形式先天,或质料先天——论舍勒对康德"先天"概念的批评

先天(a priori)这一概念是康德哲学原则性的主题之一,他将先天等同于形式,这不仅成为其理论哲学的起点,实际上也构成其伦理学的基础.舍勒正是将其对康德伦理学的批判建基在他对康德先天概念的批判之上.本文将主要着眼于"形式先天"与"质料先天"的区分,集中讨论并初步检讨舍勒对康德先天概念的批评.     

观念的关系,或先天的形式——论胡塞尔对休谟与康德"先天"概念的反省

一方面,在休谟的主要著作中,先天(apriori)这一概念很少出现,但胡塞尔却认为休谟的"观念的关系"是惟一真正的认识论上重要的先天概念。另一方面,"先天"是康德哲学原则性的主题之一,"先天的形式"可谓康德对先天的基本理解,但胡塞尔却宣称,康德缺乏真正的先天概念。胡塞尔正是通过对休谟和康德"先天"概念的反省而发现他本人所谓的"本质-先天"概念,并在思想发展史上产生了重大效应。     

A Priori Abduction

While “All events have a cause” is a synthetic statement making a factual claim about the world, “All effects have a cause” is analytic. When we take an event as an effect, no inference is required to deduce that it has a cause since this is what it means to be an effect. Some examples often given in the literature as examples of abduction work in the same way through semantic facts that follow from the way our beliefs represent those effects; from this we may deduce not only that it has a cause, but what that cause is.     

Naturalism and the A Priori

Philosophical Studies -     

A Naturalistic A Priori

Philosophical Studies -     

Contingent A Priori Knowledge

I argue that you can have a priori knowledge of propositions that neither are nor appear necessarily true. You can know a priori contingent propositions that you recognize as such. This overturns a standard view in contemporary epistemology and the traditional view of the a priori, which restrict a priori knowledge to necessary truths, or at least to truths that appear necessary.     

A Priori Conditionals and the Conceivability of Zombies

Abstract

The conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts, as proposed independently by Hawthorne (2002), Stalnaker (2002) and Braddon-Mitchell (2003), is used to undermine Chalmers's (1996) conceivability argument in a way that is compatible with our having the zombie intuition. The aim of this paper is twofold: (1) To remove current misconceptions concerning how the analysis is to be applied. It will be explained how there are two distinct ways the analysis can be used to undermine the conceivability argument. (2) To employ this exposition to defend the analysis from objections leveled against it by Chalmers (2005) and Alter (2007).