Climbing like a Girl: An Exemplary Adventure in Feminist Phenomenology

This essay uses the phenomenal advent of women's climbing as a paradigm case for integrating feminism and phenomenology, and for analyzing how women experience and evolve free movement and existence. In contrast to the paradigm set by Iris Marion Young's “Throwing like a Girl,'’ it stresses the category of the lived body over the category of gender, and it reveals how women, by employing and cultivating the body's motility and spatiality, engage and transcend the (gender) limits of crux situations.     

A Jamesian Critique of the Counseling Movement

This article argues for a “dialectical tension” between critical, psychological theory, and the practice of psychotherapy. It finds fault with the development of the counseling movement from Adler to the present; it also finds, in the philosophical categories offered in the pragmatism of William James, a consistent and fruitful ground for both critical theorizing and therapeutic pursuits. Positivism is rejected in favor of an empiricism that allows for metaphysical statements to be articulated concerning the fundamental structures and truths that constitute the reality of human experience.     

Meritocracy: A Critique

Herpes Simplex, by T. Natasha Posner, The Experience of Illness Series, London: Routledge, 1998, 143 pages, paperback £13.99     

Kantian Schemata: A Critique Consistent with the Critique

Kant posits the schema as a hybrid bridging the generality of pure concepts and the particularity of sensible intuitions. However, I argue that countenancing such schemata leads to a third‐man regress. Siding with those who think that the mid‐way posit of the Critique of Pure Reason's schematism section is untenable, my diagnosis is that Kant's transcendental inquiry goes awry because it attempts to analyse a form/matter union that is primitive. I therefore sketch a nonrepresentational stance aimed at respecting this primitivity.     

Postmodernism: A Feminist Critique

In this article the author suggests that progress in philosophy can be conceived through contemporary French theories that propose a new, polysemantic way of thinking. Postmodern philosophy has tried to renew the meaning of the subject, of the subject's identity, and of language and communication. The author believes that the postmodern, feminist approach to those concepts represents significant progress in philosophy. It is, in fact, exactly in the context of feminism—conceived of not just as a women's sociopolitical or scientific activity but as a broad theoretical approach to many areas—that Western philosophy has acquired its most explicit and adequate meaning. A crucial example here is the new historicophilosophical analysis of the concept of gender. The author appeals to Lipovetsky, Lacan, Derrida, Kristeva, and other thinkers to show how postmodern feminism helps to overcome the binary vision of the contemporary world and the dichotomic composition of earlier philosophical thought.     

具身道德:道德心理学研究的新取向

具身道德是指身体及其活动方式与道德心理和行为的相互作用。迄今为止, 具身道德研究主要采用道德Stroop范式、内隐联想测验范式、情境操纵范式和心境诱发范式。具身道德的研究内容主要包括身体解剖学结构、知觉经验及身体与环境的嵌入作用与道德心理及行为的相互作用, 且在广泛的知觉经验内容中包涵了身体厌恶与道德的关系、自我洁净-道德纯洁隐喻、道德-明度隐喻、道德-颜色隐喻、道德的空间维度与时间维度等多个内容。未来的研究需从研究内容的丰富性与全面性、隐喻效应的文化差异与一致性效应、研究方法技术的科学性与多样性等几个方面着手。     

Ethics and Selfhood: A Critique

Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Volume Two Edited by Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald Blackwell, 1995. Pp. xvii + 424. ISBN 0–631–19744–3. £50.00 (hbk). ISBN 0–631–19745–1 £16.99 (pbk).

New books on the philosophy of religion

Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason By J.L. Schellenberg, Cornell University Press, 1993. Pp. 217. ISBN 0–8014–2792–4. $36.50 (hbk).

Reason and the Heart By William J. Wainwright, Cornell University Press, 1995. Pp. 160. ISBN 0–8014–3139–5. $28.50 (hbk).

The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith Edited by Thomas D. Senor, Cornell University Press, 1995. Pp. 291. ISBN 0–8014–3127–1. $39.95 (hbk).     

More than Information: A Christian Critique of a New Dualism

In light of quantum theory and advances in computer science, scientists have posited that it is information, rather than matter, that forms the bedrock of the universe. Thus it follows that the essence of our selves as human beings is simply the information housed in the neural connections of our brain. If this is so, then the self could be reproduced digitally. Such a cybernetic immortality introduces a new Cartesian dualism that separates mind from body, locating the self wholly in the mind.

This view contrasts with the traditionally Christian view, that humans are created and best understood as being in the image of God—an image found in our rational intellect, our embodied agency, and our relationships. Our sense of self is incomplete without all three. We are neither just a mind nor just a body, but a mind that is both part and product of our human body, embedded within the larger environment of the physical world and human culture. Our knowledge, functioning, and self-understanding is shaped and acquired by and through our bodies. Without a body, we also cannot feel emotion, and thus have neither human-like intelligence nor compassion. The dreams of cybernetic immortality fail to capture the full nature of what it means to be human and are illusory hopes for a form of immortality not requiring the action of a supernatural being. Any hope for immortality is best found, as Niebuhr noted, beyond the scope of history. Further, this new dualism leads us to grandiose delusions—Niebuhr's sin of pride—regarding what we can accomplish in the here and now, delusions that are harmful to both our sense of self and to our capacity to love one another.     

Experimental Philosophy: A Methodological Critique

This article offers a critique of research practices typical of experimental philosophy. To that end, it presents a review of methodological issues that have proved crucial to the quality of research in the biobehavioral sciences. It discusses various shortcomings in the experimental philosophy literature related to (1) the credibility of self‐report questionnaires, (2) the validity and reliability of measurement, (3) the adherence to appropriate procedures for sampling, random assignment, and handling of participants, and (4) the meticulousness of study reporting. It argues that the future standing of experimental philosophy will hinge upon improvements in research methods.     

Estlund on Epistocracy: A Critique

An influential anti-democratic argument says: ??(1) Answers to political questions are truth-apt. (2) A small elite only??the epistocrats??knows these truths. (3) If answers to political questions are truth-apt, then those with this knowledge about these matters should rule. (4) Thus, epistocrats should rule.?? Many democrats have responded by denying (1), arguing that, say, answers to political questions are a matter of sheer personal preference. Others have rejected (2), contending that knowledge of the true answers to political questions is evenly distributed. David Estlund finds neither of these replies conclusive. Instead, he attacks (3) arguing that there can be no agreement between qualified people as to who the epistocrats are and that people are not subject to being ruled by experts, whose status as such they can reasonably dispute. Critically, I argue that this argument does not block all forms of epistocratic argument and that Estlund fails to consider the full range of plausible epistocratic views. More constructively, I offer a modest argument for why greater expertise does not necessarily warrant greater political authority. Presumably, the set of feasible options might differ, depending on what procedure is used, and a sub-optimal choice by nonepistocrats from a better set might be superior to the optimal choice by epistocrats from a worse set. In such cases, the mere fact of greater expertise does not warrant political authority, i.e., (3) is false.