论天人合德与道德价值的定位

中国传统伦理道德的天人合德为伦理道德价值提供了本体上的根据,这是道德价值的根本定位。其把道德价值定位于整体利益,就是定位于超越的绝对本位。这与现代伦理道德价值定位于人类个体利益一样,都存在理论和实践上的失误。伦理道德的逻辑发展,必将从此引申出集体利益与个体利益和谐一致的集体主义原则。     

The Moral Nature of Psychotherapy

Although psychotherapists are aware that psychotherapy is a value-laden practice, they do not generally appreciate that psychotherapy is necessarily based on moral values. Conceptions of moral values as attitudes regarding the well-being of others and of human enterprises as actions based on reasoned choices or values are presented. The nature of psychotherapy as a moral enterprise is shown through an examination of two views of theory. Theories, the typical basis for guiding and justifying practice, either contain moral values or require them as assumptions necessary for practice. Implications for the teaching and presentation of forms of psychotherapy are briefly discussed.     

为何要构建人与自然的道德关系

本文分析了人与自然具有事实和价值的双重关系,并从生态学的理论背景进一步阐述人与自然的关系;在此基础上,分析批判了“人类中心主义”和“非人类中心主义”,论述了构建人与自然的道德关系的必要性和重要性。     

The Moral Value of Envy

It is common to think that we would be morally better people if we never felt envy. Recently, some philosophers have rejected this conclusion by arguing that envy can often be directed toward unfairness or inequality. As such, they conclude that we should not suppress our feelings of envy. I argue, however, that these defenses only show that envy is sometimes morally permissible. In order to show that we would not be better off without envy, we must show how envy is not merely morally permissible, but morally valuable. Here I provide a defense of envy's moral value. I argue that feelings of envy are integral to the value that moral agents place on the goods and talents that they judge to be central to a worthwhile life.     

道德教育的人性假设

道德教育的人性假设包括三个判断,分别形成道德教育的本体论、目的论与方法论,三个判断之阃具有内在逻辑关系.道德教育理论的转换,往往从人性假设的转型开始.我国当前的道德教育理论,应该在唯物史观视野中建构人性假设,并以此为基础,型构符合人的发展与社会进步需要的道德教育理论体系.     

公共道德与私人道德的关系问题

本文试图厘清公共道德与私人道德之间的关系,包括它们的异同、相互之间的可引出性、它们的源头等问题。既从义务论的角度论证公共道德的非个人性,又从公共道德观的发生学的角度论证公共道德的非个人性的相对性。认为公职人员作为伦理主体在面临道德困境时,必须行使其价值判断、道德选择,并对其行为负责。     

道德悖论研究的价值与意义

以悖论的认知范式,伦理学界考辨既有道德规范的合理性,审思道德实践领域的认知困境,试图给出消解道德悖论的一般路径.道德悼论研究至少具有三重价值和意义:可以推动道德理论实现质变性创新;增添人们的道德智慧、化解道德实践悖境;转换道德认知方式、提升人们的道德悖论思维水平.     

Artistic Value and Copies of Artworks

In a recent paper, Nicholas Stang argues that (i) artworks are not valuable for their own sake in virtue of their artistic value, (ii) artworks have artistic value in virtue of the final value of the experiences they afford, and (iii) the only appropriate objects of appreciation are worktypes. All of these arguments rest on claims about the artistic value of copies of artworks that provide a radical challenge to the views that many philosophers have about copies. Here I argue that Stang's arguments are unsuccessful. The argument for (i) is mistaken about what one is committed to if one thinks artworks are valuable for their own sake in virtue of their artistic value. The defense of (ii) fails to explain what it is supposed to explain. The argument for (iii) overgeneralizes from one kind of case. Finally, the basic claim Stang makes about the artistic value of copies is false. I defend an alternative view. I conclude by discussing the implications of my arguments for experientialism (thesis (ii)). Reflection on the cases Stang considers, far from leading us to embrace experientialism, in fact reveals problems that experientialists need to confront.     

伦理精神的本质及其价值

伦理精神是文化精神之一,是民族精神的一个方面。学术界在对文化精神或民族精神的研究中,通常从两个角度去把握。一个角度是直接指向文化精神和民族精神中的基本内容。例如张岱年、方克立主编的《中国文化概论》就指出,中国文化基本精神的主     

改造自然界与人的道德责任——论对世界存在和人存在的重新开启

长期以来,人们总是将改造自然界的实践活动理解为满足人的生存需要的手段,在马克思以前从来没有人将改造自然界的实践活动视为一种先行开启世界存在和人存在的本体论的目的性活动。正是对改造自然界实践活动的这一重大误读,导致了现代性的实践活动给自然界带来巨大破坏和对人的存在的严重扭曲。因此,正本清源,还改造自然界实践活动的本来面目,成为摆在理论工作者面前一项迫在眉睫的任务。改造自然界的实践活动是创造世界和创造人的本体,它的先行存在地位决定了它才真正是人们对自然环境负道德责任的形而上学根据,正是通过它才开启出世界的存在和人的存在,因而它才有资格成为道德责任的关怀对象。改造自然界实践活动的先在性,决定了人们怎样进行改造自然界的实践活动,就有怎样的世界存在和怎样的人性。道德上负责任地进行改造自然界的实践活动,意味着人要负责任地创造世界、负责任地创造人的存在。对改造自然界的实践活动负道德责任,就是对自然世界负道德责任、对人本身负道德责任。     

Moral Compromises, Moral Integrity and the Indeterminacy of Value Rankings

Though the art of compromise, i.e. of settling differences by mutual concessions, is part of communal living on any level, we often think that there is something wrong in compromise, especially in cases where moral convictions are involved. A first reason for distrusting compromises on moral matters refers to the idea of integrity, understood in the basic sense of 'standing for something', especially standing for the values and causes that to some extent confer identity. The second reason points out the objective nature of moral values, which seems to make them immune from negotiation and barter. If one sincerely holds some moral conviction to be true, than compromising on that belief must be a sign of serious confusion.In order to reach a better understanding of these two reasons, I analyse what is involved in personal integrity and how this relates to moral integrity. I argue that the search for moral integrity naturally brings us to the question of how one could accept moral compromises and still uphold the idea that moral values and principles have an objective authority over us. To address this question I will present a version of moral pluralism which tries to capture the enormous complexity of what should matter to us as moral persons, and which explains why value-rankings are often deeply indeterminate. The general position I defend in this paper is that compromises involving moral values and norms may be morally required and, therefore, be laudable. To sustain this position I will arrive at a view of ethical objectivity that allows the possibility to negotiate about the truth of moral beliefs.     

试论高技术的道德选择及其本质

当代科学技术取得了长足的进步 ,尤其是高技术的迅速崛起 ,正日益改变着世界。高技术的发展更增加了高技术伦理风险负效应的不确定性 ,即既提供了更多的道德选择的可能性 ,又提出了严峻的挑战 ,进而使高技术的道德选择成为高技术活动主体不可回避的问题。