Solving Wollheim's Dilemma: A Fix for the Institutional Definition of Art

Richard Wollheim threatened George Dickie's institutional definition of art with a dilemma which entailed that the theory is either redundant or incomprehensible and useless. This article modifies the definition to avoid such criticism. First, it shows that the definition's concept of the artworld is not vague when understood as a conventional system of beliefs and practices. Then, based on Gaut's cluster theory, it provides an account of reasons artworld members have to confer the status of a candidate for appreciation. An authorised member of an artworld has a good reason to confer the status on an object if it satisfies a subset of criteria respected as sufficient within this artworld. The first horn of the dilemma is averted because explaining the reasons behind conferral cannot eliminate references to the institution, and the second loses its sharpness, as accepting partial arbitrariness of the conferral does not deprive the theory of its explanatory power.     

Hegel,Danto, Adorno,and the end and after of art

In this paper, I consider Adorno's claim that art is at, or is coming to, an ‘end’. I consider Adorno's account in relation to the work of Arthur Danto and G. W. F. Hegel. I employ Danto's account, together with two distinct interpretive glosses of Hegel's account, as heuristic devices in order to clarify both Adorno's own arguments, and the context within which they are being advanced. I argue that while Danto and Hegel see art as coming to an end autonomously, owing to art's successful realization of its governing principle, Adorno by contrast sees art as coming to an end heteronomously. Art's narrative is forcibly broken off, rather than completed. Adorno's account, indebted to Hegel, of art's commitment both to autonomy and the realization of ‘spiritual needs’ is explored in order to clarify how, on Adorno's view, this has happened to art; and why, precisely, he believes art is coming to an end.     

The effects of visual context and individual differences on perception and evaluation of modern art and graffiti art

Traditionally, artworks are seen as autonomous objects that stand (or should stand) on their own. However, at least since the emergence of Conceptual Art in the 1920s and Pop Art in the 1960s, art lacks any distinctive perceptual features that define it as such. Art, therefore, cannot be defined without reference to its context. Some studies have shown that context affects the evaluation of artworks, and that specific contexts (street for graffiti art, museum for modern art) elicit specific effects (Gartus & Leder, 2014). However, it is yet unclear how context changes perception and appreciation processes. In our study we measured eye-movements while participants (64 psychology undergraduates, 48% women) perceived and evaluated beauty, interest, emotional valence, as well as perceived style for modern art and graffiti art embedded into either museum or street contexts. For modern art, beauty and interest ratings were higher in a museum than in a street context, but context made no difference for the ratings of graffiti art. Importantly, we also found an interaction of context and individual interest in graffiti for beauty and interest ratings, as well as for number of fixations. Analyses of eye-movements also revealed that viewing times were in general significantly longer in museum than in street contexts. We conclude that context can have an important influence on aesthetic appreciation. However, some effects depend also on the style of the artworks and the individual art interests of the viewers.     

Sometimes frequently means seldom: Context effects in the interpretation of quantitative expressions

Subjects supplied numerical definitions for five quantitative expressions embedded in two high-frequency contexts, one moderate-frequency context, two low-frequency contexts, and with no context specified. Mean definitions differed significantly across contexts and expressions with a Context-Expression interaction (p < .01). The variance in definition of an expression embedded in a context generally increased with the discrepancy between its no-context definition and the context event's estimated frequency (p < .05). Variance in the definitions of the sampled expressions gathered over diverse contexts increased with the expression's no-context definition (p < .05). Thus, the mean and variance of an expression's numerical definitions depended upon both the expression and its context.     

Art from a Wittgensteinian Perspective: Constitutive Norms in Context

This article offers a detailed textual reexamination of the ‘family resemblance’ passages to reconsider their implications for understanding art. The reassessment takes into account their broader context in the Philosophical Investigations, including the rule following considerations, and draws on a realist interpretive framework associated principally with the work of Cavell, Diamond, McDowell, and Putnam. Wittgensteinian “realism with a human face” helps us discern that the primary issue is not whether certain concepts are definable, posing a stark opposition between essentialism and its denial about kinds such as language or games. What is at issue is keeping uses of language in view in their variety and their broader life contexts. Focus on rules suggests more broadly that norms and values inhere in practices and play a constitutive role in determining the entities integral to those practices. From this perspective, a Wittgensteinian framework explains art as locally overlapping practices, each with their own constitutive norms and values for the works integral to them. What makes something art has normative force specific to a practice. This recognizes the historically contingent nature of art practices in a way that relational definitions or disjunctive ‘cluster’ explanations do not.     

Contemporary Art and Contemporary Sport in the Arabian Peninsula

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the relationship between the development of art and sport in the Arabian Peninsula. In particular, it will be argued that both sport and art can be understood in terms of a trajectory from the ‘modern’ to the ‘contemporary’. Modernity and modernism are introduced through an interpretation of Paul Delaunay’s series of paintings ‘The Cardiff Team’ (1912–22) which may be read as an expression of modernity. The content of the paintings documents core elements of European modernist culture, including technology and science, leisure, consumerism and advertising, and crucially (international) sport. Delaunay’s work provides a background from which to reflect upon the development of sport into something like its contemporary form, in early 20th Europe. By drawing on Terry Smith’s analysis of the difference between modern and contemporary art, and applying this to sport, in order to suggest that there is a distinctive contemporary form of sport, the core tensions within both artistic and sporting practices are argued to lie in the movement from a conception of sport as an expression of modernity, where this is conceived as a universal movement, exemplified by Western humanism, towards a conception of sport as something particularised, expressive of local cultures. The promotion of art institutions and sports events within the Arabian Peninsula highlights the resultant tensions between the neo-colonial influence of Western culture and the reinterpretation of that culture, locally, in order to reflect upon and articulate communal identity within the contexts of globalism and transnationalism.     

The History of Vision

One of the most influential ideas of twentieth‐century art history and aesthetics is that vision has a history and it is the task of art history to trace how vision has changed. This claim has recently been attacked for both empirical and conceptual reasons. My aim is to argue for a new version of the history of vision claim: if visual attention has a history, then vision also has a history. And we have some reason to think that at least in certain contexts (namely, in the context of looking at pictures), visual attention does have a history.     

The Art Therapy Practice Research Network: Hurdles,pitfalls and achievements

Aim: This article gives an overview of the setting up of the Art Therapy Practice Research Network (ATPRN) in 2000, amidst a culture resistant to research. The authors discuss their experiences in changing this culture and encouraging art therapists to become practitioner/researchers. They identify learning points that may be helpful for other professionals who want to form new practice research networks (PRNs). Context: The research and practice context contemporary to the ATPRN foundation is outlined and identified as a significant influence on its inception and development. Key events in the 14 years of the PRN's life and articles on art therapy and psychotherapy research published at the time of the ATPRN foundation are used to illuminate the historical context. ATPRN newsletters and symposium reports were consulted to identify themes and issues across 14 years of development and growth. Learning points: Several learning points are identified and listed as useful factors to address when setting up and maintaining a PRN and include: shape the culture from the start; review and revise; get practical together; encourage members' presentations; build synergy with professional body; embed the ATPRN around all aspects of research publication. Conclusions: Successful PRNs depend on making practitioners feel included from the start by acknowledging fear and anxiety about research. Providing practical projects helped practitioners to feel less isolated by being part of a meaningful and productive network. Maintaining and developing PRNs is an iterative process that demands constant reviewing and revising.     

Totalitarianism and the problem of Soviet art evaluation: the Lithuanian case

By taking into account dissident/political and art historical interpretations of Soviet art, I analyze how polemics about totalitarianism in the West, which generally corresponded with Cold War debates and Eastern European dissident thought, shaped the post-Soviet evaluations of national artistic legacies. It is argued that the political relationship with the totalitarian past, like in many post-socialist areas where the immediate past was subjected to radical re-evaluation, affected Lithuanian artists’ and critics’ attitude towards local Soviet art. Because of an obvious lack of underground art in Soviet Lithuania, however, the retrospective usage of political categories here became problematic. Especially in international representations, the complexities of artists’ relationship with officialdom came to be routinely assigned to the phenomenon of non-conformism; this eventually obfuscated the differences between the Lithuanian Soviet art context as somewhat different from the Russian case.

On domain differences in categorization and context variety

Membership in many natural categories is considered all-or-none, while membership in most artifact categories is found to be graded. We introduce an alternative for the prevailing view that this domain difference in categorization results from representational differences. The context variety account posits that an item’s gradedness reflects the variety of contexts it appears in. Items that feature in a variety of contexts are assumed to be more likely to elicit a graded categorization response, since the suggested target category only provides one of many solutions to the question of the item’s identity. We review earlier work that suggested a domain difference in context variety, with artifactual items appearing in a greater variety of contexts than natural ones. The context variety domain difference is established in two separate experiments but is shown not to explain the domain difference in categorization. A selection of artifactual and natural items, for which the domain difference in context variety is reversed, is presented for categorization in a third experiment. This selection, too, fails to provide evidence for the context variety account of categorization differences. The domain difference in categorization is shown to be robust against this manipulation. Context variety appears to have no bearing on categorization, so the context variety account is not a sustainable alternative to accounts that posit representational differences between natural and artifact categories.     

What Invariance Is and How to Test for It

Causal assessment is the problem of establishing whether a relation between (variable) X and (variable) Y is causal. This problem, to be sure, is widespread across the sciences. According to accredited positions in the philosophy of causality and in social science methodology, invariance under intervention provides the most reliable test to decide whether X causes Y. This account of invariance (under intervention) has been criticised, among other reasons, because it makes manipulations on the putative causal factor fundamental for the causal methodology; consequently, the argument goes, the account is ill-suited to those contexts where manipulations are not performed, for instance, the social sciences. The article aims to extend the account of invariance (under intervention), in a way that manipulations on the putative causal factors are not methodologically fundamental, and yet invariance remains key for causal assessment both in experimental and non-experimental contexts.     

In defence of a perspectival semantics for ‘know’

Relativism offers an ingenious way of accommodating most of our intuitions about ‘know’: the truth-value of sentences containing ‘know’ is a function of parameters determined by a context of use and a context of assessment. This sort of double-indexing provides a more adequate account of the linguistic data involving ‘know’ than does standard contextualism. However, relativism has come under recent attack: it supposedly cannot account for the factivity of ‘know’, and it entails, counterintuitively, that circumstances of evaluation have features that cannot be shifted by any intensional operator. I offer replies to these objections on behalf of the relativist. I then argue that a version of contextualism can account for the same data as relativism without relativizing sentence truth to contexts of assessment. This version of contextualism is thus preferable to relativism on methodological grounds.     

Thought and action

There are perennial disputes about the scope of reason in human affairs. Some say we can never reason about ends; we can reason only about means. Others argue that this Humean view is mistaken. Still others claim that the crucial and typical use of ‘reason’ in moral contexts is both moralistic and somehow illusory. It seems to me that there are serious confusions in all these traditional contentions. Reason is not the slave of the passions, and although there is a distinctive use of ‘reason’ in moral contexts there is nothing moralistic or illusory about it. The temptation to think there is is dispelled once proper note is taken of 1) the distinction between causes and reasons, 2) the proper context of causal explanations and explanations and justifications by reasons, 3) the distinctive roles of ‘I want...’ and ‘I wish...’ and 4) the diverse, context‐dependent, uses of ‘reason’.     

Tragic Dilemmas and the Priority of the Moral

My purpose in this paper is to argue that we are not vulnerableto inescapable wrongdoing occasioned by tragic dilemmas. I directmy argument to those who are most inclined to accept tragicdilemmas: those of broadly Nietzschean inclination who reject``modern moral philosophy' in favor of the ethical ideas of theclassical Greeks. Two important features of their project are todeny the usefulness of the ``moral/nonmoral distinction,' and todeny that what are usually classified as moral reasons always oreven characteristically ``trump' nonmoral reasons in anadmirable agent's deliberations.I show critics of modern moral philosophy such as BernardWilliams that their acceptance of tragic dilemmas underminestheir project of denying the moral/nonmoral distinction and thepriority of moral reasons. The possibility of tragic dilemmasrequires an account of practical deliberation in which moralreasons appear as already in-force obligations, with blame andguilt ready to be invoked, while nonmoral reasons appear as merereasons. This makes moral reasons importantly different fromnonmoral reasons in how they achieve their deliberative weight,and also makes them characteristically weightier. Thus,accommodating tragic dilemmas reinforces the moral/nonmoraldistinction and the priority of moral reasons, the very thingsthese critics want to deny. By accepting the possibility oftragic dilemmas, these critics are undermining their own project.The standard normative theories are dead set against tragicdilemmas, and the critics of modern moral philosophy shouldreject tragic dilemmas for the good of their project. Thus we allshould reject tragic dilemmas.     

Good education,the good teacher,and a practical art of living a good life: a Catholic perspective

What is good education? We value education for reasons connected to the good provided by education in society. This good is connected to be the pedagogical aim of education. This article distinguishes five criteria for good education based on the concept of ‘Bildung’.

Next, these five criteria are used to develop the idea of the good teacher. The rationale behind the analysis is that the good teacher should be able to realise what we consider to be good education. There are different traditions of religiously affiliated schools in the world. This article gives insight into the idea of the good teacher in two documents of the Catholic Congregation of Education on the lay teacher. Finally, the article focuses on the formation of a practical art of living a good life. Again, the five characteristics of good education structure the analysis of this type of educational formation.     

What Can Be Learned from the Arts About Aging?

This brief article examines some of the theoretical questions raised by aesthetics. Paintings have not only form and content, but are underpinned by philosophical principles that connect art to gerontology. We examine specific theoretical messages of a trend in art that have important implications for conceptualizing humans, including their interactions and surroundings. Three artists are used to illustrate this trend: Cezanne, Picasso, and Pollock. These and other artists of this century foster a heightened awareness of humanistic concerns. Caught between abstract reason and expert systems on the one hand, and the life worlds of older people on the other, gerontology finds itself in a place where art can speak to its deeper concerns in unique ways.     

WHAT IT TAKES TO LIVE PHILOSOPHICALLY: OR,HOW TO PROGRESS IN THE ART OF LIVING

This essay presents an account of what it takes to live a philosophical way of life: practitioners must be committed to a worldview, structure their lives around it, and engage in truth-directed practices. Contra John Cooper, it does not require that one’s life be solely guided by reason. Religious or tradition-based ways of life count as truth directed as long as their practices are reasons responsive and would be truth directed if the claims made by their way of life are correct. The essay argues that these three conditions can be met by progressors as well as sages. Making progress in how one acts in the world, and improving one’s understanding and direction through being part of a community is living a philosophical way of life. The offered view acknowledges more ways to develop the art of living and enables a broader range of people to count as living philosophically.     

BASIC REASONS AND FIRST PHILOSOPHY: A COHERENTIST VIEW OF REASONS

This paper develops and defends a coherentist account of reasons. I develop three core ideas for this defense: a distinction between basic reasons and noninferential justification, the plausibility of the neglected argument against first philosophy, and an emergent account of reasons. These three ideas form the backbone for a credible coherentist view of reasons. I work toward this account by formulating and explaining the basic reasons dilemma. This dilemma reveals a wavering attitude that coherentists have had toward basic reasons. More importantly, the basic reasons dilemma focuses our attention on the central problems that afflict coherentist views of basic beliefs. By reflecting on the basic reasons dilemma, I formulate three desiderata that any viable coherentist account of basic beliefs must satisfy. I argue that the account on offer satisfies these desiderata.     

Following the law because it’s the law: obedience,bootstrapping, and practical reason

Voluntarists in the early modern period speak of an agent’s following the law because she was ordered to do so or because it’s the law. Contemporary philosophers tend either to ignore or to dismiss the possibility of justified obedience of this sort – that is, they ignore or dismiss the possibility that something’s being the law could in itself constitute a good reason to act. In this paper, I suggest that this view isn’t taken seriously because of certain widespread beliefs about practical reason – in particular, it’s due to the belief that it’s impossible for reasons to be “bootstrapped” into existence. I argue, though, that a plausible account of practical reasoning should allow that reasons can be bootstrapped into existence, and so there’s no reason to be suspicious about the possibility of a person’s being justified in following the law because it’s the law. I end by suggesting that this conclusion opens up important new avenues of inquiry for philosophers working on topics related to legal obedience.