On Reduction Rules,Meaning-as-use,and Proof-theoretic Semantics

The intention here is that of giving a formal underpinning to the idea of ‘meaning-is-use’ which, even if based on proofs, it is rather different from proof-theoretic semantics as in the Dummett–Prawitz tradition. Instead, it is based on the idea that the meaning of logical constants are given by the explanation of immediate consequences, which in formalistic terms means the effect of elimination rules on the result of introduction rules, i.e. the so-called reduction rules. For that we suggest an extension to the Curry– Howard interpretation which draws on the idea of labelled deduction, and brings back Frege’s device of variable-abstraction to operate on the labels (i.e., proof-terms) alongside formulas of predicate logic. Presented by Heinrich Wansing     

A Proof-theoretic View of Necessity

We give a reading of binary necessity statements of the form “ϕ is necessary for ψ” in terms of proofs. This reading is based on the idea of interpreting such statements as “Every proof of ψ uses ϕ”.     

Counseling Theory: The Problem of Definition

It is proposed that (a) research in counseling and counseling practice do not generally make explicit their roots in counseling theory, (b) this lack of connectedness to theory may represent a weakness in our theories for failing to be useful, (c) this fault may be a function of our current definitions of theory, and (d) we should focus upon philosophical premises at this time. The philosophical premise of syntony is used to illustrate how many of the commonly accepted assumptions which set our standards are not necessarily so, and how the broadening of such assumptions may encourage more activity in theory development. Counseling approaches which do not qualify as theory must at least qualify in the realm of rationale by making explicit their philosophical or value premises.     

On Primoratz's Definition of Terrorism

ABSTRACT In “What is terrorism?” Igor Primoratz defines ‘terrorism’ as “the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating them, or other people, into a course of action they otherwise would not take.” I argue that this definition needs to be modified (1) by requiring that the harm or threat be to persons other than those intimidated, (2) by including aims which do not concern action, and (3) by distinguishing terrorists who know they are terrorists from those who do not.     

On Stoffregen's Definition of Affordances

Stoffregen (2003) has proposed a formal definition of affordances as emergent or relational properties of animal-environment systems. This definition contrasts with Turvey's (1992) formal definition of affordances as properties of the environment. In this commentary, my purpose is not to take sides on this issue but instead to bring to light what I believe to be a crucial flaw in Stoffregen's definition. Specifically, I show that Stoffregen's definition places no constraint on which relational or emergent properties legitimately deserve to be counted as affordances, thus allowing any relational property that can be predicated of an animal-environment system to be considered as an affordance. As such, Stoffregen's definition lacks any substantive linkage to the "opportunity for action" notion that has accounted for the scientific utility of the concept to date, a linkage I suggest should be preserved in any definition of affordances.     

心理健康:维列鲁学派活动理论的诠释

依据维列鲁学派活动理论的基本观点,揭示了心理健康的本质在于个体主导其生命活动的有效性．在于心理系统对个体生命活动系统的有效管理;强调健康心理学是关于人生的实践智慧的学问,它的核心在于促进个体对其生命活动的有效管理,使其能采取正确的生活方式,对自己的生命承担起责任。     

广义紧张理论研究的新进展

美国学者Agnew(1992)在古典紧张理论的基础上,充分借鉴心理学对攻击研究、社会心理学对公平研究、医学心理学对压力研究的成果,提出了广义紧张理论(general strain theory)。广义紧张理论认为个体经历的紧张和压力是犯罪的原因,该理论自提出后引起众多犯罪研究者的关注和兴趣,经过近几年的实证研究,理论有较大的进展,现将广义紧张理论的研究现状作一介绍,以期对国内的研究有所启示。     

情感主义、劝导性定义与邓小平理论

斯蒂文森的观点是 ,给一个价值语词或带有情感意义的语词下定义 ,并非通常所认为的是达到认识的目的 ,而不过是推荐某种事物 ,劝导人们接受该事物而已。本文认为 ,邓小平给社会主义重新下定义 ,并非为了更深刻地认识社会主义 ,而是旨在破除原有定义的狭隘性 ,以使市场经济能够划入社会主义的范围内 ,其作用在于劝导人们接受原不可接受的东西。本文承认情感主义在善 (好 )观念解释上的重大意义 ,但认为在正当或正义观念上持情感主义是不可取的 ,为使社会获得某种稳定的基础 ,一种合理解释的正义观念是必须的。     

Partially-Ordered (Branching) Generalized Quantifiers: A General Definition

Following Henkins discovery of partially-ordered (branching) quantification (POQ) with standard quantifiers in 1959, philosophers of language have attempted to extend his definition to POQ with generalized quantifiers. In this paper I propose a general definition of POQ with 1-place generalized quantifiers of the simplest kind: namely, predicative, or cardinality quantifiers, e.g., most, few, finitely many, exactly , where is any cardinal, etc. The definition is obtained in a series of generalizations, extending the original, Henkin definition first to a general definition of monotone-increasing (M) POQ and then to a general definition of generalized POQ, regardless of monotonicity. The extension is based on (i) Barwises 1979 analysis of the basic case of M POQ and (ii) my 1990 analysis of the basic case of generalized POQ. POQ is a non-compositional 1st-order structure, hence the problem of extending the definition of the basic case to a general definition is not trivial. The paper concludes with a sample of applications to natural and mathematical languages.     

Consistency Theory for the General Nonparametric Classification Method

Psychometrika - Parametric likelihood estimation is the prevailing method for fitting cognitive diagnosis models—also called diagnostic classification models (DCMs). Nonparametric concepts...     

论英国社会服务国家的建立

英国福利国家的建立 ,依国家干预的程度和范围 ,大致可分为三个阶段。第一阶段是自由主义阶段 ,这一阶段国家对社会福利的干预极其有限 ,主要是由政府设立济贫机构对一部分社会成员进行救济 ,除此之外 ,社会成员则以自助或互助的方式寻求救济 ;第二阶段是国家部分干预阶段 ,这一阶段对社会贫困等问题逐渐形成了新的认识 ,国家也逐步对社会成员的生老病死承担起必要的责任 ,西方学者所说的“社会服务国家”① ,即2 0世纪初自由党的社会立法时期 ,就属于这一阶段 ;第三阶段则是国家全面干预阶段 ,二战以后英国建立了一整套“从摇篮到坟墓”的…     

马克思主义与自由主义论战的哲学基础

近年来,从自我所有原则到契约原则,国外马克思主义与自由主义展开了全方位的论战,这一论战涉及到从哲学到经济学、从政治学到伦理学的诸多方面。自由、平等和正义,尽管对于马克思主义和自由主义来说它们的涵义是如此地不同,却是双方所共同追求的价值导向。这些价值标准能否在自我所有原则和契约原则的具体实践中体现出来,正是双方争论的焦点所在。本文围绕着双方的争论,从一些基础理论入手,对双方的论争进行了分析和思考,试图为我们回答时代提出的新挑战,与时俱进地发展马克思主义理论提供一点借鉴作用。     

Definition,Foundation and Meaning of Illness: Locating Georg Groddeck in the History of Medicine

The paper reviews and discusses Groddeck's conception of illness. I first argue that Groddeck was a late Romanticist as much as he was a "wild" psychoanalyst. Then I use Groddeck's scattered formulations regarding definition, foundation, and meaning of illness in order to articulate them in the form of more explicit scientific statements. Finally, I suggest that Groddeck's theory of illness is fundamentally different from current medical conceptions, which, nevertheless, does not make our dialogue with him either less useful or indeed less necessary. It is through an investigation of Groddeck's therapeutic attitude and the spirit of his work that psychoanalysis and medicine can build foundations of bold, innovative, and healing future.