真的概念

弗雷格的语义学蕴涵了两个不可调和的推论:其一认为语句的意义先于命题,命题先于真,这种观点发展成为最少量论;其二认为真先于命题,因而也先于语句的意义,这种观点发展成为成真条件论.结合维特根斯坦的意义即用法的观点,得出的结论是:意义理论的核心概念并不是真,而是一个陈述得到证明的观念,意义理论并不必须采取成真条件论的形式.作为最少量论和成真条件论共同基础的奎因式语义转换原则是包含矛盾的.结合了语义转换原则和塔斯基真的定义的最少量论者必定排除戴维森式成真条件论.     

The Face of Truth

I attempt to explain Plato's choice of dialogue through an analysis of what he regarded as the conditions of knowledge acquisition. I see the main contribution of the paper in exposing the way in which time and pain are, for Plato, conditions of knowledge acquisition. Plato endorsed the "learning through suffering," or pathei mathos , convention, central to Greek drama, and did so not through theory but through the praxis some of the dialogues employ. This addition of experiential components to the more cognitively oriented definitions of knowledge that Socrates uses complicates what these works may say about human knowledge. I analyze these tensions and the bearing they may have on the question of Plato's choice of dialogue, that is, on his rhetoric in practice. The requirements for actual persuasion, as Plato specifies them in the Seventh Letter, , are only partially met by the fictional scenes of argumentation and knowledge conveying that Plato presents. However, such scenes permit transcending some of the limitations of written, systematic, nonpersonal discourse. The presentation of such interactions to a real reader through dialogue turns into a mode of writing that is closer to meeting the demands of actual communication of knowledge – at least knowledge regarding what Plato envisaged as being the highest sort of epistemic communication     

真之本性

本文是兰姆赛的一篇经典论文,在文中,兰姆赛提出了他的“真之冗余论”的基本观点：只有具有命题指称并且有断定特性的信念才能成为真之载体,一个信念P是真的,当且仅当P。     

The Spirit of Truth

This article reflects on the theme of the “spirit of truth” in a post-truth era – a time in which objective truth seems to no longer exist, any given claim can be substantiated, and it is no longer possible to tell falsehood and truth apart. Focusing on the objectivity of science, the humanity of truth, and the spirit of truth revealed by divinity, the article argues for the adoption of a humane and ecological wisdom, seeing it as a way to deal with humanity’s immense knowledge in a way that is conducive to life, to avoid optimizing humans in a “trans-human” way and making the earth uninhabitable.     

Truth Values and the Value of Truth

This paper explores the ways in which truth is better than falsehood, and suggests that, among other things, it depends on the kinds of proposition to which these values are attached. Ordinary singular propositions like "It is raining" seem to fit best the bivalent "scheme" of classical logic, the general proposition "It is always raining" is more appropriately rated according to how often it rains, and a "practically vague" proposition like "The lecture will start at 1" is appropriately rated according to its nearness to exactness. Implications for logic of this "rating system" are commented on.     

知识的“德”与“真”

西方知识论中的"知识"指的是"科学知识",即"真理"。西方知识论哲学和中西伦理道德学说的运思方式截然不同,它们具有不同的本质属性,属于不同的领域。如果任由西方知识论哲学以逻辑理性解构中西伦理道德学说的基础(诸如西方的宗教信仰或中国的儒家信仰),就会导致社会道德水平大滑坡。而这一点尚未引起中国学界的足够注意。事实上,中国学界在引入西方知识论哲学的过程中,应该立足于中国文化,认真进行"对接"问题的研究,以求在吸收西方知识论哲学精华的同时,规避其对中国社会可能造成的危害。可能的途径之一是创建一种整体意义上的"知识论"。这种"整体知识论"可以将中国伦理学说和西方科学知识论纳入同一体系,有效地规范它们的研究领域和互动关系,并为伦理道德学说保留科学知识论无法干预的空间。     

The Truth About Deception

The prohibition on lying is often thought to be very stringent. Some have even been tempted to think that it is absolute. In contrast, the prohibition on other forms of deception seems to be looser. This paper explores the relationship between the duty not to deceive and the duty not to lie. This discussion is situated in the context of a broadly Kantian account of morality. Kant himself infamously claimed that one ought not lie to a murderer at the door about the location of his intended victim. This paper aims to explain how a broadly Kantian view can endorse a distinctive duty not to lie without thereby being committed to this kind of conclusion.