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Hamid Vahid 《European Journal of Philosophy》2003,11(1):89-107
While recent debates over content externalism have been mainly concerned with whether it undermines the traditional thesis of privileged self-knowledge, little attention has been paid to what bearing content externalism has on such important controversies as the internalism/externalism debate in epistemology. With a few exceptions, the question has either been treated as a side issue in discussions concerning the implications of content externalism, or has been dealt with in a cursory way in debates over the internalism/externalism distinction in justification theory. In this paper, I begin by considering some of the arguments that have sought to address the question, focusing mainly on Boghossian's pioneering attempt in bringing the issue to the fore.1 It will be argued that Boghossian's attempt to exploit the alleged non-inferentiality of self-knowledge to show that content externalism and justification internalism are incompatible fails.
In the course of this examination, I consider and reject as inadequate some recent responses to Boghossian's argument (due to James Chase2 ). I then turn to evaluating Chase's own proposed argument to show how content externalism can be brought to bear on the internalism/externalism debate in epistemology, and find it wanting. Finally, having discussed BonJour's terse remarks in this connection,3 I set out to present, what I take to be, the strongest argument for the incompatibility of content externalism and justification internalism while highlighting the controversial character of one of its main premises. Let us, however, begin by drawing the contours of the debate. 相似文献
In the course of this examination, I consider and reject as inadequate some recent responses to Boghossian's argument (due to James Chase
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Harold Langsam 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):79-101
In this paper, I argue that what underlies internalism about justification is a rationalist conception of justification, not
a deontological conception of justification, and I argue for the plausibility of this rationalist conception of justification.
The rationalist conception of justification is the view that a justified belief is a belief that is held in a rational way;
since we exercise our rationality through conscious deliberation, the rationalist conception holds that a belief is justified
iff a relevant possible instance of conscious deliberation would endorse the belief. The importance of conscious deliberation
stems from its role in guiding us in acquiring true beliefs: whereas the externalist holds that if we wish to acquire true
beliefs, we have to begin by assuming that some of our usual methods of belief formation generally provide us with true beliefs, the internalist holds that if
we form beliefs by conscious deliberation, we can be conscious of reasons for thinking that our beliefs are true. Conscious deliberation can make us conscious of reasons because it proceeds via rational
intuitions. I argue that despite the fallibility of rational intuition, rational intuitions do enable us to become conscious
of reasons for belief.
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Harold LangsamEmail: |
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K.J. Kraay 《Erkenntnis》2002,56(3):297-317
Externalism holds that the individuation of mental content depends on factors external to the subject. This doctrine appears to undermine both the claim that there is a priori self-knowledge, and the view that individuals have privileged access to their thoughts. Tyler Burges influential inclusion theory of self-knowledge purports to reconcile externalism with authoritative self-knowledge. I first consider Paul Boghossians claim that the inclusion theory is internally inconsistent. I reject one line of response tothis charge, but I endorse another. I next suggest, however, that the inclusion theory has little explanatory value. 相似文献
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Robert Eamon Briscoe 《Synthese》2006,152(1):95-128
Semantic externalism in contemporary philosophy of language typically – and often tacitly – combines two supervenience claims
about idiolectical meaning (i.e., meaning in the language system of an individual speaker). The first claim is that the meaning
of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her intrinsic, physical properties. The second is that the meaning of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her understanding of it. I here show that a conception of idiolectical meaning is possible that accepts the “anti-internalism” of the first
claim while rejecting (what I shall refer to as) the “anti-individualism” of the second. According to this conception, externally
constituted idiolectical meaning supervenes on idiolectical understanding. I begin by trying to show that it is possible to
disentangle anti-internalist and anti-individualist strands of argument in Hilary Putnam’s well-known and widely influential
“The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.” Having once argued that the latter strand of argument is not cogent, I then try to show that individualism
(in the sense above) can be reconciled with perhaps the most plausible reconstruction of Putnam’s well-known and widely accepted
“indexical” theory of natural kind terms. Integral to my defense of the possibility of an individualist externalism about
idiolectical meaning are my efforts to demonstrate that, pace Putnam, there is no “division of linguistic labor” when it comes to the fixing the meanings of such terms in a speaker’s
idiolect. The fact that average speakers sometimes need defer to experts shows that not reference, but only reliable recognition of what belongs in the extension of a natural kind term is a “social phenomenon.”
相似文献Wittgenstein (1958, 14).
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David Bain 《The Southern journal of philosophy》2007,45(3):335-362
I defend externalism about color experiences and color thoughts, which I argue color objectivism requires. Externalists face the following question: would a subject's wearing inverting lenses eventually change the color content of, for instance, those visual experiences the subject reports with “red”? From the work of Ned Block, David Velleman, Paul Boghossian, Michael Tye, and Fiona Macpherson, I extract problems facing those who answer “Yes” and problems facing those who answer “No.” I show how these problems can be overcome, leaving externalism available to the color objectivist. 相似文献
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Amir Horowitz 《Erkenntnis》2005,63(1):133-138
In “Contents just are in the head” (Erkenntnis 54, pp. 321–4.) I have presented two arguments against the thesis of semantic externalism. In “Contents just aren’t in the head” Anthony Brueckner has argued that my arguments are unsuccessful, since they rest upon some misconceptions regarding the nature of this thesis. (Erkenntnis 58, pp. 1–6.) In the present paper I will attempt to clarify and strengthen the case against semantic externalism, and show that Brueckner misses the point of my arguments. 相似文献
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Bryan Frances 《Philosophical Studies》2007,133(2):199-232
Content externalism is the dominant view in the philosophy of mind. Content essentialism, the thesis that thought tokens have
their contents essentially, is also popular. And many externalists are supporters of such essentialism. However, endorsing
the conjunction of those views either (i) commits one to a counterintuitive view of the underlying physical nature of thought
tokens or (ii) commits one to a slightly different but still counterintuitive view of the relation of thought tokens to physical
tokens as well as a rejection of realist physicalism. In this essay I reveal the problem and articulate and adjudicate among
the possible solutions. I will end up rejecting content essentialism. 相似文献
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The main aim of this paper is to show that there is one version of supervenience of the mental on the physical which is entailed by token-token identity (I call this version change-supervenience); and to establish that of the other better known versions of supervenience in the literature (which I call difference-supervenience), none are so entailed. One consequence of this is that Burge's thought experiments while successful in refutingdifference-supervenience cannot in themselves refute identity thesis. However, the introduction of change supervenience leads me to devise an analogous thought experiment against change-supervenience, thus refuting identity thesis as well. 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - 相似文献
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Anthony Brueckner 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》1997,78(1):1-12
Paul Boghossian has put forward an influential argument against Tyler Burge's account of basic self-knowledge. The argument focuses on the relation between externalism about mental content and memory. In this paper, I attempt to analyze and answer Boghossian's argument. 相似文献
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Synthese - Despite various attempts to rectify matters, the internalism-externalism (I-E) debate in epistemology remains mired in serious confusion. I present a new account of this debate, one... 相似文献
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SVEN BERNECKER 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2004,69(3):605-632
Content externalism about memory says that the individuation of memory contents depends on relations the subject bears to his past environment. I defend externalism about memory by arguing that neither philosophical nor psychological considerations stand in the way of accepting the context dependency of memory that follows from externalism. 相似文献
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McDowell on Reasons, Externalism and Scepticism 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Duncan Pritchard 《European Journal of Philosophy》2003,11(3):273-294