试论当代宗教哲学的历史背景和主要论域

本文不仅尖锐地提出了在后休谟-康德时代,特别是在后逻辑实证主义时代,宗教哲学是否能够继中世纪和近代"再次成为哲学的可以承认的分支学科"的问题,而且从"现代经验主义的英美哲学传统"的理论维度描述了当代宗教哲学产生和存在的"历史背景",并对当代宗教哲学的主要论域,如"上帝的本性"、"宗教语言"、"对有神论的辩护"、"宗教经验"及"恶的问题"等,作了颇具特色的概述.     

Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization (in the Philosophy of Religion)

In replying to certain objections to the existence of God, Robert Adams, Bruce Langtry, and Peter van Inwagen assume that God can appropriately choose a suboptimal world, a world less good than some other world God could have chosen. A number of philosophers, such as Michael Slote and Klaas Kraay, claim that these theistic replies are therefore committed to the claim that satisficing can be appropriate. Kraay argues that this commitment is a significant liability. I argue, however, that the relevant defenses of theism are committed to the appropriateness of, not satisficing, but motivated submaximization. When one submaximizes with motivation, one aims at the optimum but accepts the good enough because of a countervailing consideration. When one satisfices, one aims at the good enough and chooses the good enough because it realizes her aim at the good enough. While commitment to the appropriateness of satisficing may be a significant liability, commitment to the appropriateness of motivated submaximization is not.     

Risk and Religion: Toward a Theology of Risk Taking

Historically the concept of risk is rooted in Renaissance lifestyles, in which autonomous agents such as sailors, warriors, and tradesmen ventured upon dangerous enterprises. Thus, the concept of risk inseparably combines objective reality (nature) and social construction (culture): Risk = Danger + Venture. Mathematical probability theory was constructed in this social climate in order to provide a quantitative risk assessment in the face of indeterminate futures. Thus we have the famous formula: Risk = Probability (of events) × the Size (of future harms). Because the concept of harm is always observer relative, however, risk assessment cannot be purely quantitative. This leads to the question, What are the general conditions under which risks can be accepted? There is, after all, a difference between incurring a risk and bearing the costs of risks selected for by other agencies. Against this background, contours of a theology of risk emerge. If God creates a self‐organizing world of relatively autonomous agents, and if self‐organization is favored by cooperative networks of autopoietic processes, then the theological hypothesis of a risk‐taking God is at least initially plausible. Moreover, according to the Christian idea of incarnation, God is not only taking a risk but is also bearing the risks implied by the openness of creation. I thus argue for a twofold divine kenosis—in creation as well as in redemption. I discuss some objections to this view, including the serious counterargument that risk taking on behalf of others remains, even for God, a morally dubious task. What are the conditions under which the notion of a risk‐taking God can be affirmed without leaving us with the picture of God as an arbitrary, cosmic tyrant? And what are the practical implications for the ways in which human agents of faith, hope, and love can learn to cope with the risks of everyday life and of political decisions?     

Religion,Theology and Science: A Reformational Dooyeweerdian Approach

The most discussed (and applied) approaches to the relationship between religion and science seem to be basically four: opposition, independence, dialogue and integration. Only a few authors take into account the reformational approach that finds its roots in the work of Abraham Kuyper, Herman Dooyeweerd and others. This model may be described by the formula “inner reformation.” A historical and systematic introduction to this approach is hereby provided by sketching its understanding of the nature of (and relationships among) science, theology and religion. In the process, the originality and value of this approach to the relationship between religion and science are highlighted.     

Robert Cummings Neville,Defining Religion: Essays in Philosophy of Religion

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Revelation between Cognitive Science of Religion and Dialectical Theology

Abstract

The article critically discusses the contemporary relevance and challenges of Rudolf Bultmann's theology of revelation in relation to the basic claims of cognitive science of religion. Underlying the analysis is the assumption that his theology still has some relevance when confronted with the claims from this scientific approach to religion. There are nevertheless also good reasons for arguing that his notion of revelation needs a wider and more experiential focus. The argument for such an experiential-based notion of revelation is provided by an analysis of what features qualified revelatory experience may consist in.     

The Future of Philosophy of Religion

This paper develops proposals for the future of philosophy of religion as a global discipline by replying to the responses to Philosophy and the Study of Religions from Andrew Irvine, J. Aaron Simmons, and James McLachlan.