Effects of Causal Structure on Decisions About Where to Intervene on Causal Systems

We investigated how people design interventions to affect the outcomes of causal systems. We propose that the abstract structural properties of a causal system, in addition to people's content and mechanism knowledge, influence decisions about how to intervene. In Experiment 1, participants preferred to intervene at specific locations (immediate causes, root causes) in a causal chain regardless of which content variables occupied those positions. In Experiment 2, participants were more likely to intervene on root causes versus immediate causes when they were presented with a long‐term goal versus a short‐term goal. These results show that the structural properties of a causal system can guide the design of interventions.     

Sufficiency and Necessity Assumptions in Causal Structure Induction

Research on human causal induction has shown that people have general prior assumptions about causal strength and about how causes interact with the background. We propose that these prior assumptions about the parameters of causal systems do not only manifest themselves in estimations of causal strength or the selection of causes but also when deciding between alternative causal structures. In three experiments, we requested subjects to choose which of two observable variables was the cause and which the effect. We found strong evidence that learners have interindividually variable but intraindividually stable priors about causal parameters that express a preference for causal determinism (sufficiency or necessity; Experiment 1). These priors predict which structure subjects preferentially select. The priors can be manipulated experimentally (Experiment 2) and appear to be domain‐general (Experiment 3). Heuristic strategies of structure induction are suggested that can be viewed as simplified implementations of the priors.     

The use of diagrams in analogical problem solving

In four experiments, we examined the impact of perceptual properties on the effectiveness of diagrams in analogical problem solving, using variants of convergence diagrams as source analogues for the radiation problem. Static diagrams representing the initial problematic state (one large line directed at a target) and the final state for a convergence solution (multiple converging lines) were not accessed spontaneously but were often used successfully once a hint to consider the diagram had been provided. The inaccessibility of static diagrams was not alleviated by adding additional diagrams to represent intermediate states (Experiment 1), but spontaneous access was improved by augmenting static diagrams with a verbal statement of the convergence principle (Experiment 3). Spontaneous retrieval and noticing were increased markedly by animating displays representing converging forces and thereby encouraging encoding of the lines as indicating motion toward a target (Experiments 3 and 4). However, neither static nor animated diagrams were effective when the arrows were reversed to imply divergence rather than convergence (Experiment 2). The results indicate that when animation encourages the interpretation of a diagram as a helpful source analogue, it can greatly enhance analogical transfer.     

Learning With Real Machines or Diagrams: Application of Knowledge to Real-World Problems

In this study, we investigated how learning from different media, either from real pulley systems or from simple line diagrams, affected mechanical learning and problem solving. Novice subjects learned about pulley systems by comparing the efficiency of different systems and receiving feedback on their accuracy. The main outcome measures were subjects' ability to compare pulley system efficiency, their level of mechanical reasoning, and their ability to apply knowledge of system efficiency and construction details. Experiment 1 showed that (a) subjects learning with the two types of media made equal improvement on the learning task, and (b) all subjects showed an increase in quantitative understanding as they learned, but (c) subjects who learned hands-on, by manipulating real pulley systems, solved application problems more accurately than those who learned from diagrams. Experiment 2 showed that both the realism of the stimuli and the opportunity to manipulate systems contributed to the improved performance on application problems.     

Coding left and right

The present study compared the processing of direction for up and down arrows and for left and right arrows in visual displays. Experiment 1 demonstrated that it is more difficult to deal with left and right than with up and down when the two directions must be discriminated but not when they must simply be oriented to. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that telling left from right is harder regardless of whether the responses are manual or verbal. Experiment 4 showed that left-right discriminations take longer than up-down discriminations for judgments of position as well as direction. In Experiment 5 it was found that position information can intrude on direction judgments both within a dimension (e.g., a left arrow to the left of fixation is judged faster than a left arrow to the right of fixation) and across dimensions (e.g., judging vertically positioned left and right arrows is more difficult than judging horizontally positioned left and right arrows). There was indirect evidence in these experiments that although the spatial codes for up and down are symmetrical, the codes for left and right may be less so; this in turn could account for the greater difficulty of discriminating left from right.     

‘You Are What You Read:’ Is selective exposure a way people tell us who they are?

Selective exposure is the tendency to gather viewpoint-congenial versus viewpoint-uncongenial information. Extant models of selective exposure suggest this tendency occurs because people anticipate reading congenial (vs. uncongenial) information will cause more favourable intrapersonal consequences. However, these models ignore the notion that people's information choices are, in part, symbolic gestures designed to convey identity-relevant beliefs to an audience through information display. Drawing from perspectives that emphasize human consumption as symbolic and a way to signal one's identity, we suggest that selective exposure pertains not only to information processing but also to conveying identity through information display. Experiment 1 showed that people characterize information display as a way to communicate their views to an audience. Experiments 2–4 showed that people are averse to displaying uncongenial versus congenial information (without processing the information), anticipate feeling more uncomfortable and more inauthentic merely displaying (without processing) uncongenial versus congenial information, and that people's intentions to engage in selective exposure in daily life are a function of their belief that selective-exposure displays convey their identity. None of these studies or findings can be generated from extant selective-exposure theories. Thus, selective-exposure theories are likely incomplete because they ignore people's beliefs and goals regarding information display.     

Does causal knowledge help us be faster and more frugal in our decisions?

One challenge that has to be addressed by the fast and frugal heuristics program is how people manage to select, from the abundance of cues that exist in the environment, those to rely on when making decisions. We hypothesize that causal knowledge helps people target particular cues and estimate their validities. This hypothesis was tested in three experiments. Results show that when causal information about some cues was available (Experiment 1), participants preferred to search for these cues first and to base their decisions on them. When allowed to learn cue validities in addition to causal information (Experiment 2), participants also became more frugal (i.e., they searched fewer of the available cues), made more accurate decisions, and were more precise in estimating cue validities than was a control group that did not receive causal information. These results can be attributed to the causal relation between the cues and the criterion, rather than to greater saliency of the causal cues (Experiment 3). Overall, our results support the hypothesis that causal knowledge aids in the learning of cue validities and is treated as a meta-cue for identifying highly valid cues.     

Strategy selection in causal reasoning: when beliefs and covariation collide.

The present study investigated how people combine covariation information (Cheng & Novick, 1990, 1992) with pre-existing beliefs (White, 1989) when evaluating causal hypotheses. Three experiments, using both within- and between-subjects designs, found that the use of covariation information and beliefs interacted, such that the effects of covariation were larger when people assessed hypotheses about believable than about unbelievable causal candidates. In Experiment 2, this interaction was observed when participants made judgments in stages (e.g., first evaluating covariation information about a causal candidate and then evaluating the believability of a candidate), as well as when the information was presented simultaneously. Experiment 3 demonstrated that this pattern was also reflected in participants' metacognitive judgments: Participants indicated that they weighed covariation information more heavily for believable than unbelievable candidates. Finally, Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated the presence of individual differences in the use of covariation- and belief-based cues. That is, individuals who tended to base their causality judgments primarily on belief were less likely to make use of covariation information and vice versa. The findings were most consistent with White's (1989) causal power theory, which suggests that covariation information is more likely to be considered relevant to believable than unbelievable causes.     

Mental animation: inferring motion from static displays of mechanical systems.

Reaction-time and eye-fixation data are analyzed to investigate how people infer the kinematics of simple mechanical systems (pulley systems) from diagrams showing their static configuration. It is proposed that this mental animation process involves decomposing the representation of a pulley system into smaller units corresponding to the machine components and animating these components in a sequence corresponding to the causal sequence of events in the machine's operation. Although it is possible for people to make inferences against the chain of causality in the machine, these inferences are more difficult, and people have a preference for inferences in the direction of causality. The mental animation process reflects both capacity limitations and limitations of mechanical knowledge.     

Stable Causal Relationships Are Better Causal Relationships

We report three experiments investigating whether people's judgments about causal relationships are sensitive to the robustness or stability of such relationships across a range of background circumstances. In Experiment 1, we demonstrate that people are more willing to endorse causal and explanatory claims based on stable (as opposed to unstable) relationships, even when the overall causal strength of the relationship is held constant. In Experiment 2, we show that this effect is not driven by a causal generalization's actual scope of application. In Experiment 3, we offer evidence that stable causal relationships may be seen as better guides to action. Collectively, these experiments document a previously underappreciated factor that shapes people's causal reasoning: the stability of the causal relationship.     

负相容效应中启动项-目标项关系对阈下信息加工的影响

采用掩蔽启动范式考察了负相容效应中启动项与目标项关系对阈下信息加工的影响,以及是否存在语义水平的负相容效应.两个实验分别以双箭头和汉字为掩蔽启动项,考察启动项和目标项重复、加工水平相同及加工水平不同三种条件下的启动效应.结果发现,两个实验的重复及加工水平相同条件下都出现负相容效应,且重复条件下启动量最大,加工水平不同条件下则无启动.这表明:(1)启动项与目标项的知觉重复影响启动量,但不是负相容效应的必要条件,只有当启动项和目标项加工水平相同时,才出现负相容效应;(2)存在语义水平上的负相容效应,阈下语义信息可得到加工并表现为对后继同类反应的抑制.     

The role of explanation in categorization decisions

Research into the role of explanation on the categorization process has yielded conflicting conclusions. Some theorists stress the importance of explanation, arguing that explanations provide a causal structure necessary to the categorization process. Others discount its significance, arguing that explanation is neither necessary nor sufficient for categorization. Experimentally, explanation has shown modest success in accounting for some categories but not others. Across three experiments, we test whether the central features of a category are the ones that capture the most explanatory structure. The objectives of the current study are threefold: to determine the importance of explanation in natural kind and artifact categorization; to understand the implications of feature correlations as they relate to explanation; and to further delineate the benefit of explanation outside of a functional role. Experiment 1 demonstrates that explanation plays a more dominant role in artifact versus natural kind categorization. Experiment 2 provides evidence that correlated features are neither necessary nor sufficient for categorization. Moreover, it demonstrates that, in the absence of correlation, people still rely on explanation for artifacts but not for natural kinds. Experiment 3 tests to what extent functional information underlies explanation in artifact categorization. We demonstrate that functional relations are not necessary for explanatory‐based categorization. Our results, coupled with previous evidence, suggest a dichotomous role for explanation‐based categorization. On the one hand, explanation is virtually ignored when categorizing biological kinds; on the other, explanation fosters artifact categorization. Implications for categorization and category‐specific disorder are considered.     

Measuring effects of voluntary attention: A comparison among predictive arrow,colour, and number cues

The Posner cueing paradigm is one of the most widely used paradigms in attention research. Importantly, when employing it, it is critical to understand which type of orienting a cue triggers. It has been suggested that large effects elicited by predictive arrow cues reflect an interaction of involuntary and voluntary orienting. This conclusion is based on comparisons of cueing effects of predictive arrows, nonpredictive arrows (involuntary orienting), and predictive numbers (voluntary orienting). Experiment 1 investigated whether this conclusion is restricted to comparisons with number cues and showed similar results to those of previous studies, but now for comparisons to predictive colour cues, indicating that the earlier conclusion can be generalized. Experiment 2 assessed whether the size of a cueing effect is related to the ease of deriving direction information from a cue, based on the rationale that effects for arrows may be larger, because it may be easier to process direction information given by symbols such as arrows than that given by other cues. Indeed, direction information is derived faster and more accurately from arrows than from colour and number cues in a direction judgement task, and cueing effects are larger for arrows than for the other cues. Importantly though, performance in the two tasks is not correlated. Hence, the large cueing effects of arrows are not a result of the ease of information processing, but of the types of orienting that the arrows elicit.     

I just love the attention: implicit preference for direct eye contact

Seven studies used the Implicit Association Test to measure preference for gaze direction. For faces with neutral expressions, people clearly preferred eyes looking towards them compared to eyes gazing to the right or left (Experiment 1). This preference remained for faces shown turned to the side (Experiment 2) and upside-down (Experiment 3). Even angry faces were preferred with direct compared to averted gaze (Experiments 4 and 5). Furthermore, preference for eye contact did not correlate to performance on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) or the Autism Quotient (AQ); note performance on the RMET and the AQ was only weakly correlated although both are claimed to measure social cognition. When the faces were replaced by coloured shapes (Experiment 6) or arrows (Experiment 7) people showed a weaker preference for the category label “looking at you” versus “looking to the side”. Overall, people revealed a robust preference for direct rather than averted gaze which generalized across face pose and expression. Together with a weaker preference for arrows pointing towards them, this is consistent with people having an implicit preference for self-directed attention.     

Exploring the memory advantage for moving scenes

Recognition memory is better for moving images than for static images (the dynamic superiority effect), and performance is best when the mode of presentation at test matches that at study (the study–test congruence effect). We investigated the basis for these effects. In Experiment 1, dividing attention during encoding reduced overall performance but had little effect on the dynamic superiority or study–test congruence effects. In addition, these effects were not limited to scenes depicting faces. In Experiment 2, movement improved both old–new recognition and scene orientation judgements. In Experiment 3, movement improved the recognition of studied scenes but also increased the spurious recognition of novel scenes depicting the same people as studied scenes, suggesting that movement increases the identification of individual objects or actors without necessarily improving the retrieval of associated information. We discuss the theoretical implications of these results and highlight directions for future investigation.     

Infant perception of causal motion produced by humans and inanimate objects

Both the movements of people and inanimate objects are intimately bound up with physical causality. Furthermore, in contrast to object movements, causal relationships between limb movements controlled by humans and their body displacements uniquely reflect agency and goal-directed actions in support of social causality. To investigate the development of sensitivity to causal movements, we examined the looking behavior of infants between 9 and 18 months of age when viewing movements of humans and objects. We also investigated whether individual differences in gender and gross motor functions may impact the development of the visual preferences for causal movements. In Experiment 1, infants were presented with walking stimuli showing either normal body translation or a “moonwalk” that reversed the horizontal motion of body translations. In Experiment 2, infants were presented with unperformable actions beyond infants’ gross motor functions (i.e., long jump) either with or without ecologically valid body displacement. In Experiment 3, infants were presented with rolling movements of inanimate objects that either complied with or violated physical causality. We found that female infants showed longer looking times to normal walking stimuli than to moonwalk stimuli, but did not differ in their looking time to movements of inanimate objects and unperformable actions. In contrast, male infants did not show sensitivity to causal movement for either category. Additionally, female infants looked longer at social stimuli of human actions than male infants. Under the tested circumstances, our findings indicate that female infants have developed a sensitivity to causal consistency between limb movements and body translations of biological motion, only for actions with previous visual and motor exposures, and demonstrate a preference toward social information.     

A secret agent? How infants learn about the identity of objects in a causal scene

Four experiments examined the role of correlations between dynamic and static parts on 12- to 16-month-olds' ability to learn the identity of agents and recipients in a simple causal event. Infants were habituated to events in which objects with a dynamic or static part acted as an agent or a recipient and then were tested with an event in which the part-causal role relations were switched. Experiment 1 revealed that 16-month-olds, but not 12-month-olds, associate a dynamic part with the role of agent and a static part with the role of recipient. Experiment 2 showed that 12- and 16-month-olds do not associate a static part with the role of agent or a dynamic part with the role of recipient. Experiment 3 demonstrated that 14-month-olds will learn the relations presented in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Experiment 4 revealed that 12-month-olds were able to discriminate the two geometric figures in the events. The results are discussed with respect to infants' developing ability to attend to correlations between dynamic and static cues and the mechanism underlying early object concept acquisition.     

Causal learning from probabilistic events in 24‐month‐olds: an action measure

How do young children learn about causal structure in an uncertain and variable world? We tested whether they can use observed probabilistic information to solve causal learning problems. In two experiments, 24‐month‐olds observed an adult produce a probabilistic pattern of causal evidence. The toddlers then were given an opportunity to design their own intervention. In Experiment 1, toddlers saw one object bring about an effect with a higher probability than a second object. In Experiment 2, the frequency of the effect was held constant, though its probability differed. After observing the probabilistic evidence, toddlers in both experiments chose to act on the object that was more likely to produce the effect. The results demonstrate that toddlers can learn about cause and effect without trial‐and‐error or linguistic instruction on the task, simply by observing the probabilistic patterns of evidence resulting from the imperfect actions of other social agents. Such observational causal learning from probabilistic displays supports human children's rapid cultural learning.     

Selecting explanations from causal chains: Do statistical principles explain preferences for voluntary causes?

We investigate whether people prefer voluntary causes to physical causes in unfolding causal chains and whether statistical (covariation, sufficiency) principles can predict how people select explanations. Experiment 1 shows that while people tend to prefer a proximal (more recent) cause in chains of unfolding physical events, causality is traced through the proximal cause to an underlying distal (less recent) cause when that cause is a human action. Experiment 2 shows that causal preference is more strongly correlated with judgements of sufficiency and conditionalised sufficiency than with covariation or conditionalised covariation. In addition, sufficiency judgements are partial mediators of the effect of type of distal cause (voluntary or physical) on causal preference. The preference for voluntary causes to physical causes corroborates findings from social psychology, cognitive neuroscience and jurisprudence that emphasise the primacy of intentions in causal attribution processes. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.