Saving Strawson: Evil and Strawsonian Accounts of Moral Responsibility

Almost everyone allows that conditions can obtain that exempt agents from moral responsibility—that someone is not a morally responsible agent if certain conditions obtain. In his seminal “Freedom and Resentment,” Peter Strawson denies that the truth of determinism globally exempts agents from moral responsibility. As has been noted elsewhere, Strawson appears committed to the surprising thesis that being an evil person is an exempting condition. Less often noted is the fact that various Strawsonians—philosophers sympathetic with Strawson’s account of moral responsibility—at least appear to have difficulty incorporating evil persons into their accounts of moral responsibility. In what follows, I argue that Strawson is not committed to supposing that being evil is an exempting condition—at least, that he can allow that evil persons are morally responsible agents.     

Teaching Critical Thinking without (Much) Writing: Multiple‐Choice and Metacognition

In this essay, I explore an exam format that pairs multiple‐choice questions with required rationales. In a space adjacent to each multiple‐choice question, students explain why or how they arrived at the answer they selected. This exercise builds the critical thinking skill known as metacognition, thinking about thinking, into an exam that also engages students in the methods of the academic study of religion by asking them to compare familiar excerpts and images. As a form of assessment, the exam provides a record of students' knowledge and their thought processes, and as a learning strategy, it encourages students to examine the thought processes they use to understand religion(s) and its many manifestations.     

Future‐Bias: A (Qualified) Defense

The preferences of ordinary folks typically display a future‐bias. For instance, we care more about pains and pleasures in our future than pains and pleasures in our past. Indeed, this future‐bias is so pervasive, many have taken it for granted that the preferences of rational agents will, or at least can, display this future‐bias to some degree or other. However, the rationality of future‐biased preferences has recently come in for critique. However, in this article, I offer a defense of future‐biased preferences against three recent attempts – offered by David Brink, Preston Greene and Meghan Sullivan, and Tom Dougherty – to show such preferences irrational.     

Navigating Bereavement With Spirituality‐Based Interventions: Implications for Non‐Faith‐Based Counselors

The relationship between spirituality and bereavement has been studied in a multitude of disciplines, yet there is a significant gap in the counseling literature on this topic. The authors explore how spirituality is often avoided in secular counseling settings, discuss adverse effects of unresolved grief on clients' functioning, and propose the concept that spirituality can be used to help clients through the bereavement process. Finally, the authors offer research and clinically based interventions that counselors, particularly those who do not identify as faith‐based, can use to incorporate spirituality into their work with bereaved clients.     

Displaced Feeling: A (Partial) Phenomenological Study

This is a partial phenomenological study of a phenomenon that I call “displaced feeling”, which is best illustrated through a concrete example. I am overcome by a strong desire to stop writing. For one reason or another, I reject the possibility of pursuing this desire. Instead of giving up the desire altogether, however, I may “speak to myself” as follows: “I feel like having a coffee” and, the chatter goes on in the background “of course to make coffee means to stop writing”. I endorse the desire to get a cup of coffee. But the action through which I pursue this desire is coloured not by the feeling that anticipates the value associated with drinking coffee but by a feeling that anticipates the value associated with stopping writing. The latter feeling has displaced the former: I am in a state of displaced feeling. Here, I will elucidate two invariant structures of displaced feeling. First, I will show that displaced feeling involves the realisation of an endorsed state of affairs, the bringing about of a rejected state of affairs, and the belief that the former will determine the latter. Next, I will show that the endorsed state of affairs appears prominently as the end of an intention (or projection), that the rejected state of affairs appears inconspicuously in the horizon of the same intention, and that the belief appears twice: (1) as a motive for this intention and (2) as the “glue” that keeps its prominent and inconspicuous zones together.     

Self‐Esteem: A Human Solution to the Problem of Death

Terror management theory (TMT) posits that the need for self‐esteem develops out of the socialization process in which children learn to abide by parental and, eventually, societal standards of ‘goodness’ to feel securely embedded in a cultural belief system. According to TMT, feeling safely immersed in a meaningful conception of reality (i.e., the cultural worldview) ultimately functions to protect people from anxiety due to the uniquely human capacity to be cognizant of their eventual death. After presenting the basic tenets of this perspective, we review several lines of research supporting it and then address some common questions and criticisms of the theory such as how is a TMT view of anxiety consistent with evolutionary principles, why do people commit suicide, and how is self‐esteem pursued in non‐Western, self‐effacing cultures? Finally, we discuss some implications of TMT for understanding social problems and for pursuing meaning and self‐esteem in healthier, more socially productive ways.     

Robust Virtue Epistemology As Anti‐Luck Epistemology: A New Solution

Robust Virtue Epistemology (RVE) maintains that knowledge is achieved just when an agent gets to the truth through, or because of, the manifestation of intellectual virtue or ability. A notorious objection to the view is that the satisfaction of the virtue condition will be insufficient to ensure the safety of the target belief; that is, RVE is no anti‐luck epistemology. Some of the most promising recent attempts to get around this problem are considered and shown to ultimately fail. Finally, a new proposal for defending RVE as a kind of anti‐luck epistemology is defended. The view developed here turns importantly on the idea that knowledge depends on ability and luck in a way that is gradient, not rigid, and that we know just when our cognitive success depends on ability not rather, but more so, than luck.     

Addressing Value‐Based Conflicts Within the Counseling Relationship: A Decision‐Making Model

A growing number of legal and ethical cases have involved value conflicts between counselors, or counselors‐in‐training, and their clients. The authors examine considerations that professional counselors are encouraged to take into account when value conflicts arise within the therapeutic relationship. The authors present a strategy known as ethical bracketing and the Counselor Values‐Based Conflict Model as tools to use when facing conflicts that arise between personal and professional values.     

解决现代西方伦理危机的实践哲学进路

现代西方伦理危机的实质是道德个体主义与道德共识的冲突.如何解决这一矛盾已成为解决现代西方伦理危机的核心课题.对此,西方新旧自由主义和共同体主义都给出了较具代表性的回答.然而,要真正解决问题还应到马克思的实践哲学中寻找答案.在马克思实践哲学的视域内,道德个体主义与道德共识的冲突源于人本体论存在的矛盾,这种矛盾只有在现实的实践活动中才能解决.所以,实践哲学进路是解决现代西方伦理危机的现实之路.     

Camp Invention®: A Creative,Inquiry‐Based Summer Enrichment Program for Elementary Students

Camp Invention® is a hands‐on creativity and science day camp run in partnership with more than 400 schools nationwide. The curriculum integrates science, history, mathematics, the arts, and fun — promoting creative learning and teamwork through interactive activities. In 2001, the Center for Creative Learning conducted an extensive nationwide evaluation of the camp's effectiveness and impact, surveying 17,526 participants, including campers, parents, and staff. The results strongly supported the positive impact of Camp Invention, for both girls and boys in urban and suburban settings, on attitudes towards creativity, active learning, and exploration. Camp Invention's innovative curriculum blends many important aspects of science and invention with the challenge of stimulating children's creativity and imagination.     

A Reason‐Based Theory of Rational Choice *

There is a surprising disconnect between formal rational choice theory and philosophical work on reasons. The one is silent on the role of reasons in rational choices, the other rarely engages with the formal models of decision problems used by social scientists. To bridge this gap, we propose a new, reason‐based theory of rational choice. At its core is an account of preference formation, according to which an agent’s preferences are determined by his or her motivating reasons, together with a ‘weighing relation’ between different combinations of reasons. By explaining how someone’s preferences may vary with changes in his or her motivating reasons, our theory illuminates the relationship between deliberation about reasons and rational choices. Although primarily positive, the theory can also help us think about how those preferences and choices ought to respond to normative reasons.