Saving Strawson: Evil and Strawsonian Accounts of Moral Responsibility

Almost everyone allows that conditions can obtain that exempt agents from moral responsibility—that someone is not a morally responsible agent if certain conditions obtain. In his seminal “Freedom and Resentment,” Peter Strawson denies that the truth of determinism globally exempts agents from moral responsibility. As has been noted elsewhere, Strawson appears committed to the surprising thesis that being an evil person is an exempting condition. Less often noted is the fact that various Strawsonians—philosophers sympathetic with Strawson’s account of moral responsibility—at least appear to have difficulty incorporating evil persons into their accounts of moral responsibility. In what follows, I argue that Strawson is not committed to supposing that being evil is an exempting condition—at least, that he can allow that evil persons are morally responsible agents.     

基于身体理论的脑机接口技术道德责任审视

道德责任问题在脑机接口的伦理讨论中显得尤为重要和突出。在身体理论的理解下,脑机接口设备只能作为人的身体部分和依附,不具有成为道德主体的能力,人应该作为最终责任主体而存在。人的自主、身份认同等可能会对脑机接口应用中的道德责任认定带来一定的困惑,但是并不能对责任认定带来根本性影响,脑机接口技术应用的道德责任依然明确。脑机接口技术具有身体延伸特性,但延伸的特性也意味着延伸的道德责任,在道德责任分配中应该明确和细化相关道德责任。

     

Multiple Criteria Decision‐Making in Management Accounting and Control‐State of the Art and Research Perspectives Based on a Bibliometric Study

As an academic discipline as well as in practice, decision support is one of the most important functions of management accounting and control (MAC). Owing to decision settings' increasing complexity, suitable multiple criteria methods are becoming increasingly important for MAC. We, therefore, examine the extent to which certain multiple criteria decision‐making (MCDM) methods are used in the MAC context. In order to do so, we undertook an extensive bibliometric analysis of the management accounting field during the last three decades. The results indicate an increase in the importance of MCDM. Furthermore, recent research activities were classified into different areas of decision‐making within MAC since the majority of publications deal with the areas of strategic management, budgeting and performance management. More specifically, strategy and performance evaluation, strategic planning and the selection of alternatives are the most prominent MCDM applications. Our analysis reveals that the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is the most popular analytical tool with which to support management in complex decision‐making situations. The results of the study prove that technical MAC literature does not cover a desirable range of MCDM applications and that the AHP, as well as the analytic network process (ANP) are of increasing importance in respect of the international scope of MAC. Therefore, the area of MCDM continues to be an active part of management science research and application, specifically of MAC. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Displaced Feeling: A (Partial) Phenomenological Study

This is a partial phenomenological study of a phenomenon that I call “displaced feeling”, which is best illustrated through a concrete example. I am overcome by a strong desire to stop writing. For one reason or another, I reject the possibility of pursuing this desire. Instead of giving up the desire altogether, however, I may “speak to myself” as follows: “I feel like having a coffee” and, the chatter goes on in the background “of course to make coffee means to stop writing”. I endorse the desire to get a cup of coffee. But the action through which I pursue this desire is coloured not by the feeling that anticipates the value associated with drinking coffee but by a feeling that anticipates the value associated with stopping writing. The latter feeling has displaced the former: I am in a state of displaced feeling. Here, I will elucidate two invariant structures of displaced feeling. First, I will show that displaced feeling involves the realisation of an endorsed state of affairs, the bringing about of a rejected state of affairs, and the belief that the former will determine the latter. Next, I will show that the endorsed state of affairs appears prominently as the end of an intention (or projection), that the rejected state of affairs appears inconspicuously in the horizon of the same intention, and that the belief appears twice: (1) as a motive for this intention and (2) as the “glue” that keeps its prominent and inconspicuous zones together.     

Teaching Critical Thinking without (Much) Writing: Multiple‐Choice and Metacognition

In this essay, I explore an exam format that pairs multiple‐choice questions with required rationales. In a space adjacent to each multiple‐choice question, students explain why or how they arrived at the answer they selected. This exercise builds the critical thinking skill known as metacognition, thinking about thinking, into an exam that also engages students in the methods of the academic study of religion by asking them to compare familiar excerpts and images. As a form of assessment, the exam provides a record of students' knowledge and their thought processes, and as a learning strategy, it encourages students to examine the thought processes they use to understand religion(s) and its many manifestations.     

Future‐Bias: A (Qualified) Defense

The preferences of ordinary folks typically display a future‐bias. For instance, we care more about pains and pleasures in our future than pains and pleasures in our past. Indeed, this future‐bias is so pervasive, many have taken it for granted that the preferences of rational agents will, or at least can, display this future‐bias to some degree or other. However, the rationality of future‐biased preferences has recently come in for critique. However, in this article, I offer a defense of future‐biased preferences against three recent attempts – offered by David Brink, Preston Greene and Meghan Sullivan, and Tom Dougherty – to show such preferences irrational.     

Applicants' and Employees' Reactions to Corporate Social Responsibility: The Moderating Effects of First‐Party Justice Perceptions and Moral Identity

This research explored individuals’ reactions to perceived corporate social responsibility (CSR) using a multimotive framework. In 2 studies, the authors explored the boundary conditions of CSR effects among job applicants and internal employees. A scenario‐based experiment (N = 81) showed that the effect of CSR perceptions on job applicants’ job pursuit intentions was mitigated by applicants’ first‐party justice experiences, whereas it was amplified by their moral identity (Study 1). Survey data from 245 full‐time employees (Study 2) further supported the interactive effects revealed in Study 1. Specifically, first‐party justice perceptions attenuated the positive relationship between employees’ CSR perceptions and their organizational citizenship behavior (OCB); and the relationship between CSR perceptions and OCB was more pronounced among employees high (versus low) in moral identity. Our findings bridge the CSR and organizational justice literatures, and reveal that the effects of individuals’ CSR perceptions are more complicated than previously thought. The findings shed light on micro (employee)‐level CSR phenomena and offer implications for both research and practice.     

Self‐Esteem: A Human Solution to the Problem of Death

Terror management theory (TMT) posits that the need for self‐esteem develops out of the socialization process in which children learn to abide by parental and, eventually, societal standards of ‘goodness’ to feel securely embedded in a cultural belief system. According to TMT, feeling safely immersed in a meaningful conception of reality (i.e., the cultural worldview) ultimately functions to protect people from anxiety due to the uniquely human capacity to be cognizant of their eventual death. After presenting the basic tenets of this perspective, we review several lines of research supporting it and then address some common questions and criticisms of the theory such as how is a TMT view of anxiety consistent with evolutionary principles, why do people commit suicide, and how is self‐esteem pursued in non‐Western, self‐effacing cultures? Finally, we discuss some implications of TMT for understanding social problems and for pursuing meaning and self‐esteem in healthier, more socially productive ways.     

Navigating Bereavement With Spirituality‐Based Interventions: Implications for Non‐Faith‐Based Counselors

The relationship between spirituality and bereavement has been studied in a multitude of disciplines, yet there is a significant gap in the counseling literature on this topic. The authors explore how spirituality is often avoided in secular counseling settings, discuss adverse effects of unresolved grief on clients' functioning, and propose the concept that spirituality can be used to help clients through the bereavement process. Finally, the authors offer research and clinically based interventions that counselors, particularly those who do not identify as faith‐based, can use to incorporate spirituality into their work with bereaved clients.     

In Defense of Anti‐Archimedean Moral Realism: A Response to Recent Critics

Ronald Dworkin famously argued that many putatively nonmoral metaethical theories can only be understood as being internal to the moral domain. If correct, this position, referred to as anti‐archimedeanism, has profound implications for the methodology of metaethics. This is particularly true for skeptical metaethical theories. This article defends a version of anti‐archimedeanism that is true to the spirit rather than the letter of Dworkin's original thesis from several recent objections. First, it addresses Kenneth Ehrenberg's recent attempt to demonstrate how certain metaethical theories can be understood in a morally neutral manner. It then discusses Charles Pigden's claim that Dworkin begs the question against error theorists and nihilists by assuming a conceptual space that error theorists and nihilists would reject. It concludes that the anti‐archimedean methodology originally proposed by Dworkin is defensible, and can be used to support a robust form of moral realism.     

Measuring Sense of Community Responsibility in Community‐Based Prevention Coalitions: An Item Response Theory Analysis

Research on sense of community (SOC) has traditionally been approached from a resource perspective. Recently, however, research on the experience of SOC has evolved to include a related but distinct construct of sense of community responsibility (SOC‐R), or feelings of accountability for the well‐being of a community. This study applied item response theory to examine the psychometric properties of a SOC‐R scale used in an evaluation of community‐based substance abuse prevention coalitions. Data were collected in 2017 from coalition members (analytic sample = 309) in the northeastern United States. Findings indicate that the scale was reliable, unidimensional, and functioned well, particularly at low and moderate levels of the construct. The addition of two items intended to capture higher levels of the construct improved the scale's functioning at higher levels of SOC‐R. The adapted SOC‐R scale was also shown to have moderately strong relationships with conceptually relevant variables, including SOC, coalition participation, number of roles performed in the coalition, and engagement in community action activities. These findings provide empirical evidence to support the reliability and validity of the SOC‐R scale, and have critical implications for our conceptualization of the SOC construct, its measurement, and for the evaluation of community‐based prevention interventions.     

解决现代西方伦理危机的实践哲学进路

现代西方伦理危机的实质是道德个体主义与道德共识的冲突.如何解决这一矛盾已成为解决现代西方伦理危机的核心课题.对此,西方新旧自由主义和共同体主义都给出了较具代表性的回答.然而,要真正解决问题还应到马克思的实践哲学中寻找答案.在马克思实践哲学的视域内,道德个体主义与道德共识的冲突源于人本体论存在的矛盾,这种矛盾只有在现实的实践活动中才能解决.所以,实践哲学进路是解决现代西方伦理危机的现实之路.     

Robust Virtue Epistemology As Anti‐Luck Epistemology: A New Solution

Robust Virtue Epistemology (RVE) maintains that knowledge is achieved just when an agent gets to the truth through, or because of, the manifestation of intellectual virtue or ability. A notorious objection to the view is that the satisfaction of the virtue condition will be insufficient to ensure the safety of the target belief; that is, RVE is no anti‐luck epistemology. Some of the most promising recent attempts to get around this problem are considered and shown to ultimately fail. Finally, a new proposal for defending RVE as a kind of anti‐luck epistemology is defended. The view developed here turns importantly on the idea that knowledge depends on ability and luck in a way that is gradient, not rigid, and that we know just when our cognitive success depends on ability not rather, but more so, than luck.