Effects of face and inanimate-object contexts on stimulus–response compatibility

Prior studies have shown that a left–right spatial compatibility effect occurs for vertically oriented stimuli relative to a background context of a face rotated 90° clockwise or counterclockwise from upright. For stimuli presented at the location of the eyes, the mapping of the right eye to a right response and the left eye to a left response, as would be viewed by the participant, yields better performance than does the opposite mapping. An issue of current interest in social cognition is whether animate objects are processed differently from inanimate ones. We investigated this issue in two experiments in which we compared the compatibility effects obtained with inanimate objects to those obtained with animate, face stimuli. The results showed left–right compatibility effects from the participant’s perspective for vehicles and faces from frontal and profile views, as well as for a road sign. Our findings indicate that coding of stimulus location relative to an external frame of reference is not restricted to face backgrounds.     

Children's and adults’ understanding of the “disgust face”

By the age of 4 years, children (N=120) know the meaning of the word disgust as well as they know the meaning of anger and fear; for example, when asked, they are equally able to generate a plausible cause for each of these emotions. Yet, in tasks involving facial expressions (free labelling of faces, deciding whether or not a face expresses disgust, or finding a “disgust face” in an array of faces), a majority of 3- to 7-year-old children (N=144) associated the prototypical “disgust face” with anger and denied its association with disgust (25% of adults on the same tasks did so as well). These results challenge the assumption that all humans easily recognise disgust from its facial expression and that this recognition is a precursor to children's understanding of the emotion of disgust.     

Concerning Gibson's ‘on the face of it’: Immediate perception and single-glance face recognition

The paper notes (1) that “thinking Gibsonian” is to be torn between two loves: cognition and reality, (2) that just because of this the cognitive scientist may beneficiently and more thoroughly rediscover that they are only two faces of his one true love: Meaning. This issue is elaborated as “the problem of intentionality” and culminates in the conclusion that Gibson's direct ecological approach to visual perception is not a theory about the constitution of perceptual meaning, which is the domain of the indirect cognitive approach. Therefore the constant Gibsonian attacks on indirect theories might be both misled and misleading. The second half of the paper begins with noting that this may be due to a confounding of the “direct” level of explanation of the perceiver with the “indirect” levels of phenomenologist and visual scientist. Next the scientist's process notions of direct and indirect theories are discussed with respect to single-glance face recognition. Within this second half of the paper about 20 different meanings of “direct” or “immediate” are presented (printed in italics). Most of these are generally acceptable and should, thus, not be invoked in support of entirely different notions, which are very problematic because these seem to eliminate the concept of mind-as-cognitive-process.     

The “parts and wholes” of face recognition: A review of the literature

It has been claimed that faces are recognized as a “whole” rather than by the recognition of individual parts. In a paper published in the Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology in 1993, Martha Farah and I attempted to operationalize the holistic claim using the part/whole task. In this task, participants studied a face and then their memory presented in isolation and in the whole face. Consistent with the holistic view, recognition of the part was superior when tested in the whole-face condition compared to when it was tested in isolation. The “whole face” or holistic advantage was not found for faces that were inverted, or scrambled, nor for non-face objects, suggesting that holistic encoding was specific to normal, intact faces. In this paper, we reflect on the part/whole paradigm and how it has contributed to our understanding of what it means to recognize a face as a “whole” stimulus. We describe the value of part/whole task for developing theories of holistic and non-holistic recognition of faces and objects. We discuss the research that has probed the neural substrates of holistic processing in healthy adults and people with prosopagnosia and autism. Finally, we examine how experience shapes holistic face recognition in children and recognition of own- and other-race faces in adults. The goal of this article is to summarize the research on the part/whole task and speculate on how it has informed our understanding of holistic face processing.     

The effects of distinctiveness on memory and metamemory for face–name associations

We examined the influence of face and name distinctiveness on memory and metamemory for face–name associations. Four types of monitoring judgements were solicited during encoding and retrieval of face–name pairs that contained distinct or typical faces (Experiment 1) or names (Experiment 2). The beneficial effects of distinctiveness on associative memory were symmetrical between faces and names, such that relative to their typical counterparts, distinct faces enhanced memory for names, and distinct names enhanced memory for faces. These effects were also apparent in metamemory. Estimates of prospective and retrospective memory performance were greater for face–name associations that contained a distinct face or name compared with a typical face or name, regardless of whether the distinct item was a cue or target. Moreover, the predictive validity of prospective monitoring improved with name distinctiveness, whereas the predictive validity of retrospective monitoring improved with facial distinctiveness. Our results indicate that distinctiveness affects not only the strength of the association between a face and a name, but also the ability to monitor that association.     

Staring us in the face? An embodied theory of innate face preference

Human expertise in face perception grows over development, but even within minutes of birth, infants exhibit an extraordinary sensitivity to face‐like stimuli. The dominant theory accounts for innate face detection by proposing that the neonate brain contains an innate face detection device, dubbed ‘Conspec’. Newborn face preference has been promoted as some of the strongest evidence for innate knowledge, and forms a canonical stage for the modern form of the nature–nurture debate in psychology. Interpretation of newborn face preference results has concentrated on monocular stimulus properties, with little mention or focused investigation of potential binocular involvement. However, the question of whether and how newborns integrate the binocular visual streams bears directly on the generation of observable visual preferences. In this theoretical paper, we employ a synthetic approach utilizing robotic and computational models to draw together the threads of binocular integration and face preference in newborns, and demonstrate cases where the former may explain the latter. We suggest that a system‐level view considering the binocular embodiment of newborn vision may offer a mutually satisfying resolution to some long‐running arguments in the polarizing debate surrounding the existence and causal structure of newborns' ‘innate knowledge’ of faces.     

The roles of sociosexual orientation and relationship status in women’s face preferences

Previous research suggests that sociosexual orientation and relationship status each predict women’s preferences for masculine men. However, if partnered women’s preferences primarily reflect the short-term (i.e., currently unfulfilled) aspect of a pluralistic mating strategy and unpartnered women’s preferences reflect the dominant aspect of their current mating strategy, then sociosexual orientation should predict the preferences of unpartnered women better than those of partnered women. Perceptions of other women’s attractiveness may show a similar pattern of individual differences, if such perceptions of other women’s attractiveness are important for intra-sexual competitive behavior. Consistent with these predictions, in the current study, analyses of the relationship between women’s face preferences and sociosexual orientation indicated that unpartnered women reporting greater willingness to engage in uncommitted relationships demonstrated stronger preferences for exaggerated sex-typical characteristics in men’s and women’s faces. For partnered women, no corresponding relationship between sociosexual orientation and face preferences was evident. Collectively, these findings suggest that individual differences in sociosexual orientation may be better predictors of face preferences among unpartnered women than among women whose long-term relationship goals are currently being met.     

Does face recognition rely on encoding of 3-D surface? Examining the role of shape-from-shading and shape-from-stereo

It is now well known that processing of shading information in face recognition is susceptible to bottom lighting and contrast reversal, an effect that may be due to a disruption of 3-D shape processing. The question then is whether the disruption can be rectified by other sources of 3-D information, such as shape-from-stereo. We examined this issue by comparing identification performance either with or without stereo information using top-lit and bottom-lit face stimuli in both photographic positive and negative conditions. The results show that none of the shading effects was reduced by the presence of stereo information. This finding supports the notion that shape-from-shading overrides shape-from-stereo in face perception. Although shape-from-stereo did produce some signs of facilitation for face identification, this effect was negligible. Together, our results support the view that 3-D shape processing plays only a minor role in face recognition. Our data are best accounted for by a weighted function of 2-D processing of shading pattern and 3-D processing of shapes, with a much greater weight assigned to 2-D pattern processing.     

“Just another pretty face”: A multidimensional scaling approach to face attractiveness and variability

Findings on both attractiveness and memory for faces suggest that people should perceive more similarity among attractive than among unattractive faces. A multidimensional scaling approach was used to test this hypothesis in two studies. In Study 1, we derived a psychological face space from similarity ratings of attractive and unattractive Caucasian female faces. In Study 2, we derived a face space for attractive and unattractive male faces of Caucasians and non-Caucasians. Both studies confirm that attractive faces are indeed more tightly clustered than unattractive faces in people’s psychological face spaces. These studies provide direct and original support for theoretical assumptions previously made in the face space and face memory literatures.     

Are the facial gender and facial age variants of the composite face illusion products of a common mechanism?

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - When the upper half of one face (‘target region’) is spatially aligned with the lower half of another (‘distractor region’), the two...     

The ‘face’ of the il y a: Levinas and Blanchot on impersonal existence

This essay argues for a reading of Levinas’ work which prioritizes the significance of the il y a over the personal Other. I buttress this reading by using the well-documented intersections between Levinas’ work and that of Maurice Blanchot. Said otherwise, I argue that Levinas’ relationship with Blanchot (a relationship that is very much across the notion of the il y a) calls scholars of the Levinasian corpus to place the conception of impersonal existence to the forefront. To do so is to take seriously the complex relationship between Levinas’ explicitly ethical account of the face, and his phenomenological account of impersonal existence. To approach Levinas in this way (by way of his relationship with Blanchot) is to not only recognize that the ethical import of the face lies in its being without determination or nomenclature, but it is to also fully acknowledge the underlying horror of a Levinasian rendition of the ethical encounter.     

What’s in a face? Perhaps some elements of both eudaimonic and hedonic well-being

The idea that eudaimonic well-being (EWB) should be distinguished from the more widespread notion of hedonic well-being (HWB), has stirred up disagreement among happiness researchers. Siding with EWB researchers, this study provides theoretical and empirical arguments supporting the distinctiveness and usefulness of a EWB dimension. A path model with data from Norwegian university students (N?=?184) showed that, when requested to draw both a happy face and a sad face, indicators of HWB were associated with a preference for working with the happy rather than the sad face. Indicators of EWB were uncorrelated with this hedonic bias. Eudaimonic feeling states were associated with the level of creativity involved in the drawings, while hedonic feelings were not. Finally, participants who draw bigger faces also felt more pleasure during the act of drawing. Eudaimonic feelings were unrelated to the size of the drawing.     

Is computer simulation changing the face of experimentation?

Morrison points out many similarities between the roles of simulation models and other sorts of models in science. On the basis of these similarities she claims that running a simulation is epistemologically on a par with doing a traditional experiment and that the output of a simulation therefore counts as a measurement. I agree with her premises but reject the inference. The epistemological payoff of a traditional experiment is greater (or less) confidence in the fit between a model and a target system. The source of this payoff is the existence of a causal interaction with the target system. A computer experiment, which does not go beyond the simulation system itself, lacks any such interaction. So computer experiments cannot confer any additional confidence in the fit (or lack thereof) between the simulation model and the target system.     

Who are you looking at? The influence of face gender on visual attention and memory for own- and other-race faces

Previous research suggests that the own-race bias (ORB) in memory for faces is a result of other-race faces receiving less visual attention at encoding. As women typically display an own-gender bias in memory for faces and men do not, we investigated whether face gender and sex of viewer influenced visual attention and memory for own- and other-race faces, and if preferential viewing of own-race faces contributed to the ORB in memory. Participants viewed pairs of female or male own- and other-race faces while their viewing time was recorded. Afterwards, they completed a surprise memory test. We found that (1) other-race males received the initial focus of attention, (2) own-race faces were viewed longer than other-race faces over time, although the difference was larger for female faces, and (3) even though longer viewing time increased the probability of remembering a face, it did not explain the magnified ORB in memory for female faces. Importantly, these findings highlight that face gender moderates attentional responses to and memory for own- and other-race faces.     

Dog–human social relationship: representation of human face familiarity and emotions in the dog brain

Animal Cognition - This study investigated the behavioral and neural indices of detecting facial familiarity and facial emotions in human faces by dogs. Awake canine fMRI was used to evaluate...     

Who are you looking at? The influence of face gender on visual attention and memory for own- and other-race faces

Previous research suggests that the own-race bias (ORB) in memory for faces is a result of other-race faces receiving less visual attention at encoding. As women typically display an own-gender bias in memory for faces and men do not, we investigated whether face gender and sex of viewer influenced visual attention and memory for own- and other-race faces, and if preferential viewing of own-race faces contributed to the ORB in memory. Participants viewed pairs of female or male own- and other-race faces while their viewing time was recorded. Afterwards, they completed a surprise memory test. We found that (1) other-race males received the initial focus of attention, (2) own-race faces were viewed longer than other-race faces over time, although the difference was larger for female faces, and (3) even though longer viewing time increased the probability of remembering a face, it did not explain the magnified ORB in memory for female faces. Importantly, these findings highlight that face gender moderates attentional responses to and memory for own- and other-race faces.     

The face inversion effect—Parts and wholes: Individual features and their configuration

The face inversion effect (FIE) is a reduction in recognition performance for inverted faces (compared to upright faces) that is greater than that typically observed with other stimulus types (e.g., houses). The work of Diamond and Carey, suggests that a special type of configural information, “second-order relational information” is critical in generating this inversion effect. However, Tanaka and Farah concluded that greater reliance on second-order relational information did not directly result in greater sensitivity to inversion, and they suggested that the FIE is not entirely due to a reliance on this type of configural information. A more recent review by McKone and Yovel provides a meta-analysis that makes a similar point. In this paper, we investigated the contributions made by configural and featural information to the FIE. Experiments 1a and1b investigated the link between configural information and the FIE. Remarkably, Experiment 1b showed that disruption of all configural information of the type considered in Diamond and Carey's analysis (both first and second order) was effective in reducing recognition performance, but did not significantly impact on the FIE. Experiments 2 and 3 revealed that face processing is affected by the orientation of individual features and that this plays a major role in producing the FIE. The FIE was only completely eliminated when we disrupted the single feature orientation information in addition to the configural information, by using a new type of transformation similar to Thatcherizing our sets of scrambled faces. We conclude by noting that our results for scrambled faces are consistent with an account that has recognition performance entirely determined by the proportion of upright facial features within a stimulus, and that any ability to make use of the spatial configuration of these features seems to benefit upright and inverted normal faces alike.     

Regulation of brain activity in the fusiform face and parahippocampal place areas in 7–11-year-old children

Developmental studies have demonstrated that cognitive processes such as attention, suppression of interference and memory develop throughout childhood and adolescence. However, little is currently known about the development of top-down control mechanisms and their influence on cognitive performance. In the present study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate modulation of activity in the ventral visual cortex in healthy 7–11-year-old children and young adults. The participants performed tasks that required attention to either face (Fs task) or scene (Sf task) images while trying to ignore distracting scene or face images, respectively. A face-selective area in the fusiform gyrus (fusiform face area, FFA) and an area responding preferentially to scene images in the parahippocampal gyrus (parahippocampal place area, PPA) were defined using functional localizers. Children responded slower and less accurately in the tasks than adults. In children, the right FFA was less selective to face images and regulation of activity between the Fs and Sf tasks was weaker compared to adults. In the PPA, selectivity to scenes and regulation of activity, there according to the task demands were comparable between children and adults. During the tasks, children activated prefrontal cortical areas including the middle (MFG) and superior (SFG) frontal gyrus more than adults. Functional connectivity between the right FFA and left MFG was stronger in adults than children in the Fs task. Children, on the other hand, had stronger functional connectivity than adults in the Sf task between the right FFA and right PPA and between right MFG and medial SFG. There were no group differences in the functional connectivity between the PPA and the prefrontal cortex (PFC). Together the results suggest that, in 7–11-year-old children, the FFA is still immature, whereas the selectivity to scenes and regulation of activity in the PPA is comparable to adults. The results also indicated functional immaturity of the PFC in children compared to adults and weaker connectivity between the PFC and the rFFA, explaining the weaker regulation of activity in the rFFA between the Fs and Sf tasks.