The Feeling Theory of Emotion and the Object‐Directed Emotions

Abstract: The ‘feeling theory of emotion’ holds that emotions are to be identified with feelings. An objection commonly made to that theory of emotion has it that emotions cannot be feelings only, as emotions have intentional objects. Jack does not just feel fear, but he feels fear‐of‐something. To explain this property of emotion we will have to ascribe to emotion a representational structure, and feelings do not have the sought after representational structure. In this paper I seek to defend the feeling theory of emotion against the challenge from the object‐directed emotions.     

Emotion in Schizophrenia: Where Feeling Meets Thinking

Our understanding of the nature of emotional difficulties in schizophrenia has been greatly enhanced by translational research over the past two decades. By incorporating methods and theories from affective science, researchers have been able to discover that people with schizophrenia exhibit very few outward displays of emotion but report experiencing strong feelings in the presence of emotionally evocative stimuli or events. Recent behavioral, psychophysiological, and brain imaging research has pointed to the importance of considering the time course of emotion in schizophrenia. This work has shown that people with schizophrenia have the ability to experience emotion in the moment; however, they appear to have difficulties when anticipating future pleasurable experiences, and this perhaps affects their motivation to have such experiences. While advancements in our understanding of emotional experience and expression in individuals with schizophrenia have been made, these developments have led to a new collection of research questions directed at understanding the time course of emotion in schizophrenia, including the role of memory and anticipation in motivated behavior, translating laboratory findings to the development of new assessment tools and new treatments targeting emotional impairments in people with this disorder.     

Towards a Theory of Oppression

Despite the concern with oppressive systems and practices there have been few attempts to analyse the general concept of oppression. Recently, Iris Marion Young has argued that it is not possible to analyse oppression as a unitary moral category. Rather, the term 'oppression' refers to several distinct structures, namely, exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. This paper rejects Young's claim and advances a general theory of oppression. Drawing insight from American chattel slavery and the situation of the German Jews during the 1930's, I argue that to be oppressed is to be unjustly denied the opportunity for what I call 'resilient autonomy'. I argue that all instances of oppression can usefully be analysed in these terms. I test my analysis against each of Young's five structures of oppression, concluding that in each case they are captured by my analysis.     

Hooked on a Feeling: Russia's Annexation of Crimea Through the Lens of Emotion

This article tests the plausibility of an affect-centered framework for foreign policy analysis, using the 2014 annexation of Crimea as an illustrative case. It identifies questions left open by prevailing accounts based on international relations theory and shows how a supplementary conceptual lens can improve existing explanations. The affective perspective suggests that the Russian president deemed intervention in Ukraine without alternative. Otherwise, Russia would have surrendered any claim to relevance in European security. More saliently, the ouster of Yanukovych, as a possible precedent for Russia, frightened Putin and increased his resolve to take action. Also, contrary to the interpretation of the annexation as an improvised reaction to a political crisis, evidence suggests that the Russian elite welcomed the opportunity to break free from uncomfortable partnership dynamics with the West.     

Towards a Theory of Social Dynamics

(Résumé) Vers Une Théorie de la Dynamique Sociale

On considère la théorie pratique (“field theory”) basée sur la philosophie organismique de la biologie, la méthode hypothétique-déductive, et le langage des constructs comme l'approche la plus juste à une psychologie sociale scientifique. L'auteur examine diverses théories de la psychologie sociale et ne trouve aucunes qui satisfassent les critères qu'il a établis pour une approche théorique-pratique. Il définit ensuite le champ social et discute les variantes dynamiques topologiques et non-mesurées dans sa structure. Les concepts de région, fluidité, limite, barrière, caractère de membre (“membership character”), et direction de tension premièrement employés par K. Lewin pour la psychologie individuelle sont appliqués aux problèmes sociologiques et sociaux-psychologiques. Le problème d'une “foule” qui devient une “multitude désordonnée” est sujeté à une analyse théorique-pratique. On conclut que la méthode serait également applicable à d'autres problèmes sociaux-psychologiques et que les groupes sociaux peuvent ětre traités selon la méthode théorique-pratique. On suggère que cette approche pourrait fournir une psychologie sociale de valeur scientifique.

Brown

(Referat) NACH EINER THEORIE DER SOZIALEN DYNAMIK HIN

Eine Feldtheorie, die auf die organismische Philosophie der Biologie, die hypothetisch-deduktive Methode, und auf die Sprache der Konstrukte gegründet ist, wird als die gültigste Annährung an die wissenschaftlich-soziale Psychologie betractet. Der Autor untersuch die verschiedenen Theorien der sozialen Psychologie und findet keine, welche die Kriterien erfüllt, die er zur feldtheoretischen Annährung aufgestellt hat. Er definiert dann das soziale Feld und bespricht die topologischen und nichtmetrischen dynamischen Varianten in seinem Aufbau. Die Begriffe von Gebiet, Flüssigkeit, Grenze, Barriere, Zugehörigkeit, und Spannung, die zuerst von K. Lewin für individuelle Psychologie gebraucht waren, werden auf soziologische und sozial-psychologische Probleme angewandt. Das Problem des Uebergangs von einer Menge Leute zu einem “Mob” wird einer feldtheoretischen Untersuchung unterworfen. Es wird gefolgert, dass die Methode sich ebensogut auf andere Probleme anwenden lässt und dass soziale Gruppen feldtheoretisch behandelt werden dürften. Es wird vorgeschlagen, dass eine solche Annährung eine wissenschaftlich gülitige soziale Psychologie verschaffen könnte.

Brown     

情绪调节内隐态度对个体情绪调节的影响

研究使用内隐联结测验,序列递减任务以及中国情绪图片系统(CAPS)中的情绪图片为实验材料,比较了负性情绪诱发情境下,不同情绪调节内隐态度个体的情绪体验差异.研究结果表明,对情绪调节持积极内隐态度的个体,在负性情绪诱发情境下,会自动化的调节和控制自己的情绪;而对情绪调节持消极内隐态度的个体,则未对自已的情绪进行自动化的控制和调节.     

Towards a Theory of Toys and Toy-Play

The distinction between toys and games is built into grammar itself: one plays games but plays with toys. Although some thinkers have recognized the importance of the distinction, their insights are often contradictory and vague, and the word toy is used unsystematically to refer to a wide range of objects and associated play-activities. To remedy this problem a phenomenological approach to play could be helpful, but those that exist rarely discuss the difference between forms of play, instead using playfulness as ambiguous shorthand for freedom from rules. Beginning with Charles Baudelaire’s 1853 essay, “The Philosophy of Toys,” the author surveys and synthesizes various theories of toys to produce a detailed account of those objects that conduce to toy-play, focusing on insignificance as the defining phenomenological quality of toys. He then uses speech act theory to offer a definition of a toy—an invitation to play with its identity—and explores how the existence of such an invitation depends not only on the intrinsic qualities of the object of play, but also its context and the identity of the player.     

Towards a Theory of Reflexive Intentional Systems

(1) Intentional system: a system whose behaviour we may reliably predict via the intentional strategy, i.e., by interpreting its behaviour as a (more or less) rational consequence of its beliefs and desires. (2) Reflexive intentional system: a system that is able to interpret itself via the intentional strategy, and whose behaviour is, thus, influenced by an understanding of itself. All intentional systems behave in a meaningful way, but only reflexive intentional systems are aware of the meaning, Hence, only the latter are conscious of what they are doing.     

Towards a Critical Theory of Transnational Justice

This paper argues for a conception of transnational justice that provides an alternative to globalist and statist views. In light of an analysis of the transnational context of justice, a critical theory is suggested that addresses the multiple relations of injustice and domination to be found in this context. Based on a universal, individual right to reciprocal and general justification, this theory argues for justifiable social and political relations both within and between states. In both of these contexts, it distinguishes between minimal and maximal justice and stresses the interdependence of domestic and transnational justice. On both levels, minimal justice calls for a discursive structure of justification, whereas maximal justice implies a fully justified basic social structure.     

Towards a Cognitive Theory of Cyber Deception

This work is an initial step toward developing a cognitive theory of cyber deception. While widely studied, the psychology of deception has largely focused on physical cues of deception. Given that present-day communication among humans is largely electronic, we focus on the cyber domain where physical cues are unavailable and for which there is less psychological research. To improve cyber defense, researchers have used signaling theory to extended algorithms developed for the optimal allocation of limited defense resources by using deceptive signals to trick the human mind. However, the algorithms are designed to protect against adversaries that make perfectly rational decisions. In behavioral experiments using an abstract cybersecurity game (i.e., Insider Attack Game), we examined human decision-making when paired against the defense algorithm. We developed an instance-based learning (IBL) model of an attacker using the Adaptive Control of Thought-Rational (ACT-R) cognitive architecture to investigate how humans make decisions under deception in cyber-attack scenarios. Our results show that the defense algorithm is more effective at reducing the probability of attack and protecting assets when using deceptive signaling, compared to no signaling, but is less effective than predicted against a perfectly rational adversary. Also, the IBL model replicates human attack decisions accurately. The IBL model shows how human decisions arise from experience, and how memory retrieval dynamics can give rise to cognitive biases, such as confirmation bias. The implications of these findings are discussed in the perspective of informing theories of deception and designing more effective signaling schemes that consider human bounded rationality.     

具身的情绪：情绪研究的新范式

在计算机隐喻的影响下,认知加工情绪理论成为现代情绪理论的主要支柱。计算机隐喻陷入困境后,具身认知的观点逐渐被人们接纳,具身认知在情绪研究中的应用——具身的情绪可以解除情绪研究的传统局限,摆脱情绪非心即身的两难选择,从而开启了情绪研究的新范式。     

迈向新的“全球生命伦理学”

导　　言第四届国际生命伦理学大会的召开是一件盛事 ,能够成为开幕式上的几位基调发言者之一 ,我感到非常荣幸。1 995年 ,东亚生命伦理学学会 (ＥＡＡＢ ,1 997年更名为亚洲生命伦理学学会 ,简称ＡＢＡ)在北京成立。协会的成立基于这样一个共识 :东亚的生命伦理学研究虽然在很