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GUY ROHRBAUGH 《美学与艺术评论杂志》2018,76(1):105-107
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Greg Fried 《Theology & Science》2016,14(2):175-189
Alvin Plantinga proposes that mathematical objects and propositions are divine thoughts. This position, which I call divine psychologism, resonates with some remarks by contemporary thinkers. Plantinga claims several advantages for his position, and I add another: it helps to explain the glory of mathematics. But my main purpose is to issue a challenge to divine psychologism. I argue that it has an implausible consequence: it identifies an entity with God's relation to that entity. I consider and rebut several ways in which a divine psychologist might argue that this is not really a consequence, or that the identification is plausible. 相似文献
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Naomi Eilan 《Ratio》2014,27(1):32-52
Is the location of consciousness in the objectively represented world intelligible? The paper examines the grounds for Nagel's negative answer, which can be presented as a response to the following paradox. (1) We are realists about consciousness. (2) Realism about a domain of reference requires commitment to the possibility of an objective, perspective‐free conception of it. (3) The phenomenal character of an experience can only be captured by means of perspectival concepts. According to Nagel, we can have either realism about consciousness or the link between realism and objectivity. He opts for the former, where this leads to the postulation of an essentially perspectivally reality inhabited by consciousness. I argue, contra Nagel, that questions about the intelligibility of locating consciousness in the objectively representable world should be asked relative the kinds of objectivity provided for by our spatial thought. Not only does this formally dissolve the paradox, as such thought allows for essential reliance on perspectival concepts; but it also shows how we do in fact make sense of the objective location of consciousness, in virtue of the link between spatial thought and something Strawson calls our ‘commonsense realism’ about physical objects, which ascribes ‘phenomenally‐laden’ properties to such objects. 1 1 For extended discussion, over the years, of the issues raised here I am much indebted to Bill Brewer, Steve Butterfill, John Campbell, Quassim Cassam, Christoph Hoerl, Hemdat Lerman, Guy Longworth, Adrian Moore, Johannes Roessler and Matt Soteriou. For helpful comments on the current version of the paper I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this journal.
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Sharon Berry 《The Southern journal of philosophy》2019,57(3):324-346
In this paper, I will distinguish two varieties of external world skepticism: belief and confidence skepticism. I will argue that we can defang the intuitive motivations for confidence skepticism (though not a meeker “argument from might,” which got some attention in the twentieth century literature on external world skepticism) by adopting a partially psychologistic answer to the problem of priors. And I will argue that certain recent work in the epistemology of mathematics and logic provides independent support for such psychologism. 相似文献
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Renante D. Pilapil 《Res Publica》2012,18(1):39-51
The paper explores the philosophical anthropology and the moral grammar of recognition. It does so by examining how the formation
of the self is informed by social recognition, the result of which can motivate individuals and groups to engage in struggles
for recognition. To pursue this task, the discussion focuses on the insights of Honneth, who grounds his theory of recognition
in the intersubjective relations between persons. The idea that recognition impacts the formation of personal identity is
regarded as susceptible to the charge of reducing recognition demands into demands for satisfying psychological needs. Contrary
to this worry, the central claim of the paper is that such an identity-based understanding of recognition can still be salvaged.
More precisely, this can be done by conceiving of demands of recognition as demands for inclusion into personhood through
which the moral dimension of recognition struggles is properly understood. This article concludes that despite its potential
ambiguities, the notion of personhood and its relation to recognition remains philosophically defensible. 相似文献
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Florence W. Kaslow 《Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy》2002,32(1):83-92
This article summarizes the evolution of my theoretical orientation and treatment intervention style over the past thirty-something years. It discusses the pathways taken, influences felt, and experiences that have contributed to my expanding mindset and current therapeutic modus operandi, progressing from past to present. As to what will be in the future, that is difficult to predict as the metamorphosis keeps happening, although some components remain essential ingredients and provide grounding and balance. Que será, será sums up the future succinctly. 相似文献
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ANDREA SAUCHELLI 《美学与艺术评论杂志》2013,71(3):239-246
The merited response argument is an argument in favor of artistic ethicism. According to this view, the interaction between art and morality is such that a moral defect in a work of art negatively influences the work's artistic value (and a moral merit, when relevant, is always an artistic merit). I contend that the argument relies on a criterion of aesthetic and artistic relevance that, when properly understood, fails to constitute a premise that either the artistic contextualist or the autonomist would accept. I then offer a version of the merited response argument that supports artistic contextualism and argue that, given certain controversial assumptions, immoral art in the Western tradition is more common than typically acknowledged in the recent literature on the topic. 相似文献
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José Medina 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(3):293-318
This paper is a critical examination of Wittgenstein's view of the limits of intelligibility. In it I criticize standard analytic readings of Wittgenstein as an advocate of transcendental or behaviourist theses in epistemology; and I propose an alternative interpretation of Wittgenstein's view as a social contextualism that transcends the false dichotomy between Kantianism and psychologism. I argue that this social contextualism is strikingly similar to the social account of epistemic practices developed by Pierre Bourdieu. Through a comparison between Wittgenstein's and Bourdieu's view and an analysis of the notion of habitus , I try to show how social contextualism can account for the distinction between sense and nonsense without falling into transcendental constructivism or social behaviourism. 相似文献
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A New Argument from Interpersonal Variation to Subjectivism about Color: A Response to Gómez‐Torrente 下载免费PDF全文
Nat Hansen 《No?s (Detroit, Mich.)》2017,51(2):421-428
I describe a new, comparative, version of the argument from interpersonal variation to subjectivism about color. The comparative version undermines a recent objectivist response to standard versions of that argument (Gómez‐Torrente 2016). 相似文献
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Henry John Pratt 《Philosophia》2012,40(3):591-606
Supposing that talk of a distinctively artistic type of value is warranted, what separates it from other sorts of value? Any plausible answer must explain both what is of value and what is artistic about artistically valuable properties. Flaws with extant accounts stem from neglect of one component or the other; the account offered here, based on careful attention to actual art-critical practices, brings both together. The ??value?? component depends on the capacity of artworks to provide subjectively valuable experiences, while the ??artistic?? component relies on the specific norms constitutive of artworld institutions. Understanding artistic value in this way allows for progress on several persistent problems, including the ethical value of art, relativism in artistic value, and the proper boundaries of philosophical aesthetics. 相似文献