Cognitive functions, bodily sensibility and the brain

Body representations traverse the whole of the brain. They provide vital sources of information for every facet of an animal’s behavior, and such direct neural connectivity of visceral input throughout the nervous system demonstrates just how strongly cognitive systems are linked to bodily representations. At each level of the neural axis there are visceral appraisal systems that are integral in the organization of action. Cognition is not one side of a divide and viscera the other, with action merely a reflexive outcome. There is no divide between cognition and bodily functions once the brain is involved. Cognitive mechanisms that permeate neural function are a cardinal piece of biological function and adaptation.     

The where of bodily awareness

Synthese - In bodily awareness body parts are felt to occupy locations relative to the rest of the body. Bodily sensations are felt to be, in Brian O’Shaughnessy’s terms...     

Metaphors of a bodily mind

Patients' metaphors in analysis may allow access to ineffable experiences. This is understandable, since the mind is a bodily mind, and language is a fully embodied function of this mind. That is, both are dependent for their existence upon the physical body. The ontogenic accumulation of perceived sensory impressions and affective processes far exceeds what can be put into words. Research in cognitive psychology suggests that the active mind functions in such a manner that later perceptions are organized by means of earlier ones. However, since the mind can know only its own representations, it inhabits two ever unknown realms: the external world itself, and the domain of internal unconscious processes that sustain the mind's functions. As a result, the world and the self we know are constructed by the mediation of our bodies. In language also, the active mode by which we perceive, process, and feel makes our understanding of words dependent on previous experience. The fact that the limbic system is activated immediately in the moment of processing experience means that all modalities of representation include an affective valuation.This inevitable processing of information through the mediation of affectively valued bodily perceptions gives the metaphorical function-the human capacity to organize experience and life in metaphoric ways-the ability to create linguistic metaphors that can capture and express otherwise inexpressible psychic experiences. This manner of understanding metaphor has implications for psychoanalytic technique.     

The objects of bodily awareness

Is it possible to misidentify the object of an episode of bodily awareness? I argue that it is, on the grounds that a person can reasonably be unsure or mistaken as to which part of her body he or she is aware of at a given moment. This requires discussing the phenomenon of body ownership, and defending the claim that the proper parts of one’s body are at least no less ‘principal’ among the objects of bodily awareness than is the body as a whole. I conclude with some reasons why this should lead us to think that bodily awareness, unlike introspection, is a form of perception.     

Spatial aspects of bodily self-consciousness

Visual, somatosensory, and perspectival cues normally provide congruent information about where the self is experienced. Separating those cues by virtual reality techniques, recent studies found that self-location was systematically biased to where a visual–tactile event was seen. Here we developed a novel, repeatable and implicit measure of self-location to compare and extend previous protocols. We investigated illusory self-location and associated phenomenological aspects in a lying body position that facilitates clinically observed abnormal self-location (as on out-of-body experiences). The results confirm that the self is located to where touch is seen. This leads to either predictable lowering or elevation of self-localization, and the latter was accompanied by sensations of floating, as during out-of-body experiences. Using a novel measurement we show that the unitary and localized character of the self can be experimentally separated from both the origin of the visual perspective and the location of the seen body, which is compatible with clinical data.     

Psychological conceptions of randomness

This article presents a critique of the concept of randomness as it occurs in the psychological literature. The first section of our article outlines the significance of a concept of randomness to the process of induction; we need to distinguish random and non-random events in order to perceive lawful regularities and formulate theories concerning events in the world. Next we evaluate the psychological research that has suggested that human concepts of randomness are not normative. We argue that, because the tasks set to experimental subjects are logically problematic, observed biases may be an artifact of the experimental situation and that even if such biases do generalise they may not have pejorative implications for induction in the real world. Thirdly we investigate the statistical methodology utilised in tests for randomness and find it riddled with paradox. In a fourth section we find various branches of scientific endeavour that are stymied by the problems posed by randomness. Finally we briefly mention the social significance of randomness and conclude by arguing that such a fundamental concept merits and requires more serious considerations.     

Lay conceptions of neuroticism

This paper is concerned with various aspects of a lay-person's conceptualization of neuroticism. Three experiments are reported which aim to investigate various determinants of the common-sense conception of neuroticism. In the first experiment subjects completed various standardized psychological tests measuring neuroticism and anxiety, while also estimating the extent of their own anxiety and neuroticism. In the second experiment subjects attempted to detect items measuring neuroticism in a standard personality questionnaire and secondly estimate the extent of their own and the ‘average’ person's neuroticism. Finally, in the third experiment subjects rated the typicality of various neurotic traits and behaviour which had been supplied by subjects in the previous two experiments. The results suggested some similarity in expert explicit theories and lay-person implicit theories, though there appeared to be systematic biases in the subjects' perception of their own neuroticism. The results are discussed in terms of the correspondence between implicit theories and explicit theories, and the functions of each theory in everyday life are considered. Problems associated with these studies and this research in general are discussed.     

Children's conceptions of Jesus

This paper presents findings from a recent study investigating young children's (aged 10–11) conceptions of Jesus in England. The overall picture revealed by the study is that whilst there was a general assent amongst pupils in our sample towards an ethical and humanistic conception of the historical Jesus, there was less of a consensus about those issues which previous research claims children find difficult to understand, namely: the divinity of Jesus; the miracles of Jesus; and Christian beliefs pertaining to Jesus' continued presence in people's lives today. The paper concludes by arguing that the variety of conceptions of Jesus which are encountered in religious education (RE) may be seen by children as a barrier to learning rather than an opportunity to grow in understanding and highlights the need for further research into the relationship between children's hermeneutical horizons and RE curriculum content.     

Reasoning's relation to bodily action

Recent philosophical work on the relation between reasoning and bodily action is dominated by two views. It is orthodox to have it that bodily actions can be at most causally involved in reasoning. Others have it that reasoning can constitutively involve bodily actions, where this is understood as a matter of non-mental bodily events featuring as constituents of practical reasoning. Reflection on cases of reasoning out-loud suggests a neglected alternative on which both practical and theoretical reasoning can have bodily actions as constituents, where such bodily actions themselves amount to contentful mental events. Furthermore, the natural lines of resistance to this view trade on type-token errors, or on a questionable common-factor assumption.     

Stimulus functions in some chained fixed-ratio schedules of reinforcement

For two pigeons, behavior was compared in equivalent two-link chained and tandem schedules in which 100 responses were required for food reinforcement but the responses required in the two links of the chained schedule were varied over the values 2-98, 50-50, and 98-2. Initial pausing, response rate in each link, and the total time to complete each ratio were recorded. In chained components, initial-link pausing (for both birds) and total time to complete the ratio (for one bird) were generally shorter when the response requirement was 2-98 than when it was 50-50 or 98-2; for terminal-link pausing this relationship was reversed for both birds. There were also systematic changes in behavior in tandem components, and in the relationship between behavior in chained and tandem components. The results are discussed in terms of conditioned reinforcement.     

Contrasting conceptions of human infants

The XIII Biennial International Conference on Infant Studies was held in Toronto, Canada on 18-21 April 2002.     

Eating-problem patients' conceptions of normality

Three groups of people--anorexic patients, helping professionals, and a control group--filled out the Eating Attitude Test (Garner & Garfinkel, 1979) three times. The control subjects were asked to fill it out honestly for themselves; as they imagined an ordinary person might complete it; and, finally, as they would expect a patient with an eating disorder to fill it out. The anorexic patients were asked to complete it honestly for themselves; as they imagined an ordinary person might fill it out; and, finally, as they would expect to fill it out when fully recovered. The professionals filled out the questionnaires as they imagined the typical patient with eating disorders might; as they imagined the ordinary person might complete it; and as a recovered patient might complete it. The results provided support for some but not all hypotheses, the most central of which was that there would be a difference between how the patients rated the ordinary person and how control subjects (supposedly ordinary people) rated themselves.     

Alternative conceptions of semantic theory

It is argued that theories of semantic memory have diverged in a manner that parallels current linguistic controversy concerning the representation of meaning. The feature-comparison model (Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974) applies the linguistic theory of Lakoff (1972) to predict people's reaction times to verify sentences, while the marker-search model, described here, uses the type of semantic representation outlined by Katz (1972) to explain a similar range of data. The two models are described and the evidence for each is reviewed. Available evidence supports the marker-search model, but disconfirms a major prediction of the feature-comparison model. It is argued that the feature-comparison model is in principle inadequate as a model of semantic representation, unless its conception of semantic components is substantially alatered.