Excusing Economic Envy: On Injustice and Impotence

From the Ancient Greeks, through medieval Christian doctrine, and into the modern age, philosophers have long held envy to be irrational, a position that increasingly accompanies the political view that envy is not a justification for redistributing material goods. After defining the features of envy, and considering two arguments in favour of its irrationality, this article opposes the dominant philosophical and political consensus. It does so by deploying Rawls's much‐ignored concept of ‘excusable envy’ to identify a form of envy that is not imprudent and does not mis‐describe. With this work completed, the article then argues – no doubt controversially – that excusable envy constitutes good grounds for redistribution or inequality‐mitigation. In so doing, the article throws light on the moral significance of certain forms of uncivil disobedience, and also offers a new vocabulary for popular ‘politics of envy’ debates, which are yet to acknowledge the role of social institutions in reproducing envy‐excusing economic inequalities.     

Episodic Envy

Episodic envy, the unpleasant emotion resulting from a specific negative social comparison, is discussed. A new measure designed to assess it is developed, validated, and cross-validated in 3 studies. The implications of episodic envy are also examined. Results show that episodic envy is composed of a feeling component and a comparison component; and is different from unfairness, admiration, and competition. The feeling component is strongly correlated with negative emotional reactions (anxiety, depression, negative mood, hostility) and behavioral reactions (e.g., harming the other, creating a negative work atmosphere) to envy. The comparison component is correlated with behaviors intended to improve one's position in the organization. Episodic envy predicts reactions to envy above and beyond dispositional envy.     

Envy and difference

This paper explores five examples of envy, examining the similarities and differences between the clinical situations. The theory relating to envy is extensively reviewed and a critique of the Kleinian position is offered, suggesting that the aversion to separation and difference is not only prior to, but also has explanatory precedence over, the functioning of envy. Kleinian examples are explored in this light. The experience of separateness and difference is understood to lead to a number of outcomes: envy, admiration, competitiveness, a sense of low self-esteem and inadequacy, or a fear of being envied. It is argued that the individual's particular personality organization and their associated relational pattern will determine their experience of envy. Examples of schizoid, borderline, narcissistic and hysteric functioning in relation to envy are examined in some depth. The link between these phenomena and the death instinct is touched on.     

Envy and us

Within emotion theory, envy is generally portrayed as an antisocial emotion because the relation between the envier and the rival is thought to be purely antagonistic. This paper resists this view by arguing that envy presupposes a sense of us. First, we claim that hostile envy is triggered by the envier's sense of impotence combined with her perception that an equality principle has been violated. Second, we introduce the notion of “hetero‐induced self‐conscious emotions” by focusing on the paradigmatic cases of being ashamed or proud of somebody else. We describe envy as a hetero‐induced self‐conscious emotion by arguing (a) that the impotence felt by the subject grounds the emotion's self‐reflexivity and (b) that the rival impacts the subject's self‐assessment because the rival is framed by the subject as an in‐group member. Finally, we elaborate on the asset at stake in envy. We contend that this is esteem recognition: The envier covets the esteem that her reference group accords to the rival. Because, in envy, the subject conceives of herself as member of a group to which the other is also understood to belong, we conclude that envy is a social emotion insofar as it presupposes a sense of us.     

Antecedents of Envy Reaction

Antecedents of envy were studied in a multivariate design by means of a semi-projective questionnaire depicting stories of the differential fates of two heroes. Thirty Ss participated. The results supported the predictions that the content and intensity of satisfaction of the other, as well as background information about the heroes describing the “requirements of justice” for both of them, were systematically related to the intensity of envy reaction. Theoretical implications are discussed, mainly relating to Heider's Cognitive Balance Theory.     

Envy: Further thoughts

Urges toward the good may be hidden in bad acts. A case in point is envy, which is often motivated by desire for the good. Its ill effects can be counteracted by this realization.Ann Belford Ulanov, M.Div., Ph.D., is Christiane Brooks Johnson Professor of Psychiatry and Religion at Union Theological Seminary in New York, a psychoanalyst in private practice, and Co-Editor of theJournal of Religion and Health.     

Jealousy in Relation to Envy

The conceptions of jealousy used by philosophical writers are various, and, this paper suggests, largely inadequate. In particular, the difference between jealousy and envy has not yet been plausibly specified. This paper surveys some past analyses of this distinction and addresses problems with them, before proposing its own positive account of jealousy, developed from an idea of Leila Tov-Ruach(a.k.a. A. O. Rorty). Three conditions for being jealous are proposed and it is shownhow each of them helps to tell the emotion apart from some distinct species of envy.It is acknowledged that the referents of the two terms are, to some extent, overlapping,but shown how this overlap is justified by the psychologies of the respective emotions.     

Envy and Generosity Between Co-Therapists

This paper explores the dynamics of envy and generosity between co-therapists. Generally speaking, co-therapists can be drawn into the same social comparisons (overt and covert), competitiveness, and envy as their group members. The list of valued resources can include the group's affection, appreciation, and recognition, or, more generally, one's status, popularity, creativity, sensitivity, understanding, or parental functioning. The group in turn, will sometimes tend to divide the therapists into the good one and the bad one in order to serve its own developmental needs. This process can increase the tension between the therapists, and feed their envy. I present an argument for processing those feelings and assert that awareness of co-therapist envy can promote the expression of generosity and enhance the capacity of group members for similar experiences. Clinical material will be presented to demonstrate how this works.     

The Moral Value of Envy

It is common to think that we would be morally better people if we never felt envy. Recently, some philosophers have rejected this conclusion by arguing that envy can often be directed toward unfairness or inequality. As such, they conclude that we should not suppress our feelings of envy. I argue, however, that these defenses only show that envy is sometimes morally permissible. In order to show that we would not be better off without envy, we must show how envy is not merely morally permissible, but morally valuable. Here I provide a defense of envy's moral value. I argue that feelings of envy are integral to the value that moral agents place on the goods and talents that they judge to be central to a worthwhile life.     

La Caze on Envy and Resentment

Abstract

Marguerite La Caze has recently published a stimulating analysis of the emotions of envy and resentment in which she argues that to envy others for a benefit they have received or to resent them for such a reason can be ethically acceptable in cases where that benefit has been unjustly obtained (La Caze, 2001). I question this on the ground that the judgement that the benefit has been unjustly obtained plays a more complex role in the structure of envy and resentment than La Caze allows and should alter the nature of the feeling that is evoked. From the perspective of virtue ethics there is nothing creditable about still feeling envy or resentment in such circumstances.     

Envy, identification, and pride

The constituents of the complex affective experience of envy are delineated, and defenses against each of these constituents are explored. Attention is then called to a common, variably adaptive, and socially approved means of obviating or coping with envious feelings, involving a partial identification and culminating in the conscious experience of "being proud of." A conjecture is made regarding the kind of pathology most likely to interfere with this mechanism.