Apology with and Without a Request for Forgiveness

The offender who desires to restore or maintain a relationship after a conflict apologises to his or her victim. Not only an individual but also a group can make apology. Groups do it through their representatives who are recognised as such by both sides. Sometimes offenders acknowledge wrongdoing and express regret for it. At other times while apologising, they may also ask for forgiveness. Does apology without a request for forgiveness mean the same as apology with such a request? Are there any cases where apology may be appropriate, but not a request for forgiveness? Do those who apologise without asking for forgiveness really not want to be forgiven? This article answers these questions by exploring the notion of apology and its relation to forgiveness.     

远离苏格拉底

在西方哲学的谱系中,苏格拉底可谓哲学精神的典范和化身,备受后人景仰。本文以阿里斯托芬对苏格拉底的喜剧刻划作为切入点,指出了远离苏格拉底的警告实际上从苏格拉底生前就一直伴随着对苏格拉底及其哲学精神的崇拜。通过对柏拉图《会饮》文本细节的分析,文章表明了《会饮》这篇对话生动体现了日神精神和酒神精神的紧张和互动,同时强调了哲学的危险始终与其崇高相伴随。     

Why the Non-Identity Problem Does Not Undermine our Obligations to the Future under Real-World Conditions

Philosophia - When Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons, examined whether the Non-Identity Problem could be solved with the Impersonal Total Principle, he assumed perfect equality in the future...     

Why Brains Are Not Computers,Why Behaviorism Is Not Satanism,and Why Dolphins Are Not Aquatic Apes

Modern psychology has, to all intents and purposes, become synonymous with cognitive psychology, with an emphasis on the idea that the brain is a form of computer, whose job is to take in sensory input, process information, and produce motor output. This places the brain at a remove from both the body and environment and denies the intimate connection that exists between them. As a result, a great injustice is done to both human and nonhuman animals: On the one hand, we fail to recognize the distinctive nature of nonhuman cognition, and on the other hand, we continue to promote a somewhat misleading view of human psychological capacities. Here, I suggest a more mutualistic, embodied, enactive view might allow us to ask more interesting questions about how animals of all kinds come to know their worlds, in ways that avoid the (inevitable) anthropocentric baggage of the cognitivist viewpoint.     

Why the Liar Does not Matter

This paper develops a classical model for our ordinary use of the truth predicate (1) that is able to address the liar's paradox and (2) that satisfies a very strong version of deflationism. Since the model is a classical in the sense that it has no truth value gaps, the model is able to address Tarski's indictment of our ordinary use of the predicate as inconsistent. Moreover, since it is able to address the liar's paradox, it responds to arguments against deflationism based upon that paradox alone. The model is based upon a notion of the complexity of propositions that a fixed set of speakers might express. A context-sensitive definition of the truth predicate is then provided based upon a class of possible worlds defined in terms of these speakers. Reasonable constraints on the memories and lifetimes of ordinary speakers are used to limit the set of propositions that they might express so that deflationist requirements are satisfied.     

Why Epistemic Contextualism Does Not Provide an Adequate Account of Knowledge: Comments on Barke

According to Antonia Barkes version of contextualism, epistemic contextualism, a context is defined by a method and its associated assumptions. The subject has to make the assumption that the method is adequate or reliable and that good working conditions hold in order to arrive at knowledge by employing the method. I will criticize Barkes claim that epistemic contextualism can provide a more satisfactory explanation or motivation for context shifts than conversational contextualism (in particular, David Lewiss contextualism). Two more points of criticizm will be presented, which are meant to show that epistemic contextualism presupposes epistemic internalism, and that (epistemic) contextualism leads to an implausible view about which parameters the special achievement that is constitutive of knowledge depends on. I suggest that, contra (epistemic) contextualism, knowledge is a more robust phenomenon that does not depend on whether anyone calls into question any assumptions or raises skeptical doubts in conversation or in his or her mind (as, for example, Fred Dretskes account says). I indicate how this can be reconciled with the phenomenon that knowledge attributions are somewhat unstable and seemingly context-dependent.     

Equality of Opportunity and Other-Affecting Choice: Why Luck Egalitarianism Does Not Require Brute Luck Equality

The luck egalitarian view famously maintains that inequalities in individuals’ circumstances are unfair or unjust, whereas inequalities traceable to individuals’ own responsible choices are fair or just. On this basis, the distinction between so-called brute luck and option luck has been seen as central to luck egalitarianism. Luck egalitarianism is interpreted, by advocates and opponents alike, as a view that condemns inequalities in brute luck but permits inequalities in option luck. It is also thought to be expressed in terms of the view that no individual ought to be worse off other than because of a fault or choice of his or her own. I argue that these two characterizations of luck egalitarianism are not equivalent and that, properly understood, luck egalitarianism is compatible with widespread, potentially radical, inequalities in brute luck.     

Why Gamers Are Not Performers

I argue that even if video games are interactive artworks, typical video games are not works for performance and players of video games do not perform these games in the sense in which a musician performs a musical composition (or actors a play, dancers a ballet, and so on). Even expert playings of video games for an audience fail to qualify as performances of those works. Some exemplary playings may qualify as independent “performance‐works,” but this tells us nothing about the ontology of video games or playings of them. The argument proceeds by clarifying the concepts of interactivity and work‐performance, drawing particularly on recent work by Dominic Lopes, Berys Gaut, and David Davies.     

Why Drug Testing in Elite Sport Does Not Work: Perceptual Deterrence Theory and the Role of Personal Moral Beliefs1

Performance‐enhancing drug use by elite athletes is a modern sporting and social concern. We applied a long‐overdue theoretical framework, perceptual deterrence, to predicting the banned drug‐use decisions of 116 elite Australian footballers and soccer players. The strongest influence on athletes' hypothetical decisions to use drugs was their personal moral beliefs and health concerns, each of which also mediated the relationship between drug testing and athletes' decisions to use banned substances. Drug testing had little influence on athletes' imagined drug use decisions, although there are athletes for whom legal sanctions are necessary. The results have important implications for the way in which authorities fund and frame future anti‐drug initiatives; particularly the relationship between drug testing and athletes' personal moral beliefs.     

Why Pains Are Not Mental Objects

Philosophical Studies -