Reconciliation and Mission

This article discusses the message and ministry of reconciliation with a view to both its biblical content and its contemporary missional application. Within a salvation historical framework of missio Dei, the article outlines the biblical narrative about human beings created in the image of God for personal relationships with God, self, other people, and nature; the fall in sin and the human predicament that necessitate reconciliation; the historical reconciliation provided by God through the incarnation, atoning death, and victorious resurrection of Christ (the first stage); the message of reconciliation in the mission of the church; the present reception of reconciliation through faith in that message (the second stage); and the results of reconciliation both in relation to God (“vertical reconciliation”) and among human beings in the church and in the world (“horizontal reconciliation”), with an emphasis on peace, unity, love, forgiveness, righteousness, and freedom. Christ’s victory over and subjugation of all evil spirit powers are described as “cosmic reconciliation.” Because reconciliation may be partial in this world where sin still exists and evil powers are active, the eschatological hope is for a final reconciliation where the relationships to God, to other human beings, and to a recreated world are renewed and consummated.     

On the connection between sickness and sin: a commentary.

In response to the articles by Eibach and Groenhut in this issue, I argue that there is a general connection between sickness and the entrance of sin into the world. There are times when there is a causal link between more specific sin and sickness, though often the patient is the one who has been sinned against. Illness can also expose sin in a patient's life. Integrating the reality of illness into the life history of a patient is a significant pastoral care issue and can be done with humility and sensitivity if done in accordance with the teaching of Job and Ecclesiastes. These books argue that "under the sun" or this side of eternity, human beings can't grasp the coherence of life, including the "why" of illness. Rather, God provides His loving presence, through His people as a comfort to those suffering from illness.     

In the Image of the Triune God

This programmatic article addresses the question of how the creation of human beings in the image of God can be made specifically trinitarian. It does this by considering the ways in which human life can image forth the particular personal characteristics of each of the divine persons, and by examining how that imaging forth is distorted by the reality of sin.     

Free will,grace, and anti-Pelagianism

Critics of synergism often complain that the view entails Pelagianism (or at least semi-Pelagianism), and so, critics think, monergism looks like the only live (orthodox) option. Critics of monergism often claim that the view entails that the blame for human sin ultimately traces to God. Recently, several philosophers (including Richard Cross, Eleonore Stump, and Kevin Timpe) have attempted to chart a middle path by offering soteriological accounts which are monergistic (and thus avoid Pelagianism) but maintain the resistibility of God’s grace (with the aim of blocking the tracing of sin to God). In this paper, we present a challenge to such accounts of the resistibility of grace, namely that they imply that human beings are praiseworthy for omitting to resist God’s grace. Even if such views escape Pelagianism as it is typically defined, they fail to avoid the worry at the heart of prominent criticisms of Pelagianism concerning the praise for a human being’s salvation. At the end of the paper, we suggest three possible solutions to this problem.     

What is so Good about Moral Freedom?

Many Christian philosophers believe that it is a great good that human beings are free to choose between good and evil, so good indeed that God is justified in putting up with a great many evil choices for the sake of it. But many of the same Christian philosophers also believe that God is essentially good – good in every possible world. Unlike his sinful human creatures, God cannot choose between good and evil. In that sense, he is not 'morallyFree'. It is not easy to see how to fit these two theses into a single coherent package. If moral freedom is such a great good in human beings, why is it not a grave defect in God that he lacks it? And if the lack of moral freedom does not detract in any way from God's greatness, would it not have been better for us not to have it? I develop, but ultimately reject, what I take to be the most initially promising strategy for resolving this dilemma.     

"BE NOT OVERCOME BY EVIL, BUT OVERCOME EVIL WITH GOOD"—AN ORIENTATIONAL APPROACH TO SUFFERING AND EVIL

I discuss two recent books by Ingolf U. Dalferth, which consider the problem of suffering and evil. Dalferth argues that evil is defined by events where someone experiences ills, not by an act of the will or an evil intention, as Kant thought. Suffering is seen in relation to evil, evil in relation to God, and God in relation to the history of Jesus Christ, in whom God created new life through the overcoming of evil. Christianity shall proclaim the end of evil, not the end of suffering. Dalferth contends that nothing connects human beings as strongly as the common experience of evil. Unfortunately, he does not elaborate on the problem of sin , especially in relation to God.     

INTEGRATING EVOLUTION: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF CREATION

Abstract. Science has demonstrated that the universe creates itself through its own history. This history is the result of a probabilistic process, not a deterministic execution of a plan. Science has also documented that human beings are a result of this universal, probabilistic process of general evolution. At first sight, these results seem to contradict Christian teaching. According to the Bible, history is essentially the history of salvation. Human beings therefore are not an "accident of nature" but special creations to be saved. With deeper theological probing, it becomes clearer, however, that creation must create itself. The Christian God is the loving God who enters into a loving relationship with human beings if they desire to reciprocate. If creation could not create itself, human beings could not be free. Without freedom to ignore or reject God's love, the central act of the Christian God, the drama of salvation, would become a parody played by marionettes in the hands of a supernatural manipulator. Christians should welcome the fundamental insight brought forth by science that the universe, including human beings, created itself through its own history. This article will try to show that this scientific insistence is required and confirmed by the intrinsic character of the orthodox, Judeo-Christian concept of God. That nature has to create itself, including human beings, secures human freedom and with it, the responsibility for human actions. From this perspective one might better understand the Bible in the light of God's revelation through the book of nature.     

The Mystery of Sexuality

Abstract

Mystery is a term that permeates and energizes the Catholic tradition. In its strictest terms, it refers to the infinite incomprehensibility of God, but the USCCB speaks also of “the great mystery” of human sexuality. In this essay, only to establish the meanings of mystery as we use the word, we consider, first and briefly, the mystery of God and the oikonomia established by God and, then and more extendedly, the mystery of human sexuality. We offer a meditation on this mystery, leading to a theological understanding of it as a lower-case sacrament of the presence of the incomprehensible God in human history. This analysis leads us to conclude that human sexuality demands ongoing analysis to be better understood physically, psychologically and spiritually in order to be better understood theologically as a lower-case sacrament revelatory of the presence of God.     

Non-Penal Substitution

Abstract:  McLeod Campbell is synonymous with the doctrine of atonement known as vicarious penitence, according to which Christ atones for human sin by repenting on behalf of fallen human beings. This understanding of Christ's work has been very influential, but not always clearly understood. In this article I set out a version of this doctrine, called non-penal substitution, drawing on the work of Jonathan Edwards, the original inspiration for Campbell's work. This version of non-penal substitution is able to overcome several difficulties for the Campbellian version of the doctrine and offers an intriguing and original way of conceiving the work of Christ that, unlike Campbell's account, does not require revisions to the doctrine of God.     

Taking Sin Seriously

Contemporary Roman Catholic ethics endeavors to take sin seriously by offering theologies of sin that emphasize it as a force and as a basic, personal orientation. Such efforts rightly counter the Catholic tradition's earlier reduction of sin to sins, and sins to external acts and moral culpability. But perhaps they go too far in this regard. By engaging Charles Curran, this study argues that inattention to sins undermines the theological referent of sin as a discourse that concerns more than moral culpability, obscures God as the source of freedom and value, and neglects the way in which acts express and sustain sin and fashion a personal orientation. Drawing on the work of Jean Porter, the essay shows that attention to sins highlights the historicity, particularity, and provisionality of human acts because of the theological referent and analogical character of sin and sins.     

Being as Iconic: Aquinas on ‘He Who Is’ as the Name for God

Aquinas claims that ‘He Who Is’ is the most proper of the names we have for God. But this attempt to ‘describe’ God with a philosophical concept like ‘being’ can seem dangerously close to creating a false conception based on our limited understanding – an idol. A dominant criticism of Aquinas’ use of this term is that any attempt to use ‘being’ to describe God will inevitably make him merely some object in our ontology alongside other beings, unacceptably mitigating God's radical transcendence and otherness. I will argue that Aquinas has a very creative response to this charge: ‘being’ stands in a unique relationship as the only concept that can ensure we do not draw God under some particular creaturely limit and thus use divine names to create an ‘idol’. In other words, ‘being’ is a special paradigm concept/term which ensures that we preserve humility in our attempts to name God.     

Naming the Unnameable God: Levinas, Derrida, and Marion

In this essay I present the postmodern phenomenological approach of Levinas, Derrida, and Marion to the problem of naming the unnameable God. For Levinas, God is never experienced directly but only as a third person whose infinity is testified to in the infinity of responsibility to the hungry. For Derrida, God remains the unnameable “wholly other” accessible only as the indeterminate term of pure reference in prayer. For Marion, God remains the object of “de-nomination” through praise. In all three, the problem of naming the unnameable God is necessarily linked to how we relate to fellow human beings, to the hungry in Levinas, justice in Derrida, and charity in Marion. I also reflect on the merits and adequacy of phenomenology as such for speaking of divine transcendence.     

Theological issues in genetics

Theological reflection can contribute a distinctive perspective from which to analyze and evaluate moral debates about issues in modern genetics and reproductive medicine. The author appeals to two hermeneutical themes, human beings as "images of God" and the tendency of humans to "play God," in order to discuss various church statements and theological literature on human gene transfer, somatic cell nuclear transplant cloning of human beings, and patenting of human genes.     

Lucretius Hebraizant: Spinoza's Reading of Ecclesiastes

Spinoza viewed the book of Ecclesiastes, in its original Hebrew and thus cleared of the interpretations imposed upon it in the guise of translation, as a powerful critique of the two most important variants of the superstition that taught human beings to regard both nature and themselves as degraded expressions of an unattainable perfection. The first was organized around the concept of miracle, the divine suspension of the actual concatenation of things, as if God were an earthly sovereign declaring a state of exception. The second was the apparent opposite of this first, the idea that the concatenation of things has an origin and an end, that is, an order decreed by God. Spinoza reads Ecclesiastes through the lens of Epicurus and Lucretius, as if it were an attempt in the Hebrew idiom, an idiom in certain ways perhaps better suited for this task than either Greek or Latin, to shatter the decrees of destiny and to regard with pleasure those singular things (both human and non‐human) that cannot and need not be made straight.     

Spinozistic Pantheism,the Environment and Christianity

I am not a pantheist and I don’t believe that pantheism is consistent with Christianity. My preferred speculation is what I call the Swiss Cheese theory: we and our artefacts are the holes in God, the only Godless parts of reality. In this paper, I begin by considering a world rather like ours but without any beings capable of sin. Ignoring extraterrestrials and angels we could consider the world, say, 5 million years ago. Pantheism was, I say, true at that time. That is my qualified endorsement of pantheism. I then use the Sin premise, namely that we are capable of sinning, to argue that beings like us are not parts of God and I examine some consequences.     

Suffering, meaning, and bioethics.

Suffering evokes moral and metaphysical reflection, the bioethics of suffering concerns the proper ethos of living with suffering. Because empirical and philosophical explorations of suffering are imprisoned in the world of immanent experience, they cannot reach to a transcendent meaning. Even if religious and other narratives concerning the meaning of suffering have no transcendent import, they can have aesthetic and moral significance. This understanding of narratives of suffering and of their custodians has substantial ecumenical implications: chaplains can function as general custodians of narratives and sustainers of a generic religious meaning. This understanding is contrary to traditional Christianity, which discloses a transcendent significance of human suffering found in a very particular history involving particular persons: Christ as the second Adam through the submission of the second Eve has taken on our nature so that we can be united with God. Human suffering is tied to human sin, not simply as a punishment for sin, much less as an opportunity to discharge a supposed temporal punishment due to sin. Human suffering is the result of our rebellious free choices. It provides an opportunity for humility and submission, so that, united to the cross of Christ, sin can be forgiven and suffering set aside in the Resurrection. Knowledge of this framing context for all human suffering is accessible not through rational argument. It is a knowledge garnered through repentance, purification of the heart, illumination by God's grace, and unification with God. Christian bioethics is embedded in the narrative of suffering, which is part of the history of salvation and which encompasses and places all of medicine in its terms.     

Art,Empathy and the Divine

Religious art can reconfigure our conception of God’s omniscience. This should be seen in terms of divine understanding, with empathy and love required for God’s understanding of human beings. §I surveys reasons to think that God can empathize with us. §II and §III consider different ways that religious art has attempted to represent such empathetic relations. There are images of Christ’s suffering that elicit empathy in the viewer, and there are depictions of God’s empathetic understanding of humanity. §IV and §V consider the epistemic roles of art and how religious art can reconfigure how we think of God’s omniscience.     

The circle of life: A cross‐cultural comparison of children's attribution of life‐cycle traits

Do children attribute mortality and other life‐cycle traits to all minded beings? The present study examined whether culture influences young children's ability to conceptualize and differentiate human beings from supernatural beings (such as God) in terms of life‐cycle traits. Three‐to‐5‐year‐old Israeli and British children were questioned whether their mother, a friend, and God would be subject to various life‐cycle processes: Birth, death, ageing, existence/longevity, and parentage. Children did not anthropomorphize but differentiated among human and supernatural beings, attributing life‐cycle traits to humans, but not to God. Although 3‐year‐olds differentiated significantly among agents, 5‐year‐olds attributed correct life‐cycle traits more consistently than younger children. The results also indicated some cross‐cultural variation in these attributions. Implications for biological conceptual development are discussed.     

Personal Value and the “Song of the Sea”

The author draws a contrast between certain pagan hymns of victory and the biblical hymn of victory recorded in Exodus 15: 1b–18. The author notes that in the Exodus hymn, Yahweh, God of Israel, fulfills the role that is assigned by the pagan hymns to a terrestrial king. This shift in emphasis from the human to the divine carries with it a new view of the human creature, which asserts that human beings beholden to this God owe no absolute obedience to any ruler or any state. The biblical hymn, then, praises not simply God but the absolute dignity of all human beings.     

Julian of Norwich: Problems of Evil and the Seriousness of Sin

Julian of Norwich emphasizes God’s eternal and unchanging love for humankind. Her visions show how God is not angry with our sins and so has no need to forgive us. God does not shame or blame us but excuses us and plans how to reward and compensate us for sin. In relation to Mother Jesus, we remain dear lovely children who need help, correction, and education. Although these remarks suggest to some that Julian must be “soft” on sin, that she has no adequate appreciation of the worthiness of God or the dignity of human nature, I argue that this is far from the case. On the contrary, she makes Divine worthiness axiomatic and urges readers to live into it. She relocates human dignity not in its intrinsic value but in our centrality to God’s plan. She measures the seriousness of sin in terms of the “real hard work” it takes to rear us up out of it: crucifixion for Christ, the hell of being a sinner and the crucifixion of life-long penance for us. Nevertheless, the brightness of her visions dominates with her assurance that despite the sin-produced sufferings of this present life, all will be well.