Do Good Feminists Compete?

In this paper I argue against the view widely held among feminists that nurturing and competition are incompatible. I also explore the following two more specific objections against competition: (1) competitions are “mini-wars” which encourage hatred; (2) while not “miniwars,” competitions foster a war-like mentality. Underlying these objections is the fear that too strong a sense of self makes war likely by severing connection with others. I argue that because patriarchy encourages women to have too little sense of self, some competition may be useful.     

When Do I Disclose?

SUMMARY

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) heralded a new era of civil rights for the disabled, including the mentally ill. This article concerns Title I of the ADA, protections against discrimination in employment. It is a revised version of an article orginally published in a consumer publication, the MDSG/New York Newsletter (Mood Disorder Support Group) to provide guidance on the pro's and con's of making disclosure of mental illness in the job environment. As such it is a valuable reference for both therapists and service recipients who wish to learn more about how the ADA relates to the employment of people with mental illness and who may be faced with the difficult decision of whether or not they should disclose their condition and request reasonable accommodation. Occupational therapists should be well-informed on this topic, to assist consumers with questions on disclosure, reasonable accommodations and other aspects of Title T. Employers can benefit by providing them with information about appropriate accommodations. And occupational therapists can advise both consumers and employers on how a psychiatric illness may affect work performance.     

Do Renormalization Group Explanations Conform to the Commonality Strategy?

Renormalization group (RG) explanations account for the astonishing phenomenon that microscopically very different physical systems display the same macro-behavior when undergoing phase-transitions. Among philosophers, this explanandum phenomenon is often described as the occurrence of a particular kind of multiply realized macro-behavior. In several recent publications, Robert Batterman denies that RG explanations account for this explanandum phenomenon by following (what I call) the commonality strategy, i.e. by identifying properties that microscopically very different physical systems have in common. Arguing against Batterman’s claim, I defend the view that RG explanations are in accord with the commonality strategy.     

When is a picture?

Philosophical discussions of depiction sometimes suffer from a lack of differentiation between several questions concerning the ‘nature’ of pictorial representation. To provide a suitable framework I distinguish six such questions and several levels on which one might want to proceed in order to answer some of them. With this background, I reconstruct Goodman's and Elgin's answer to the specific question: ‘What distinguishes the pictorial from the verbal or linguistic?’ I try to reveal some major motivations behind their system-oriented approach and to indicate some reasons why a strategy of this kind is to a certain extent mandatory to grasp the ‘nature of the pictorial’. The system-relative and functional character of depiction has to be captured by every adequate theory.     

Systemic Explanations of Scientific Misconduct: Provoked by Spectacular Cases of Norm Violation?

Journal of Academic Ethics - In the past two decades, individual explanations of scientific misconduct (‘bad apples’) have increasingly given way to systemic explanations (‘bad...     

When is a Deleuzian becoming ?

Much has been written recently about the Deleuzian concept of becoming. Most of that writing, especially in feminist criticism, has drawn from the later collaborations with Guattari. However, the concept of a becoming arises earlier and appears more consistently across the trajectory of Deleuze's work than the discussion of specific becomings might lead one to believe. In this paper, I trace the concept of becoming in Deleuze's work, and specifically in the earlier works. By doing so, I hope to shed some light on the specific becomings that are the focus of the collaborative work with Guattari, and to deepen an understanding of the concept in general.     

Do Problems of Clinic-Referred African-American Children Overlap with the Child Behavior Checklist?

Many factors contribute to children's psychopathology. African-American children, members of the largest U.S. minority group, are reportedly at high risk for psychopathology, but researchers and developers of diagnostic measures seldom focus on them. We surveyed the clinic records of 1,605 African-American children, ages 4–18. Coders recorded children's problems, their gender, and age. They coded children's problems according to the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL). Overlap between some problems African-American children presented and CBCL items emerged but other problems did not match CBCL items. For problems which matched the CBCL, associations between such problems and children's age emerged and boys had more problems than girls. The content and cultural validity of the CBCL for African-American children may, however, be questionable.     

Must the Scientific Realist be a Rationalist?

Marc Alspector-Kelly claims that Bas van Fraassen’s primary challenge to the scientific realist is for the realist to find a way to justify the use of some mode of inference that takes him from the world of observables to knowledge of the world of unobservables without thereby abandoning empiricism. It is argued that any effort to justify such an “inferential wand” must appeal either to synthetic a priori or synthetic a posteriori knowledge. This disjunction turns into a dilemma for the empirically-minded realist as either disjunct leads to unwanted consequences. In this paper, I split the horns of this dilemma by arguing that the realist can justify one particular such mode of inference – abduction – without committing himself to rationalism. The realist may justify this mode of inference by appealing to the analytic a priori axioms of the probability calculus. I show that Peter Lipton’s tripartite defense of abduction constitutes such a method of justification.     

When is a weight not illusory?

Weight illusions occur whenever some aspect of an object--such as its size, material or colour--arouses the expectation that its weight will be heavier or lighter than it actually is. The direction of the illusion normally contrasts with the expected weight. When objects are hidden from sight and lifted by strings they can provide no misleading cues, and a correct weight-expectation should be achieved after one or two trials. When a visible object has the same physical and apparent weight as a hidden object, it can be defined as non-illusory. Weighted tins and polystyrene blocks of various sizes were compared with hidden weights. Tins were found to be non-illusory when their density was about 1.7, and polystyrene blocks when their density was about 0.14.

Weight illusions may be due to a central scaling process which enables a wide range of weights to be estimated, different ranges being selected according to the expected value of the weight. If the selected range is inappropriate an illusion occurs. Changes in expected value could also allow for the operation of “weight-constancy” during changes in proprioceptive stimulation.     

When is a cognitive system embodied?

For cognitive systems, embodiment appears to be of crucial importance. Unfortunately, nobody seems to be able to define embodiment in a way that would prevent it from also covering its trivial interpretations such as mere situatedness in complex environments. The paper focuses on the definition of embodiment, especially whether physical embodiment is necessary and/or sufficient for cognitive systems. Cognition is characterized as a continuous complex process rather than ahistorical logical capability. Furthermore, the paper investigates the relationship between cognitive embodiment and the issues of understanding, representation and task specification.     

When is a Concrete Property Basic?

We more or less understand how composition works in the case of objects. We cement bricks together to build a wall. We stir together red paint and yellow paint to get orange paint. In both cases, one way or another, A = B + C. This paper examines composition in the case of concrete natural properties. It explains why property composition is so much less straightforward than object composition. Then it distinguishes strictly basic properties (like the mass of an electron), compositely basic properties (like the mass of a planet), and fully non-basic properties (like the saltiness of blood). It shows how strictly basic properties compose, or result in, compositely basic and fully non-basic properties, which differ from, yet depend for their natures on, the strictly basic properties they result from. It explains the characteristics and differences of these types of properties. It notes that the existence of compositely basic and non-basic properties grounds an argument for the genuine existence of composite properties as well as the composite objects they characterize. Finally, it defends the usefulness of these distinctions by identifying projects they assist, and by applying them both to mark off distinct metaphysical views too often conflated and to correct sundry metaphysical mistakes.     

Do Extenuating Circumstances Influence African American Women's Attitudes Toward Suicide?

African American women commit suicide less than other U.S. women and men, perhaps partly due to strong, anti-suicide attitudes. To see if suicide attitudes might be softened by extenuating circumstances such as terminal illness, 192 African American and European American women imagined themselves in one of four extenuating circumstances, then completed measures of suicide acceptability and religiosity. Both ethnic groups reported a greater likelihood of suicide when imagining depression, regardless of religiosity. Religiosity, but not extenuating circumstances, corresponded with negative attitudes toward suicide and physician assisted suicide. These African American and European American young women remained steadfastly against suicide, regardless of circumstance.