A philosophical examination of coercion for mental health issues

This article considers two philosophical questions about coercion and mental disorders: (1) an analytical question, i.e., what is meant by the concept of coercion? (2) a normative question, i.e., what justifies the use of coercion? The article distinguishes between coercion from other forms of power such as inducement, persuasion, and authority. It then considers a range of arguments for the paternalistic use of coercion for the benefit of mentally disordered persons and the use of coercion to restrain mentally disordered dangerous persons. This article rests on the assumption that there is something to be said for an academic division of labour, that empirical research in mental health and the law can benefit from conceptual clarification and the analysis of normative arguments. In this article I distinguish between two importantly different sorts of questions that we can ask about coercion and then offer some answers to those questions in broad strokes.     

The threat of logical inversion and our need for philosophical attention: from thought-expression to discourse and discussion

Thought-expressions are not simply good; instead, they become good for us when they make sense, empower action, and support health. From time to time, we may need to (re)consider the difference between thought-expression and discourse, or thought-expression that really makes sense, and the difference between discourse and discussion, or a discourse-situation that makes genuine agreement or disagreement possible for us. In this essay, I explore a problem that D. Z. Phillips and Randy Ramal have termed “logical inversion,” and I argue that wherever logical inversions have gained a foothold in our thought-expressions, they threaten to render us incapable of authentic discourse and discussion by ensuring that we misunderstand the understandings of others such that we deceive ourselves and others by picturing the knowledge and truth of our perspective against an unreal background of conceivable falsehoods which we have falsely attributed to the perspectives of others. Where this has taken place, practices of philosophical attention and conceptual clarification are needed to help us move from a situation of endless thought expression toward authentic discourse and discussion.     

A rational approach to rational suicide.

Suicide is a reaction to internal and external sources of stress and the impact of life events. In the elderly these situations are prevalent in many who are not suicidal and instead choose life. They represent what may be called rational nonsuicide. They are far more frequent than rational suicide. Nevertheless, considerably more is written about rational suicide than its alternative. The reasons for this phenomenon are reviewed, and suggestions are made for a rational approach to the affirmation of life rather than its rejection, even to the very end.     

The perfect murder: A philosophical whodunit

In his Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit argues from the possibility of cases of fission and/or fusion of persons that one must reject identity as what matters for personal survival. Instead Parfit concludes that what matters is “psychological connectedness and/or continuity with the right kind of cause,” or what he calls an R-relation. In this paper, I argue that, if one accepts Parfit’s conclusion, one must accept that R-relations are what matter for moral responsibility as well. Unfortunately, it seems that accepting that the R-relation is what matters for both survival and moral responsibility leads to a contradiction. My goal, however, is not merely to point out a problem in Parfit’s account. Instead, I believe that once we understand the basic intuitions which lead to this contradiction, it is clear that there is no fully satisfactory way to account for what matters with respect to survival and moral responsibility.     

Inductive reasoning in psychometrics: A philosophical corrective

A brief historical overview of inductive logic is presented, and the logic of enumerative induction is discussed in its two generalized forms: rule-derivative and event-predictive. The psychometric tradition and experimental studies in induction are briefly recapitulated to indicate that they have not included event-predictive induction, that probabilities have not been prevalently included in rule-generative induction, and that the linguistic medium might be utilized more fully in the inductive area. An experimental test model designed in order to address these considerations is discussed. This test model of event-predictive induction in the linguistic medium was administered to a large sample of college graduates. Statistical characteristics of the tests and items were very satisfactory when compared to operational subtests. The theoretical significance of the study for future psychometric and experimental investigations in induction is discussed.     

Lottery judgments: A philosophical and experimental study

In this paper, we present the results of two surveys that investigate subjects’ judgments about what can be known or justifiably believed about lottery outcomes on the basis of statistical evidence, testimonial evidence, and “mixed” evidence, while considering possible anchoring and priming effects. We discuss these results in light of seven distinct hypotheses that capture various claims made by philosophers about lay people’s lottery judgments. We conclude by summarizing the main findings, pointing to future research, and comparing our findings to recent studies by Turri and Friedman.     

Target-directed visual attention is a prerequisite for action-specific perception

Witt et al. (2008) have recently shown that golfers who putt with more success perceive the hole to be bigger than golfers who putt with less success. In three experiments, we systematically examined whether this phenomenon, labelled action-specific perception, depends on directing visual attention towards the action target. In Experiment 1 we replicated previously reported action-specific effects on perception in golf putting. In 3 and 4 we directly assessed whether action-specific effects on perception in golf putting are dependent on focusing visual attention on the target. To this end, the participants performed the putting task while visual attention towards the target was either completely withheld (Experiment 2) or divided over the target and other task-relevant objects (Experiment 3). No action-specific effects were found when visual attention towards the action target was occluded or partially diverted from the target. Together, our results provide evidence to suggest that focusing visual attention on the target while performing the action is a prerequisite for the emergence of action-specific perception.