The Problem of Other Minds: Wittgenstein's Phenomenological Perspective

This paper discusses Wittgenstein's take on the problem of other minds. In opposition to certain widespread views that I collect under the heading of the “No Problem Interpretation,” I argue that Wittgenstein does address some problem of other minds. However, Wittgenstein's problem is not the traditional epistemological problem of other minds; rather, it is more reminiscent of the issue of intersubjectivity as it emerges in the writings of phenomenologists such as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger. This is one sense in which Wittgenstein's perspective on other minds might be called “phenomenological.” Yet there is another sense as well, in that Wittgenstein's positive views on this issue resemble the views defended by phenomenologists. The key to a proper philosophical grasp of intersubjectivity, on both views, lies in rethinking the mind. If we conceive of minds as essentially embodied we can understand how intersubjectivity is possible.     

从现象学角度看佛教因明中的遮诠问题

笔者在此提出并尝试论证以下三个命题：其一,应当区分佛教因明中与为他比量相关的“遮诠”方法以及可以运用在整个量论领域的“遮遣”方法。具体地说,“遮诠”只是“遮遣”的一种,即专指运用于概念语言领域的遮遣方法。其二,现象学本质直观思想的提出,消解了量论中现量与比量的严格区分,并可以导致对感知、思维、判断、推理、自相、共相、概念、语词等范畴的重新理解。其三,表诠一遮诠方法、连同整个因明,在中国佛教史上乃至在整个佛教史上始终发展不兴,很大原因在于它们被人为地限定在语言层面。     

The Problem of Temporal Order in Stimulation and Perception

A nonrandom socioeconomically homogeneous convenience sample of 150 young adolescent mothers, 260 older adolescent mothers, and 242 older mothers was analyzed according to their standing on key determinants of parenting. The results of a discriminant analysis showed that the young teen mothers differed from the older mothers in terms of knowledge of child development, punitive attitudes toward childrearing, and level of depression. Accuracy of classification was improved with the discriminant function for younger and older mothers, but decreased by 20% for older adolescents.     

Sartre and Fanon: The Phenomenological Problem of Shame and the Experience of Race

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that existing accounts of shame are incomplete in so far as they don’t take account of the problem of shame. This is the problem concerning the possibility of a primary experience of shame. It is the problem Sartre considers under the terms of a “primitive shame” or shame “in its primary structure” that grounds other more complex experiences of shame. This problem is centred on the tension between shame as an immediate, pre-reflective experience and the requirement that shame must involve an awareness of some definitive aspect of the self. I’m going to suggest, correlatively, how by trying to resolve this problem we end up with a more nuanced understanding of shame. In the second part of the paper, I go on to look at how this new interpretation of shame helps us understand race. Looking at Fanon, I explore how a fundamental and overlooked ineffability in our relation to others impacts upon responses to racialized shame.     

The Phenomenological Failure of Groundwork III

Henry Allison and Paul Guyer have recently offered interpretations of Kant's argument in Groundwork III. These interpretations share this premise: the argument moves from a non-moral, theoretical premise to a moral conclusion, and the failure of the argument is a failure to make this jump from the non-moral to the moral. This characterization both of the nature of the argument and its failure is flawed. Consider instead the possibility that in Groundwork III, Kant is struggling toward something rather different from this, not trying to pull the moral rabbit out of the theoretical hat, but instead seeking a proto-phenomenological grounding of morality: a grounding that begins from first personal felt experiences that already possess moral content, and proceeds to its further practical claims via attentive reflection on these felt experiences. This paper brings this assumption to our reading of Groundwork III, showing that in doing so we acquire a deeper appreciation both of the argument, and the reasons it fails. Kant's argument is practical throughout. And the failure of the argument is the failure of Kant's nascent efforts to provide a new, phenomenological method for the grounding of practical philosophy.     

Logos and Logoi Ensarkos: Christology and a Problem of Perception

Abstract:  The question of how we perceive objects remains a highly mysterious issue. One particular problem is how the primary perceivable properties of objects relate to their secondary properties, in particular how secondary properties can equally be true of objects. John Locke offered two possibilities: dispositionalism and divine action. Unfortunately, both fail to relate primary and secondary properties in the object. In this article I argue that the means to overcome this disjunction is christological – by interpreting objects in their primary and secondary properties as existing in ontological derivation from the Christ who eternally will become incarnate.     

Perception,Memory, and Duration: The Binding Problem and the Synthesis of the Past

Theories of perception and of memory are closely allied. The binding problem (which considers how bits of perception are reassembled by the brain) leads to neurophysiological subjectivism. This could be outflanked by arguing with Bergson that perceiving consciousness is out in the world. Thus the brain would bind only behavioral “maps.” In turn, consciousness would retain our personal pasts. Such personal (episodic) memories both help us to recognize present objects and to perform creative acts. Memory, although retentive, is also creative. This is important in rethinking biological and evolutionary memory.     

The Phenomenological Approach to Art Therapy

The present paper discusses the phenomenological approach to art-therapy and suggests an operational terminology for its main theoretical concepts. First we present the general assumptions that underline art therapy. Definitions, leading approaches, and the therapeutic effect of artwork are considered. Next we indicate the need for relevant and particular theories of art therapy. Phenomenological theory is examined as a case in point because of its popularity among art therapists. Despite its philosophical appeal, however, we find phenomenological theory lacking the operational terminology that is essential to form a coherent and distinct school of therapy. In the present paper, we extract from phenomenological theory operational principles, which can be followed and applied by art therapists. In this analysis, we take into consideration Betensky's pioneer attempt to create the bridge between phenomenological theory as applied in verbal psychotherapy and art therapy. We end by discussing the urgent need to operationalize other verbal psychotherapeutic theories so they are relevant for art-therapy practice and may help create greater similarities among art therapists of the same school of psychotherapy.     

The Phenomenological Treatment of Dissociative Identity Disorder

Phenomenological treatment of dissociative identity disorder involves (a) the demystification of dissociation, (b) the breakdown of amnesic barriers, and (c) the integration of alter conscious states. While standard treatment presupposes an understanding of the adaptive role of dissociation in mitigating childhood trauma, phenomenological method entails suspension of judgments about the patient's historical existence, bracketing of clinical theory, and cultivation of a neutralized as if consciousness. This strategy facilitates a therapist's ability to imaginatively enter and creatively fashion a resolution of the dissociative drama enacted by hypnotically susceptible patients. A case study exemplifies successful treatment of a notorious multiple personality for whom standard treatment was ineffective.     

The Competitive Perception

This paper aims to define what competitive perception is. Using Dufrenne's phenomenological analysis of the art spectator's experience, namely the concept of aesthetic perception, I will claim that it is useful to apply this phenomenological approach to the experience of watching sport events. I will argue that the concepts of uncertainty and auto teleology, being two main features in sport competition, are helpful to define competitive perception.     

The Value of Perception

This paper develops a form of transcendental naïve realism. According to naïve realism, veridical perceptual experiences are essentially relational. According to transcendental naïve realism, the naïve realist theory of perception is not just one theory of perception amongst others, to be established as an inference to the best explanation and assessed on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis that weighs performance along a number of different dimensions: for instance, fidelity to appearances, simplicity, systematicity, fit with scientific theories, and so on. Rather, naïve realism enjoys a special status in debates in the philosophy of perception because it represents part of the transcendental project of explaining how it is possible that perceptual experience has the distinctive characteristics it does. One of the potentially most interesting prospects of adopting a transcendental attitude towards naïve realism is that it promises to make the naïve realist theory of perception, in some sense, immune to falsification. This paper develops a modest form of transcendental naïve realism modelled loosely on the account of the reactive attitudes provided by Strawson in ‘Freedom and Resentment’, and suggests one way of understanding the claim that naïve realism is immune to falsification.     

Perception vs. Inner Sense: A Problem about Direct Awareness

Philosophical Studies -