Multimedia: where are we now and where do we go from here?

This paper comments on the current state and future role of computer-based multimedia in psychology instruction. It includes practical tips on getting started with successful multimedia production. It also introduces a new World-Wide Web site archiving this information as well as other useful multimedia production and teaching resources.     

Incarnational Christian psychology and psychotherapy: What do we believe and what do we do?

The following paper proposes a viewpoint regarding the working assumptions, theology and practice for an “incarnational” psychology or “Christian psychology,” particularly with regard to psychotherapy. This essay is primarily meant to be an affirmation and guide for those Christian psychologists and others working in the allied professions. However, both veteran theorists and newcomers to such inquiry will benefit from this essay. Discussion begins with the dynamic of surrendering and receiving a personal relationship with Jesus Christ. The understanding of the unique person as soul: in mind, body, life and spirit is discussed. In addition, the working of the incarnate Holy Spirit is elaborated for both therapist and patient in the regenerative and therapeutic process. Psychopathology is reframed in reference to the Judeo-Christian revelation of sin and evil. In addition, truth, falsity and psychopathology are considered in light of the essentially regenerated man/woman or “new creation” in Christ. Some practical examples for psychotherapeutic intervention are offered, including the unique role of the Christian psychologist and his or her relationship with both patient and Christ. Seven major assumptions of “incarnational” or Christian psychology, which diverge from purely secular (psychological) theory and practice, are presented. Lastly, Christian psychology is distinguished from both “integrated” psychology and theology; and Biblical counseling.

When do children learn from unreliable speakers?

Children do not necessarily disbelieve a speaker with a history of inaccuracy; they take into account reasons for errors. Three- to five-year-olds (N = 97) aimed to identify a hidden target in collaboration with a puppet. The puppet’s history of inaccuracy arose either from false beliefs or occurred despite his being fully informed. On a subsequent test trial, children’s realistic expectation about the target was contradicted by the puppet who was fully informed. Children were more likely to revise their belief in line with the puppet’s assertion when his previous errors were due to false beliefs. Children who explained this puppet’s prior inaccuracy in terms of false belief were more likely to believe the puppet than those who did not. As children’s understanding of the mind advances, they increasingly balance the risk of learning falsehoods from unreliable speakers against that of rejecting truths from speakers who made excusable errors.     

What do we learn in psychoanalytic training?

Can one define the aims of psychoanalytic training that most analysts would agree upon? For more than a decade the EPF Working Party ‘End of Training Evaluation Project (ETEP)’ has worked on this issue. Summarizing results of this work the author describes a set of basic elements every developing analyst should have learned or internalized during his training. His assertion is that most analysts notwithstanding their theoretical orientation could agree upon these necessary requirements for a successful ending of psychoanalytic training. These elements are demonstrated in the ability to understand the emotional demand of a patient in every session and the often ensuing emotional storm, to appreciate and deeply understand the value of free association, to preserve a neutral stance, to think in terms of transference and countertransference, and to think conceptually about what is happening and what one is doing in the session.     

Neuromotor profiles: what are they and what can we learn from them?

Eye movements, alternating movements, rapid pointing movements, and various tremors were measured on patients with Parkinson's disease (n = 21), on Cree subjects exposed to methylmercury (n = 36), and on healthy control subjects (n = 30). Neuromotor profiles were created according to thirty characteristics extracted from test results of four subgroups matched for age and composed of six subjects each. Z scores were calculated with respect to the mean and standard deviation of the control group for each of the 30 characteristics. The subgroup with the lower methylmercury blood level had larger z scores than the control subgroup and with a few positive values above one standard deviation. The subgroup with the higher methylmercury blood level had several z scores above two standard deviations. Interestingly, the abnormal values for the subgroup with Parkinson's disease were mostly limited to static tremor recorded with no visual feedback and reached up to 5 standard deviations. These results indicate that neuromotor profiles can be used to summarize information extracted from different neuromotor tests and to differentiate neurological conditions.     

When educational supervision meets clinical supervision: what can we learn from the discrepancies?

The authors question the taken-for-granted notion of supervision. Their concerns arose out of an attempt to introduce 'clinical' supervision into academia as a way of addressing an increasing number of the ethical issues which confront lecturers. They recognise that knowledge can impact adversely on students and that lecturers at times find themselves compromised. They settled on supervision as an organisational space in the domain of power in which to address the distress they observed. However, through their different experiences of supervision, they soon found themselves talking past each other. When clinical supervision meets educational supervision, several anomalies are brought to the fore. The authors draw on Foucault's notion of discourse, and of knowledge as power, in order to foreground these and conclude by cautioning against an uncritical acceptance of supervision as an ethical practice. They believe there is a benefit in bringing together the two discourses of clinical and educational supervision for further discussion.     

What do we learn from binding features? Evidence for multilevel feature integration

Four experiments were conducted to investigate the relationship between the binding of visual features (as measured by their aftereffects on subsequent binding) and the learning of feature-conjunction probabilities. Both binding and learning effects were obtained, but they did not interact. Interestingly, (shape-color) binding effects disappeared with increasing practice, presumably because of the fact that only 1 of the features involved was relevant to the task. However, this instability was only observed for arbitrary, not highly overlearned combinations of simple geometric features and not for real objects (colored pictures of a banana and strawberry), where binding effects were strong and resistant to practice. These findings suggest that learning has no direct impact on the strength or resistance of bindings or on speed with which features are bound; however, learning does affect the amount of attention particular feature dimensions attract, which again can influence which features are considered in binding.     

When we like what we know – A parametric fMRI analysis of beauty and familiarity

This paper presents a neuroscientific study of aesthetic judgments on written texts. In an fMRI experiment participants read a number of proverbs without explicitly evaluating them. In a post-scan rating they rated each item for familiarity and beauty. These individual ratings were correlated with the functional data to investigate the neural correlates of implicit aesthetic judgments. We identified clusters in which BOLD activity was correlated with individual post-scan beauty ratings. This indicates that some spontaneous aesthetic evaluation takes place during reading, even if not required by the task. Positive correlations were found in the ventral striatum and in medial prefrontal cortex, likely reflecting the rewarding nature of sentences that are aesthetically pleasing. On the contrary, negative correlations were observed in the classic left frontotemporal reading network. Midline structures and bilateral temporo-parietal regions correlated positively with familiarity, suggesting a shift from the task-network towards the default network with increasing familiarity.     

At what age do children learn to discriminate between act and actor?

Children's ability to make moral judgements about an act on the basis of aspects of the act rather than on liking and preconceived ideas about the actor was investigated. 85 children of 4 age groups (preschool, Grades 1, 2, and 3, age range 5-9 years) participated. Act/Actor discrimination was investigated with a test consisting of 8 cartoons. In 4, a rabbit was behaving aggressively against a wolf; the other 4 portrayed identical acts with the wolf as aggressor and the rabbit as victim. Participants made moral evaluations of each cartoon. IQ was measured with Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices, and the general level of moral development was measured in accord with Piaget's (1932) criteria. Age, IQ, and general moral development correlated with discriminative ability for Act and Actor. In Piagetian terms, children at the heteronomous level were not capable of such discrimination, while children at the autonomous level (above 7 years of age) in general were.     

What do mind readers know and what do we know about mind readers?

In this commentary, I raise various questions about Kim and Harris's fascinating findings. I ask what kind of knowledge children expect telepathic individuals to have, who children might consider to be good mind readers, why children value telepathy, and how puzzled children are by telepathy. I suggest potential ways to address some of these questions and end by reiterating the importance of probing individual differences in scepticism and credulity.     

When do we simulate non-human agents? Dissociating communicative and non-communicative actions

There is strong evidence that we automatically simulate observed behavior in our motor system. Previous research suggests that this simulation process depends on whether we observe a human or a non-human agent. Measuring a motor priming effect, this study investigated the question of whether agent-sensitivity of motor simulation depends on the specific action observed. Participants saw pictures depicting end positions of different actions on a screen. All postures featured either a human or non-human agent. Participants had to produce the matching action with their left or right hand depending on the hand presented on the screen. Three different actions were displayed: a communicative action (emblem), a transitive (goal-directed) action and an intransitive action. We found motor priming effects of similar size for human and non-human agents for transitive and intransitive actions. However, the motor priming effect for communicative actions was present for the human agent, but absent for the non-human agent. These findings suggest that biological tuning of motor simulation is highly action-selective and depends on whether the observed behavior appears to be driven by a reasonable goal.     

When do gestures communicate? A meta-analysis

Do the gestures that speakers produce while talking significantly benefit listeners' comprehension of the message? This question has been the topic of many research studies over the previous 35 years, and there has been little consensus. The present meta-analysis examined the effect sizes from 63 samples in which listeners' understanding of a message was compared when speech was presented alone with when speech was presented with gestures. It was found that across samples, gestures do provide a significant, moderate benefit to communication. Furthermore, the magnitude of this effect is moderated by 3 factors. First, effects of gesture differ as a function of gesture topic, such that gestures that depict motor actions are more communicative than those that depict abstract topics. Second, effects of gesture on communication are larger when the gestures are not completely redundant with the accompanying speech; effects are smaller when there is more overlap between the information conveyed in the 2 modalities. Third, the size of the effect of gesture is dependent on the age of the listeners, such that children benefit more from gestures than do adults. Remaining questions for future research are highlighted.     

Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do

While it is generally believed that justification is a fallible guide to the truth, there might be interesting exceptions to this general rule. In recent work on bridge-principles, an increasing number of authors have argued that truths about what a subject ought to do are truths we stand in some privileged epistemic relation to and that our justified normative beliefs are beliefs that will not lead us astray. If these bridge-principles hold, it suggests that justification might play an interesting role in our normative theories. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, a value that’s notoriously difficult to understand if we think of justification as but a fallible means to a desired end. We will argue that these bridge-principles will be incredibly difficult to defend. While we do not think that normative facts necessarily stand in any interesting relationship to our justified beliefs about them, there might well be a way of defending the idea that our justified beliefs about what to do won’t lead us astray. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, but this way of thinking about justification and its value comes with costs few would be willing to pay.     

Are we born and do we die?

The stranglehold on our imagination by the mind-body dualisms that permeate the culture is such that most people seem to suppose that "body" and "soul" name distinct and separable entities. Resisting such dualisms in favour of an old-fashioned Aristotelean view of the soul as the form of the body, this essay considers two questions: do human parents produce human beings, and do human beings die? The doctrine of the special creation of the individual soul seems to require us to answer the first question in the negative because, according to this doctrine, parents only produce matter for the God-given soul to form. As to the second, many people seem to suppose that human beings do not die, only their bodies do. Arguing against the view that immortality is a natural property of human minds, the essay suggests (with the help of Joseph Ratzinger) that, whether we speak of "immortality" or of "resurrection", life from death is neither nature, nor achievement, but gift.     

Affect and emotions in placebo and nocebo effects: What do we know so far?

Once considered nuisance variance in clinical trials, placebo effects and nocebo effects are now widely recognized as important and mutable psychobiological contributors to mental and physical health. Psychological theory explaining these effects emphasizes associative learning and conscious expectations. It has long been suggested, however, that affective states such as moods, emotions, and distress could play a significant role. In this paper, we draw together and review the empirical data linking affective states to placebo and nocebo effects. To organize this disparate literature, three questions are addressed: (1) Does pre‐existing state and trait affect modulate placebo and nocebo effects? (2) Does administering placebo and nocebo treatments change affective states, and if so, does the resulting affect causally influence placebo and nocebo effects? Finally, (3) Can placebo treatments be successfully employed as a regulation strategy to modulate different affective states? In reviewing the evidence in relation to these three questions, it is clear that affect does play a key role in placebo and nocebo effects in many circumstances, and further, there may be a reciprocal dynamic at play between a treatment event, affect, and placebo/nocebo effects. The paper concludes by discussing implications for theory and intervention and recommends future research priorities.     

Producing simple utterances: How far ahead do we plan?

The subjects were presented pictures depicting a man, woman, girl, or boy touching, kicking, greeting, or standing beside one of the others. The subjects, constrained to using only these names, produced utterances whose lengths and grammatical forms were prespecified. The latencies for subject-verb utterances (e.g., The man is greeting) were longer than for naming the actors (e.g., The man). However, the latencies for subject-verb utterances when the actor was already known were shorter than for naming the actions (e.g., Greeting). Together these results imply that some, but not all, verb selection is performed before subject-verb utterances are initiated. Three control experiments eliminated alternative interpretations. Finally, it was demonstrated that the same degree of advance planning occurs before the initiation of subject-verb-object utterances (e.g., The man is greeting the woman).     

Stars and steam engines: To what extent do thermodynamics and statistical mechanics apply to self-gravitating systems?

Synthese - Foundational puzzles surround (Newtonian) gravitational thermal physics—a realm in which stars are treated as akin to molecules in a gas. Whether such an enterprise is successful...