Scepticism: Epistemic and Ontological

It is widely thought that sceptical arguments, if correct, would show that everyday empirical knowledge-claims are false. Against this, I argue that the very generality of traditional sceptical arguments means that there is no direct incompatibility between everyday empirical claims and sceptical scenarios. Scepticism calls into doubt, not ordinary empirical beliefs, but philosophical attempts to give a deep ontological explanation of such beliefs. G. E. Moore's attempt to refute scepticism (and idealism) was unsuccessful, because it failed to recognise that philosophical scepticism operates on a different level from that on which we make – or doubt – particular empirical claims. And, as I argue with specific reference to work by Nozick and Fogelin, Moore's basic confusion is still widely shared in contemporary discussions of scepticism.     

Problems for Linguistic Solutions to the Paradox of Analysis

G. E. Moore opined that the paradox of analysis might be avoided if it could be shown that sentences expressing conceptual analyses convey information not only about concepts, but also about the expressions they use. If so, "to be a brother is to be a male sibling" and "to be a brother is to be a brother" might express the same proposition, and yet not be identical in information value as the paradox suggests. How sentences might do this, Moore could not see. Many philosophers have pointed out an obvious way in which sentences might be said to convey information about the expressions they use. Some have suggested this information might be used to develop Moore's intuition and resolve the paradox of analysis. I argue that this approach fails. I present a version of the paradox of analysis that resists this sort of solution.     

From an axiological standpoint

I maintain that intrinsic value is the fundamental concept of axiology. Many contemporary philosophers disagree; they say the proper object of value theory is final value. I examine three accounts of the nature of final value: the first claims that final value is non‐instrumental value; the second claims that final value is the value a thing has as an end; the third claims that final value is ultimate or non‐derivative value. In each case, I argue that the concept of final value described is either identical with the classical notion of intrinsic value or is not a plausible candidate for the primary concept of axiology.     

Two Kinds of Organic Unity

This paper distinguishes two interpretations of G. E. Moore's principle of organic unities, which says that the intrinsic value of a whole need not equal the sum of the intrinsic values its parts would have outside it. A holistic interpretation, which was Moore's own, says that parts retain their values when they enter a whole but that there can be an additional value in the whole as a whole that must be added to them. The conditionality interpretation, which has been defended by Korsgaard, says that parts can change their values when they enter wholes, so no additional value is needed. The paper shows that the two interpretations, which differ on such apparently important issues as the nature of intrinsic value, can always yield the same conclusions about the overall value in a state of affairs, so there is in that sense nothing to choose between them. At the same time, though, the differences between the interpretations make sometimes one and sometimes the other more appropriate for expressing a given evaluative view. In this last connection the paper considers views about beauty, posthumous achievement, vices of disproportion, deserved and compassionate pain, and undeserved and malicious pleasure.     

Organic Unities, Non-Trade-Off, and the Additivity of Intrinsic Value

Whether or not intrinsic valueis additively measurable is often thought todepend on the truth or falsity of G. E. Moore'sprinciple of organic unities. I argue that thetruth of this principle is, contrary to received opinion, compatible with additivemeasurement. However, there are other veryplausible evaluative claims that are moredifficult to combine with the additivity ofintrinsic value. A plausible theory of the goodshould allow that there are certain kinds ofstates of affairs whose intrinsic value cannotbe outweighed by any number of states ofcertain other, less valuable, kinds. Such``non-trade-off' cannot reasonably be explainedin terms of organic unities, and it can bereconciled with the additivity thesis only ifwe are prepared to give up some traditionalclaims about the nature of intrinsic value.     

The early Russell on the metaphysics of substance in Leibniz and Bradley

While considerable ink has been spilt over the rejection of idealism by Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore at the end of the 19th Century, relatively little attention has been directed at Russell’s A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, a work written in the early stages of Russell’s philosophical struggles with the metaphysics of Bradley, Bosanquet, and others. Though a sustained investigation of that work would be one of considerable scope, here I reconstruct and develop a two-pronged argument from the Philosophy of Leibniz that Russell fancied—as late as 1907—to be the downfall of the traditional category of substance. Here, I suggest, one can begin to see Russell’s own reasons—arguments largely independent of Moore—for the abandonment of idealism. Leibniz, no less than Bradley, adhered to an antiquated variety of logic: what Russell refers to as the subject-predicate doctrine of logic. Uniting this doctrine with a metaphysical principle of independence—that a substance is prior to and distinct from its properties—Russell is able to demonstrate that neither a substance pluralism nor a substance monism can be consistently maintained. As a result, Russell alleges that the metaphysics of both Leibniz and Bradley has been undermined as ultimately incoherent. Russell’s remedy for this incoherence is the postulation of a bundle theory of substance, such that the category of “substance” reduces to the most basic entities—properties.     

Intrinsicalism and Conditionalism about Final Value

The paper distinguishes between two rival views about the nature of final value (i.e. the value something has for its own sake) — intrinsicalism and conditionalism. The former view (which is the one adopted by G.E. Moore and several later writers) holds that the final value of any F supervenes solely on features intrinsic to F, while the latter view allows that the final value of F may supervene on features non-intrinsic to F. Conditionalism thus allows the final value of F to vary according to the context in which F appears. Given the plausible assumption that there is an intimate tie between final values and appropriate attitudinal responses, it appears that conditionalism is the better approach for mainly the following three reasons: First, intrinsicalism is too indiscriminate, which makes it subject to what I call ‘location problems’ of final value. I illustrate this problem by discussing alleged examples of Moorean organic unities. Second, intrinsicalism evokes symptoms of ‘evaluative schizophrenia’. Third, considerations of theoretical economy tell in favour of conditionalism. Thereafter I respond to some recent challenges to conditionalism. An appendix surveys some meritorious implications that conditionalism offers for various substantial versions of such structurally different views about value as monism, pluralism, and particularism.     

In Defence of the Open Question Argument

The purpose of this paper is to defend G. E. Moore's open question argument, understood as an argument directed against analytic reductionism, the view that moral properties are analytically reducible to non-moral properties. In the first section I revise Moore's argument in order to make it as plausible and resistant against objections as possible. In the following two sections I develop the argument further and defend it against the most prominent objections raised against it. The conclusion of my line of reasoning is that the open question argument offers the best explanation of our responses to the questions put in the argument, namely that analytic reductionism is mistaken. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The relationship of the inner and the outer in psychoanalysis

What is internal and what is external according to psychoanalytic theory? This is a surprisingly complicated question. The terminology is often ambiguous and inconsistent as, for instance, in the use of terms like ‘object’ and ‘other’. The relationship between internal and external in psychoanalysis is analysed from a philosophical, concept analytical, developmental psychological, methodological and trauma versus internal dynamics point of view. It is argued that psychoanalytical writing is influenced by the authors’ need to create their personal psychoanalytic theory and language. This is seen as one of the main reasons for the terminological variety and ambiguity in psychoanalytic writing. It is also argued that one particular reason for difficulties concerning the internal–external terminology is the existential anxiety awakened by the threat of the essential aloneness of man. The consciousness of this has a tendency to fade and lead to unclear terminology. The importance of the transitional world as a resting place from the hard reality of this essential aloneness is emphasized. The transitional world is also seen as a necessary part of psychoanalytical practice, as an aid in striving for the truth and reality, important goals of psychoanalysis.     

Analysing Personal Value

It is argued that the so-called fitting attitude- or buck-passing pattern of analysis may be applied to personal values too (and not only to impersonal values, which is the standard analysandum) if the analysans is fine-tuned in the following way: An object has personal value for a person a, if and only if there is reason to favour it for a’s sake (where “favour” is a place-holder for different pro-responses that are called for by the value bearer). One benefit with it is its wide range: different kinds of values are analysable by the same general formula. Moreover, by situating the distinguishing quality in the attitude rather than the reason part, the analysis admits that personal value is recognizable as a value not only by the person for whom it has personal value, but for everyone else too. We thereby avoid facing two completely different notions of value, viz., one pertaining to impersonal value, and another to personal value. The analysis also elucidates why we are (at least pro tanto) justified in our concern for objects that are valuable for us; if value just is, as it is suggested, the existence of reasons for such a concern, the justification is immediately forthcoming.     

The Conditions of Philosophy in Totalitarian and Post-Totalitarian Poland

This compound paper presents the views of two Polish philosophers on the strong international pressures influencing the development of Polish philosophy in recent times. The first part, by Leszek Koczanowicz, treats the philosophical situation and problems of totalitarian Poland under the influence of Soviet Marxism, while the second part, by Adam Chmielewski, focuses on the main trends and difficulties of post-totalitarian Poland, dominated by Western influence.     

思想考古方法与中国哲学史研究

中国哲学史研究中长期运用的主要方法是经典的解读及理论的分析,但这种方法并不是惟一的、完全没有问题或缺陷的,所以,必须引入一些新的方法如思想考古的方法予以补充。所谓思想考古,即是借鉴历史学和人类文化学等学科的田野调查方法,去思想家生活、求学、家居、从业的地方进行详细的实地考察,以感受和体验研究对象的情感、思绪,把思想家的思想还原为在具体情境中的思想,找到其思想学说或行为的外在根据,并进而印证或质疑某些史书中对思想家的言行记载,对某些语焉不详的史料或有争议的问题做出分析与考辨。     

The dispositional shift in attribution over time

Two experiments examined the effect of time on causal attributions. In Experiment I, subjects who described themselves into a tape recorder assumed more personal responsibility for their behavior after 3 weeks' time than others who explained their behavior immediately after its occurrence. In Experiment II, actor-subjects took part in a getting acquainted conversation and explained their behavior more dispositionally and less situationally after 3 weeks' time than they had initially, while observer-subjects experienced no change over time. Results were interpreted in terms of an altered self-perspective in memory and the diminished salience of situational details over time.     

公正世界信念：概念、测量、及研究热点

公正世界信念是美国心理学家Lerner最先提出的一个概念,即人们需要相信他们所处的世界是一个公正有序的世界,在这样一个世界里,人们得其所应得,并且所得即应得。公正世界信念为个体提供了一种对世界的可控制感,从而使人贯注于长远目标,并遵循社会规范行事。这对个体适应复杂的物理和社会环境具有重要意义。文章对公正世界信念的概念、测量、及当前的研究热点进行了简要介绍,并且指出,探讨公正世界信念与其他心理公正研究诸分支的区别和联系,借鉴内隐社会认知、内隐动机研究中的一些技术方法来研究公正世界信念,深入探索公正世界信念发挥作用的潜意识机制,可能是这一领域研究的发展方向     

The occurrence of paraphasias in the spontaneous speech of children with an acquired aphasia

Two children with an acquired aphasia were observed during the recovery process. In the spontaneous speech, paraphasias belonging to different categories, such as neologisms, verbal paraphasias, and literal paraphasias, were found. Especially with regard to neologisms the time of investigation was very important. In addition, one child with a phonemic jargon aphasia and one child with a fluent aphasia and empty speech were observed. These observations implicate a modification of the current clinical picture of childhood aphasia. Some aspects are discussed in relation to adult aphasia.     

The effects of cue distinctiveness on infants' manual search

Nine- and sixteen-month-old infants were repeatedly presented a manual search problem in which a toy was hidden in one of two containers, which were then moved into reach. The distinctiveness of the containers or their closeness during the movement was varied in different conditions. Overall, the older infants performed better than younger infants, performance improved across trials, and there were more correct searches when the containers or trajectories were distinctive. Analyses of visual orienting indicated that infants learned to restrict their looking to the hiding place. The ability to maintain attention to discriminative cues may be instrumental to progress in delayed-reaction and object permanence tasks.     

Precocious conservation in context: The solution of quantity tasks by nonquantitative strategies

C. Sinha and B. Carabine's (1981, Journal of Child Language, 8, 109–129) claim of a U-shaped course to the development of quantitative knowledge with an early stage of conservation based on functional significance was tested in two experiments. Children at three age groups from 3 to 6 years were presented with the original procedure or control versions in which the display was slightly altered. Results showed that although Sinha and Carabine's result was replicable, their interpretation is unwarranted. Performance in the younger groups was best interpreted as the use of nonquantitative possession or position strategies.     

The RNA World and Divine Action in and Through Quantum Mechanics

ABSTRACT

Life emerged on Earth approximately 4.1 billion years ago. Current scholarship on the origin of life supports the RNA world scenario, although controversy still goes on. This article examines the origin issue in light of a divine action theory proposed by Robert J. Russell. Although the author himself has not much considered the issue in light of the divine action, the article is still fruitful in the sense that the origin of life issue is now incorporated into the dialogue with divine action, and also that Russell’s divine action theory can be reconsidered in a new context.