Friedrich Nietzsche’s Twilight of the Idols

This review essay of Nietzsche’s “Twilight of the Idols” (1888) is part of the journal TOPOI’s “Untimely Reviews” series of classic works of philosophy. Themes dealt with are Nietzsche’s attacks on morality, on free will, on mental causation, on Socrates, and on Kant. Connections are drawn with contemporary work by Mark Johnston, David Rosenthal, and Daniel Wegner, among others.     

Statements of Method and Teaching: The Case of Socrates

In this paper, I ponder the question of whether Socrates follows a method of investigation — the method of hypothesis — which he advocates in Plato's Phaedo. The evidence in the dialogue suggests that he does not follow the method, which raises additional questions: If he fails to do so, why does he articulate the method? Does his statement of method affect his actions or is it mainly forgotten? Although Socrates is a fictional character, his actions in the Phaedo suggests questions about the function of espoused methods in actual situations.     

Rethinking Medical Humanities

This paper questions different conceptions of Medical Humanities in order to provide a clearer understanding of what they are and why they matter. Building upon former attempts, we defend a conception of Medical Humanities as a humanistic problem-based approach to medicine aiming at influencing its nature and practice. In particular, we discuss three main conceptual issues regarding the overall nature of this discipline: (i) a problem-driven approach to Medical Humanities; (ii) the need for an integration of Medical Humanities into medicine; (iii) the methodological requirements that could render Medical Humanities an effective framework for medical decision-making.     

Poor communication in psycholinguistics: Review of four new textbooks

Four new textbooks on psycholinguistics are reviewed:Psycholinguistics: A Cognitive View of Language by H. S. Cairns and C. E. Cairns;Experimental Psycholinguistics by S. Glucksberg and J. H. Danks;Psycholinguistics: Introductory Perspectives by J. F. Kess, andIntroduction to Psycholinguistics by I. Taylor. Three general issues about psycholinguistics are considered in detail: (1) Psycholinguists should attempt to provide psychological tests of competing linguistic theories. (2) More attention should be given by psycholinguists to the work done in the field of human information processing. (3) There is evidence for the Whorfian hypothesis, even in its strong version, at the phonetic level of language. It is concluded that improvement is needed in the communication between psycholinguistics and related disciplines and among the subdivisions of psycholinguistics.     

Medicine as a form of practical understanding

This paper is an attempt to reframe the debate of whether medicine is an art or a science in the Aristotelian sense. The recent book of Pellegrino and Thomasma, A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice, serves as the starting point. Taking clinical interaction as the distinctive feature of medicine, the resemblances of medicine with the characteristics of practical reasoning in the Aristotelian sense are further explored. This comparison proves especially useful in discussing the special status of medical knowledge. Clinical reasoning, resulting in clinical judgments, shows strong similarities with practical reasoning. The application of general principles, instead of deduction from them as in science is essential to both. The ancient concept of practical rationality may therefore be more appropriate while trying to ascribe rationality to medicine than the modern concept of rationality, associated solely with scientific reasoning.     

The perception of a familiar face is no more than the sum of its parts

Why do faces become easier to recognize with repeated exposure? Previous research has suggested that familiarity may induce a qualitative shift in visual processing from an independent analysis of individual facial features to analysis that includes information about the relationships among features (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka Psychological Review, 105, 482–498, 1998; Maurer, Grand, & Mondloch Trends in Cognitive Science, 6, 255–260, 2002). We tested this idea by using a “summation-at-threshold” technique (Gold, Mundy, & Tjan Psychological Science, 23, 427–434, 2012; Nandy & Tjan Journal of Vision, 8, 3.1–20, 2008), in which an observer’s ability to recognize each individual facial feature shown independently is used to predict their ability to recognize all of the features shown in combination. We find that, although people are better overall at recognizing familiar as opposed to unfamiliar faces, their ability to integrate information across features is similar for unfamiliar and highly familiar faces and is well predicted by their ability to recognize each of the facial features shown in isolation. These results are consistent with the idea that familiarity has a quantitative effect on the efficiency with which information is extracted from individual features, rather than a qualitative effect on the process by which features are combined.     

Correcting the correction of conditional recency slopes

Farrell (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 36, 324–347, 2010) presented some analyses of free recall data that suggest that recency items initially become more accessible as recall progresses, in contrast to the assumptions of temporal drift models. Moran and Goshen-Gottstein (2013) present some challenges to Farrell’s (2010) analyses of the change in conditional recency across output position in free recall. Simulations using a very basic free recall model that controls conditional recency across recall show that Farrell’s (2010) analyses are not substantially biased, while the procedure proposed by Moran and Goshen-Gottstein introduces a substantial underestimation of the true slopes. The null slopes observed in immediate recall by Moran and Goshen-Gottstein are not informative of the true slopes characterizing the data. Accordingly, Farrell’s (2010) results continue to present a challenge to temporal drift models.     

Processing Topics from the Beneficial Cognitive Model in Partially and Over-Successful Persuasion Dialogues

A persuasion dialogue is a dialogue in which a conflict between agents with respect to their points of view arises at the beginning of the talk and the agents have the shared, global goal of resolving the conflict and at least one agent has the persuasive aim to convince the other party to accept an opposing point of view. I argue that the persuasive force of argument may have not only extreme values but also intermediate strength. That is, I wish to introduce two additional types of the effects of persuasion in addition to successful and unsuccessful ones (cf. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser in Argumentation 14(3):293–305, 2000; Advances in pragma-dialectics. Sic Sat, Amsterdam, 2002; Walton in A pragmatic theory of fallacy. University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa, 1995; Walton and Krabbe in Commitment in dialogue: basic concepts of interpersonal reasoning. State University of New York Press, Albany, New York, 1995). I propose a model which provides for modified versions of the standpoint of an agent needed in order to bring about two possible outcomes of a persuasion dialogue. These two outcomes I label partially-successful and over-successful. I call the potential, not yet verbalised, standpoint of an agent here the original topic t. Based on some aspects of relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson in Relevance: communication and cognition. Blackwell, Oxford, 1986; Wilson and Sperber in The handbook of pragmatics. Blackwell Publishing, Malden, 2006), I explain that the modified version of the original topic t is an implicature created from the original topic t and from a specific mental topic which belongs to, what I call the beneficial cognitive model (hence BCM). I define BCMi,t as a set of topics which are within the area of agent i’s interest of persuasion with respect to t.     

A cluster-analytically derived typology: Feasible alternative to clinical diagnostic classification of children?

Despite numerous studies of the relationships among symptoms manifested by children and adolescents, there have been few systematic attempts to group individuals on the basis of the syndromes identified. In the course of a treatment evaluation project requiring classification of both child patients and untreated controls, the present study was conducted to determine whether replicable types of children and adolescents could be identified by the cluster analysis of their IJR Behavior Checklist profiles. One clinical sample (N=185) and two mixed clinical and normal subsamples (Ns of 358 and 373) were cluster-analyzed separately. Seven types that replicated across at least two subsamples were identified: (1) High Assets, Flat Symptom Profile; (2) Sociopathic, Academic Problems; (3) Moderate Assets, Egocentric, Incontinent; (4) Insecure, Somaticizing, Underachieving; (5) Aggressive, Overreactive; (6) Schizoid, Withdrawn, Anxious, Bizarre; and (7) Diffuse, Mixed Pathology. The issue posed by the title of the article was explored in the light of the findings.     

The psychology of inferring conditionals from disjunctions: A probabilistic study

There is a new probabilistic paradigm in the psychology of reasoning that is, in part, based on results showing that people judge the probability of the natural language conditional, if $A$then $B$, $P\left(ifAthenB\right)$, to be the conditional probability, $P(B\mid A)$. We apply this new approach to the study of a very common inference form in ordinary reasoning: inferring the conditional if not-$A$then $B$ from the disjunction $A$ or $B$. We show how this inference can be strong, with $P$(if not-$A$then $B$) “close to” $P\left(AorB\right)$, when $A$ or $B$ is non-constructively justified. When $A$ or $B$ is constructively justified, the inference can be very weak. We also define suitable measures of “closeness” and “constructivity”, by providing a probabilistic analysis of these notions.     

A Puzzle for Particulars?

In this paper we examine a puzzle recently posed by Aaron Preston for the traditional realist assay of property (quality) instances. Consider Socrates (a red round spot) and red₁—Socrates’ redness. For the traditional realist, both of these entities are concrete particulars. Further, both involve redness being `tied to’ the same bare individuator. But then it appears that red₁ is duplicated in its ‘thicker’ particular (Socrates), so that it can’t be predicated of Socrates without redundancy. According to Preston, this suggests that a concrete particular and its property instances aren’t genuinely related. We argue that Preston’s proffered solution here—to treat property instances as “mental constructs”—is fraught with difficulty. We then go on to show how, by fine-tuning the nature of bare particulars, treating them as abstract modes of things rather than concrete particulars, the traditional realist can neatly evade Preston’s puzzle.

A Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Investigation of the External Correlates of Sluggish Cognitive Tempo and ADHD-Inattention Symptoms Dimensions

The objective was to determine if the external correlates of sluggish cognitive tempo (SCT) and ADHD-inattention (IN) dimensions were the same in cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses. Teachers and aides rated SCT, ADHD-IN, ADHD-hyperactivity/impulsivity (HI), oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), and depression along with academic impairment in 758 Spanish children (55 % boys) on three occasions (twice at the end of the first grade year [6-week separation] and then again 12-months later at the end of the second grade year). Three of eight SCT symptoms showed substantial loadings on the SCT factor and substantially higher loadings on the SCT factor than the ADHD-IN factor for teachers and aides at each assessment (seems drowsy, thinking is slow, and slow moving). Cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses yielded similar results with SCT and ADHD-IN factors having different and unique external correlates (higher scores on SCT predicted lower scores on ADHD-HI and ODD while higher scores on ADHD-IN predicted higher scores on ADHD-HI and ODD with SCT and ADHD-IN both uniquely predicting academic impairment and depression). Developmental and methodological reasons are discussed for the failure to find an inconsistent alertness SCT factor (daydreams, alertness fluctuates, absent-minded, loses train of though, and confused).     

Against Hypothetical Syllogism

The debate over Hypothetical Syllogism is locked in stalemate. Although putative natural language counterexamples to Hypothetical Syllogism abound, many philosophers defend Hypothetical Syllogism, arguing that the alleged counterexamples involve an illicit shift in context. The proper lesson to draw from the putative counterexamples, they argue, is that natural language conditionals are context-sensitive conditionals which obey Hypothetical Syllogism. In order to make progress on the issue, I consider and improve upon Morreau’s proof of the invalidity of Hypothetical Syllogism. The improved proof relies upon the semantic claim that conditionals with antecedents irrelevant to the obtaining of an already true consequent are themselves true. Moreover, this semantic insight allows us to provide compelling counterexamples to Hypothetical Syllogism that are resistant to the usual contextualist response.     

Commentary on Wolford,Taylor, and Beck: The conjunction fallacy?

AlthoughP(A&B|X) can never exceedP(A|X) (the conjunction rule), it is possible forP(X|A&B) to exceedP(X|A). Hence, people who rankA&B as more probable thanA are not necessarily violating any normative rule if the ranking is done in terms of the probability of these events to yield an eventX. Wolford, Taylor, and Beck (1990) have argued that this indeed is what happens in some problems (e.g. Tversky& Kahneman’s [1983] Linda problem). The claim made here is that the Linda problem is hard to reconcile with this interpretation; that there is little if any evidence that subjects utilize this interpretation; and that in any case, representativeness can account for all Linda problem results.     

Waiting for feedback helps if you want to know the answer: the role of curiosity in the delay-of-feedback benefit

When participants answer a test question and then receive feedback of the correct answer, studies have shown that the feedback is more effective when it is delayed by several seconds rather than provided immediately (e.g., Brackbill & Kappy, Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 55, 14–18, 1962; Schroth, Contemporary Educational Psychology, 17, 78–82, 1992). Despite several demonstrations of this delay-of-feedback benefit, a theoretical explanation for this finding has not yet been developed. The present study tested the hypothesis that brief delays of feedback are beneficial because they encourage anticipation of the upcoming feedback. In Experiment 1, participants answered obscure trivia questions, and before receiving the answer, they rated their curiosity to know the answer. The answer was then provided either immediately or after a 4-s delay. A later final test over the same questions revealed a significant delay-of-feedback benefit, but only for items that had been rated high in curiosity. Experiment 2 replicated this same effect and showed that the delay-of-feedback benefit only occurs when feedback is provided after a variable, unpredictable time duration (either 2, 4, or 8 s) rather than after a constant duration (always 4 s). These findings demonstrate that the delay-of-feedback effect appears to be greatest under conditions in which participants are curious to know the answer and when the answer is provided after an unpredictable time interval.     

Examining the Internal Consistency Reliability and Construct Validity of the Authentic Happiness Inventory (AHI) among Iranian EFL Learners

Unlike other measures of happiness that have tended to capture current levels of happiness, the Authentic Happiness Inventory (AHI) (Peterson, 2005; Seligman et al. in The American Psychologist 60:410–421, 2005) assesses changes in happiness based on the creation of positive emotions (the pleasant life), engagement in activities that facilitate the utilization of one’s strengths (the engaged life), and serving a more worthwhile purpose than merely the self’s pleasures (the meaningful life). Nonetheless, there is little published data regarding the construct validation of the AHI. The present study, which is part of a larger research project in assessing the effectiveness of integrating happiness intervention programs in the foreign language teaching curriculum at private English institutes and universities in Iran, attempts an examination of the psychometric quality and the construct validation of the Persian version of AHI (hereafter AHI-PV) using data collected from 234 Iranian learners of English as a Foreign Language (EFL), mainly through employing the Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). The AHI was translated into Persian to ensure item comprehension by the Iranian participants. The results show that the AHI-PV enjoys a high internal consistency (alpha?=?.93). Further, having determined a ‘marvelous’ factorability of the present sample through the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test of Sampling Adequacy (.94) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (p?Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and the Scree test indicated that, in contrast to earlier findings, a four-factor solution provides a more parsimonious grouping of the items in the inventory. Having analyzed the items on the scale, we labeled the four factors as ‘Meaningful and Purposeful Life’, ‘Pleasures and Positive Emotions’, ‘Engagement in Life Activities’, and ‘Interpersonal Connectedness’, hence the alignment of these new factors to Seligman’s (2002) conceptualization of authentic happiness.