Thinking About Gender

I present a way of thinking about gender that I have found helpful in evaluating various proposed feminist projects. By considering gender and value as independent dimensions, relationships of “difference” can be more clearly perceived as involving relationships of lack, of complementarity, or of perversion. I illustrate the use of my gender/value “compass” with applications to questions of self-identity, rationality, and knowledge. This way of thinking about gender allows a conceptualization of feminism that neither erases nor emphasizes gender distinctions.     

对未来思考的思考

未来思考是前瞻性思考,旨在解决人生发展任务。人类的未来思考有多种类型。从是否具有现实性上来看,可以把未来思考分为两种主要形式：期望和幻想。幻想抑制动机和行为,但是,如果对幻想和不利现实因素进行心理对照,幻想就可以转变成执行性意图,这是因为心理对照过程能够产生美好未来和当前现实的同时通达。我们还探讨了习惯于不同自我监控思维模式的人对待时间、失败的人格差异,并提出了进一步的研究方向。     

Thinking About Thinking About Work: A Meta-Analysis of Off-Job Positive and Negative Work-Related Thoughts

Work is frequently on the minds of employees—even during evenings, weekends, and vacations. The present study is the first comprehensive meta-analysis of off-job work-related thoughts (WRTs; i.e., thoughts employees have about work when they are not at work). We were particularly interested in comparing off-job positive and negative work-related thoughts (PWRTs and NWRTs; i.e., thoughts about positive/negative work experiences or characteristics) to each other and other off-job WRT constructs, which we integrated into a typology. We coded 520 effect sizes from 171 independent samples (N = 58,682) and conducted a random-effects, individual-correction meta-analysis. We found that PWRTs and NWRTs were unrelated, and psychological detachment was negatively related to NWRTs but unrelated to PWRTs. Furthermore, PWRTs and NWRTs exhibited significantly different relationships with various antecedents (e.g., age, negative affectivity) and outcomes (e.g., work engagement, burnout). Compared to PWRTs and NWRTs, psychological detachment and problem-solving pondering exhibited generally weaker relationships with outcomes. NWRTs contaminated with negative affective strains (i.e., negative work-related thoughts and feelings) exhibited generally stronger relationships with outcomes. Overall, our meta-analytic findings indicate that PWRTs and NWRTs are different and underscore the importance of empirically and conceptually separating PWRTs and NWRTs from each other and other off-job WRT constructs. The findings also complement the nascent literature on interventions that target promoting PWRTs and reducing NWRTs.

     

More Thinking About Gender: Reply

Patricia Elliot distorts my work, in summarizing my position as one of advocating a revaluing of feminine qualities. After clarifying my position, I flesh out in greater detail my argument that complete gender neutrality is neither necessary nor sufficient for a non-sexist society. The argument focuses on gender as a cognitive category and on the crucial question of “how do we get there from here.”     

关于道德教育问题的思考

中国几千年来传诵的"不言利"的道德教育模式,不但忽视了作为人所需要的包括政治上、精神和物质上的一切权"利",而且从客观上还鼓励了某些人的道德沦丧,所以,只讲义务不讲权"利"的道德,决不能达到社会教化的目的.作为道德教育者必须从这一点出发,一方面使道德教育适应人的天性发展,另一方面在自爱和爱他的基础上发现那种高贵精神和思想的种子,从这样的人身上着手道德精神的重建.     

Thinking Creatively About Religion: Belief-Related Differences

Writers (Chisholm, 1996) and theorists (Fateux, 1995a, 1995b) have discussed the relationship between religion and creativity, however, until the present, empirical studies examining this relationship have not been done. The current study used a psychometric approach to investigate the relationships among religiosity, religious motivation and creative thought about religious issues for two different religious groups. Results showed few relationships between self-perceived religiosity, religious motivation and religious creative thought. A comparison between two religious populations showed that the Mormon group scored higher in religiosity and religious motivation, but lower in creativity than the non-Mormon group. Future studies need to expand this type of work to other religious groups, and focus more on gender and age-related differences related to religious creativity.     

Knowing How to Talk About What Cannot Be Said: Objectivity and Epistemic Locatedness

I take it that A. W. Moore is right when he said that ‘Wittgenstein was right: some things cannot be put into words. Moreover, some things that cannot be put into words are of the utmost philosophical importance’. There is, however, a constant threat of self-stultification whenever an attempt is made to put the ineffable into words. As Pamela Sue Anderson notes in Re-visioning gender in philosophy of religion: reason, love, and epistemic locatedness, certain recent approaches to ineffability—including Moore’s approach—attempt to find a ‘third way’ of engaging with it, which displaces the traditional dichotomy between the effable and the ineffable, that is, between what can be said and what cannot be said. In this way, they seek to overcome the threat of self-stultification mentioned above. Still, one important challenge to this kind of approach, which Moore addresses, is, as he puts it, ‘to show how it is possible’ to talk about the ineffable ‘without belying its very ineffability’. His solution to the problem of the ineffable takes the notion of ‘knowing how’ to play a central role, and is formulated in accordance with his commitments to truth and objectivity. A further important challenge to the kind of approach to the ineffable Moore proposes concerns the issue of objectivity. In Re-visioning gender in philosophy of religion, Anderson draws attention to our epistemic locatedness, which brings in questions concerning, for example, gender and culture. Pursuing this view, the challenge is to show ineffable insight without ignoring our epistemic locatedness and, in particular, the role of gender in the conceptualisation and imagery through which we seek to come to terms with the ineffable. My paper deals with these challenges. By engaging with Moore’s and Anderson’s discussions of the ineffable, I examine how it is possible to talk philosophically about the ineffable, without breaking a commitment to enlarged or objective thinking, and without ignoring the epistemic locatedness of thinking.     

Knowing The World By Knowing One's Mind

This paper addresses the question whetherintrospection plus externalism about mental contentwarrant an a priori refutation of external-worldskepticism and ontological solipsism. The suggestionis that if thought content is partly determined byaffairs in the environment and if we can havenon-empirical knowledge of our current thoughtcontents, we can, just by reflection, know about theworld around us – we can know that our environment ispopulated with content-determining entities. Afterexamining this type of transcendental argument anddiscussing various objections found in the literature,I argue that the notion of privileged self-knowledgeunderlying this argument presupposes that we canlearn, via introspection, that our so-called thoughtsare propositional attitudes rather than contentlessstates. If, however, externalism is correct andthought content consists in the systematic dependencyof internal states on relational properties, we cannotknow non-empirically whether or not we havepropositional attitudes. Self-knowledge (apropositional attitude) is consistent with us lackingthe ability to rule out, via introspection, thepossibility that we don't have any propositionalattitudes. Self-knowledge provides us with knowledgeof what is in our minds, but not that we haveminds. Hence, the combination of externalism with thedoctrine of privileged self-knowledge does not allowfor an a priori refutation of skepticism and istherefore unproblematic.