Opening a conceptual space for metamemory experience

The experiences associated with remembering, including metamemory feelings about the act of remembering and attempts at remembering, are not often integrated into general accounts of memory. For example, David Rubin (2022) proposes a unified, three-dimensional conceptual space for mapping memory states, a map that does not systematically specify metamemory feelings. Drawing on Rubin's model, we define a distinct role for metamemory in relation to first-order memory content. We propose a fourth dimension for the model and support the proposal with conceptual, neurocognitive, and clinical lines of reasoning. We use the modified model to illustrate several cases, and show how it helps to conceptualize a new category of memory state: autonoetic knowing, exemplified by déjà vu. We also caution not to assume that memory experience is directly correlated with or caused by memory content, an assumption Tulving (1989) labeled the doctrine of concordance.     

Wittgenstein's therapies: From rules to hinges

Recently Wittgenstein's claim to be primarily engaged in a kind of therapy for the problems that trouble people in the grip of a certain picture of how things must be has been strongly emphasized. The form the therapy takes is to display various kinds of grammatical errors in the pathological practice. In Wittgenstein's late work, On Certainty, the role of the concept of rule as the ground of a practice is extended to include a different kind of grounding in “hinges”. I argue that there is a therapeutic role for the work of bringing to light the “hinges” that hold fast when the door of philosophy turns. I contrast examples of Wittgensteinian therapy where the cure is achieved by a display of grammatical rules, to cases in which the cure depends on emphasizing the role of a hinge or hinges in pathological confusions of thought in psychology.     

Wittgenstein's philosophies of mathematics

Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics has long been notorious. Part of the problem is that it has not been recognized that Wittgenstein, in fact, had two chief post-Tractatus conceptions of mathematics. I have labelled these the calculus conception and the language-game conception. The calculus conception forms a distinct middle period. The goal of my article is to provide a new framework for examining Wittgenstein's philosophies of mathematics and the evolution of his career as a whole. I posit the Hardyian Picture, modelled on the Augustinian Picture, to provide a structure for Wittgenstein's work on the philosophy of mathematics. Wittgenstein's calculus period has not been properly recognized, so I give a detailed account of the tenets of that stage in Wittgenstein's career. Wittgenstein's notorious remarks on contradiction are the test case for my theory of his transition. I show that the bizarreness of those remarks is largely due to the calculus conception, but that Wittgenstein's later language-game account of mathematics keeps the rejection of the Hardyian Picture while correcting the calculus conception's mistakes.The following abbreviations are used in this article to refer to Wittgenstein's works: WWK: Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations Recorded by Friedrich Waismann, ed. B. F. McGuinness, trans. J. Schulte and B. F. McGuinness, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979; CAM I: Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge, 1930–32, ed. D. Lee, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982; CAM II: Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge, 1932–35; ed. A. Ambrose, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982; PG: Philosophical Grammar, ed. R. Rhees, trans. A. Kenny, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974; BIB: The Blue and Brown Books, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958; LFM: Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics: Cambridge, 1939, ed. C. Diamond, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976; RFM: Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, ed. G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, revised ed., Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978; PI: Philosophical Investigations, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe, R. Rhees, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, New York: Macmillan Company, 1953; Z: Zettel, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. von Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970.References to PI and Z are to remark number; references to RFM are to part number (Roman numerals) and remark number (Arabic numerals); and references to the other works are to page numbers. As the evolutionary nature of Wittgenstein's work is an important theme of this article, following the abbreviation for the book in the text I have put in brackets the date of the book or the part of the book from which the quotation comes.     

Contiguity and the causal theory of memory

In Memory: A Philosophical Study, Bernecker argues for an account of contiguity. This Contiguity View is meant to solve relearning and prompting, wayward causation problems plaguing the causal theory of memory. I argue that Bernecker’s Contiguity View fails in this task. Contiguity is too weak to prevent relearning and too strong to allow prompting. These failures illustrate a problem inherent in accounts of memory causation. Relearning and prompting are both causal relations, wayward only with respect to our interest in specifying remembering’s requirements. Solving them requires saying more about remembering, not causation. I conclude by sketching such an account.     

Epistemic and non‐Epistemic Theories of Remembering

Contemporary memory sciences describe processes that are dynamic and constructive. This has led some philosophers to weaken the relationship between memory and epistemology; though remembering can give rise to epistemic success, it is not itself an epistemic success state. I argue that non‐epistemic (causal) theories will not do; they provide neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for remembering that p. I also argue that the shortcomings of the causal theory are epistemic in nature. Consequently, a theory of remembering must account for both its fundamentally epistemic nature and for its constructive and dynamic processes.     

Event‐based prospective memory and obsessive–compulsive disorder intrusive obsessional thoughts

Recent studies have found poorer prospective remembering among students selected for elevated obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) checking and washing. However, as prospective memory performance also requires retrospective remembering, it is not clear from earlier work whether deficits in prospective memory in samples with OCD symptomatology are due to problems with prospective remembering, or to retrospective memory failures that result in poorer performance on prospective memory tasks. The present study examines performance on matched prospective and retrospective memory tasks among students selected for high (n = 48) and low (n = 44) scores on the Obsessive–Compulsive Inventory‐Revised Obsession subscale. Significant differences between the groups were found in prospective memory (regardless of whether the word was neutral or harm/danger‐related), but not retrospective memory. The findings are consistent with the prediction that obsessional thoughts that occupy working memory capacity would have a deleterious effect on a resource‐demanding prospective memory task. An additional finding was that there were no group differences in self‐reported complaints of problems with prospective memory.     

Beyond cognitive myopia: a patchwork approach to the concept of neural function

In this paper, I argue that looking at the concept of neural function through the lens of cognition alone risks cognitive myopia: it leads neuroscientists to focus only on mechanisms with cognitive functions that process behaviorally relevant information when conceptualizing “neural function”. Cognitive myopia tempts researchers to neglect neural mechanisms with noncognitive functions which do not process behaviorally relevant information but maintain and repair neural and other systems of the body. Cognitive myopia similarly affects philosophy of neuroscience because scholars overlook noncognitive functions when analyzing issues surrounding e.g., functional decomposition or the multifunctionality of neural structures. I argue that we can overcome cognitive myopia by adopting a patchwork approach that articulates cognitive and noncognitive “patches” of the concept of neural function. Cognitive patches describe mechanisms with causally specific effects on cognition and behavior which are likely operative in transforming sensory or other inputs into motor outputs. Noncognitive patches describe mechanisms that lack such specific effects; these mechanisms are enabling conditions for cognitive functions to occur. I use these distinctions to characterize two noncognitive functions at the mesoscale of neural circuits: subsistence functions like breathing are implemented by central pattern generators and are necessary to maintain the life of the organism. Infrastructural functions like gain control are implemented by canonical microcircuits and prevent neural system damage while cognitive processing occurs. By adding conceptual patches that describe these functions, a patchwork approach can overcome cognitive myopia and help us explain how the brain’s capacities as an information processing device are constrained by its ability to maintain and repair itself as a physiological apparatus.     

Looking the past in the eye: Distortion in memory and the costs and benefits of recalling from an observer perspective

Jordi Fernández (2015) discusses the possible benefits of two types of allegedly distorted memories: observer memories and fabricated memories. Fernández argues that even when memory does not preserve the past, some memories can still provide an adaptive benefit for the subject. I explore Fernández’s claims focussing on the case of observer perspective memories. For Fernández, observer perspectives are distorted memories because they do not preserve past experience. In contrast, I suggest that observer perspectives can accurately reflect past experience: observer perspectives are not necessarily distorted memories. By looking at the complexity of the relation between remembering trauma from an observer perspective and emotional closure, I also sound a note of caution against Fernández’s assertion that observer memories of trauma can be adaptively beneficial. Finally, I suggest that because observer perspectives are not necessarily distorted, but involve a distinct way of thinking about one’s past, such memories can be epistemically beneficial.     

The Problem of Other Minds: Wittgenstein's Phenomenological Perspective

This paper discusses Wittgenstein's take on the problem of other minds. In opposition to certain widespread views that I collect under the heading of the “No Problem Interpretation,” I argue that Wittgenstein does address some problem of other minds. However, Wittgenstein's problem is not the traditional epistemological problem of other minds; rather, it is more reminiscent of the issue of intersubjectivity as it emerges in the writings of phenomenologists such as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger. This is one sense in which Wittgenstein's perspective on other minds might be called “phenomenological.” Yet there is another sense as well, in that Wittgenstein's positive views on this issue resemble the views defended by phenomenologists. The key to a proper philosophical grasp of intersubjectivity, on both views, lies in rethinking the mind. If we conceive of minds as essentially embodied we can understand how intersubjectivity is possible.     

Reappraisal mitigates overestimation of remembered pain in anxious individuals

Anxiety sensitivity, a trait characterised by fear of anxiety-related body sensations, has been linked to heightened attention to pain, appraising body sensations as threatening, and remembering threat-related information. We assessed whether individuals with greater anxiety sensitivity overestimate in remembering pain. We also assessed whether emotion regulation strategies that direct attention away from pain (distraction), or alter appraisals of pain (reappraisal), alleviate memory bias. Participants (N = 137) were randomly assigned to one of two emotion regulation conditions or to a control condition before taking part in a cold pressor task. Greater anxiety sensitivity was associated with overestimation in remembering pain. Engaging in reappraisal mitigated this memory bias but engaging in distraction did not. This is the first study to examine the relations among anxiety sensitivity, emotion regulation and memory for pain. The findings suggest that health-care practitioners can encourage reappraisal to promote more positive memories of procedural pain, particularly in patients high in anxiety sensitivity.     

Is memory for remembering? Recollection as a form of episodic hypothetical thinking

Misremembering is a systematic and ordinary occurrence in our daily lives. Since it is commonly assumed that the function of memory is to remember the past, misremembering is typically thought to happen because our memory system malfunctions. In this paper I argue that not all cases of misremembering are due to failures in our memory system. In particular, I argue that many ordinary cases of misremembering should not be seen as instances of memory’s malfunction, but rather as the normal result of a larger cognitive system that performs a different function, and for which remembering is just one operation. Building upon extant psychological and neuroscientific evidence, I offer a picture of memory as an integral part of a larger system that supports not only thinking of what was the case and what potentially could be the case, but also what could have been the case. More precisely, I claim that remembering is a particular operation of a cognitive system that permits the flexible recombination of different components of encoded traces into representations of possible past events that might or might not have occurred, in the service of constructing mental simulations of possible future events. So that imagination and memory are but one thing, which for diverse considerations hath diverse names. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 1.2.      

Hallucinating real things

No particular dagger was the object of Macbeth’s hallucination of a dagger. In contrast, when he hallucinated his former comrade Banquo, Banquo himself was the object of the hallucination. Although philosophers have had much to say about the nature and philosophical import of hallucinations (e.g. Macpherson and Platchias, Hallucination, 2013) and object-involving attitudes (e.g. Jeshion, New essays on singular thought, 2010), their intersection has largely been neglected. Yet, object-involving hallucinations raise interesting questions about memory, perception, and the ways in which we have knowledge of the world around us. In this paper, I offer an account of object-involving hallucinations. Specifically, I argue that they are an unusual species of perceptual remembering.     

Visual search for changes in scenes creates long-term,incidental memory traces

Humans are very good at remembering large numbers of scenes over substantial periods of time. But how good are they at remembering changes to scenes? In this study, we tested scene memory and change detection two weeks after initial scene learning. In Experiments 1–3, scenes were learned incidentally during visual search for change. In Experiment 4, observers explicitly memorized scenes. At test, after two weeks observers were asked to discriminate old from new scenes, to recall a change that they had detected in the study phase, or to detect a newly introduced change in the memorization experiment. Next, they performed a change detection task, usually looking for the same change as in the study period. Scene recognition memory was found to be similar in all experiments, regardless of the study task. In Experiment 1, more difficult change detection produced better scene memory. Experiments 2 and 3 supported a “depth-of-processing” account for the effects of initial search and change detection on incidental memory for scenes. Of most interest, change detection was faster during the test phase than during the study phase, even when the observer had no explicit memory of having found that change previously. This result was replicated in two of our three change detection experiments. We conclude that scenes can be encoded incidentally as well as explicitly and that changes in those scenes can leave measurable traces even if they are not explicitly recalled.     

Styles of Remembering and Types of Experience: An Experimental Investigation of Reconstructive Memory

No one can access the original events to examine the veracity of a human experience in everyday situations. The present experiment was done to compare two conditions under which a participant remembered (1) her actual contact with the environment and (2) her indirect experience—information about another person’s direct experience that was communicated to her. Several differences in the forms of remembering such as narrative styles, way of describing and naming of object, motive for actions—were found to differ between those two conditions. Those differences were shown to disappear with repeated remembering occasions due to intrapersonal and interpersonal conventionalization. These results suggest that it is possible to examine the veracity of an experience based on forms of remembering, rather than on its content. Theoretical discussion links the present experiment to the study of memory and remembering from the perspective of Bartlett’s (Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932) schema theory.

Noncognitive factors in high-road/low-road learning: I. Modes of abstraction in adulthood

Since the termscognition andcognitive are broadly used but not clearly defined, it may be helpful to clarify what is meant bynoncognitive factors. In cognitive science, the termscognition andcognitive generally describe mental processes that are informational insofar as they carry information about the organism's own body and the material world. Thus defined, there are three sorts of noncognitive organismic factors important in adult learning:affective processes, self-developmental processes, andhardware factors (i.e., noninformational, purely organismic constraints such as mental capacity/working memory limitations, gestaltist field factors, etc.). In this series of papers, we attempt to show how these noncognitive factors interact with cognitive factors to facilitate adult learning. We outline and give reference to a dialectical constructivist (neoPiagetian) model of the psychological organism that integrates noncognitive with cognitive factors and that can serve to explicate the findings of the literature and to process/task analyze adult learning. An important aim is the integration of the findings of decline and regression from the cognitive literature with the findings regarding the increase in self-directedness reported by adult education theorists. This is explicated through a process-analytic account of the will, particularly as it pertains to noncognitive factors. In Part II, we continue our explication of a dialectical model of the ego and conclude with a discussion of modes of learning/instruction in adulthood.     

Choices Chance and Change: Luck Egalitarianism Over Time

The family of theories dubbed ‘luck egalitarianism’ represent an attempt to infuse egalitarian thinking with a concern for personal responsibility, arguing that inequalities are just when they result from, or the extent to which they result from, choice, but are unjust when they result from, or the extent to which they result from, luck. In this essay I argue that luck egalitarians should sometimes seek to limit inequalities, even when they have a fully choice-based pedigree (i.e., result only from the choices of agents). I grant that the broad approach is correct but argue that the temporal standpoint from which we judge whether the person can be held responsible, or the extent to which they can be held responsible, should be radically altered. Instead of asking, as Standard (or Static) Luck Egalitarianism seems to, whether or not, or to what extent, a person was responsible for the choice at the time of choosing, and asking the question of responsibility only once, we should ask whether, or to what extent, they are responsible for the choice at the point at which we are seeking to discover whether, or to what extent, the inequality is just, and so the question of responsibility is not settled but constantly under review. Such an approach will differ from Standard Luck Egalitarianism only if responsibility for a choice is not set in stone—if responsibility can weaken then we should not see the boundary between luck and responsibility within a particular action as static. Drawing on Derek Parfit’s illuminating discussions of personal identity, and contemporary literature on moral responsibility, I suggest there are good reasons to think that responsibility can weaken—that we are not necessarily fully responsible for a choice for ever, even if we were fully responsible at the time of choosing. I call the variant of luck egalitarianism that recognises this shift in temporal standpoint and that responsibility can weaken Dynamic Luck Egalitarianism (DLE). In conclusion I offer a preliminary discussion of what kind of policies DLE would support.     

Recognition memory with little or no remembering: Implications for a detection model

Remembering and knowing are two states of awareness that reflect autonoetic and noetic consciousness. Recent extensions of signal detection theory have attempted to fitremember andknow responses, which measure these states of awareness, to a continuum of trace strength or familiarity. The model assumes there are two response criteria, a remembering criterion, which is more strict, and a recognition criterion, which is more lenient and leads to any positive recognition response. The most important prediction of this model is that bias-free estimates of memory should be the same whether derived from overall hit and false alarm rates or fromremember hit and false alarm rates. We describe evidence that disconfirms this prediction and discuss other findings that the model cannot accommodate.     

Repetition of previously novel melodies sometimes increases both remember and know responses in recognition memory

Recognition memory for previously novel melodies was tested in three experiments in which subjects usedremember andknow responses to report experiences of recollection, or of familiarity in the absence of recollection, for each melody they recognized. Some of the melodies were taken from Polish folk songs and presented vocally, but without the words. Others were taken from obscure pieces of classical music, presented as single-line melodies. Prior to the test, the melodies were repeated for varying numbers of study trials. Repetition of the Polish melodies increased both remember and know responses, while repetition of classical melodies increased remember but not know responses. When subjects were instructed to report guesses, guess responses were inversely related to remember and know responses and there were more guesses to lures than to targets. These findings establish that remembering and knowing are fully independent functionally and, by the same token, they provide further evidence against the idea that response exclusivity causes increases in remembering to force decreases in knowing. The findings also suggest that simultaneous increases in remembering and knowing occurred because the Polish melodies came from a genre for which the subjects had relatively little previous experience.     

Memory for prenominal adjectives in ordinary English sentences

Ss have been found to remember the gist of English sentences quite well while having little or no memory for structural features unrelated to the basic meaning. This research examines the representation of meaning in memory using adjective-noun phrases embedded in ordinary sentences. Ss studied a long series of sentences and were later tested for memory of certain of the adjectives in these sentences. Tested with a specially constructed forced-choice recognition procedure, Ss made significantly more recognition errors to distractors from the same predicative class as the correct choice than they did to distractors from different classes. This effect was highly significant when the correct choice was a nonpolar adjective but was not different from chance when a polar was correct. Data from a recall test procedure suggested this difference was due to Ss remembering the denotative or referential meaning of the adjective. The results showed that Ss remember abstract aspects of the predicative meaning of adjectival modification.