What Are You Really Saying? Associations between Shyness and Verbal Irony Comprehension

Verbal irony exploits the ambiguity inherent in language by using the discrepancy between a speaker's intended meaning and the literal meaning of his or her words to achieve social goals. Irony provides a window into children's developing pragmatic competence. Yet, little research exists on individual differences that may disrupt this understanding. For example, verbal irony may challenge shy children, who tend to interpret ambiguous stimuli as being threatening and who have difficulty mentalizing in social contexts. We examined whether shyness is related to the interpretation of ironic statements. Ninety‐nine children (8–12 year olds) listened to stories wherein one character made either a literal or ironic criticism or a literal or ironic compliment. Children appraised the speaker's belief and communicative intention. Shyness was assessed using self‐report measures of social anxiety symptoms and shy negative affect. Shyness was not related to children's comprehension of the counterfactual nature of ironic statements. However, shyness was related to children's ratings of speaker meanness for ironic statements. Thus, although not related to the understanding that speakers intended to communicate their true beliefs, shyness was related to children's construal of the social meaning of irony. Such subtle differences in language interpretation may underlie some of the social difficulties facing shy children. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Three Quines

This paper concerns Quine's stance on the issue of meaning normativity. I argue that three distinct and not obviously compatible positions on meaning normativity can be extracted from his philosophy of language - eliminative ]naturalism (Quine I), deflationary pragmatism (Quine II), and (restricted) strong normativism (Quine III) - which result from Quine's failure to separate adequately four different questions that surround the issue: the reality, source, sense, and scope of the normative dimension. In addition to the incompatibility of the views taken together, I argue on the basis of considerations due to Wittgenstein, Dummett, and Davidson that each view taken separately has self-standing problems. The first two fail to appreciate the ineliminability of the strong normativity of logic and so face a dilemma: they either smuggle it in illicitly, or insofar as they do not, fail to give an account of anything like a language. The third position's mixture of a universalism about logical concepts with a thorough-going relativism about non-logical concepts can be challenged once a distinction is drawn between the universalist and contextualist readings of strong normativity, a distinction inspired by Wittgenstein's distinction between grammatical and empirical judgements.     

Predictors and Outcomes of Experiences Deemed Religious: A Longitudinal Investigation

The two studies reported here revised Hunt's (1972) LAM (Literal, Anti-Literal, Mythological) Scale to include a Metaphorical dimension. The first study investigated the relationship between preference for literal versus metaphorical interpretations of religious language and structural levels of religious thinking. As predicted, participants who preferred a literal interpretation of religious statements gave evidence of a low developed structure of religious judgment. The predicted relationship between preference for metaphorical interpretations and style of religious thinking was not found. The second study compared samples of participants scoring highest on the Literal and the Metaphorical subscales. Literal participants scored lower on imaginative thinking and made greater use of religious language in an objectifying manner than did metaphorical participants. The meaning of these data for mature religious thinking is considered.     

Children's Developing Intuitions About the Truth Conditions and Implications of Novel Generics Versus Quantified Statements

Generic statements express generalizations about categories and present a unique semantic profile that is distinct from quantified statements. This paper reports two studies examining the development of children's intuitions about the semantics of generics and how they differ from statements quantified by all, most, and some. Results reveal that, like adults, preschoolers (a) recognize that generics have flexible truth conditions and are capable of representing a wide range of prevalence levels; and (b) interpret novel generics as having near‐universal prevalence implications. Results further show that by age 4, children are beginning to differentiate the meaning of generics and quantified statements; however, even 7‐ to 11‐year‐olds are not adultlike in their intuitions about the meaning of most‐quantified statements. Overall, these studies suggest that by preschool, children interpret generics in much the same way that adults do; however, mastery of the semantics of quantified statements follows a more protracted course.     

Tarski ‐ a dilemma

Tarski's correspondence theory of truth (which he spells out in his semantic conception of truth) is open to two interpretations. This ambiguity in the theory has led philosophers to find support in it for metaphysical reali sm. In fact, Tarski's theory turns out to support a form of ontological relativism. In different passages Tarski himself gives support to each of these interpretations. The first interpretation leads to ontological relativism, while the second sacrifices the connection between language and the world. I clarify the dilemma that I see in having to choose between these two interpretations, explain how these interpretations have their source in different problems which occupied Tarski, and consider a possible solution to the dilemma. Finally, finding good reasons to claim that Tarski's theory is indeed a correspondence theory of truth, I argue in favour of the first interpretation with its relativistic implications.     

The social-psychological study of conflict: Rejoinder to a critique

This paper is a rejoinder to Plon's critique of the social psychology of conflict published in this Journal. The rejoinder reviews the history of American social psychology, the meaning of ‘conflict resolution’, the nature of the dilemma in the Prisoner's Dilemma, and other related matters, which Plon has apparently misconstrued. The rejoinder criticizes Plon's crude ‘economic determinism’ version of Marxist theory and briefly considers the role of power in politics. The characteristics of the present author's social-psychological approach to conflict is outlined, and it is suggested that such an approach has direct relevance to the intellectual concerns of those who seek to bring about social change.     

Necessity and Language: In Defence of Conventionalism

Kalhat has forcefully criticised Wittgenstein's linguistic or conventionalist account of logical necessity, drawing partly on Waismann and Quine. I defend conventionalism against the charge that it cannot do justice to the truth of necessary propositions, renders them unacceptably arbitrary or reduces them to metalingustic statements. At the same time, I try to reconcile Wittgenstein's claim that necessary propositions are constitutive of meaning with the logical positivists’ claim that they are true by virtue of meaning. Explaining necessary propositions by reference to linguistic conventions does not reduce modal to non‐modal notions, but it avoids metaphysical accounts, which are incapable of explaining how we can have a priori knowledge of necessity.     

Male Sex Bias against Men and Women in Various Professions

Abstract

It is suggested that the popularity of the Rokeach Value Survey is undeserved and that the apparent independence of each value being measured is a consequence of the fact that the survey measures each value quite badly. For each of the 18 terminal values on the Rokeach Value Survey, various interpretations were suggested to 71 subjects, who indicated which interpretations represented their thoughts when they were completing the survey. There were a variety of interpretations. When a factor analysis of the correlations among all the interpretations of each value was carried out, all but one value had more than one significant factor (dimension of meaning), and two major factors accounted for 41% of the variance of all the interpretations. These results indicate that the Rokeach Value Survey is not a good measure of the relative desirability of different values, and they support the view that people's evaluations of the world may be based on more fundamental values.     

Social-psychological reflections on religious changes in Ghana

Religious symbols are primarily significant because they draw people into relationships. Drawing on actor-network theory the paper demonstrates that symbols are hybrids of beliefs, cognitive interpretations, ritual performances and relational networks. The significance of symbols is located in this middle ground, as they mediate between thought and action, as well as between interpretative meaning and relational practice. Aesthetic experiences and ritual performance are interwoven with cognitive meaning and representation to generate the impact of religious symbols. This understanding of symbols is illustrated through an ethnographic account of a Pagan ritual involving the deity Baphomet. One of the participants describes this ritual succinctly: ‘Baphomet is a recreation of the Witches’ sabbat, an invocation of archetypal Witchcraft. It's R-rated, it contains adult themes, nudity and sex references.’ Through ritual experiences, religious symbols change the way people feel about themselves, the world and the people around them.     

Habermas and Dummett: Beyond Dogmatism and Scepticism

In this article I suggest a way of overcoming the traditional dichotomy between analytic and continental philosophy by pointing at some similarities between apparently disparate philosophical approaches, viz. those of Michael Dummett and Jürgen Habermas. The comparison revolves around the so-called 'paradox of analysis', which poses a dilemma concerning philosophical propositions: these are allegedly shown to be either trivial or unsecured. Both Dummett and Habermas offer ways out of the dilemma, through recognition of the intersection of analysis with life. A transcendentally characterized conception of language is conceived by both as the only way to overcome the haunting objective m subjective distinction. Thus they offer fresh insights into the nature of meaning and truth, and the place these occupy within philosophical systems. Both philosophers take the notions of justification and procedural rationality to be primary in the order of philosophical explanation. Meaning is not conceived in terms of representation and truth conditions, but in terms of validity claims. Truth is not viewed as independent and static, but as historically conditioned and constantly unfolding. As a result, even the statements of logic, and certainly those of philosophy, find a place between the alleged emptiness of analyticity and the robust empirical character of science. This common ground represents, I believe, one of the new faces of post-analytic m and hence also post-continental m philosophy. Parts of it are shared by other contemporary philosophers, such as Derrida and Brandom. What marks this new Weltanschauung is the way it surpasses the current eliminativist trends in philosophy.     

Larger reward values alone are not enough to entice more cooperation

Two experiments using an iterated prisoner's dilemma game examined under which conditions participants' cooperation rates would either change due to monetary value changes (e.g., 3 cents to 3 dollars) or not change due to numeric value changes (e.g., 3 dollars to 300 cents). A total of 102 university students played the game against a computer that employed one of four strategies across blocks. Results showed high rates of cooperation when participants played against a tit-for-tat strategy and low rates of cooperation against a random strategy. There was no change in cooperation rates due to changes in numeric value alone and a decrease in cooperation rates when large monetary values were at stake. Cooperation rates were higher and cooperation responses slower at earlier stages of the game. I argue that people's ability to strategize plays a key role in the changing rates and speed of cooperative behaviour in the prisoner's dilemma.     

Tho Press Release: Symbolic Communication In Life History Interviewing

ABSTRACT This study describes and analyzes the apparently misleading, irrelevant, and sterotyped initial self-report statements that were obtained in an in-depth multiple case study of women changing careers Using assumptions from the fields of hermeneutics (interpretation) and phenomenology about how meaning is constructed and interpreted, these initial accounts are understood as symbols which can be decoded and can also reveal larger meaning when read in different contexts This study shows how these accounts concealed connections between current behavior and personal history and prevented appropnate refer-ence to personal expenence. The reasons for these distortions are understood by placing them in a sociocultural context These women's initial accounts are interpreted as a response to their perceived violation of cultural mandates preventing development of work roles The damaged symbolic language they used to explain themselves is seen as an example of mistaken cultural assumptions about the “self” The demonstrated necessity of interpreting these initial accounts as symbolic communication alerts researchers relying on self-report statements to the pitfalls of taking such statements at face value     

Attributionism and Counterfactual Robustness

In this journal (AJP 2016), Vishnu Sridharan presents a novel objection to attributionism, the view according to which agents are responsible for their conduct when it reflects who they are or what they value. The key to Sridharan's objection is that agents can fulfil all attributionist conditions for responsibility while being under the control of a manipulator. In this paper, we show that Sridharan's objection falls prey to a dilemma—either his manipulator is counterfactually robust, or she is not—and that neither of its horns undermines attributionism.     

The Disenchantment of Nonsense: Understanding Wittgenstein's Tractatus

This paper aims to argue against the resolute reading, and offer a correct way of reading Wittgenstein's Tractatus. According to the resolute reading, nonsense can neither say nor show anything. The Tractatus does not advance any theory of meaning, nor does it adopt the notion of using signs in contravention of logical syntax. Its sentences, except a few constituting the frame, are all nonsensical. Its aim is merely to liberate nonsense utterers from nonsense. I argue that these points are either not distinctive from standard interpretations or incorrect. Instead, the Tractarian elucidations help to shed light on the nature of language and logic, and introduce the correct method in philosophy. Philosophy deals with philosophical utterances and Tractarian elucidations by pointing out that they are nonsensical. By doing this, one is helped to see that what they appear to be saying is shown by significant propositions saying something else.     

The Problem of das Man—A Simmelian Solution

Current interpretations of Heidegger's notion of das Man are caught in a dilemma: either they cannot accommodate the ontological status Heidegger accords it or they cannot explain his negative evaluation of it, in which it is treated as ontic. This paper uses Simmel's agonistic account of human sociality to integrate the ontological and the ontic, indeed perjorative aspects of Heidegger's account. Section I introduces the general problem, breaks the exclusive link of Heidegger's account to Kierkegaard and delineates the general form of a solution. Section II then sketches Simmel's conception of sociology and sociality. Section III determines what Heidegger is trying to do in Chapter Four of Division I in Being and Time in order to formulate a strictly ontological account of das Man. Section IV uses Simmel's account of sociality to build into this ontological account an inherent tendency to display the negative features Heidegger ascribes to das Man. In conclusion, section V points to how the proposed account of das Man intimates the character of fundamental ontology as nascently a form of critical theory. It also explains the extent to which Heidegger's perjorative characterisations of das Man and the Man-selbst are legitimate.     

Vygotsky versus Dewey on mental causation: The core of two divergent conceptions of human thought

The developmental psychologies of Dewey and Vygotsky are often brought together, or even assimilated, by contemporary constructivist and social constructivist theories, including sociocultural approaches. These theories broadly subscribe to the naturalistic philosophical paradigm dominating educational research. Nevertheless, they are incompatible, as expressed from the outset in their antagonistic conceptions of the relationship between human development and biological evolution. This article proposes a comparative analysis of the meaning of key concepts such as sign, meaning, mind, consciousness, will, personality or freedom in Dewey's and Vygotsky's texts, and contrasts their respective interpretations of human choice and the mind-body problem. On this basis, the fundamental issue of mental causation appears at the core of the divergences between Dewey and Vygotsky's theories of human thought.     

Kant on Truth-Aptness

Many scholars claimed that, according to Immanuel Kant, some judgements lack a truth-value: analytic judgements, judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience, judgements of perception, and non-assertoric judgements. However, no one has undertaken an extensive examination of the textual evidence for those claims.

Based on an analysis of Kant's texts, I argue that: ? according to Kant, only judgements of perception are not truth-apt. All other judgements are truth-apt, including analytic judgements and judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience.

? Kant sometimes states that truth-apt judgements are actual bearers of truth or falsity only when they are taken to state what is actually the case. Kant calls these judgements assertoric. Other texts ascribe truth and falsity to judgements, regardless of whether they are assertoric.

Kant's views on truth-aptness raise challenges for correspondentist and coherentist interpretations of Kant's theory of truth; they rule out the identification of Kant's crucial notion of objective validity with truth-aptness; and they imply that Kant was not a verificationist about truth or meaning.     

No Place to Hide: When Shame Causes Proselfs to Cooperate

Shame is considered a social emotion with action tendencies that elicit socially beneficial behavior. Yet, unlike other social emotions, prior experimental studies do not indicate that incidental shame boosts prosocial behavior. Based on the affect as information theory, we hypothesize that incidental feelings of shame can increase cooperation, but only for self-interested individuals, and only in a context where shame is relevant with regards to its action tendency. To test this hypothesis, cooperation levels are compared between a simultaneous prisoner's dilemma (where “defect” may result from multiple motives) and a sequential prisoner's dilemma (where “second player defect” is the result of intentional greediness). As hypothesized, shame positively affected proselfs in a sequential prisoner's dilemma. Hence ashamed proselfs become inclined to cooperate when they believe they have no way to hide their greediness, and not necessarily because they want to make up for earlier wrong-doing.     

Satisfaction with Spirituality, Satisfaction with Religion and Personal Well-Being among Spanish Adolescents and Young University Students

Young people in Catalonia are studied in order to better understand differences between satisfaction with spirituality and satisfaction with religion. Results suggest a reactive position on the part of most Spanish youngsters towards traditional religion; they consider it not very important either for their well-being or to give a sense of meaning to their own lives. While the importance given to spirituality is clearly higher, the concept seems to have several very different interpretations among young people. The discussion underlines the importance of discovering young people’s own points of view in order to understand the meaning they give to religion and spirituality in the context of an ever more rapidly changing society. The implications for future research and practice are discussed.