect for persons, and provides a less demanding interpretation of fair access to qualifications; it nevertheless places constraints on the behaviour of parents, and has implications for educational provision in schools.     

Do epistemic reasons bear on the ought simpliciter?

Are epistemic reasons normative in the same sense as, for instance, moral reasons? In this paper I examine and defend the claim that epistemic reasons are normative only relative to an epistemic standard. Unlike moral reasons they are not substantially normative, because they fail to make an independent contribution to obligations or permissions simpliciter. After presenting what I take to be the main argument for this view, I illustrate that the argument has often been defended by examples which controversially presuppose strong epistemic obligations or pragmatic reasons for belief. Opponents of the argument often deny the existence of obligations and reasons of these kinds. I therefore examine whether the argument can withstand that line of critique by employing new examples.     

Normative reasons as good bases

In this paper, I defend a new theory of normative reasons called reasons as good bases (RGB), according to which a normative reason to φ is something that is a good basis for φing. The idea is that the grounds on which we do things—bases—can be better or worse as things of their kind, and a normative reason—a good reason—is something that is just a good instance of such a ground. After introducing RGB, I clarify what it is to be a good basis, and argue that RGB has various attractive features: it has intuitive implications, makes good sense of the weights of reasons, and attractively explains the relationship between normative reasons and motivating reasons. I then briefly defend the view from objections and compare it to rivals. Finally, I sketch two possible implications of RGB: some kind of constitutivism, according to which the norms that govern us are explained by the nature of agency, and second, the claim that agents who do things for reasons generally do them for good reasons.     

略论托马斯·斯坎伦的契约主义

托马斯·斯坎伦是以约翰·罗尔斯为首的平等的自由主义阵营内一位重要政治哲学家,面对《正义论》发表以后所遭受的各方面的批评,他在罗尔斯道德契约论的基础上,转变罗尔斯专注于宏观社会基本制度的学术走向,提出了一种实质性的契约主义,从微观角度来论证个人道德的本质,论证人们为什么要关注正当和不正当的问题,论证为什么正当和不正当对其它关怀和价值具有优先性。从而发展了罗尔斯道德理论的契约形式,对罗尔斯强于制度美德而疏于个人道德论证的缺陷做了有益补充,在伦理学界引起了较大反响。     

Private School,College Admissions and the Value of Education

In this article, I defend a proposal to cap the proportion of students admitted to elite colleges who were educated at elite, often private, schools to not more than the proportion of students who attend such schools in society as a whole. In order to defend this proposal, I draw on recent debates that pit principles of equality against principles of adequacy, and I defend the need for a pluralist account of educational fairness that includes both elements. I argue that while equality best captures our convictions about unfairness in access to the instrumental and positional benefits of education, such as job prospects and college admission, adequacy best captures our convictions about unfairness in stunting the development of human talent and the intrinsic benefits of education. The proposal to cap the proportion of private school students at elite universities advances both of these, usually conflicting, principles because it permits unequal but efficient talent development through the vehicle of private tuition and elite schooling, and yet promises to seriously curtail the unfair positional instrumental benefits of private or elite schooling by having those students compete against each other and not students who did not attend elite schools. The policy also achieves its aim consistent with preserving some attractive aspects of parental choice. Towards the end of the article I consider a number of practical objections and an alternative proposal.     

Functional explanation,consequence explanation,and Marxism

I argued in Karl Marx's Theory of History that the central claims of historical materialism are functional explanations, and I said that functional explanations are consequence explanations, ones, that is, in which something is explained by its propensity to have a certain kind of effect. I also claimed that the theory of chance variation and natural selection sustains functional explanations, and hence consequence explanations, of organismic equipment. In Section I I defend the thesis that historical materialism offers functional or consequence explanations, and I reject Jon Elster's contention that game theory can, and should, assume a central role in the Marxist theory of society. In Section II I contrast functional and consequence explanation, thereby revising the position of Karl Marx's Theory of History, and I question whether evolutionary biology supports functional explanations. Section III is a critique of Elster's views on functional explanation, and Sections IV and V defend consequence explanation against metaphysical and epistemological doubts. A concluding section summarizes my present understanding of the status of historical materialist explanations.     

‘I hope that I get old before I die’: ageing and the concept of disease

Ageing is often deemed bad for people and something that ought to be eliminated. An important aspect of this normative aspect of ageing is whether ageing, i.e., senescence, is a disease. In this essay, I defend a theory of disease that concludes that ageing is not a disease, based on an account of natural function. I also criticize other arguments that lead to the same conclusion. It is important to be clear about valid reasons in this debate, since the failure of bad analyses is exploited by proponents of the view that ageing is indeed a disease. Finally, I argue that there could be other reasons for attempting to eradicate senescence, which have to do with an evaluative assessment of ageing in relation to the good life. I touch on some reasons why ageing might be good for people and conclude that we cannot justify generalized statements in this regard.     

Mere formalities: fictional normativity and normative authority

It is commonly said that some standards, such as morality, are ‘normatively authoritative’ in a way that other standards, such as etiquette, are not; standards like etiquette are said to be ‘not really normative’. Skeptics deny the very possibility of normative authority, and take claims like ‘etiquette is not really normative’ to be either empty or confused. I offer a different route to defeat skeptics about authority: instead of focusing on what makes standards like morality special, we should focus on what makes standards like etiquette ‘not really normative’. I defend a fictionalist theory on which etiquette is ‘not really normative’ in roughly the same way that Sherlock is ‘not really a detective’, and show that fictionalism about some normative standards helps us explain the possibility of normative authority.     

Risk-sensitivity: crossroads for theories of decision-making

Most actions result in one of a set of possible outcomes. To understand how this uncertainty, or risk, affects animals' decision-making some researchers take a normative approach, asking how an animal should respond to risk if it is maximizing its fitness. Others focus on predicting responses to risk by generalizing from regularities in behavioural data, without reference to cognitive processes. Yet others infer cognitive processes from observed behaviour and ask what actions are predicted when these processes interact with risk. The normative approach (Risk-sensitivity Theory; RST) is unique in predicting a shift in a subject's response to risk as a function of its resource budget, but the predictions of this theory are not yet widely confirmed. In fact, evidence suggests a strong bias towards risk-proneness when delay to reward is risky and risk-aversion when amount of reward is risky, a pattern not readily explained by RST. Extensions of learning theory and of Scalar Expectancy Theory provide process-based explanations for these findings but do not handle preference shifts or provide evolutionary justification for the processes assumed. In this review we defend the view that risk-sensitivity must be studied with theoretical plurality.