方言对社会决策及情绪的影响——-来自电生理的证据

方言是心理学本土化研究的新方向,本研究旨在考察语言类型（方言、普通话）对群体和个体社会决策的影响。实验1通过改编的公共物品博弈范式,发现方言条件下信任与合作水平、主观评定积极情绪和心率的变化值更大,皮肤电无显著变化;普通话条件下信任在主观消极情绪评定和合作行为间发挥着完全中介作用。实验2利用改编的最后通牒博弈范式,发现不公平的￥2-￥8分配方案下方言条件的接受率显著高于普通话条件,提议越公平接受率越高。结果表明方言会影响人们认知、情绪和决策行为,研究为语言和决策领域的探索提供了新思路。     

信任及其对公共财物两难博弈中合作行为影响

社会两难的行为动机研究认为,害怕和贪婪是人们选择不合作的原因。信任的心理学研究为社会两难的合作行为提供了另一种观点,即害怕被利用的背后实际上体现了博弈者对对方的信任的缺失。鉴于传统社会两难范式存在难以区分信任和合作两个因素的问题,本研究设计了“信任一合作”二阶段模拟实验,通过操作重复信托博弈中的信息反馈,研究虚拟多人信托博弈中初始信任和基于经验的信任对随后的公共财物两难博弈中合作行为的影响,结果发现：（1）初始信任对基于经验的信任的建立具有一定的积极影响,但是它对合作行为的作用远不如随后的基于经验的信任;（2）基于经验的信任水平高的被试在随后的公共财物两难博弈中也表现出较高的合作行为。     

不同博弈情境下社会排斥对社会决策的影响作用

本研究借助经典的最后通牒博弈范式(UG)和独裁者博弈范式(DG),将回应者/接受者作为研究对象,考察了不同公平条件、平等条件下社会排斥对社会决策的影响作用。实验结果发现:(1)在面对高不公平性的分配方案时,被排斥组比被接纳组更倾向于拒绝接受该分配方案;(2)被排斥组对高不公平性分配方案的满意度要显著低于被接纳组;(3)被排斥组在不平等的博弈(DG)条件下对分配方案的满意度显著低于平等博弈(UG)条件下对分配方案的满意度。本研究结果说明,社会排斥情境下的被试对公平与平等因素更加敏感:在高不公平条件下,被排斥的个体表现出更少的合作互惠行为,甚至不惜放弃自身经济利益,也要惩罚博弈对方的不公平行为;此外,在不平等的博弈条件下,被排斥的个体产生了更多的消极情绪体验。本文的研究结果提高了社会决策研究的生态效度和传统决策模型的预测效度,有利于更加完整透彻地了解社会决策的影响因素。     

群体任务中合作行为的跨阶段演变

合作是电子商务时代群体工作的重要基础。本实验通过资源两难任务研究群体工作中的合作行为的演变。111名被试参加了实验。研究发现,在动态博弈过程中,群体其他成员行为的多个阶段反馈将成为决策者合作机制形成的主要基础,与决策者价值等内部因素和环境不确定性等外部因素,共同影响合作行为的演变     

信任还是设防？互动博弈中社会善念对合作行为的促进效应

社会善念是个体在人际互动中充满善意地关注、尊重并保护他人选择的需要和权利的行为,通过实施社会善念有助于提升他人的合作行为。为检验这一假设,本实验设置了“施—受”双方的互动博弈情境,采用“物品选择游戏”操纵实施者的社会善念水平,分别利用信任博弈和公共物品游戏测查接受者在互动过程中的信任水平和合作行为。结果发现：相比于低社会善念组,被试在高社会善念组中表现出更高的信任水平和合作行为。进一步路径分析也发现,信任在感知社会善念与合作行为间发挥着部分中介作用。由此可见,社会善念行为的实施为互动双方建立信任关系提供了重要线索,降低了人们时时“设防”的监控动机,使合作带来的利益双赢成为可能。     

社会价值取向与反馈对动态社会两难决策的影响：以水资源两难决策为例

以水资源两难情景为实验任务,探讨了社会价值取向与反馈在社会两难决策中的作用.结果表明: (1)社会价值取向在决策者的两难决策行为中起着非常重要的作用.合作型个体比非合作型个体显著地表现出更多的合作行为.个体的社会价值取向可以作为预测两难决策行为的一个重要因素: (2)不同的反馈类型对具有不同社会价值取向的决策者的决策行为影响不同.非合作型个体受反馈信息影响比较明显,而合作型个体则不易受他人的决策信息影响.     

“为逐利而追名”：社会观察和社会距离对亲环境行为的影响

考察社会观察对亲环境行为的影响以及社会距离的作用。实验1通过多试次的绿色消费范式探讨有、无互惠的社会观察的对亲环境行为的影响。结果发现无互惠的社会观察并未对亲环境行为产生影响;而在有互惠的社会观察条件下被试的亲环境行为大于无观察条件（控制条件）。实验2通过操纵决策者和环境结果承担者的社会距离进一步探讨社会距离与社会观察对亲环境行为的影响。结果发现,当环境结果的承担者指向熟人和陌生人时,被试在社会观察条件下的亲环境行为大于控制条件;而当环境结果的承担者指向密友时无此差异。这些结果说明,社会观察情境下人们为了将来获益会出于名誉的策略考虑而表现出更加积极的亲环境行为,社会距离可调节社会观察对亲环境行为的影响。     

公共资源两难管理的社会学习过程和动机释放机制

公共资源两难的根本问题是个人经济利益与社会整体利益的矛盾。一些人为了追逐个人利益最大,过度获取公共资源,走向＂公共的悲剧＂,或不愿为公共资源作出贡献,＂搭便车＂现象流行。传统的研究从理性经济人的角度探讨公共资源两难博弈行为的机制,用＂贪婪＂来解释＂搭便车＂现象,并根据强化理论以奖励和惩罚作为主要对策。但是,这种理性经济人观点忽视了人的社会动机。实际上,公共资源两难博弈是一个社会互动的过程,人的社会心理因素在其中起了很重要的作用,因此在方法论上有必要从社会人（Homo socius）的人性观来进行分析。本文在当前的相关研究文献基础上,分析了公共资源两难博弈行为的动机模式,从社会学习理论出发,提出了公共资源两难管理的社会学习过程和动机释放机制。     

囚徒困境博弈中对手面部表情对合作行为的影响及其作用机制

3个实验逐步深入地考察了囚徒困境博弈中, 对手的高兴、中性和愤怒面部表情对个体合作行为的影响及相关变量的中介和调节作用。实验1的结果表明, 对手的高兴表情比愤怒表情诱发了更高的合作水平, 且高兴和中性表情均比愤怒表情产生了更高的合作预期, 合作预期中介了面部表情与合作行为的关系; 实验2引入指导语操纵被试的直觉或理性决策模式, 发现实验1的结果仅出现在直觉条件下, 却未出现在理性条件下, 且整体而言直觉决策模式下比理性决策模式下更合作; 实验3采用更加严格的时间压力范式操纵被试的直觉或理性决策模式, 发现除了高兴表情比中性表情也诱发了更多的合作行为外, 其他几乎复制了实验2的结果。基于这些结果, 建立了有调节的中介模型, 以期揭示他人面部表情、合作预期、合作行为及个体决策模式之间的复杂关系。     

从演化博弈看文化的形成与稳定

从演化博弈视角看,文化的形成与稳定可以视为多个纯纳什均衡的演化稳定过程。演化稳定策略(ESS)可以很好地解释这个过程。从演化博弈的角度研究群体文化的形成,用演化博弈的基本观点和方法进行社会行为解读,有助于解释群体成员的行为模式。文化的演化可以用演化博弈思想加以解释:文化的形成是一个演化稳定的过程。一个群体文化的形成过程,在博弈框架下可以看成群体成员在某个策略上实现合作的过程。     

价值取向与社会距离影响经济决策的合作与冲突行为：Chicken Game的证据

采用Chicken Game博弈任务,考察了不同社会价值取向个体（亲社会者与亲自我者）在面对不同社会距离的博弈对手（朋友和陌生人）时表现出的合作与冲突行为。研究结果发现：（1）社会价值取向与社会距离交互影响个体的合作与冲突行为;（2）社会价值取向影响选择策略的反应时,亲社会者选择合作的反应时长于选择冲突的反应时,亲自我者选择合作与选择冲突的反应时没有显著差异;（3）无论对亲社会者还是亲自我者,反馈类型都显著影响个体的合作与冲突行为的选择率以及随后决策的反应时。上述结果表明,个体的合作或冲突行为,并非单一地受到社会价值取向的影响,更可能是受到个人因素（社会价值取向）与其他社会因素（比如,社会距离）的共同调节,并且在这一过程中个体会根据决策后反馈信息不断的调整自己的行为策略。     

Social Identification and a Solution to Social Dilemmas

The study explored whether cooperation could be promoted by identification with an in-group. A game was used to create two groups independent of each other. Thirty-six Japanese undergraduate students participated in the game, followed by a social dilemma game. Analysis revealed a two-factor structure of social identification: identification with the group and identification with its members. As predicted from social identity theory, subjects showed a significantly higher level of cooperation when the dilemma game was played with in-group members than with out-group members. Furthermore, identification with the group affected both in-group bias and cooperative behavior in the social dilemma game, but this effect was not found for identification with members.     

An experimental test of a game‐theoretical model of reciprocity

In this contribution the norm of reciprocity is defined as a basic internal motivation. Using formal tools of game theory, a model of social utility function is presented. The reciprocity model predicts that social actors should reciprocate costs and benefits they receive, even when there are costs in conforming to the norm. Hypotheses about actors' behavior, expectations and evaluations are derived from the model. The hypotheses were tested in an experimental situation, the reciprocity game, consisting of a prisoner's dilemma game (PD) followed by a dictator game (DG). The sample was composed of 74 Italian undergraduate students. In line with the model's predictions, the experimental results showed that participants reciprocate the behavior of the opponent in the PD. In the DG, if the opponent cooperated, participants gave back an almost equal share, whereas if the opponent defected, participants gave a minimal amount. These reciprocity effects are modulated by individual differences in the concern for reciprocity. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Melioration behaviour in the Harvard game is reduced by simplifying decision outcomes

Self-control experiments have previously been highlighted as examples of suboptimal decision making. In one such experiment, the Harvard game, participants make repeated choices between two alternatives. One alternative has a higher immediate pay-off than the other, but with repeated choices results in a lower overall pay-off. Preference for the alternative with the higher immediate pay-off seems to be impulsive and will result in a failure to maximize pay-offs. We report an experiment that modifies the Harvard game, dividing the pay-off from each choice into two separate consequences—the immediate and the historic components. Choosing the alternative with the higher immediate pay-off ends the session prematurely, leading to a loss of opportunities to earn further pay-offs and ultimately to a reduced overall pay-off. This makes it easier for participants to learn the outcomes of their actions. It also provides the opportunity for a further test of normative decision making by means of one of its most specific and paradoxical predictions—that the truly rational agent should switch from self-control to impulsivity toward the end of the experimental sessions. The finding that participants maximize their expected utility by both overcoming impulsivity and learning to switch implies that melioration behaviour is not due to the lure of impulsivity, but due to the difficulty of learning which components are included in the pay-off schedules.     

Equilibrium behavior and repeated play of the prisoner's dilemma

This paper examines a model of the prisoner's dilemma in which the nature of the Nash equilibria of the game can be varied. Two equilibrium indices are derived and are compared with two cooperation indices proposed by Rapoport and Chammah (1965). Preliminary experimental results indicate that the nature of the equilibria of a game affect the amount of cooperation.     

社会价值取向与损失情境对不同时间压力下双人社会困境中合作行为的影响

为揭示双人社会困境中合作行为的影响因素,选取四种不同类型的双人社会困境,采用实验法考察社会价值取向与损失情境对不同时间压力下合作行为的影响。结果显示,亲社会个体的合作率显著高于亲自我个体的合作率,收益情境下的合作率显著高于损失情境下的合作率,在社会困境中双方冲突程度越大合作率越低;此外,高时间压力提升了亲自我个体在囚徒困境以及收益情境下信任困境中的合作率,同时降低了亲自我个体在损失情境下最大差异困境中的合作率。结果表明,社会价值取向、收益损失情境以及困境冲突程度均对合作行为的发生具有影响作用,而时间压力对合作行为的作用也同样受到三者的影响。这些发现能够为合作行为自动性的理论分歧提供新的证据。     

Social learning under the labeling effect: Exploring travellers’ behavior in social dilemmas

This paper presents results of a laboratory experiment, in which subjects made choices between public and private transportation when managing Personal Carbon Allowances (PCAs). The objectives of this study were twofold. Firstly, it was aimed at investigating the labeling effect under the social dilemma context. Secondly, it showed insights into the decision-making process when feedback about others’ choices was provided. A combination of the labeling effect and feedback helped individuals change their commuting pattern and increase the number of trips by public transportation under the PCAs regime. Feedback on others’ choices resulted in social learning and incentivized choice of public transportation more frequently in social dilemma situations.     

Two Egocentric Sources of the Decision to Vote: The Voter's Illusion and the Belief in Personal Relevance

The decision to vote in a national election requires a choice between serving a social good and satisfying one's self-interest. Viewed as a cooperative response in a social dilemma, casting a vote seems irrational because it cannot have a discernible effect on the electoral outcome. The findings of two studies with undergraduate samples suggest that some people vote not because they set aside self-interest, but because they expect their own behaviors to matter. Two psychological processes contribute to this belief: the voter's illusion (the projection of one's own choice between voting and abstention to supporters of the same party or candidate), and the belief in personal relevance (the belief that one's own vote matters regardless of its predictive value for the behavior of others). The rationality of these two egocentric mechanisms depends on the normative framework invoked. Their relevance for actual voting behavior is indicated by their ability to account for four types of variation in turnout rates.     

社会价值取向和反馈方式对公共物品困境中决策行为的影响

本研究通过模拟投资实验和问卷来探讨重复型公共物品困境中社会价值取向（SVO）与信息反馈方式对决策行为的影响。结果表明：(1)合作型SVO的个体比非合作型个体表现出更多的合作行为;(2)SVO与信息反馈方式的交互作用岁实验轮次越来越显著,非合作型的个体会受信息反馈方式的影响,而合作型个体则不易受反馈方式的影响;(3)与无反馈的条件相比,集体反馈倾向于促进个体的合作行为,个体反馈倾向于抑制合作行为,但反馈所造成的适应性改变使情况更为复杂。     

Decision making in the prisoner's dilemma game: The effect of exit on cooperation and social welfare

The prisoner's dilemma game is a mixed‐motive game that offers two players the simultaneous choice between a cooperative and a defective alternative. An often neglected aspect of such a binary‐choice game, however, is that in many real‐life encounters, people can choose not only to cooperate or defect, but they also have a third option: to exit the social dilemma. Although in the literature a consensus has emerged that the addition of an exit opportunity benefits cooperation, there is only scant research into its effect on social welfare. In order to allow a direct comparison of cooperation rates and welfare levels across binary‐choice and trinary‐choice games, in this study, we used a design in which the same participants played similar games with and without an exit option (i.e., a within‐subjects design), and this in a range of structural variations. The findings of our study indicated that the aggregated outcome of both players is generally lower in games with an exit option than in games without an exit option. Moreover, our results showed that the efficiency of the exit option strongly depends on the specific outcome structure of the game (in terms of its endowment size, (a)symmetry, and level of noncorrespondence). In the discussion, it is argued that the implementation of an exit option as a strategy to increase social welfare should be critically assessed.