从现代逻辑观点看印度新因明三支论式

Comparing the three-form reasoning of new Hetu-vidya with Western logic, scholars have put forward four perspectives. Combining their strengths and shortcomings, and the examples of Hetu-vidya reasoning, we can conclude that the three-form reasoning should have four forms: (1) the affirmative expression of formal implication; (2) the modus ponens of hypothetical reasoning concerning sufficient conditions after universal instantiation; (3) the negative expression of a formal implication; and (4) the modus tollens of hypothetical reasoning concerning sufficient conditions after universal instantiation.     

自尊概念辨析

自尊是个人对自我价值和自我能力的情感体验,属于自我系统中的情感成分,具有一定的评价意义。它与其相近概念,如自尊需要、自我效能、自我价值、自我概念等都有着本质的区别和联系。该文就自尊的概念及其与相关概念的区别与联系进行了尝试性探讨,以期抛砖引玉,更好地认识自尊这一人格变量。     

佛教义理与因明逻辑

佛学与因明的关系问题是学术界尚未涉足又不可回避的重要课题。本文通过对三法印说与因明量论、三自性说与因三相、缘起说与三支论式等这些主要方面的比较分析，认为佛学对因明有着极为深刻的影响，彼此间诸多的相息相通之处是不可置疑的；以此阐明佛学与因明之间存在着相当密切的内在因缘关系。不过，佛学与因明在一些关键之点上有其根本区别，表明佛学本身固有的浓郁的宗教伦理体系色彩，而因明在本质上是一个不断趋向合理性、科学性、有效性的逻辑体系。     

Belief in reasoning

Reasoning has three types, deduction, induction, and abduction, of which we perceive deduction to be necessarily true, induction plausibly true, and abduction only hypothetically true. Syllogistic is a theory of deductive reasoning, introducing three figures of inferencing, of which figure-1 is obviously true, figure-3 and figure-2 are increasingly less transparent. We argue that the three figures of syllogistic and the three types of reasoning are related and their truth perceptions can be explained as different degrees of belief. We suggest that the source of this difference can be found in the conversion of a premise required by syllogistic processing. Experimental results illustrating our theory are included.     

Differentiating Phenomenology and Dance

This paper critically reviews phenomenological philosophy of the body in light of postmodern and postcolonial critiques of universalism. It aims to recast the notion of the lived body in plural rather than singular terms. It does so within the context of phenomenology and dance, using cultural anthropology to highlight the sense in which bodies are culturally and corporeally specific. The notion of corporeal specificity is applied to the perception of dance, paying particular attention to questions of power and hegemony. This is not to reject phenomenology, but to differentiate it according to its social, historical and kinaesthetic milieux.     

Differentiating Derrida and Deleuze

Repetition plays a significant, productive role in the work of both Derrida and Deleuze. But the difference between these two philosophers couldn't be greater: it is the difference between negation and affirmation, between Yes and No. In Derrida, the productive energy of repetition derives from negation, from the necessary impossibility of supplementing an absence. Deleuze recognizes the kind of repetition which concerns Derrida, but insists that there is another, primary form of repetition which is fully positive and affirmative. I will argue that there is nothing in Derrida's philosophy to match the affirmative, primary form of repetition articulated by Deleuze. Moreover, it is precisely this difference that accounts for the most exciting features of Deleuze's work: the possibility of breaking through to the other side of representation, beyond authenticity and inauthenticity, becoming-becoming.     

Heidegger and the Essence of Dasein

Being and Time argues that we, as Dasein, are defined not by what we are, but by our way of existing, our “existentiell possibilities.” I diagnose and respond to an interpretive dilemma that arises from Heidegger's ambiguous use of this latter term. Most readings stress its specific sense, holding that Dasein has no general essence and is instead determined by some historically contingent way of understanding itself and the meaning of being at large. But this fails to explain the sense in which Being and Time is a work of fundamental ontology, concluding in Heidegger's claim to have found the meaning of Dasein's being in the concept of originary temporality. On the other hand, readings that stress the general sense of “existentiell possibilities” find Heidegger on a fruitless quest for the transcendental conditions necessary for Dasein's existence, which seems to founder on the claims that Dasein is constitutively thrown, factical, and “in‐each‐case‐mine” [jemeinig]. Both readings are problematic and, I contend, result from a failure to disambiguate and explain the ontologically unique relationship between the specific and general aspects of Dasein's essence. I argue that we can better explain this relationship, Heidegger's method for investigating it, and the sense in which Dasein has an essence that is open to philosophical investigation, if we read Being and Time's ontology of Dasein in terms of what Anton Ford calls “categorial” genus‐species relationships.     

Work and the Human Essence

ABSTRACT Jenkins and Sherman hold that belief in the value of work is artificially inculcated and that a 'leisure society' is desirable and possible, as well as being necessitated by the introduction of microprocessors. After distinguishing between meaningful work and labour (first section), I reply obliquely to their case by contending that meaningful work affords most people their best chance of the necessary good of self-respect (second section), and that it constitutes the exercise of an essential human capacity, the development of which is necessary to human wellbeing (third section). Because of the contingent connections between employment on the one hand and meaningful work and self-respect on the other, we should recognise the value of work and plan for full employment (fourth section).     

Differentiating the differential rotation effect

As an observer views a picture from different viewing angles, objects in the picture appear to maintain their orientation relative to the observer. For instance, the eyes of a portrait appear to follow the observer as he or she views the image from different angles. We have explored this rotation effect, often called the Mona Lisa effect. We report three experiments that used portrait photographs to test variations of the Mona Lisa effect. The first experiment introduced picture displacements relative to the observer in directions beyond the horizontal plane. The Mona Lisa effect remained robust for vertical and/or diagonal observer displacements. The experiment also included conditions in which the portrait had averted gaze directions. An interaction between picture position relative to the observer and gaze direction was found. The second experiment followed up on very pronounced individual differences, suggesting that the Mona Lisa effect is even stronger than it should be for half of all observers (over-rotators). These individual differences do not correlate with any of the standard personality dimensions (Big Five) or with spatial intelligence. In the third experiment, we extended the experiment to virtual 3D heads using the same gaze directions and picture displacements as for the 2D portrait faces. Besides the picture displacements relative to the observer, we also added observer displacements relative to the picture. 3D pictures showed the Mona Lisa effect, but to a smaller extent than did 2D pictures.     

Reasoning about highly emotional topics: Syllogistic reasoning in a group of war veterans

Previous studies have generally found that emotion impairs logical reasoning. However, laboratory experiments have typically involved relatively mild levels of emotion where affect is not linked to personal experience. In this study we examined how army veterans reasoned about syllogisms of three types: neutral, generally emotional, and combat-related emotional. We also measured intensity of combat experience. Veterans were more likely to provide logically accurate answers when reasoning about combat-related compared to neutral problems. Participants with more intense combat experiences showed a reduced advantage in reasoning about combat-related emotional problems.