Setting the stage subliminally: unconscious context effects

An important approach to understand how the brain gives rise to consciousness is to probe the depth of unconscious processing, thus to define the key features that cause conscious awareness. Here, we investigate the possibility for subliminal stimuli to shape the context for unconscious processing. Context effects have generally been assumed to require consciousness. In the present experiment, unconscious context processing was investigated by looking at the impact of the context on the response activation elicited by a subliminal prime. We compared the effects of the same subliminal prime on target processing when the prime was embedded in different unconscious contexts. Results showed that the same prime can evoke opposite responses depending on the unconscious context in which it is presented. Taken together, the results of this study show that context effects can be unconscious.     

Conscious and unconscious processes: the effects of motivation

The process-dissociation procedure has been used in a variety of experimental contexts to assess the contributions of conscious and unconscious processes to task performance. To evaluate whether motivation affects estimates of conscious and unconscious processes, participants were given incentives to follow inclusion and exclusion instructions in a perception task and a memory task. Relative to a control condition in which no performance incentives were given, the results for the perception task indicated that incentives increased the participants' ability to exclude previously presented information, which in turn both increased the estimate of conscious processes and decreased the estimate of unconscious processes. However, the results also indicated that incentives did not influence estimates of conscious or unconscious processes in the memory task. The findings suggest that the process-dissociation procedure is relatively immune to influences of motivation when used with a memory task, but that caution should be exercised when the process-dissociation is used with a perception task.     

我们如何直面苦难

从《约伯记》看神允许苦难存在的原因,我想至少有四个方面。第一：确实是由于个人的罪譬如：一个人荒宴醉酒,吃喝嫖赌而导致生病,这是罪的工价,那么神要藉着难处来提醒你,管教你。我常想浪子出去,若一帆风顺的话,他不会回来的,于是神用饥荒招他回来,所以他醒悟了,所以有时人犯了罪,是神的管教。神的管教表显了神的爱。别人的孩子犯错误,你不会管教他,自己的孩子犯错误你才会去管教他,所以如果确实是因个人有罪,个人远离了神,个人贪爱世俗,做了很多基督徒不该做的事,那么他们是得到了罪的工价,罪的报应,这个情况下,神要提醒他们,圣灵在他们里面要他们“为罪、为义、为审判,自己责备自己”(约16：8)。圣灵在他们里面提醒他们,提醒不行,圣灵为他们担忧,还要做,那么神的管教来了,对这样的情况,解决的办法是什么呢?就是他们应该从今以后把     

A modest proposal: (re)defining unconscious fantasy

The author argues that unconscious fantasy, properly defined, necessarily represents the three-dimensional intersection of wishful thinking (fantasy), veridical perception of the environment (reality), and the naive cognition of childhood. It is proposed that, although attachment theory developed out of the intent to capture the unalloyed reality of dyadic experience, that experience is inextricably entangled with the other two components, wishes and naive cognition, and furthermore, that the behavior of children in the attachment paradigm can only be accounted for by positing the existence of underlying unconscious fantasies. In making these arguments, the author also addresses the development of unconscious fantasies and their relationship to compromise formations and trauma.     

Extending a focused attention paradigm to critically test for unconscious congruency effects

ABSTRACT

In a novel integration of research designs, we tested for unconscious perception effects at an unattended stimulus location using a focused attention paradigm (Lachter, J., Forster, K. I., & Ruthruff, E. 2004. Forty-five years after Broadbent (1958): Still no identification without attention. Psychological Review, 111(4), 880–913. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.111.4.880). Target-masked word or nonword prime stimuli were briefly displayed for 14, 28, or 56?ms at an experimentally-defined attended or unattended location, followed by a lexical decision task. At the briefest prime durations (14 and 28?ms), we failed to find any evidence for unattended priming effects, consistent with Lachter et al., but there were some small priming (i.e., congruency) effects at the attended location. The 14?ms primes could not be discriminated above chance, but could be detected. Our results support the claim that perceptual processing is strongest with focal attention. For the 14?ms primes at the attended location, results could support an unconscious perception claim, but the effect was weak and awareness of the primes was unlikely to have been completely eliminated.     

Facing up to the issues: Reply to Hellige (1983)

In a recent article in this journal, Hellige (Brain and Cognition, 2, 199-203, 1983) presented a critique of the chimeric-face technique that was used by us to validate a hand preference questionnaire. Data were presented by Hellige to show that the left visual field (LVF) bias that occurs on this task is due primarily to differences in detail in the features of the two faces and not because of right hemisphere dominance for face perception. In our rebuttal, we acknowledge that the two faces are not mirror-image duplicates of each other, but contend that this fact does not explain why differences between left-handers and right-handers have been observed on this task. Further data on the role of handedness as well as other variables impacting on this task are presented. A possible explanation is also offered for the rather small extent of LVF bias that Hellige obtained when he used corrected (i.e., true mirror-image) versions of Jaynes' chimeric faces.     

Effects of depressed mood on drinking refusal self-efficacy: examining the specificity of drinking contexts

College students with elevated depressive symptoms are more likely to engage in risky drinking and experience alcohol-related negative consequences. Efforts to understand the association between depressed mood and alcohol use have begun to identify the role of cognitive-motivational processes. Drinking refusal self-efficacy is one such process that influences the decision to drink, but its relationship with depressed mood remains unclear. The current study sought to clarify the role of these processes using a depressed mood induction procedure in a sample of college student drinkers. Eighty-six students were randomized to a depressed or neutral mood induction and completed assessments of drinking refusal self-efficacy. Depressed mood significantly decreased self-efficacy in high-risk drinking contexts related to depression, whereas ratings of other high-risk contexts were unaffected. These findings suggest that the association between hazardous drinking and depressed mood may be due in part to the direct influence of mood state on one's self-efficacy to resist drinking in relevant contexts.     

Not Sitting Down for It: How Stand-Up Differs from Fiction (And How Neither Is Immune to Ethical Criticism)

One of the standard defenses of Daniel Tosh, Andrew Dice Clay, Bernard Manning, and other stand-up comedians who have been accused of crossing moral lines is that the responses they elicit belong to an aesthetic rather than a moral domain to which standard methods of ethical evaluation are therefore inapplicable. I argue, first, that fictionality does not confer immunity to ethical criticism and, second, that the stance adopted by the stand-up artist is not fully analogous to a fictive one in any event. Whatever the case with respect to the adoption of an alternative persona, the stand-up artist refers in his or her pronouncements to the actual world in a way that a fiction does not. That also suggests susceptibility to ethical criticism, just for different reasons.     

On the status of unconscious memory: Merikle and Reingold (1991) revisited

Four experiments are reported that reevaluate P. M. Merikle and E. M. Reingold's (1991) demonstration of unconscious memory: the greater sensitivity to familiarity (repetition) of an indirect (implicit) memory task than of a comparable direct (explicit) task. At study, participants named the cued member of a pair of visually presented words. At test, new and uncued study words were presented against a background mask. Participants judged whether each word was old or new (direct task) or whether the contrast between the word and the background was high or low (indirect task). Contrary to the original findings, the sensitivity of the indirect task to familiarity never exceeded that of the direct task. These findings pose a challenge to a key pillar of evidence for unconscious influences of memory.     

情绪面孔的意识神经相关物及其无意识自动加工：来自事件相关电位的证据

意识的神经相关物尚有争议, 且个体能否无意识自动检测视觉环境变化尚不清楚。本研究采用非注意视盲范式操控视觉意识, 并引入具有社会信息的情绪面孔, 探讨意识的神经相关物以及视觉意识与自动检测变化机制的关系。在A阶段, 部分被试对任务无关的情绪面孔处于无意识水平; 在B阶段, 所有被试对任务无关的情绪面孔处于意识水平; 在C阶段, 所有被试对任务相关的情绪面孔处于意识水平。结果显示, 任务无关的情绪面孔的意识过程诱发视觉意识负波(visual awareness negativity, VAN)、晚期正成分(late positivity, LP)和晚期枕区正成分(late occipital positivity, LOP)。此外, 无意识的情绪面孔能诱发视觉失匹配负波(visual mismatch negativity, vMMN), 且其幅值不受意识影响, 但是受任务相关性调制。这些结果提示对情绪面孔的视觉意识在不同的时间进程上有不同的ERP指标——VAN反映早期知觉经验, 而LP和LOP反映晚期意识过程, 而且面孔情绪信息的自动加工独立于视觉意识, 但是受视觉注意调制。     

The mood effect: How mood,disclosure language and ad skepticism influence the effectiveness of native advertising

This research investigated the interplay between mood, disclosure language, and ad skepticism on consumers' recognition and evaluation of native advertising. During two online experiments, participants first received a mood manipulation and then read an article-style native advertisement. Results from both studies indicated that participants were more likely to recognize a native ad with an explicit rather than an implicit disclosure label, and a negative mood was more likely than a positive mood to drive participants to recognize the native ad. More importantly, participants in a positive mood evaluated a native ad with an implicit disclosure more favorably than an ad with an explicit disclosure. By contrast, participants in a negative mood responded more positively to a native ad with explicit disclosure compared to an ad with implicit disclosure. Study 2 demonstrated that the interaction between mood and disclosure language was further moderated by individuals' levels of ad skepticism. These results are believed to provide meaningful theoretical and practical implications to the field of native advertising and consumer behavior.     

Making conscious the unconscious in order to modify unconscious processing: Some mechanisms of therapeutic change1

This paper examines some of the mechanisms through which interpretation aimed primarily at increasing conscious awareness can nonetheless produce unconscious changes, the latter being deemed the basic aim of psychoanalysis. The concept of valency or motivational weight of the interpretation is proposed to assess which forces of the various motivational systems the interpretation mobilizes (hetero/self‐preservation, sensual/sexual, attachment, narcissistic, psychobiological regulation etc.), on which of the above‐mentioned systems interpretation relies, and which would oppose therapeutic intervention and why. Certain conditions are also analyzed that could explain the so‐called ‘change through the analytic relationship’, pointing out that, despite the major differences between this form of change and change through interpretation, both of them would share certain mechanisms. This conclusion leads to the need to qualify the idea that interpretation would be exclusively aimed at declarative memory, with no effects upon procedural memory. The paper examines the potential consequences for therapeutic techniques derived from recent fi ndings in neuroscience on so‐called labile state memory, and proposes the coupling of experiences as one of the analytical instruments used for therapeutic change. A clinical vignette is included to illustrate some of the theoretical and technical aspects considered.     

On bad mood and white bears: The effects of mood state on ability to suppress unwanted thoughts

Does temporary mood influence people's ability to engage in effective thought suppression? Based on past research on mental control and recent work on affective influences on social cognition, this experiment predicted and found that negative mood improved and positive mood impaired people's ability to suppress their thoughts when instructed not to think of a neutral concept, white bears. We also found clear evidence for ironic rebound effects: on a subsequent generative task, intrusions of the suppressed thought were greater in the negative than in the positive mood group. Participants received positive or negative feedback about performance on a supposed creativity task to induce positive or negative moods, and then engaged in two consecutive generative writing tasks, the first accompanied by instructions to suppress thoughts of white bears. Those in a negative group reported fewer “white bear” intrusions when attempting to suppress, but more “white bear” intrusions (an ironic rebound effect) in the subsequent task when the suppression instruction was lifted. The implications of these results for everyday tasks of mental control, and for recent affect–cognition theories are discussed.     

A pathway from neuroticism to depression: examining the role of emotion regulation

We examined whether the relation between neuroticism and the severity of depressive symptoms is mediated by emotion regulation. At the same time, we examined whether the type of emotion regulation strategy (maladaptive vs. adaptive) moderates the effects of neuroticism on depression severity. Community participants (N =?533; 235 women and 298 men) completed a set of questionnaires over the Internet. We used structural equation modeling to examine the mediational role of emotion regulation in linking neuroticism and the levels of depressive symptoms. The well-documented relation between neuroticism and depression is mediated by individual differences in the use of different emotion regulation strategies. More specifically, the use of maladaptive forms of emotion regulation, but not reappraisal, fully mediated the association between neuroticism and the severity of depressive symptoms.     

Parts outweigh the whole (word) in unconscious analysis of meaning

In unconscious semantic priming, an unidentifiable visually masked word (the prime) facilitates semantic classification of a following visible related word (the target). Three experiments reported here provide evidence that masked primes are analyzed mainly at the level of word parts, not whole-word meaning. In Experiment 1, masked nonword primes composed of subword fragments of earlier-viewed targets functioned as effective evaluative primes. (For example, after repeated classification of the targets angel and warm , the nonword anrm acted as an evaluatively positive masked prime.) Experiment 2 showed that this part-word processing was potent enough to oppose analysis at the whole-word level. Thus, smile functioned as an evaluatively negative (!) masked prime after repeated classification of smut and bile . Experiment 3 found no priming when masked word primes contained no parts of earlier targets. These results suggest that robust unconscious priming (a) is driven by analysis of part-word information and (b) requires previous classification of visible targets that contain the fragments later serving as primes. Contrary to a widely held view, analysis of subliminal primes appears not to function at the level of analysis of complete words.