A note on ‘scepticism and absurdity’

In ‘Scepticism and Absurdity’ (Inquiry, Vol. 7, No. 2) Ingemund Gullvag concludes that recent attempts to counter scepticism have failed. It is suggested that where the attempts Gullvåg investigates are complex theories of a sociological and linguistic‐psychological nature, we need only refer to a simple and inspectable fact of language to counter scepticism.     

A note on “pattern variants on a square field”

It is shown how results of Prokhovnik on the number of pattern variants that may be formed byk markers on a square network ofm ² positions may be derived more simply by means of a combinatorial theorem of Pólya's, which may also be used to solve systematically many other problems of this type.     

A note on the “B” in REBT

In this brief article, I argue for the inclusion of B based on principles of classical and instrumental conditioning. It's time to manage our discomfort with the alignment of REBT with behavior therapy.former Co-Editor of thisJournal. He is a Professor Emeritus and a Licensed Psychologist in private practice in Roanoke, VA.     

Bourdieu and Derrida on Gift: Beyond “Double Truth” and Paradox

Bourdieu and Derrida share a focus on the ambiguity of the practice of gift relationships already pointed out by Mauss. From Bourdieu’s perspective, the question of gratuity is epistemically futile, as it veils the objective truth of gift-giving, yet ethically and politically relevant, as it refers to a hypocrisy which can be instrumental to enhancing civic virtue and solidarity. Bourdieu’s “scientific humanism,” however, implausibly reduces this ambiguity to interest maximization, and aims to build a solidaristic democracy by means of the generalization of the hypocrisy of gratuity. In turn, by interpreting gratuity as “unconditionality,” Derrida aims not at dissolving, but at dramatizing the ambiguity of gift relationships by turning it into “madness” and an “impossible possibility”. Whereas I agree with Derrida’s insistence on the salience of the requirement of gratuity, his approach can lead to counterintuitive and hubristic consequences. Instead, I suggest some elements of an alternative way of understanding gratuitous gifts as communicative acts irreducible to an economic calculation or circle. From this standpoint, a gratuitous gift can be constituted by certain forms of recognition, emotions, or convictions without for that becoming an “impossibility”.     

A note on the relation between coefficient alpha and guttman's “split-half” lower bounds

Use of the same term split-half for division of ann-item test into two subtests containing equal [Cronbach], and possibly unequal [Guttman], numbers of items sometimes leads to a misunderstanding about the relation between Guttman's maximum split-half bound and Cronbach's coefficient alpha.Coefficient alpha is the average of split-half bounds in the Cronbach sense and so is not larger than the maximum split-half bound in either sense whenn is even. Whenn is odd, however, splithalf bounds exist only in the Guttman sense and the largest of these may be smaller than coefficient alpha.     

A note on ‘knowledge,certainty, and probability'∗

In ‘Knowledge, Certainty and Probability’, Dr. Heidelberger claims to have shown ‘that it is a mistake to assimilate probability and rational belief to knowledge’. The conclusion may be true but his argument is faulty.     

A note on Dasgupta’s Generalism

Philosophical Studies - Dasgupta (Philos Stud Int J Philos Anal Tradit 145(1):35–67, 2009) has argued that material individuals, such as particles and laptops, are metaphysically...     

A note on the ω-incompleteness formalization

The paper studies two formal schemes related to -completeness.LetS be a suitable formal theory containing primitive recursive arithmetic and letT be a formal extension ofS. Denoted by (a), (b) and (c), respectively, are the following three propositions (where (x) is a formula with the only free variable x): (a) (for anyn) ( _T (n)), (b) _{T x} Pr _T (^–(x)^–) and (c) _T x(x) (the notational conventions are those of Smoryski [3]). The aim of this paper is to examine the meaning of the schemes which result from the formalizations, over the base theoryS, of the implications (b) (c) and (a) (b), where ranges over all formulae. The analysis yields two results overS : 1. the schema corresponding to (b) (c) is equivalent to ¬Cons _T and 2. the schema corresponding to (a) (b) is not consistent with 1-CON _T. The former result follows from a simple adaptation of the -incompleteness proof; the second is new and is based on a particular application of the diagonalization lemma.Presented byMelvin Fitting     

Two French Variations on Truth: Ricoeur's Attestation and Foucault's “Parrhesiastic” Attitude

Both Ricoeur and Foucault, apparently independently of each other, dedicated much effort to provide an account of truth that goes far beyond the truth of sentences, propositions, or judgments. While well aware of the speech act theory and pragmatics, they want to go beyond a formalism of rules of speech or arguments and integrate the attitude of the one who speaks in the very notion of truth. They see truth not merely as a property of statements, but as an existential process in such a way that the truth of statements is linked to the historically situated speaker. Truth as a property of statements is related to truth as an event. However, both reject any form of historicism or relativism.

I examine Ricoeur's notion of attestation and Foucault's notion of parrhesia, showing how both notions represent a kind of “poetics of truth”, which combines the existential position of the speaker and the historical circumstances of utterance. I show the extent to which both poetics of truth are political and ethical and how successful each poetics is: Ricoeur believes that he can maintain a claim to universality whereas Foucault abandons such a claim and instead subscribes to a radical singularity of the event of speech in a mode of truth that is, as he says, “polemic”.     

Apparent movement and metacontrast: A note on Kahneman’s formulation

Recently metacontrast has been described as a case of “impossible” apparent motion. Kahneman (J 967) has supported this hypothesis with a study showing that apparent motion and metacontrast functions resemble one another. However, when visual angle, luminance, and duration vary from the values used in the Kahneman study, the resemblance between the two effects breaks down. Since the apparent motion explanation for metacontrast assumes an identity between apparent motion and metacontrast, these present results indicate that the apparent motion hypothesis for metacontrast is untenable. Metacontrast and apparent motion may not be unrelated, however; they might both have something to do with single units in the visualcortex. For each effect, however, different functional units would be involved.     

A note on the deontic system DL of Jones and Pörn

I would like to thank Ingmar Pörn for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper.