Normative explanation unchained

Normative theories aim to explain why things have the normative features they have. This paper argues that, contrary to some plausible existing views, one important kind of normative explanations which first-order normative theories aim to formulate and defend can fail to transmit downward along chains of metaphysical determination of normative facts by non-normative facts. Normative explanation is plausibly subject to a kind of a justification condition whose satisfaction may fail to transmit along the relevant kind of metaphysical hierarchy. A broader aim of the paper is to contribute to systematic theorizing about normative explanation: whereas there has been a great deal of work on scientific explanation, there has been little by way of systematic exploration of what sort of explanations normative theories aim to formulate and defend.     

关于自我改变的心理研究

本文总结和概括了关于自我改变研究的理论成果,分析了自我改变的努力容易失败的原因,揭示了人们对自我改变失败的认知取向,以及在很可能会再度失败的情况下启动自我改变的新一轮行动的心理机制。     

Ethical Theory,Completeness &; Consistency

This paper argues that many leading ethical theories are incomplete, in that they fail to account for both right and wrong. It also argues that some leading ethical theories are inconsistent, in that they allow that an act can be both right and wrong. The paper also considers responses on behalf of the target theories.     

On the inconclusiveness of “crucial” cognitive tests of dissonance versus self-perception theories

Several recent experiments are claimed to have tested conflicting predictions of cognitive dissonance and self-perception theories. It is argued that these claims fail to take into account the capacity of each formulation to account adequately for results “predicted” by the other. This argument is then continued, at a metatheoretical level, to reach the conclusion that the two theories are not capable of producing unequivocally contradictory predictions of cognitive consequences of experimental procedures.     

The failure of theories of personhood

The belief persists in philosophy, religion, science, and popular culture that some special cognitive property of persons like self-consciousness confers a unique moral standing. However, no set of cognitive properties confers moral standing, and metaphysical personhood is not sufficient for either moral personhood or moral standing. Cognitive theories all fail to capture the depth of commitments embedded in using the language of "person." It is more assumed than demonstrated in these theories that nonhuman animals lack a relevant form of self-consciousness or its functional equivalent. Although nonhuman animals are not plausible candidates for moral personhood, humans too fail to qualify as moral persons if they lack one or more of the conditions of moral personhood. If moral personhood were the sole basis of moral rights, then these humans would lack rights -- and precisely for the reasons that nonhuman animals would.     

A Note on the Unprovability of Consistency in Formal Theories of Truth

Journal of Philosophical Logic - Why is it that even strong formal theories of truth fail to prove their own consistency? Although Field (Mind, 115, 459, 2006) has addressed this question for many...     

Contiguity and contingency in instrumental conditioning

There have been several attempts to construct molar theories of conditioning on the empirical basis that response-reinforcement contingency is important in determining conditioning. Such theories claim to explain behavior in terms of molar level processes which transcend the molecular level and, therefore, are not reducible to molecular processes or their interaction. These molar theories are critically examined and found to be seriously flawed because they fail to account for the effects of delaying reinforcement (degree of contiguity). Observed molar level relations, such as the matching law, do not require a molar theory, but may be more usefully considered as a product of molecular processes.     

The Objectivity of Wellbeing

Subjective theories of wellbeing place authority concerning what benefits a person with that person herself, or limit wellbeing to psychological states. But how well off we are seems to depend on two different concerns, how well we are doing and how well things are going for us. I argue that two powerful subjective theories fail to adequately account for this and that principled arguments favoring subjectivism are unsound and poorly motivated. In the absence of more compelling evidence that how things go for us cannot directly constitute our wellbeing, I conclude that wellbeing is objective.     

Why Evolution is Really Indeterministic

Leslie Graves, Barbara Horan and Alex Rosenberg (1999) have argued that the process of evolution is really deterministic, so we should be instrumentalists about our probabilistic evolutionary theory. I criticize the consistency of their view. I argue that because they are realists towards multiple theories (quantum mechanics and macrophysics) their arguments against realism for another scientific theory fail. The main point of this paper is critical, but in order to set up this criticism I explore the ramifications of realism for multiple theories. Finally, I offer a brief metaphysical justification for realism about multiple theories. This view justifies realism for evolutionary theory, which has been defended by Robert Brandon and Scott Carson (1996).     

Staring at the Sun: Tragedy,trauma, and ecological harmony

Recently it has become increasingly evident that current theories of civilization are unsustainable. Within this essay I critique three alternative theories: bioregionalism, sustainable development, and The Universe Story. I argue that although these theories address ecological devastation, they fail to grapple with the legacy of white supremacy. Evoking Richard Wright's poem Between the World and Me, I argue that for minorities the landscape is often inscribed with trauma. Consequently, any theory of ecological harmony must take this into account. I refer to the task of contending with the legacy of slavery, colonization, and genocide as Staring at the Sun.     

Self-Control,Intimate Partner Abuse,and Intimate Partner Victimization: Testing the General Theory of Crime in Thailand

Cities invariably have “gray” areas where formal policing and regulatory reach is relatively ineffective. By focusing on individuals or groups traditional theories of deviance fail to account for community-level processes that create local alternative norms that contribute to behavior seen as deviant by outsiders. By combining theories of space with issues of identity construction and deviance, we analyze an inner-city neighborhood in Mexico City in terms of four factors: Structural Location, Material Form, Meaningfulness, and Organizational Integration. This creates a model for understanding forms of deviance that are rooted in community processes of resistance to the dominant normative system.     

How General Do Theories of Explanation Need To Be? *

Theories of explanation seek to tell us what distinctively explanatory information is. The most ambitious ones, such as the DN‐account, seek to tell us what an explanation is, tout court. Less ambitious ones, such as causal theories, restrict themselves to a particular domain of inquiry. The least ambitious theories constitute outright skepticism, holding that there is no reasonably unified phenomenon to give an account of. On these views, it is impossible to give any theories of explanation at all. I argue that both the less ambitious and outright skeptical varieties are committed to a certain context‐sensitivity of our explanatory discourse. And though this discourse is almost certainly context‐sensitive in some respects, it does not exhibit the context‐sensitivity less than fully ambitious theories are committed to. Therefore, all accounts that seek to restrict themselves in scope, including causal accounts of explanation, fail.     

Virtue theory,ideal observers,and the supererogatory

I argue that recent virtue theories (including those of Hursthouse, Slote, and Swanton) face important initial difficulties in accommodating the supererogatory. In particular, I consider several potential characterizations of the supererogatory modeled upon these familiar virtue theories (and their accounts of rightness) and argue that they fail to provide an adequate account of supererogation. In the second half of the paper I sketch an alternative virtue-based characterization of supererogation, one that is grounded in the attitudes of virtuous ideal observers, and that avoids the concerns raised in the first part of the paper.     

Consciousness and information integration

Integration information theories posit that the integration of information is necessary and/or sufficient for consciousness. In this paper, we focus on three of the most prominent information integration theories: Information Integration Theory (IIT), Global Workspace Theory (GWT), and Attended Intermediate-Level Theory (AIR). We begin by explicating each theory and key concepts they utilize (e.g., information, integration, etc.). We then argue that the current evidence indicates that the integration of information (as specified by each of the theories) is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness. Unlike GWT and AIR, IIT maintains that conscious experience is both necessary and sufficient for consciousness. We present empirical evidence indicating that simple features are experienced in the absence of feature integration and argue that it challenges IIT’s necessity claim. In addition, we challenge IIT’s sufficiency claim by presenting evidence from hemineglect cases and amodal completion indicating that contents may be integrated and yet fail to give rise to subjective experience. Moreover, we present empirical evidence from subjects with frontal lesions who are unable to carry out simple instructions (despite appearing to understand their meaning) and argue that they are irreconcilable with GWT. Lastly, we argue that empirical evidence indicating that patients with visual agnosia fail to identify objects they report being conscious of present a challenge to AIR’s necessity claim.

     

Irrational desires

Conclusion I believe that the attempts discussed above fail to show that logically satisfiable basic desires can be rationally impotent. Obviously, this does not entail that they cannot be. Nevertheless, I think it is reasonable to accept a Neo-Humean view. Such acceptence need not be based on burden of proof arguments, about which there is well-grounded skepticism. I prefer instead to base it on a burden of introduction argument; because of the initial plausibility of the Neo-Humean view, critics carry the burden of introducing theories that entail that basic desires can be non-instrumentally irrational (in the relevant sense). Once such theories are introduced, the philosophical court can rule without imposing a burden of proof. I have tried to establish that three recently introduced theories in fact give us no grounds for rejecting Neo-Humeanism.     

The metaphysics of groups

If you are a realist about groups (e.g. religious institutions, football teams, the Mafia etc.) there are three main theories of what to identify groups with. I offer reasons for thinking that two of those theories (groups as sui generis entities and groups as mereological fusions) fail to meet important desiderata. The third option is to identify groups with sets, which meets all of the desiderata if only we take care over which sets they are identified with. I then canvass some possible objections to that third theory, and explain how to avoid them.     

Euthyphro and Moral Realism: A Reply to Harrison

Gerald Harrison identifies two Euthyphro-related concerns for divine command theories and makes the case that to the extent that these concerns make trouble for divine command theories they also make trouble for non-naturalistic moral realism and naturalistic moral realism (call this the parity thesis). He also offers responses to the two concerns on behalf of divine command theorists. I show here that the parity thesis does not hold for the most commonly discussed version of divine command theory. I further argue that his responses to the two concerns fail. Finally, I draw on some of Harrison’s ideas to identify an advantage that non-naturalistic moral realism has over divine command theories and naturalistic moral realism.     

A Dilemma for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness

Higher Order theories of consciousness have their fair share of sympathisers, but the arguments mustered in their support are—to my mind—unduly persuasive. My aim in this paper is to show that Higher Order theories cannot accommodate the possibility of misrepresentation without either falling into contradiction, or collapsing into a First-Order theory. If this diagnosis is on the right track, then Higher Order theories—at least in the specific versions here considered—fail to give an account of what they set out to explain: what is distinctive of ‘conscious’ phenomena.     

Explanation and Manipulation1

I argue that manipulationist theories of causation fail as accounts of causal structure, and thereby as theories of “actual causation” and causal explanation. I focus on two kinds of problem cases, which I call “Perceived Abnormality Cases” and “Ontological Dependence Cases.” The cases illustrate that basic facts about social systems—that individuals are sensitive to perceived abnormal conditions and that certain actions metaphysically depend on institutional rules—pose a challenge for manipulationist theories and for counterfactual theories more generally. I then show how law‐based accounts of causal structure can answer such challenges. The moral of the story is that the basic manipulationist idea that our interest in causal structure is driven by our interest in manipulating our environment faces decisive problems in a central domain of application, the social sciences.     

Manifestability and Semantic Realism

Abstract: This paper provides a critical discussion of Alexander Miller's recent attack on antirealist arguments against semantic realism that are based on manifestability requirements. Miller attempts to defend semantic realism against Wright-Hale arguments from manifestability. He does so in reliance on a McDowell type assertion-truth platitude. This paper argues in both general terms and in relation to the details of Miller's argument, that attempts to defend semantic realism while accepting a Dummettian-Wittgensteinian framework on theories of meaning, are misconceived and likely to fail, as I believe is true in Miller's case. Semantic realism is best defended within a context of metaphysical realism, and naturalistic-causal theories of meaning and explanation.