How to suppress obsessive thoughts

Thought suppression (i.e. consciously trying to avoid certain thoughts from entering consciousness) has been argued to be an inadequate strategy in case of unwanted intrusions. That is, thought suppression seems to result in more rather than less intrusions. Although this experimental finding has been explained in terms of failing attempts to distract oneself from the target thought, the White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; a scale that measures chronic thought suppression tendencies) does not address the means by which respondents try to suppress unwanted thoughts. To examine which strategies of mental control people use to suppress unwanted thoughts, obsessive-compulsive disorder patients (N=47) completed the WBSI, the Thought Control Questionnaire, and two measures of psychopathology. Results suggest that the crucial mechanism in thought suppression may not be distraction, but self-punishment.     

Managing unwanted intrusive thoughts in obsessive-compulsive disorder: Relative effectiveness of suppression, focused distraction, and acceptance

Suppression is one of various mental control techniques that people may use to manage unwanted thoughts. Evidence suggests that it is at best unsustainable and at worst counterproductive. This leads to the question: If suppression is a futile way to respond to unwanted, intrusive thoughts, what is a more effective alternative? In the current study, we evaluated the relative effectiveness of suppression and two alternative mental control techniques—focused distraction and acceptance—on the frequency of intrusions and distress associated with them. Results support the claim that suppression is a counterproductive technique for dealing with unwanted, intrusive thoughts in OCD. However, the harmfulness of suppression was reflected primarily in the magnitude of distress and not in intrusion frequency. Focused distraction and acceptance were the more effective techniques for managing clinically significant intrusive thoughts. We discuss implications for the cognitive treatment for OCD.     

Thought suppression in obsessive-compulsive disorder

Social cognition research has indicated that attempts to suppress thoughts can lead to a paradoxical increase in the frequency of that thought. This phenomenon has been a central component of cognitive-behavioural models of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD); however, research has yet to demonstrate deficient thought suppression ability in OCD patients. We examined whether individuals with OCD (OCs) exhibit a deficit in the ability to suppress thoughts. In Experiment 1, attempted thought suppression led to a paradoxical increase in self-reported thoughts for OCs, but not for nonanxious controls (NACs) or anxious controls (ACs). In order to rule out self-report biases, in Experiment 2 we utilized a lexical decision paradigm that measured priming strength of a target word under thought suppression conditions. Results paralleled those of Experiment 1: OCs showed decreased lexical decision latency of the 'suppressed' thought (thought to reflect either increased priming strength or disrupted processing of nonsuppressed thoughts), thus exhibiting a paradoxical effect of thought suppression. This effect was not seen in NACs or ACs. These findings suggest that deficits in cognitive inhibitory processes may underlie the intrusive, repetitive nature of clinical obsessions.     

The gravity of unwanted thoughts: Asymmetric priming effects in thought suppression

An unwanted thought appears to be cued easily by reminders in the environment but often the thought itself seems to cue nothing more than the desire to eliminate it from consciousness. This unusual asymmetry in the way unwanted thoughts are linked to other thoughts was the focus of the present research. Participants who were asked to suppress a thought or to concentrate on it completed a task assessing the influence of priming on reaction time (RT) for word/non-word judgments. Results revealed that suppression under cognitive load produced asymmetric priming: Priming with the associate of a suppressed word speeded RT for the suppressed word, but priming with a suppressed word did not speed RT for associated words. These findings suggest that thought suppression induces an unusual form of cognitive accessibility in which movement of activation toward the suppressed thought from associates is facilitated but movement of activation away from the suppressed thought to associates is undermined.     

Implicit and explicit appraisals of the importance of intrusive thoughts

To evaluate cognitive theories of obsessions, the current study experimentally manipulated appraisals of the importance of intrusive thoughts. Undergraduate students (N = 156) completed measures of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) symptoms and beliefs and were primed with a list of commonly reported unwanted thoughts. Participants were then informed that unwanted thoughts are either (1) significant and indicative of their personal values, or (2) meaningless, or participants (3) received no instructions about unwanted thoughts. Participants then completed implicit and explicit measures of self-evaluation and interpretations of their unwanted thoughts. Results indicated that the manipulation shifted implicit appraisals of unwanted thoughts in the expected direction, but not self-evaluations of morality or dangerousness. Interestingly, explicit self-esteem and beliefs about the significance of unwanted thoughts were associated with measures of OCD beliefs, whereas implicit self-evaluations of dangerousness were better predicted by the interaction of pre-existing OCD beliefs with the manipulation. Results are discussed in terms of divergent predictors of implicit and explicit responses to unwanted thoughts.     

Effects of suppression and appraisals on thought frequency and distress

Cognitive theories of obsessions highlight appraisals of personal significance and thought suppression in the development and maintenance of intrusive thoughts. The current study examined the role of personal significance within the context of a thought suppression paradigm. The primary aim was to examine whether suppression would have differential effects for target thoughts appraised as personally meaningful versus relatively unimportant. A blasphemous thought served as the target thought, and highly religious and nonreligious participants were recruited. Participants completed a two-interval thought suppression task; during interval 1 they were randomly assigned to suppress or not suppress the target thought and during interval 2, all participants were given “do not suppress” instructions. Suppression resulted in sustained frequency of thoughts in contrast to the decline in thought frequency observed for non-suppression. Differential effects of suppression were found across the two groups. Moreover, suppression was associated with increased negative mood and anxiety. Results suggest that suppression of personally meaningful thoughts is a counterproductive strategy.     

Organization of the Self-Concept and the Suppression of Self-Relevant Thoughts

The rebound effect associated with thought suppression has been found following attempts at suppressing both novel stimuli and stereotypical thoughts. However, research examining the suppression of self-relevant thoughts has been less successful in demonstrating the rebound effect. A potential factor that has not yet been fully explored in research on thought suppression is how different types of distracter thoughts may influence the ability to suppress unwanted thoughts. One type of distracter that people may use while attempting to suppress unwanted self-relevant thoughts is information related to other aspects of their lives. To the extent that these other aspects are more likely to be associated in memory with the unwanted thoughts, rebound should be more likely to occur. Thus, we expected and found that people lower in self-complexity (i.e., those with fewer self-aspects that are more interrelated with one another) revealed greater rebound following thought suppression that involved self-relevant distracting thoughts than did people greater in self-complexity. Implications of these findings for thought suppression, self-complexity, depression, and the experience of affect are discussed.     

A comparison of the effects of thought suppression, distraction and concentration

This study compared the effects of suppression, focused-distraction, and concentration on controlling unwanted distressing thoughts, and examined how anxiety levels were associated with the use of each thought-control technique. In the study, college students were told to suppress thoughts about a distressing story, to suppress the same thoughts by focusing on an alternative distraction task, to simply concentrate on that alternative task, or to think about anything without restrictions for 6 minutes. This initial period was followed by a “free-thinking” period to assess the delayed effect of thought-control techniques. The results indicated that focused-distraction and concentration led to fewer intrusions of target thoughts than suppression, and concentration in turn resulted in fewer target intrusions than focused-distraction during the initial period. Participants in the focused-distraction and concentration condition also tended to report lower anxiety during the initial period than those who were told to suppress thoughts.     

Separating sustained from transient aspects of cognitive control during thought suppression

Cognitive theories of how people regulate their thoughts have suggested the involvement of two control processes that occur over different time courses. These cognitive accounts parallel recent neural models of executive control, which suggest that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) mediates sustained changes in the allocation of control processes, whereas the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) relays a transient need for additional control. Combining these cognitive and neural models of control, we used recently developed analysis techniques to distinguish transient from sustained changes in brain activation while subjects attempted to suppress an unwanted thought. Results were consistent with both models: Dorsolateral PFC demonstrated sustained increases in activation during attempts at thought suppression, whereas bilateral ACC demonstrated transient increases associated with occurrences of unwanted thoughts. These data support proposals regarding the different contributions made by the PFC and ACC to executive control and provide initial neuroimaging support for dual-process models of how individuals regulate their thoughts.     

A Psychometric Evaluation of the Thought Control Ability Questionnaire (TCAQ) and the Prediction of Cognitive Control

Study 1 evaluated the psychometric properties of the English version of the Thought Control Ability Questionnaire (TCAQ; Luciano et al. 2005), an index of perceived control over intrusive cognitions. Confirmatory factor analysis in a sample of 720 University students revealed a clear uni-dimensional structure (after removal of items 5, 7, 8, 14, and 25) with high internal consistency (α = .87, 95% CI = [.86, .88]) and test-retest reliability after a six month interval (r = .68). Correlational analyses supported an inverse relationship with measures of depression, anxiety, maladaptive cognitive control strategies, and obsessive–compulsive symptomatology. Study 2 tested the ability of the TCAQ to predict successful cognitive control during an experimental suppression protocol. Results demonstrated that weak thought control ability was predictive of the frequency and associated levels of distress of a target thought while under instruction to suppress. Additionally, weak perceived thought control ability was predictive of increased efforts to suppress the target material. Collectively, results suggest that thought control ability is a measurable individual difference variable and that the TCAQ is a reliable index of perceived cognitive control.     

Attentional interference by threat and post-traumatic stress disorder: The role of thought control strategies

Attentional interference by threat is associated with PTSD, but the mechanisms of this relationship remain unclear. Attentional interference might be related to increased use of maladaptive thought control strategies, such as suppressing unwanted thoughts (thought suppression) or replacing threatening thoughts with everyday concerns (worry), which increase PTSD risk. Conversely, attentional interference might be associated with reduced use of adaptive strategies, such as talking about threatening thoughts (social control), which decrease PTSD risk. This study tested if thought control strategies mediate the relationship between attentional interference and PTSD. Sixty-one male Vietnam-era veterans completed measures of PTSD symptoms and thought control strategies. Participants also completed a Visual Search Task measuring attentional interference, which required participants to identify a target letter string among a group of threat or neutral words. Attentional interference by threat was related to PTSD symptoms, and mediation analyses revealed significant indirect effects of attentional interference through thought suppression and worry. Attentional interference was related to re-experiencing and avoidance, but not hyperarousal, symptom clusters. Thought suppression was a unique mediator for re-experiencing, whereas thought suppression and worry both mediated the relationship with avoidance. These results offer evidence for maladaptive thought control strategies as a mechanism linking attentional biases for threat to PTSD.     

Thought suppression and its effects on thought frequency, appraisal and mood state in individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder

Leading models of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) implicate thought suppression as a key factor in the escalation and persistence of the disorder. This experiment examined the effects of suppression on the frequency of obsessional thoughts in 50 individuals with a primary diagnosis of OCD, and also investigated the effects of participants' appraisals regarding their failures in thought control on distress about intrusive thoughts and on mood. Participants' most upsetting obsessional thought was primed and they then monitored its occurrence over two 4-min intervals. In the first interval, half of the participants were instructed to suppress their obsessional thought and half were instructed not to suppress any thoughts. In the second interval, all participants were given the 'Do Not Suppress' instructions. Participants rated their suppression effort and discomfort over thought occurrences after each interval and recorded their appraisals of thought recurrences during the first interval. Mood state was then reassessed. No ironic effect of suppression on frequency was noted. However, negative appraisals of thought recurrences were associated with more discomfort over thought occurrences and more negative mood at Time 2. These findings suggest that interpretations regarding failures in thought control may be of central importance in understanding obsessional problems.     

Effects of suppressing neutral and obsession-like thoughts in normal subjects: beyond frequency

Recent cognitive-behavioral theories on obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) show that deliberate attempts to suppress intrusive and undesirable thoughts lie at the genesis of clinical obsessions. In this paper the results of an experimental study on the suppression of neutral and obsession-like thoughts in normal subjects are presented. Eighty-seven university students performed in three experimental periods: (1) base-line monitoring, (2) experimental instruction, and (3) monitoring. For each of these periods, the frequency of the occurrence of a "white bear" thought or a personally relevant intrusive thought was registered. Half of the subjects received instructions to suppress the target-thought in period 2, and the other half were instructed to only monitor the target-thought in each of the experimental periods. Several measures were also obtained before and after the experiment: annoyance caused by the intrusion, suppression effort, subjective success, and evaluative appraisals of the target-thought. The results showed neither immediate nor delayed frequency increases of the target thought. However, evidence was found that deliberate thought suppression efforts, regardless of their content, had greater negative consequences than did non suppression. These results are discussed in relation to the recent cognitive proposals about OCD.     

Thought suppression and self-injurious thoughts and behaviors

This study proposes and tests a theoretical model suggesting that the propensity to suppress unwanted thoughts is associated with an increased presence and frequency of self-injurious thoughts and behaviors (SITB). In the model, propensity to suppress unwanted thoughts is hypothesized to be a cognitive mediator of the relationship between emotional reactivity and SITB, and is expected to be related to the extent to which SITB is initiated to escape from aversive emotions. Results of this cross-sectional study of adolescents (N=87) revealed that the self-reported propensity to suppress unwanted thoughts is associated with the presence and frequency of non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI), suicidal ideation, and suicide attempts. Furthermore, thought suppression partially mediates the relationship between emotional reactivity and the frequency of NSSI and suicidal ideation. Finally, adolescents with a higher tendency to suppress unwanted thoughts report engaging in NSSI in order to reduce aversive emotions rather than for social communication. Results are discussed within the framework of the negative reinforcement function of SITB.     

Suppressing and focusing on a negative memory in social anxiety: effects on unwanted thoughts and mood

Researchers have hypothesized that thought suppression contributes to the large volume of unwanted thoughts in anxiety disorders. However, comparisons to both non-suppression and non-anxious groups are necessary for studies on thought suppression in high anxiety. Participants completed a series of thought verbalization periods and a social interaction. During one period, participants were randomly assigned to focus upon a negative social memory, suppress it, or think freely while monitoring the memory. Results indicated that thought suppression and focusing caused a greater rise and subsequent decline in unwanted thoughts than monitoring instructions for both high and low social anxiety groups. Importantly, highly socially anxious participants had more unwanted thoughts overall, but did not respond significantly differently to thinking instructions when compared to the less anxious group. Interestingly, highly socially anxious participants did report more thought suppression attempts in their everyday life. They also appeared to benefit by experiencing less shyness after suppression when compared to focusing, a pattern not evident for the low social anxiety group.     

The tendency to suppress, inhibiting thoughts, and dream rebound

Ironic control theory proposes that suppressing thoughts leads to increased occurrence of the suppressed thought because monitoring for the unwanted thought leads to intrusions. This study investigated the influence of suppressing unwanted thoughts on dream content. One hundred participants who had high or low levels of tendency to suppress unwanted thoughts nominated an intrusive thought, and half of the participants were instructed to suppress that thought for 5 min prior to sleeping. Participants completed a dream diary upon waking, which was subsequently rated by independent raters for dream content. In terms of the 79 participants who reported dreaming, more high suppressors who were instructed to suppress dreamt about the intrusive thought than high suppressors in the control condition. There was no difference between low suppressors in the suppression and control conditions. These results suggest that dream content can be influenced by attempted suppression prior to sleep, and this is particularly apparent in people with a tendency to suppress unwanted thoughts.     

Why did the white bear return? Obsessive-compulsive symptoms and attributions for unsuccessful thought suppression

The current study examined the nature and consequences of attributions about unsuccessful thought suppression. Undergraduate students with either high (n=67) or low (n=59) levels of obsessive–compulsive symptoms rated attributions to explain their unsuccessful thought suppression attempts. We expected that self-blaming attributions and attributions ascribing importance to unwanted thoughts would predict more distress and greater recurrence of thoughts during time spent monitoring or suppressing unwanted thoughts. Further, we expected that these attributions would mediate the relationship between obsessive–compulsive symptom levels and the negative thought suppression outcomes (distress and thought recurrence). Structural equation models largely confirmed the hypotheses, suggesting that attributions may be an important factor in explaining the consequences of thought suppression. Implications are discussed for cognitive theories of obsessive–compulsive disorder and thought suppression.     

Cognitive biases and obsessive-compulsive symptoms in children: examining the role of maternal cognitive bias and child age

Objective: Multiple cognitive biases associated with adult obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) were tested in a clinical sample of children (ages 7-11) and adolescents (12-17) and their mothers. This study examined (a) the associations between child cognitive biases and OCD severity, (b) maternal cognitive biases and child OCD severity, and (c) maternal cognitive bias and child cognitive bias. It was hypothesized that age would significantly moderate these relationships, with stronger associations with OCD severity for cognitive bias in adolescents (relative to children), and maternal cognitive bias in younger children (relative to adolescents). Method: Forty-six children and adolescents diagnosed with OCD and their mothers completed questionnaires assessing responsibility bias, thought-action fusion (TAF), thought suppression, and metacognitive beliefs. OCD symptoms were assessed using structured diagnostic interviews and semistructured symptom interviews. Results: As predicted, age significantly moderated associations between (a) child cognitive variables and OCD severity-specifically between child responsibility and child metacognition, which were associated with OCD severity for adolescents only; (b) maternal cognitive biases and child OCD severity-specifically for maternal responsibility and thought suppression, which were significantly and positively associated with child OCD severity but not adolescent OCD severity; and (c) maternal cognitive biases and child cognitive bias-such that significant associations were evident only in the younger child sample, and only between maternal TAF self and metacognition, with child suppression and child TAF moral, respectively. Conclusion: Maternal cognitive biases are more consistently linked to greater OCD severity among younger children, whereas personal cognitive biases are associated with greater OCD symptoms in adolescents. Treatments for pediatric OCD are likely to be improved by age-specific considerations for the role of maternal and child cognitive biases associated with OCD.     

Obsessive‐compulsive disorder across developmental trajectory: Cognitive processing of threat in children,adolescents and adults

Background . While the cognitive theory of obsessive‐compulsive disorder (OCD) is one of the most widely accepted accounts of the maintenance of the disorder in adults, no study to date has systematically evaluated the theory across children, adolescence and adults with OCD. Method . This paper investigated developmental differences in the cognitive processing of threat in a sample of children, adolescents and adults with OCD. Using an idiographic assessment approach, as well as self‐report questionnaires, this study evaluated cognitive appraisals of responsibility, probability, severity, thought‐action fusion (TAF), thought‐suppression, self‐doubt and cognitive control. It was hypothesised that there would be age related differences in reported responsibility for harm, probability of harm, severity of harm, thought suppression, TAF, self‐doubt and cognitive control. Results . Results of this study demonstrated that children with OCD reported experiencing fewer intrusive thoughts, which were less distressing and less uncontrollable than those experienced by adolescents and adults with OCD. Furthermore, responsibility attitudes, probability biases and thought suppression strategies were higher in adolescents and adults with OCD. Cognitive processes of TAF, perceived severity of harm, self‐doubt and cognitive control were found to be comparable across age groups. Conclusions . These results suggest that the current cognitive theory of OCD needs to address developmental differences in the cognitive processing of threat. Furthermore, for a developmentally sensitive theory of OCD, further investigation is warranted into other possible age related maintenance factors. Implications of this investigation and directions for future research are discussed.     

Individual differences in self-reported thought control: the role of the repressive coping sytle

The purpose of the present research is to assess differences between repressors and non repressors in some aspects associated with conscious thought control. Thus, Sixty-three Spanish university students with different combinations of trait anxiety and defensiveness completed the Thought Control Ability Questionnaire (TCAQ) and the White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI). Data analysis showed that subjects with low anxiety (repressors and low anxious) reported higher perceived ability to control unpleasant thoughts and less tendency to suppress than did subjects with high anxiety (high anxious and defensive high anxious). Implications of these results are discussed in relation to recent researches that have explored the association between repression and thought suppression.