Are we free to imagine what we choose?

It has long been recognized that we have a great deal of freedom to imagine what we choose. This paper explores a thesis—what we call “intentionalism (about the imagination)”—that provides a way of making this evident (if vague) truism precise. According to intentionalism, the contents of your imaginings are simply determined by whatever contents you intend to imagine. Thus, for example, when you visualize a building and intend it to be of King’s College rather than a replica of the college you have imagined the former rather than the latter because you intended to imagine King’s College. This is so even if the visual image you conjure up equally resembles either. This paper proposes two kinds of counterexamples to intentionalism and discusses their significance. In particular, it sketches a positive account of how many sensory imaginings get to be about what they are about, which explains how the causal history of our mental imagery can prevent us from succeeding in imagining what we intended.

     

Using analogical mapping to simulate time-course phenomena in perceptual similarity

We present a computational model of visual similarity. The model is based upon the idea that perceptual comparisons may utilize the same mapping processes as are used in analogy. We use the Structure Mapping Engine (SME), a model of Gentner’s structure-mapping theory of analogy, to perform comparison on representations that are automatically generated from visual input. By encoding visual scenes incrementally and sampling the output of SME at multiple stages in its processing, we are able to model not only the output of similarity judgments, but the time course of the comparison process. We demonstrate the model’s effectiveness by replicating the results from three psychological studies that bear on the time course of comparison.     

Children's visual descriptions

The aim of the experiments described below was to elucidate aspects of children's mental representations of what they see, through studying their drawings of simple geometric forms when copying from standard models. Two specific questions were studied: (a) Do children produce symbolic representations based, as in machine perception, on decomposition of the visual object into features or properties, subsequently reaggregated to a greater or lesser degree, rather than attempts to copy the visual appearance of the model? The answer was affirmative, though the phenomenon is relatively rare, (b) Does a child's drawings of simple geometric drawings improve if he can watch an adult do the same drawings first? This has been asserted in the literature and bears on the question of static versus procedural representation. In a sample of 499 drawings made by children aged from 2½ to 5 years we showed that such an effect is absent or very small.     

Solving geometric analogy problems through two-stage analogical mapping

Evans' 1968 ANALOGY system was the first computer model of analogy. This paper demonstrates that the structure mapping model of analogy, when combined with high-level visual processing and qualitative representations, can solve the same kinds of geometric analogy problems as were solved by ANALOGY. Importantly, the bulk of the computations are not particular to the model of this task but are general purpose: We use our existing sketch understanding system, CogSketch, to compute visual structure that is used by our existing analogical matcher, Structure Mapping Engine (SME). We show how SME can be used to facilitate high-level visual matching, proposing a role for structural alignment in mental rotation. We show how second-order analogies over differences computed via analogies between pictures provide a more elegant model of the geometric analogy task. We compare our model against human data on a set of problems, showing that the model aligns well with both the answers chosen by people and the reaction times required to choose the answers.     

Number versus continuous quantity in numerosity judgments by fish

A fundamental question in human cognition is how people reason about space. We use a computational model to explore cross-cultural commonalities and differences in spatial cognition. Our model is based upon two hypotheses: (1) the structure-mapping model of analogy can explain the visual comparisons used in spatial reasoning; and (2) qualitative, structural representations are computed by people’s visual systems and used in these comparisons. We apply our model to a visual oddity task, in which individuals are shown an array of two-dimensional images and asked to the pick the one that does not belong. This task was previously used to evaluate understanding of geometric concepts in two disparate populations: North Americans, and the Mundurukú, a South American indigenous group. Our model automatically generates representations of each hand-segmented image and compares them to solve the task. The model achieves human-level performance on this task, and problems that are hard for the model are also difficult for people in both cultures. Furthermore, ablation studies on the model suggest explanations for cross-cultural differences in terms of differences in spatial representations.     

Syntax in A Dynamic Brain

Proponents of the language of thought (LOT) thesis are realists when it comes to syntactically structured representations, and must defend their view against instrumentalists, who would claim that syntactic structures may be useful in describing cognition, but have no more causal powers in governing cognition than do the equations of physics in guiding the planets. This paper explores what it will take to provide an argument for LOT that can defend its conclusion from instrumentalism. I illustrate a difficulty in this project by discussing arguments for LOT put forward by Horgan and Tienson. When their evidence is viewed in the light of results in connectionist research, it is hard to see how a realist conception of syntax can be formulated and defended.

     

Visualizing the perisaccadic shift of spatiotopic coordinates

A point light source flickering on and off during a horizontal saccade projects a horizontal array onto the retina. The apparent visual direction of the tail end of the perceived (phantom) array reflects the amount of perisaccadic shift of spatiotopic coordinates that has been completed by the end of the saccade. Four men, saccading 8° to the right across a flashing light, judged the horizontal visual direction of the left (tail) end of the phantom array relative to the left end of a standard 8° array that had projected an image onto the retina before the saccade began. On average, the left ends appeared to be aligned when the last flash in the phantom array was imaged on the retina 7.4° to the right of the image of the left end of the standard array. This result implies that the shift of spatiotopic coordinates is virtually complete by the end of the saccade.     

Transport and use of common objects: Influence of weight on action planning

Internal knowledge and visual cues about object's weight play an important role in grasping and lifting objects. It has been shown that both visual cues and internal knowledge might influence movement kinematics and force production depending on action goal (use vs. transport). However, there is little evidence about weight's influence on action planning as reflected by initiation time. In the present study we investigated this issue. In Experiment 1, participants had to grasp light and heavy objects (without moving them) to either use or transport them. In Experiment 2 we asked another group of participants to actually use or transport the same objects. We observed that initiation times were faster for heavy objects than for light objects in both the transport and use tasks, but only in Experiment 2. Thus, weight influenced the planning of use and transport actions, only when the end-goal of the action was really achieved. These data are incompatible with the hypothesis that only use actions are supported by stored object's representations. They rather suggest that in some circumstances, depending of the end-goal of the action and the physical constraints the planning of both use and transport actions are based on stored object representation.     

Looking for Arguments

How do people find arguments while engaged in a discussion? Following an analogy with visual search, a mechanism that performs this task is described. It is a metarepresentational device that examines representations in a mostly serial manner until it finds a good enough argument supporting one??s position. It is argued that the mechanism described in dual process theories as ??system 2??, or analytic reasoning fulfills these requirements. This provides support for the hypothesis that reasoning serves an argumentative function.     

Resistance is futile: The unwitting insertion of analogical inferences in memory

Analogical inferences can modify people’s understanding, but can this occur even when the inferences are unpalatable? We report two experiments suggesting that this is the case. Participants read a source passage on the role and status of gay people in society. Half then read an analogy describing the historical persecution of left-handers. On a subsequent recognition test, the participants who read the analogy were more likely than the control participants to misrecognize analogical inferences as statements explicitly presented, but the two groups did not differ in recognition rates for other kinds of statements. A priori explicit attitudes toward gays did not moderate these findings, although the participants with more positive attitudes toward gays saw the analogy to left-handers as more sound. Our findings demonstrate that analogical inferences can be seamlessly integrated into mental representations of the target domain even when those inferences are unpalatable; in short, resistance to analogy is futile.     

Can neuroimaging really tell us what the human brain is doing? The relevance of indirect measures of population activity

Neuroimaging studies using positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) give an indication towards the localization of mental representations and processes in the human brain. It is not clear to what extent such global measures of neuronal activity, pooling across large populations of neurons, can reveal how certain computations are implemented by the neurons in such population ('computational neuroimaging'). Population activity is related tightly to single-cell activity when all neurons in the population have similar response properties. We describe some evidence from single-cell recordings in monkeys that indicates that neurons with similar response properties are not scattered randomly throughout the visual cortex. Notwithstanding this clustering, populations of nearby neurons are still rather heterogeneous, requiring some prudence in deriving single-cell response properties from population activity. The following review of recent neuroimaging studies of the visual system describes to what degree inferences about computations and representations can be drawn from these studies.     

How Are Different Properties of a Scene Encoded in Visual Memory?

Recent studies in scene perception suggest that much of what observers believe they see is not retained in visual memory. Depending on the roles they play in organizing the perception of a scene, different visual properties may require different amounts of attention to be incorporated into a mental representation of the scene. The goal of this study was to compare how three visual properties of scenes, colour, object position, and object presence, are encoded in visual memory. We used a variation on the change detection “flicker” task and measured the time to detect scene changes when: (1) a cue was provided regarding the type of change; and, (2) no cue was provided. We hypothesized that cueing would enhance the processing of visual properties that require more attention to be encoded into scene representations, whereas cueing would not have an effect for properties that are readily or automatically encoded in visual memory. In Experiment 1, we found that there was a cueing advantage for colour changes, but not for position or presence changes. In Experiment 2, we found the same cueing effect regardless of whether the colour change altered the configuration of the scene or not. These results are consistent with the idea that properties that typically help determine the configuration of the scene, for example, position and presence, are better encoded in scene representations than are surface properties such as colour.     

Visualizing space,time, and agents: production,performance, and preference

Visualizations of space, time, and agents (or objects) are ubiquitous in science, business, and everyday life, from weather maps to scheduling meetings. Effective communications, including visual ones, emerge from use in the field, but no conventional visualization form has yet emerged for this confluence of information. The real-world spiral of production, comprehension, and use that fine-tunes communications can be accelerated in the laboratory. Here, we do so in search of effective visualizations of space, time, and agents. Users’ production, preference, and performance aligned to favor matrix representations with time as rows or columns and space and agents as entries. Overall, performance and preference were greater for matrices with discrete dots representing cell entries than for matrices with lines, but lines connecting cells may provide an advantage when evaluating temporal sequence. Both the diagram type and the technique have broader applications.     

The Cost of Accessing an Object's Feature Stored in Visual Working Memory

The effects of accessing or retrieving information held in working memory are poorly understood compared to what we know about the nature of information storage in this limited-capacity memory system. Previous studies of object-based attention have often relied upon memory-demanding tasks, and this work could indicate that accessing a piece of information in visual working memory may have deleterious effects upon the other representations being maintained. In the present study, we tested the hypothesis that accessing a feature of an object represented in visual working memory degrades the representations of the other stored objects' features. Our findings support this hypothesis and point to important new questions about the nature of effects resulting from accessing information stored in visual working memory.     

Varieties of Pictorial Illusion

This article focuses on a potentially perplexing aspect of our interactions with pictorial representations (including film, paintings, pictures, drawings, photographs, even video games): in some cases, it seems that visual representations can play tricks on our cognitive faculties. We may either come to believe that objects represented in pictures are real or perhaps perceive them as such. The possibility of widespread pictorial illusions has been oft discussed, and discarded, in the aesthetics literature. I support this stance. However, the nature of the illusion is more complicated than is usually considered. I argue that there are five different types of potential illusions and present reasons for rejecting each. I also explore in detail the most persistent illusion: the “object recognition perceptual illusion thesis,” which states that we undergo a perceptual illusion while viewing pictorial representations simply in virtue of seeing objects in the representation. I contend that a rejection of this thesis depends on the nature of perceptual content, an issue with far‐reaching consequences in aesthetics.     

What is it to be aware of your awareness of red? A review essay of Michelle Montague’s The Given

In this review essay of Michelle Montague’s The Given we focus on the central thesis in the book: the awareness of awareness thesis. On that thesis, a state of awareness constitutively involves an awareness of itself. In Section 2, we discuss what the awareness of awareness thesis amounts to, how it contrasts with the transparency of experience, and how it might be motivated. In Section 3, we discuss one of Montague’s two theoretical arguments for the awareness of awareness thesis. A view that accepts the awareness of awareness thesis, Montague argues, is to be preferred over competing views because it outperforms them in accounting for the property attributions one makes in perceptual experience. We suggest that it is not clear that this argument for the awareness of awareness thesis is successful. Finally, in Section 4 we consider the relation between Montague’s view of color experience and what she calls Strawson’s datum, arguing that Montague may not be able to explain this datum as straightforwardly as she supposes. This, we suggest, threatens Montague’s second theoretical argument for the awareness of awareness thesis.     

The Micro-Category account of analogy

Here, we investigate how activation of mental representations of categories during analogical reasoning influences subsequent cognitive processing. Specifically, we present and test the central predictions of the "Micro-Category" account of analogy. This account emphasizes the role of categories in aligning terms for analogical mapping. In a semantic priming paradigm, a four-word analogy task was compared to two other four-word tasks. Stimuli were identical in all tasks; only the instructions given to participants differed. Participants were instructed to identify analogy relations, category relations, or conventionalized semantic relations in the four-word sets. After each four-word set, a single target word appeared and participants named this word aloud. Target words that referred to category relations in the preceding four-word sets were primed as strongly when participants identified analogies as when participants identified categories, suggesting that activation of category concepts plays an important role in analogical thinking. In addition, priming of category-referent words in the analogy and category tasks was significantly greater than priming of these words when participants identified conventionalized semantic relations. Since identical stimuli were used in all conditions, this finding indicates that it is the activation of category relations, distinct from any effect of basic semantic association, that causes analogical reasoning to prime category-referent words. We delineate how the "Micro-Category" account of analogy predicts these phenomena and unifies findings from diverse areas of research concerning analogical reasoning.     

Situating vision in the world

Recently, there has been a great deal of interest in what has been called 'situated cognition', which has included claims that certain forms of representation are inadequate for modeling active organisms or agents such as humans and robots. In this article, I suggest that a weakness in classical theories of visual representation is the way in which representations connect with the real world, which may account for many of the concerns expressed by the situated cognition community. Specifically, I claim that what current theories lack is any provision for a certain form of direct, preconceptual connection between objects in the visual world (visual objects or proto-objects) and their representations in the visual system. This type of connection is akin to what philosophers and semanticists have referred to as an 'indexical' or 'demonstrative' reference and what some cognitive scientists have referred to as 'deictic pointers'. I explain why such a mechanism is needed and suggest that many workers have, in fact, been studying precisely this under the term 'visual index'. The visual index hypothesis is illustrated with the results of some relevant experiments, including multiple object tracking, visual routines and subset-selected visual searches. Indexing theory provides a synthesis that has profound implications for explaining a wide range of psychophysical findings, certain results in infant cognitive development and also some ancient problems in the philosophy of mind.     

Fusing Apples and Oranges: A Rejoinder to Carver & Scheier and to Fenigstein

ABSTRACT A simple parable is introduced that serves as an analogy to the private/public self-focus distinction The analogy elucidates that the reliability of the effects observed by the private/public research direction is not the focus of the Wicklund and Gollwitzer critique Rather, the critique questions the validity of the explanations offered More importantly, the analogy implies the conclusion that construing social dependency as an issue of self-focus does injustice to both the social dependency and self-focus concepts     

Show me the features! Understanding recognition from the use of visual information

We propose an approach that allows a rigorous understanding of the visual categorization and recognition process without asking direct questions about unobservable memory representations. Our approach builds on the selective use of visual information in recognition and a new method (Bubbles) to depict and measure what this information is. We examine three face–recognition tasks (identity, gender, expressive or not) and establish the componential and holistic information responsible for recognition performance. On the basis of this information, we derive task–specific gradients of probability for the allocation of attention to the different regions of the face.