Moral Beliefs,Isolation from Peers,and Abstention from Delinquency

Criminological research has established that the vast majority of young people engage in some level of delinquency and drug use during the period of adolescence. Thus young people who completely refrain from delinquency and drug use are atypical and, as such, are deserving of scientific scrutiny. Perhaps because they have been impressed by the statistical abnormality of delinquency abstention, some researchers have explained this behavior in terms of the characterological abnormality of abstainers, arguing that abstention may be less the result of positive characteristics (such as strong moral beliefs) than the result of pathological traits that serve to isolate abstainers from their peers. In this study, data from a large survey of adolescents are used to help assess the respective roles of moral beliefs and peer isolation in delinquency abstention. The findings challenge certain previous interpretations of delinquency abstention and shed additional light on the forces that help to sustain adolescent conformity. The findings also raise intriguing questions about the stigma attached to delinquency abstainers.     

Public Option Versus the Market: Perceived Value Violations Drive Opposition to Healthcare Reform

The debate over healthcare reform in the United States has been divisive. Research demonstrates that beliefs that policy beneficiaries violate values strongly predict opposition to these policies. Similar dynamics may be happening regarding opposition to healthcare reform. Specifically, this study tested the hypothesis that opposition to a public option in healthcare reform results from stereotypes that public‐option beneficiaries violate values. In two studies utilizing three samples, beliefs about beneficiaries violating values of hard work consistently predicted opposition to a public option and an alternative market‐based healthcare reform plan, often proposed by public‐option opponents. Results also suggest that assertions that a public option would lead to bigger government increases opposition to a public option by indirectly masking underlying stereotypes about value violations.     

The Role of Cognitive Style in the Link Between Genes and Political Ideology

There is growing interest in how genes affect political beliefs. To better understand the role of genes in politics, we examine the relationship between cognitive style (the need for cognition, the need for cognitive closure) and various measures of political attitudes (issue‐based ideology, identity‐based ideology, social ideology, economic ideology, authoritarianism, and egalitarianism). We show, for the first time, that the need for cognition and the need for cognitive closure are heritable and are linked to political ideology primarily, perhaps solely, because of shared genetic influences; these links are stronger for social than economic ideology. Although prior research demonstrated that Openness to Experience shares genetic variance with political ideology, we find that these measures of cognitive style account for distinct genetic variance in political ideology. Moreover, the genetic Openness‐ideology link is fully accounted for by the need for cognition. This combination of findings provides a clearer understanding of the role of genes in political beliefs and suggests new directions for research on Big Five personality traits and ideology.     

Harmful Ideas,The Structure and Consequences of Anti‐Semitic Beliefs in Poland

The harmfulness of anti‐Semitic beliefs is widely discussed in current political and legal debates (e.g., Cutler v. Dorn). At the same time, empirical studies of the psychological consequences of such beliefs are scarce. The present research is an attempt to explore the structure of contemporary anti‐Semitic beliefs in Poland—and to evaluate their predictive role in discriminatory intentions and behavior targeting Jews. Another aim was to determine dispositional, situational, and identity correlates of different forms of anti‐Semitic beliefs and behavior. Study 1, performed on a nation‐wide representative sample of Polish adults (N = 979), suggests a three‐factorial structure of anti‐Semitic beliefs, consisting of: (1) belief in Jewish conspiracy, (2) traditional religious anti‐Judaic beliefs, and (3) secondary anti‐Semitic beliefs, focusing on Holocaust commemoration. Of these three beliefs, belief in Jewish conspiracy was the closest antecedent of anti‐Semitic behavioral intentions. Study 2 (N = 600 Internet users in Poland) confirmed the three‐factor structure of anti‐Semitic beliefs and proved that these beliefs explain actual behavior toward Jews in monetary donations. Both studies show that anti‐Semitic beliefs are related to authoritarian personality characteristics, victimhood‐based social identity, and relative deprivation.     

Wild Analysis in Politics

This commentary provides a critical discussion of Crouse and Stalker's (2007) attempt to psychoanalyze right‐wing authoritarian beliefs. The psychological inventory used by Crouse and Stalker for this purpose, The Right‐Wing Authoritarian Scale (Altemeyer, 1998), has dubious validity characteristics, and the conclusions reached by Crouse and Stalker regarding the origins and characteristics of right‐wing political beliefs and attitudes may be more reflective of the authors' political prejudices than of a serious psychoanalytic study of different personality structures. In the present article, the author demonstrates not only the flaws associated with the measuring instrument used, but also the left‐wing biases in the Crouse and Stalker analysis. Unfortunately, these prejudices against individuals with conservative political beliefs may be extensively present in the psychology and psychoanalytic communities and serve neither an appropriate clinical nor scientific purpose.     

Engagement With Self‐Practice/Self‐Reflection as a Professional Development Activity: The Role of Therapist Beliefs

A number of research studies support self‐practice/self‐reflection (SP/SR) as an experiential learning process that facilitates the acquisition of therapeutic skill in a number of cognitive‐behavioural therapy (CBT) competencies and as showing potential as a valuable professional development activity. Engaging therapists to participate in SP/SR programmes is sometimes difficult, and when they are offered the option to participate in SP/SR programmes as part of professional development, relatively few volunteer. This study investigates the role of therapist beliefs about SP/SR as a potential obstacle to engagement. An online survey was developed to assess the strength of 14 commonly held therapist beliefs concerning the consequences of participating voluntarily in a SP/SR programme. Participants were a combined sample of 44 Psychological Wellbeing Practitioners and high‐intensity CBT therapists employed by an Improving Access to Psychological Therapies service in the United Kingdom. Few negative beliefs about SP/SR emerged. The majority of respondents believed SP/SR programmes were relevant to their work situation, but perceived “lack of time” as a significant barrier to participation. Three factors are considered in relation to introducing SP/SR as a workforce professional development activity: (a) The importance of managing therapist perceptions regarding time; (b) SP/SR as a mechanism to increase self‐care and reduce burnout; and (c) The need to focus mental health services' attention on the potential of SP/SR programmes to increase staff morale and improve service delivery.     

Different Religions,Different Politics? Religion and Political Attitudes in Argentina and Chile

Various theories attempt to explain political outcomes. One of the most bitterly contested schools of explanation deals with culture, attitudes, and values. In the broadest sense, this tradition argues that political and social outcomes are determined in large part by the shared beliefs and values of the populace or a subgroup thereof. Thus, Stephen White (1984) has defined political culture as “historically formed beliefs and behavior,” recognizing that one's political attitudes and behavior are usually formed by inherited values as well as life experience. Moreover, scholars of political culture expect continuity of values over time and therefore are intrigued by cases of changing beliefs and attitudes. Thus, the explosive growth of evangelical and Pentecostal Protestantism in Latin America, where Protestants have grown from a handful to 20–30 percent of the population in a single generation, provides a unique opportunity for study. This rapid shift to Protestantism and its consequences for democracy have been fiercely debated in recent years. Max Weber's Protestant ethic thesis suggests that Protestantism may provide a catalyst for the establishment of democratic norms. However, many contemporary scholars argue that evangelical Protestantism is conservative, authoritarian, and politically passive. Do different religions result in different political attitudes? Does religious devotion, as distinguished from denomination, affect one's politics? This article evaluates political attitudes among Protestants and Catholics in Argentina and Chile to examine the claims of recent political culture arguments that modern Latin American Protestantism is resistant to democratic values. Survey data indicate that religious intensity (“devout‐ness”), rather than religious affiliation, does influence political attitudes, and that demographic and political engagement variables also influence democratic values.     

Social psychology of Making Poverty History: Motivating anti‐poverty action in Australia

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) represent the first global, tractable effort to combat world poverty and preventable disease. The success of the MDGs, however, depends critically upon the support of the people who do not themselves experience the disadvantage: That is, the people and governments of developed countries. In this paper it is argued that the solution to combating poverty and preventable disease in developing nations lies in creating sufficient political will among people in developed countries such as Australia. The authors draw on social psychological insights to explore ways to inspire social and political action in support of the anti‐poverty cause. Taking a social identity perspective, the role is reviewed of three key variables in promoting anti‐poverty action: (a) the presence of meaningful social identities that prescribe action, (b) motivating group emotions, and (c) group efficacy beliefs. A method is described that crystallises these three elements to boost commitment to the anti‐poverty cause. The paper concludes by arguing for the importance of meaningful group memberships in motivating social and political action to make poverty history for people in developing countries.     

Physiological Arousal and Political Beliefs

It is by now well known that political attitudes can be affected by emotions. Most earlier studies have focused on emotions generated by some political event (e.g., terrorism or increased immigration). However, the methods used in previous efforts have made it difficult to untangle the various causal pathways that might link emotions to political beliefs. In contrast, we focus on emotions incidental (i.e., irrelevant) to the decision process, allowing us to cleanly trace and estimate the effect of experimentally induced anxiety on political beliefs. Further, we build upon innovative new work that links physiological reactivity (Hatemi, McDermott, Eaves, Kendler, & Neale, 2013; Oxley et al., 2008a) to attitudes by using skin conductance reactivity as a measure of emotional arousal. We found that anxiety—generated by a video stimulus—significantly affected physiological arousal as measured by tonic skin‐conductance levels, and that higher physiological reactivity predicted more anti‐immigration attitudes. We show that physiological reactivity mediated the relationship between anxiety and political attitudes.     

Parents' child‐rearing values and beliefs in the United States and Russia: the impact of culture and social class

Parents' values for their children and their beliefs about appropriate child‐rearing practices contribute to the ways in which they try to shape their children's development. This paper examines the values and beliefs of 71 parents (37 mothers and 34 fathers) from two cities in the United States and Russia. Half of the families were middle class (determined by education and occupation criteria) and half were working class. The results revealed no cross‐societal differences in value for self‐direction in the children; perhaps reflecting the recent economic and ideological changes in Russia. In contrast, significant social class differences, for both mothers and fathers, were found in child‐rearing values and beliefs. Middle class parents in both societies were more likely to value self‐direction and believe that children should have freedom in and around the home, whereas working class parents were more likely to believe that children should be expected to conform to rules. The results of this study underscore the role of within‐society heterogeneity, as a function of social class, in parents' values and beliefs about child‐rearing.     

Task complexity,student perceptions of vocabulary learning in EFL,and task performance

Background. The study deepened our understanding of how students’ self‐efficacy beliefs contribute to the context of teaching English as a foreign language in the framework of cognitive mediational paradigm at a fine‐tuned task‐specific level. Aim. The aim was to examine the relationship among task complexity, self‐efficacy beliefs, domain‐related prior knowledge, learning strategy use, and task performance as they were applied to English vocabulary learning from reading tasks. Sample. Participants were 120 second‐year university students (mean age 21) from a Chinese university. Method. This experiment had two conditions (simple/complex). A vocabulary level test was first conducted to measure participants’ prior knowledge of English vocabulary. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of the learning tasks. Participants were administered task booklets together with the self‐efficacy scales, measures of learning strategy use, and post‐tests. Data obtained were submitted to multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) and path analysis. Results. Results from the MANOVA model showed a significant effect of vocabulary level on self‐efficacy beliefs, learning strategy use, and task performance. Task complexity showed no significant effect; however, an interaction effect between vocabulary level and task complexity emerged. Results from the path analysis showed self‐efficacy beliefs had an indirect effect on performance. Our results highlighted the mediating role of self‐efficacy beliefs and learning strategy use. Conclusions. Our findings indicate that students’ prior knowledge plays a crucial role on both self‐efficacy beliefs and task performance, and the predictive power of self‐efficacy on task performance may lie in its association with learning strategy use.     

An Investigation of the Determinants of Stigmatization and Prejudice Toward People Living With HIV/AIDS

The components and determinants of HIV/AIDS stigma and prejudice were investigated in an online‐questionnaire study. The results show that the components of the attitude toward people with HIV/AIDS consist of social distance, demands for political measures, negative stereotypes, and attribution of responsibility to people living with HIV/AIDS. Besides antigay attitudes and false beliefs about ways of infection, the HIV/AIDS attitude is connected to and depends on social dominance orientation (SDO) and right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA). Structural equation modeling indicated that antigay attitudes and false beliefs function as mediator variables for SDO and RWA. Implications of the results are discussed.     

Going to political extremes in response to boredom

Boredom makes people attempt to re‐establish a sense of meaningfulness. Political ideologies, and in particular the adherence to left‐ versus right‐wing beliefs, can serve as a source of meaning. Accordingly, we tested the hypothesis that boredom is associated with a stronger adherence to left‐ versus right‐wing beliefs, resulting in more extreme political orientations. Study 1 demonstrates that experimentally induced boredom leads to more extreme political orientations. Study 2 indicates that people who become easily bored with their environment adhere to more extreme ends of a political spectrum compared with their less easily bored counterparts. Finally, Study 3 reveals that the relatively extreme political orientations among those who are easily bored can be attributed to their enhanced search for meaning. Overall, our research suggests that extreme political orientations are, in part, a function of boredom's existential qualities.     

Optimism and realism: A review of self‐efficacy from a cross‐cultural perspective

T his review critically examines much of the research investigating self‐efficacy beliefs through cross‐cultural comparisons. Two sets of cross‐cultural comparison groups are examined: Asian (or immigrant Asian) versus Western, and Eastern European versus Western European and American groups. After an introduction to self‐efficacy theory, some cross‐cultural aspects of self and self‐beliefs are discussed, and the cultural dimensions of individualism and collectivism are introduced. Analysis of the articles focuses on differences in levels of efficacy beliefs, calibration of beliefs with performance, methodological problems, and implications for practice. Almost all of the 20 studies reviewed found efficacy beliefs to be lower for non‐Western cultural groups, but in some cases these lower beliefs were more predictive of subsequent functioning. There is some evidence that the mean efficacy beliefs of a cultural group are modified through immigration or political changes. For some non‐Western groups, collective efficacy appears to operate in much the same way as self‐efficacy operates for Western groups. Realistic—as opposed to optimistic—efficacy beliefs do not necessarily predict poor performance for all cultural groups, as has been suggested by self‐efficacy theory. Only a minority of the studies included measurement of cultural dimensions such as individualism and collectivism, although most of the studies based conclusions on assumed cultural differences. In some cases, self‐efficacy was poorly defined and bore little resemblance to theoretically derived definitions. Conclusions from this research have implications especially for applied settings in education and business: Efficacy beliefs and performance appear to be enhanced when training approaches are congruent with the individual's sense of self. Lower levels of self‐efficacy beliefs found in some collectivist groups do not always signify lower subsequent performance, but are instead reflective of differing construals of self.     

Self-Interest, Economic Beliefs, and Political Party Preference in New Zealand

This study explored the associations among income level, economic beliefs, and political party preference in terms of self-interest and ideological theories of party preference. Results from a survey of 487 New Zealand voters showed that the income levels and economic beliefs of supporters of the four major parties were organized along a single dimension: ACT supporters had the highest income and strongest neoliberal economic beliefs, followed closely by National supporters, whereas Alliance supporters had the lowest income and strongest welfare-state economic beliefs, followed by Labour supporters. However, the prediction of party preference from income and economic beliefs showed a different pattern: Income significantly predicted support for ACT, National, and Alliance; economic beliefs had the strongest influence on National and Labour support; and economic beliefs interacted with income to influence ACT and National support, but not Labour and Alliance support. The results suggest that voters who have gained or lost the most from the implementation of neoliberal policies—in this case, those with the highest and lowest incomes (i.e., ACT and Alliance supporters), respectively—form political party preference mainly from economic self-interest, whereas middle-income voters (i.e., National and Labour supporters) form party preference from ideological congruence. Moreover, higher status individuals may be more likely to use ideology to express self-interested motivation.     

Personal and Professional Discord: Examining Religious Conservatism and Lesbian‐, Gay‐, and Bisexual‐Affirmative Counselor Competence

Lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) orientations can evoke strong reactions that are often based on personal beliefs that seemingly conflict with professional standards calling for LGB‐affirmative counseling. This study examined the relationship between religious conservatism and LGB‐affirmative counselor competence. Controlling for education level, political conservatism, and LGB interpersonal contact, the results indicate that, as religious conservatism increased, LGB competency significantly decreased. The strongest predictor of LGB‐affirmative counselor competency was religious fundamentalism, whereas multicultural course work was not a significant predictor.     

Individual Differences in Commitment to Value‐Based Beliefs and the Amplification of Perceived Belief Dissimilarity Effects

The commitment to beliefs (CTB) framework (Maxwell‐Smith & Esses, 2012) proposes that there are individual differences in the extent to which people generally follow beliefs that are a reflection of their values. The current research hypothesized that CTB would amplify the effects of perceived belief dissimilarity or incompatibility, such that individuals higher in CTB would display more pronounced reactions to belief‐relevant groups, events, or individuals seen as incompatible with their value‐based beliefs. We tested our hypothesis in three studies that assessed participants' CTB and their perceptions of belief dissimilarity or incompatibility with regard to other religious groups (Study 1), political parties during a national election (Study 2), and their romantic partner (Study 3). CTB amplified the effects of perceived belief dissimilarity or incompatibility on people's biases toward other religious groups, voting intentions and behavior in a national election, and their evaluative and behavioral responses toward their romantic partner. These results collectively suggest that perceptions of belief dissimilarity or incompatibility are particularly important cues for individuals with higher levels of CTB as they encounter other people or events that are relevant to their beliefs.     

It's only a dream if you wake up: Young adults' achievement expectations,opportunities, and meritocratic beliefs

The present paper examines university graduates' beliefs about how meritocratic socioeconomic status (SES) attainment in U.S. society is for themselves (merit agency beliefs) and for most other people (merit societal beliefs), and how these distinct beliefs are differentially associated with labour market experiences and achievement‐goal attitudes and expectations in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Data from a 10‐month longitudinal study of 217 graduates from the 2013 class of a large public U.S. university were analysed using multilevel modelling. The results indicate that most participants optimistically expected to attain upward social mobility. Furthermore, participants' merit agency beliefs were reflective of their labour market prospects and experiences, and calibrated their achievement‐goal attitudes and expectations. However, participants' merit societal beliefs were not associated with these labour market experiences and achievement‐goal attitudes and expectations. The distinction between merit agency beliefs and merit societal beliefs may be motivationally beneficial by allowing individuals to continue striving toward the uncertain long‐term goal pursuit of upward social mobility despite the short‐term struggles and setbacks many young adults are likely to experience in the aftermath of the Great Recession.     

The intergenerational transmission of ethnic essentialism: how parents talk counts the most

The present study analyzed the role of parents as potential sources of children's essentialist beliefs about ethnicity. We tested 76 parent–child (5‐year‐olds) dyads of Jewish Israeli parents from three social groups, defined by the kindergartens children attended: national religious, secular, or Jewish‐Arab integrated. We assessed parents' and children's beliefs, and parents' usage of ethnic attitudinal and categorization markers in a book‐reading activity. Overall, national religious parents manifested the strongest ethnic essentialism and endorsement of anti‐negotiations with Palestinians, and were the most likely to express negative attitudes and mark ethnic categories in their conversations with their children. Moreover, regression analyses revealed that ethnic categorization in parents' speech was the most reliable predictor of children's ethnic essentialism. Ethnic essentialism is transmitted to children not via explicit communication of intergroup beliefs or attitudes, but rather via the sheer marking of categories in ways that resonate with children's own intuitive ways of conceptualizing the social world.     

Symbolic Politics and the Prediction of Attitudes Toward Federal Regulation of Reduced‐Exposure Tobacco Products1

The present study relies on symbolic politics theory to predict public attitudes toward the federal regulation of conventional tobacco products (a familiar attitude object) and reduced‐exposure tobacco products (a relatively novel attitude object). We predicted that attitudes toward most forms of regulation would be more strongly influenced by symbolic beliefs about the role of government in society than by self‐interested concerns, with the exception of taxation. We predicted that the financial consequences of taxation policies would be less ambiguous for those who are affected, resulting in a stronger relationship between self‐interest and policy attitudes. The results strongly supported our hypotheses, suggesting a process by which symbolic beliefs and self‐interested concerns influence attitude formation. Theoretical and policy implications are discussed.