THE MORALITY,POLITICS, AND IRONY OF WAR: Recovering Reinhold Niebuhr's Ethical Realism

The American experience of war is ironic. That is, there is often an intimate and unexamined relationship between seemingly contrary elements in war such as morality and politics. This article argues that without understanding such irony, we are unlikely to reflect in morally comprehensive ways on past, present, or future wars. Traditional schools of thought, however, such as moralism and political realism, reinforce these apparent contradictions. I propose, then, an alternative—“ethical realism” as informed by Reinhold Niebuhr—that better explains the irony of war. Through an ethical realist examination of the U.S. Civil War, World War II, and the Iraq War, I consider how American political interests have been inextricably linked with deep moral concerns. Ethical realism charts a middle path that ennobles traditional realpolitik while eschewing certain perfectionist tendencies of moralism. Ethical realism provides a conceptual framework for evaluating these other frameworks—a distinct form of moral‐political deliberation about war.     

What Is Realistic Political Philosophy?

In the study of politics, Cambridge is sometimes associated with a school of political philosophical “realism.” This article discusses what realism in political philosophy might mean, by examining first what might count as “unrealistic” political philosophy (looking at Sidgwick and Rawls), and then some recent attempts to identify a more realistic philosophical approach to politics. It argues that realistic political philosophy tends to emerge as a thin account of politics that falls between the stools of either more philosophical (i.e., more idealistic) or less philosophical (i.e., more historical) accounts. It illustrates this in relation to Sidgwick and also Hobbes, who is often held up as the quintessential realist in the history of political philosophy.     

Democratic Moral Education and the Gifts of the Holy Spirit

How far is Thomas Aquinas available for current discussions in political philosophy? While there are certainly things to be learned from him about our political preoccupations, the pedagogy of his moral teaching typically resists our familiar questions. This holds even when the question is put in terms that Thomas should recognize—say, as a question about the virtues appropriate for a democracy. Thomas not only gives different meanings to these terms, he moves political topics away from the center of theological attention and so organizes them very differently. A reader can notice these differences at many points but perhaps especially in the attention that Thomas gives in the Summa to the gifts of the Holy Spirit. His account of these gifts qualifies significantly what he says of virtue and suggests large limits on human agency, whether in ethics or in politics.     

Truthmaking, metaethics, and creeping minimalism

Creeping minimalism threatens to cloud the distinction between realist and anti-realist metaethical views. When anti-realist views equip themselves with minimalist theories of truth and other semantic notions, they are able to take on more and more of the doctrines of realism (such as the existence of moral truths, facts, and beliefs). But then they start to look suspiciously like realist views. I suggest that creeping minimalism is a problem only if moral realism is understood primarily as a semantic doctrine. I argue that moral realism is better understood instead as a metaphysical doctrine. As a result, we can usefully regiment the metaethical debate into one about moral truthmakers: In virtue of what are moral judgments true? I show how the notion of truthmaking has been simmering just below the surface of the metaethical debate, and how it reveals one metaethical view (quasi-realism) to be a stronger contender than the others.     

The Moral Reality in Realism

abstract This paper aims to gain a deeper understanding of the different forms of moralism in order to throw light upon debates about the role of morality in international affairs. In particular, the influential doctrine of political realism is reinterpreted as objecting not to a role for morality in international politics, but to the baneful effects of moralism. This is a more sympathetic reading than that usually given by philosophers to the realist doctrines. I begin by showing the ambiguity and elusiveness of realist claims about morality in politics and then distinguish six forms of moralism, understood as a distortion of genuine morality: moralism of scope, of imposition, of abstraction, of absolutism, of inappropriate explicitness, and of deluded power. I argue that most of these are relevant to typical realist claims and can make their objections more plausible. But, though realists can be interpreted as rightly drawing attention to the dangers of moralism in international and national affairs, their conflation of moralism with morality wrongly leads them to an exaltation of the pursuit of national interest and to the rejection of policies and judgements that are not in fact moralistic.     

RETHINKING THE CHRISTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF REINHOLD NIEBUHR'S CHRISTIAN REALISM

While Reinhold Niebuhr's realist political philosophy continues to find advocates in many quarters on account of its explanatory power, his Christian ideals have had difficulty gaining purchase in the material world. The tension between particular political interests and universal moral ideals threatens not only to undermine Niebuhr's efforts to preserve the ethical quality of politics but also his grounds for hope. The source of this problem can be traced to a weakness in the Christological foundations of Niebuhr's Christian realism—specifically to his intentional severing of classical Christology from politics in his appropriation of Augustine's realism. After examining the reasons for this rejection of classical reflections about Jesus, this article explains how the Christology of Niebuhr's favorite early Christian realist, Augustine, makes possible a theological reasoning that expands the social imagination, and promotes a deeply principled and hopeful material transformation, while not forfeiting its critical and explanatory capacity.     

Realism Versus Constructivism in Their Competition for Dominance in Politics: The Case of Russia

This article focuses on the general theoretical issue of realism versus constructivism (or normativism) in politics, with a case of the present-day Russia as the main and most telling (but not the only) example. We present four assertions that we are going to defend. First, we claim that in the sphere of international relations, political realism of the offensive type, after decades of more tempered USA–USSR relations, is again challenging its opponent: political constructivism. Second, political realism is winning in the sphere of domestic politics and policy in the leading countries as well. Third, we touch upon theoretical issues and discuss the ontological nature of political realism in comparison with political constructivism and the kindred of the latter with normativism, legalism, constitutionalism and liberalism. Political constructivism as a concept is underestimated and rarely used. Our article explicates the concept of political constructivism, which is a novel contribution to political theory and political philosophy. Fourth, we show that political constructivism, being the most advanced achievement of political civilization compared to archaic realism, has not lost the game so far and should be upheld in its battle with the remnants of the wild political past. Sliding back to political realism would turn humankind into another degraded animal species instead of making it the pilot in continuing human progress.     

The Order of Pascal's Politics

This essay rejects two common views of Pascal: (a) that he holds only temporal and contingent standards of justice to be available to human beings and (b) that he is indifferent to all but eternal standards of justice. Against these reductive misunderstandings, I provide a detailed reconstruction of Pascal's political thought, drawn from the Pensées and other texts. I show that Pascal develops an account of two distinct and hierarchized orders of justice: a temporal order and an eternal order. Pascal recognizes the integrity of the temporal order of justice, as expressed in local, particular custom and the historical development of positive law and, at the same time, holds that the axiological and ontological condition of this temporal order is an eternal order, a horizon beyond history which serves to ground it. Pascal's politics, rather than a tragic pessimism or a passion for the absolute, is simply a limited specification of his moral and metaphysical realism.     

The Moralism of Multiculturalism

abstract Moralism is a frequent charge in politics, and especially in relation to the ‘politics of recognition’. In this essay, I identify three types of moralism — undue abstraction, unjustified moralism and impotent moralism — and then discuss each in relation to recent debates over multiculturalism in liberal political theory. Each of these forms of moralism has featured in interesting ways in recent criticisms of the political theory and public policy of multiculturalism. By ‘multiculturalism’ I mean, broadly speaking, the pursuit of group‐differentiated public policies that move beyond the protection of basic individual civil and political rights. Here the charge is not so much that moral judgments have no application in relation to the treatment of cultural and associational minorities, but that the moral claims of defenders of multiculturalism are: (a) appealed to without any sense of the practical realities on the ground (the undue abstraction charge); (b) asserted as if they were self‐evidently true (the unjustified moralism charge); which often results in (c) a stifling of reasoned criticism of the orthodoxy surrounding multiculturalism (thus engendering impotent moralism). I assess these charges in the course of defending the democratic character of the most plausible forms of multicultural accommodation in liberal democratic societies.     

论马克思实践哲学的政治意蕴

In order to deepen the studies on the philosophy of practice, it is essential to explore the political significance of Marx's philosophy of practice. Marx's philosophy of practice is rooted in the problem of modernity and the separation between “individual subjectivity” and “societal community” in the modern context is the basic background of Marx's practical philosophy. It is the basic interest of Marx's philosophy of practice to find a way to end this separation via critique of civil society. Therefore, Marx's philosophy of practice has a clear significance, which manifests in the following aspects: one is “liberation politics,” and the other, “the regulatory mode of the socio-political institution.” Translated by Zhang Lin from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Research), 2007, (1): 3–10     

"Moralism" and the Gender Gap: Judgments of Political Ethics in Japan

This article investigates whether women are, as many claim, "moralists"—that is, moral and ethical standard-setters who seek clean politics and have strict standards for public officials. An analysis of data from the 1996 Japanese Elections and Democracy Study survey and from 18 focus groups conducted in 1996 indicates that women in Japan are not moralists. As elsewhere, there is a gender gap in Japan on "issue preference sets," with women favoring a "care" agenda, but women assign political ethics less importance than do men, even though women are more likely to see adverse effects from political corruption. Studying people's judgments of four ethics scenarios reveals minimal gender gaps; controlling for education and age, women's judgments overall are less, not more, strict than men's. Among women, age is a better predictor of moralism than education; older women are stricter than younger women on political ethics. This is attributed to gender-based differences in moral reasoning: Japanese women and men both rely heavily on a "relation-based" frame (which is situation-specific and requires extensive social information), but gender stratification patterns create information inequalities. Younger women lack social information necessary for judging political misconduct, whereas older women overcome the information deficit through life experience.     

Why Talk about Chinese Metaphysics?

Chinese philosophy in the twentieth century has often been related to some sort of cultural or other particularism or some sort of philosophical universalism. By and large, these still seem to be the terms along which academic debates are carried out. The tension is particularly manifest in notions such as “Chinese philosophy,” “Daoist cosmology,” “Neo-Confucian idealism,” or “Chinese metaphysics.” For some, “Chinese metaphysics” may be a blatant contradictio in adiecto, while others may find it a most ordinary topic to be discussed at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In this article, I set out to examine two major discourses in which talk about “metaphysics” is frequent and popular and to which talk of “Chinese metaphysics” may wish to contribute: the history of philosophy and analytic philosophy. My contention is that it is usually far from obvious what reasons are behind putting “Chinese metaphysics” on the academic agenda and to what precise purpose this is done. What my discussion seeks to highlight is the as yet often largely unarticulated dimension of the politics of comparative philosophy—of which talk about “Chinese metaphysics” may but need not be an example.     

How to Construct Marxian Thoughts as a Political Philosophy?

Importance of contemporary political philosophy has increased in recent decades. Since the 1970s, studies of Marx’s theories have become an important part of the discussion within contemporary theories of justice. More extensive studies concerning Marxist political philosophy from multiple perspectives are becoming a focal point in other fields of academic research. “How to understand Marx’s political philosophy?” has been a classic question for over a hundred years. Not an academic philosopher himself, Marx seems not to have issued a complete or consistent political philosophy by today’s standards, so it is only natural that his views would be interpreted differently by different scholars. While it is justifiable for us to construct Marx’s political philosophy, we must do it through a comprehensive theoretical reflection, and our construction must take full account of the history of the interpretations of Marx’s political philosophy. This applies especially of his theory of justice—a history which has lasted for more than a century. It is even more important for us to reread the original texts, particularly Marx’s early philosophical writings, and take them as the textual foundation for Marx’s political philosophy.     

Justifying political decisions through theological arguments

The relationship between religion and politics in Muslim contexts has been discussed from many different perspectives. One of these proceeds from the theory of religious politics, according to which political thoughts and decisions are justified and legitimated with the support of theological explanations. A central premise is that religion is able to provide a moral sanction for political actions and decisions. This article discusses the relationship between religion and politics in a Shiite context in pre-modern and early modern times, based on the theory of religious politics. The central point is that the Shiite scholars, during the Safavid era (1501–1736), based their secular viewpoints on interpretations of the Quran, the hadiths, and the 12 Imamite Shiite sources, especially the specific ideas about the hidden imam, to legitimate their own collaboration with the Safavid kings. According to this theory, the religious politics occur within an ideological context such as a nation-state and specific historical circumstances. The religious legitimizations of political actions are usually intertwined with local and historical identities. As such the religious ideologies reflect not a return to tradition per se, but rather an ideological reconstruction of tradition for a new context. The ultimate question is which came first? Did the theological interpretations precede secular and political decisions, or was it the other way around? The theory of religious politics arrives at the conclusion that the theological explanations are employed to legitimate traditions of political thought and secular decisions and not the reverse.     

Bocheński on Morality and Ethics

Studies in East European Thought - What are the main results of Bocheńskiinvestigations in ethics and moral philosophy?In his own view, he contributed to threematters: his treatise on miltary...     

Revival and significance of political philosophy at present time

Taking a panoramic view on the history of modern philosophy, we can learn that political philosophy, a new arena for modern philosophy, has become an important field in philosophical studies since the later half of the 20th century. As far as the problem domain of political philosophy is concerned, political philosophy is only a special form of philosophy. The revival of political philosophy, however, indicates that philosophical inspection of political matters has regained legitimacy, and also means the restaging of philosophy as a knowledge type at modern times. In one sense, we can view the newly-revived political philosophy as typical modern philosophy, because its problem domain, its unique angle of looking into the life world and its ideal concern about the actual world make it one of the best ways in which we can reflect the existence of mankind in modern times. __________ Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Studies), 2005 (6) by Teng Jianhui     

Xunzi on Moral Expertise

This paper is about two proposals endorsed by Xunzi. The first is that there is such a thing as a moral expert, whose moral advice we should adopt even when we cannot appreciate for ourselves the considerations in favor of it. The second is that certain political authorities should be treated as moral experts. I identify three fundamental questions about moral expertise that contemporary philosophy has yet to address in depth, explicate Xunzi??s answers to them, and then give an account of politically authorized moral expertise as Xunzi understands it. The three questions at the heart of this study are these: how should we distinguish between knowing the correct course of action on another??s authority and knowing it for oneself? What exactly are the underlying considerations that the expert grasps and the novice does not? Who are the experts and in what spheres of life can they legitimately claim expertise?     

The moral behavior of ethics professors: A replication-extension in German-speaking countries

What is the relation between ethical reflection and moral behavior? Does professional reflection on ethical issues positively impact moral behaviors? To address these questions, Schwitzgebel and Rust empirically investigated if philosophy professors engaged with ethics on a professional basis behave any morally better or, at least, more consistently with their expressed values than do non-ethicist professors. Findings from their original US-based sample indicated that neither is the case, suggesting that there is no positive influence of ethical reflection on moral action. In the study at hand, we attempted to cross-validate this pattern of results in the German-speaking countries and surveyed 417 professors using a replication-extension research design. Our results indicate a successful replication of the original effect that ethicists do not behave any morally better compared to other academics across the vast majority of normative issues. Yet, unlike the original study, we found mixed results on normative attitudes generally. On some issues, ethicists and philosophers even expressed more lenient attitudes. However, one issue on which ethicists not only held stronger normative attitudes but also reported better corresponding moral behaviors was vegetarianism.     

Realism,morality, and liberal democracy

Conclusions The picture of liberal democratic realism that we have presented can withstand a powerful set of criticisms that have emerged in the last two decades. We have argued that realism does not misconstrue the value of the state, it does not justify the ruthless suppression of every domestic threat that could face the state, it does not depend upon a conception of international politics that rules out moral constraints, and it does not misunderstand the relationship between self-interest and morality. The defense of liberal democratic reason of state depends upon the state protecting and securing the values and welfare of individuals and groups living within its domain. Realism cannot be justified if the state has lost its legitimacy.This version of realism, however, generates its own distinctive problems. The most significant of these is that it does not offer a clean, unambiguous solution to the problems raised by the survival of the liberal democratic regime. Unlike extreme realist or idealist conceptions of the role of morality in international relations, we have argued that for the liberal democratic state this problem cannot be settled without moral remainders. On this account, realism presents leaders with a moral dilemma that is theoretically unresolvable. But this is not a failure of realism. Indeed, it is an acknowledgement that the liberal democratic state can be seen as no more, and no less, than a necessary condition of value.