Memory for targets in a multilevel simulated environment: Evidence for vertical asymmetry in spatial memory

In two experiments, adult participants explored a symmetrical three-tiered computer-simulated building that contained six distinctive objects, two on each floor. Following exploration, the objects were removed, and the participants were asked to make direction judgments from each floor, indicating the former positions of the objects on that floor and on higher and lower floors. Relative tilt error scores indicated a bias, in that targets that were higher than the test location were judged as consistently lower than their actual positions and targets that were lower than the test location were judged as consistently higher than their actual positions. Absolute tilt errors revealed an asymmetry, with more accurate and less variable tilt errors for judgments directed to lower floors than for judgments directed to higher floors. Experiment 3 ruled out an account of the findings that does not relate them to spatial memory. The results suggest that the superiority of downward over upward spatial judgments, previously reported in two-dimensional visual-spatial tasks, extends to navigational spatial memory.     

New motion illusion caused by pictorial motion lines

Motion lines (MLs) are a pictorial technique used to represent object movement in a still picture. This study explored how MLs contribute to motion perception. In Experiment 1, we reported the creation of a motion illusion caused by MLs: random displacements of objects with MLs on each frame were perceived as unidirectional global motion along the pictorial motion direction implied by MLs. In Experiment 2, we showed that the illusory global motion in the peripheral visual field captured the perceived motion direction of random displacement of objects without MLs in the central visual field, and confirmed that the results in Experiment 1 did not stem simply from response bias, but resulted from perceptual processing. In Experiment 3, we showed that the spatial arrangement of orientation information rather than ML length is important for the illusory global motion. Our results indicate that the ML effect is based on perceptual processing rather than response bias, and that comparison of neighboring orientation components may underlie the determination of pictorial motion direction with MLs.     

Open-field behavior in domestic chicks tested individually or in pairs: Differential effects of painted lines delineating subdivisions of the floor

The open field is a common test of fear, but the apparatus varies widely. Lines painted on the floor facilitate measurement of locomotion (areas entered), but, though some animals balk at lines, this variable has received little attention. In Experiment 1, 10-day-old female chicks were tested individually in an open field with an unmarked floor or one delineated into areas by 1- or 3-mm-wide black lines. In Experiment 2, chicks were tested in pairs in the presence or absence of 3-mm-wide lines. Strong intraindividual correlations demonstrated that both paces and areas entered are effective measures of locomotion. Chicks tested individually were unaffected by the presence or width of lines. Conversely, pair-tested chicks paced and pecked more when the floor was delineated. Given the latter findings, some standardization is recommended.     

How Do Opportunities to View Objects Together in Time Influence Children's Memory for Location?

We conducted three experiments to investigate how opportunities to view objects together in time influence memory for location. Children and adults learned the locations of 20 objects marked by dots on the floor of an open, square box. During learning, participants viewed the objects either simultaneously or in isolation. At test, participants replaced the objects without the aid of the dots. Experiment 1 showed that when the box was divided into quadrants and the objects in each quadrant were categorically related, 7-, 9-, and 11-year-olds and adults in the simultaneous viewing condition exhibited categorical bias, but only 11-year-olds and adults in the isolated viewing condition exhibited categorical bias. Experiment 2 showed that when the objects were categorically related but no boundaries were present, 11-year-olds and adults in the simultaneous viewing condition exhibited categorical bias, but only adults showed bias in the isolated viewing condition. Experiment 3 revealed that adults exhibited bias in both simultaneous and isolated viewing conditions when boundaries were present but the objects were not related. These findings suggest that opportunities to see objects together in time interact with cues available for grouping objects to help children form spatial groups.     

How do biases in spatial memory change as children and adults are learning locations?

This investigation tracked changes in categorical bias (i.e., placing objects belonging to the same spatial group closer together than they really are) while 7-, 9-, and 11-year-olds and adults were learning a set of locations. Participants learned the locations of 20 objects marked by dots on the floor of an open square box divided into quadrants. At test, participants attempted to place the objects in the correct locations without the dots and boundaries. In Experiment 1, we probed categorical bias during learning by alternating learning and test trials. Categorical bias was high during the first test trial and decreased over the second and third test trials. In Experiment 2, we manipulated opportunities for learning by providing participants with either one, two, three, or four learning trials prior to test. Participants who experienced one or two learning trials exhibited more bias at test than did those who experienced four learning trials. The discussion focuses on how categorical bias emerges through interactions between the cognitive system and task structure.     

A Clockwork Orange: Compensation opposing momentum in memory for location

Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl's (1983; Libet, 1985) influential work using a clock-watching task suggests that voluntary actions are initiated in motor cortex prior to the point where the participant claims to have initiated that action. Joordens, van Duijn, and Spalek (2002) showed that a bias exists in this task with respect to the participants' reports of initiation times. Joordens et al. assumed that this bias was primarily due to motion cues that are very much like those used to elicit phenomena such as representational momentum. In the present Experiment 1, it is demonstrated that this bias disappears when a mouse-click response is used in place of a temporal-order judgment. This finding, however, is actually more confusing than clarifying given that the procedural parallels with representational momentum are still present and should be supporting a bias. In the three subsequent experiments the view that a bias is indeed present, but that it is opposed by an opposite-acting compensation process, is proposed and tested. Implications for both representational momentum and for the general use of clock-watching tasks (e.g., Libet et al., 1983) are highlighted.     

How undistorted spatial memories can produce distorted responses

Reproducing the location of an object from the contents of spatial working memory requires the translation of a noisy representation into an action at a single location—for instance, a mouse click or a mark with a writing utensil. In many studies, these kinds of actions result in biased responses that suggest distortions in spatial working memory. We sought to investigate the possibility of one mechanism by which distortions could arise, involving an interaction between undistorted memories and nonuniformities in attention. Specifically, the resolution of attention is finer below than above fixation, which led us to predict that bias could arise if participants tend to respond in locations below as opposed to above fixation. In Experiment 1 we found such a bias to respond below the true position of an object. Experiment 2 demonstrated with eye-tracking that fixations during response were unbiased and centered on the remembered object’s true position. Experiment 3 further evidenced a dependency on attention relative to fixation, by shifting the effect horizontally when participants were required to tilt their heads. Together, these results highlight the complex pathway involved in translating probabilistic memories into discrete actions, and they present a new attentional mechanism by which undistorted spatial memories can lead to distorted reproduction responses.     

Some further tests of the brief confinement effect and the SSDR account of flooding

Although brief confinement in novel or fearful places may occasionally produce flooding-like effects with regard to hastening avoidance response extinction, the results of the three experiments reported here indicate that this is not as robust a phenomenon as is flooding. Experiments 1 and 2 found that any tendency for a brief confinement effect to occur is likely to result from the use of a procedure where extinction is started on the grid floor as opposed to on the ledge of a jump-up box. Experiment 3 found no evidence at all that confinement in either a novel or a fearful place can hasten the extinction of a more well-learned jump-up response than that studied in previous experiments, even when the grids extinction procedure was used. Overall these results do not support the SSDR account of flooding, which has derived its chief support from experiments demonstrating a brief confinement effect.     

Investigations of closure processes: What source-monitoring judgments suggest about what is “closing”

On many occasions, the perception of an object is based on incomplete information because portions of the object are occluded from view. Nevertheless, people are able to identify an occluded object, suggesting that the identification is mediated by the activation of completion processes which “fill in” the missing information. Although these completion processes are invoked as causal mechanisms for many phenomena, the processes mediating the “completion” have not been specified. The present experiments tested two potential explanations for closure processes. In each experiment, participants were presented with pictures, complete or incomplete in form, and, on a surprise source-monitoring task, they were then asked to remember whether pictures had been presented complete or incomplete in form. Whether viewing pictures of objects, faces, or camouflaged objects, participants showed a pronounced tendency to claim that incomplete pictures were actually presented complete in form. This bias was evident after the participants described functions for objects (Experiments 1, 1A, and 2), after they evaluated properties of faces (Experiment 4), and after they searched for objects hidden in a complex scene (Experiment 5). However, this bias was not evident after they simply named objects portrayed in pictures (Experiment 3). This bias is interpreted as evidence for the activation of implicit imaginal processing. The results of these experiments are informative in their contribution to our understanding of the bases of closure, an intuitively appealing notion frequently invoked to account for object identification, but, as yet, not fully understood.     

Eccentricity biases of object categories are evident in visual working memory

In high-order object areas, face-selective areas prefer centrally presented stimuli, whereas building-selective areas prefer peripherally presented stimuli (Levy et al., 2001). We investigated whether this eccentricity bias was also evident in visual working memory. In Experiment 1, we found that working memory performance for faces decreased towards the periphery while the performance for buildings remained unchanged across different eccentricities. To rule out the possibility that lower level features influence these results, we manipulated the spatial frequency of faces and buildings (Experiment 2) and the spatial layout information of the buildings (Experiment 3). In both of the experiments, we replicated the results of Experiment 1, even when these lower level features of stimuli were controlled. Consistent with previous findings, the current results suggest that each object category is processed in a different manner depending on the eccentricity. This eccentricity bias is likely the result of how the high-order object areas represent different object categories.     

消极刻板印象对老年人医疗决策的影响及归因偏差的作用

随着年龄的增长, 对老年人的消极刻板印象和医疗决策逐渐成为了与老年群体越来越相关的两个概念。在此背景下, 很有必要系统地探讨消极刻板印象对老年人医疗决策的效应及其机制。本研究以158名老年人为被试, 通过两个实验考察了消极刻板印象、归因偏差和老年人医疗决策质量间的关系。实验1结果发现, 消极刻板印象负向影响老年人的医疗决策质量, 同时, 归因偏差在刻板印象对老年人医疗决策质量的效应中起到中介作用。实验2结果表明, 减少归因偏差的干预控制可以有效降低刻板印象对医疗决策质量的消极效应。本研究对理解刻板印象效应机制、缓解刻板印象消极效应、以及改善老年人医疗决策质量具有一定的理论意义和实践价值。     

Ingroup and outgroup differences in face detection

Humans show improved recognition for faces from their own social group relative to faces from another social group. Yet before faces can be recognized, they must first be detected in the visual field. Here, we tested whether humans also show an ingroup bias at the earliest stage of face processing – the point at which the presence of a face is first detected. To this end, we measured viewers' ability to detect ingroup (Black and White) and outgroup faces (Asian, Black, and White) in everyday scenes. Ingroup faces were detected with greater speed and accuracy relative to outgroup faces (Experiment 1). Removing face hue impaired detection generally, but the ingroup detection advantage was undiminished (Experiment 2). This same pattern was replicated by a detection algorithm using face templates derived from human data (Experiment 3). These findings demonstrate that the established ingroup bias in face processing can extend to the early process of detection. This effect is ‘colour blind’, in the sense that group membership effects are independent of general effects of image hue. Moreover, it can be captured by tuning visual templates to reflect the statistics of observers' social experience. We conclude that group bias in face detection is both a visual and a social phenomenon.     

Early mechanism of negativity bias: An attentional blink study1

Abstract: The negativity bias is the perceptual phenomena whereby an emotionally negative stimulus is processed faster than a positive or neutral stimulus. We used the attentional blink paradigm to investigate whether attentional resources are required to obtain the negativity bias. Positive, negative or neutral words were used as a preceding target (T1) and/or a subsequent target (T2). Experiment 1 showed that the negativity bias occurred, because the attentional blink was reduced by a negative T2, but not by a positive or neutral T2. Experiment 2 indicated that a negative T1 grabbed attentional resources, interfering with the identification of a neutral T2. Experiment 3 demonstrated that the report of a negative T2 deteriorated when T1 was also negative. We conclude that attentional resources were required for the occurrence of the negativity bias.     

Naloxone-induced hypoalgesia: Effects of heat, cold and novelty

Experiment 1 confirmed that pairings of the opioid antagonist naloxone and a heated floor served to induce and then to maintain a conditioned hypoalgesia in rats. Experiments 2a and b demonstrated that this was not specific to some property of the heated floor: pairings of the drug and a cold floor (a) resulted in conditioned hypoalgesia and (b) maintained the hypoalgesia provoked by pairings of the drug with a heated floor. Experiments 3a and 4 showed that pairings of naloxone with the non-heated floor of the apparatus provoked hypoalgesia and provided evidence that this was due to the drug's disruption of a familiarization process. Experiment 3b revealed that pairings of naloxone with the non-heated floor maintained the hypoalgesia induced by pairings of the drug with a heated one. The results were interpreted to mean that naloxone interacts selectively with a stressor so as to maintain or enhance its aversive properties.     

Domain Knowledge and Hindsight Bias among Poker Players

Hindsight bias occurs when individuals believe that events were more predictable after they have occurred than they actually were before they occurred. Although hindsight bias is a well‐studied phenomenon, few studies have examined the role of expertise in this bias. Two experiments investigated the relation between the magnitude of hindsight bias and self‐reported poker expertise (Experiment 1) and assessed poker knowledge (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, self‐rated poker expertise was negatively correlated with hindsight bias. Experiment 2 employed memory and hypothetical hindsight conditions and found that poker knowledge was negatively correlated with hindsight bias in the memory condition, but unrelated to hindsight bias in the hypothetical condition. These results help elucidate the role of expertise in hindsight bias and provide additional support for the separate components view, which claims there are different forms of hindsight bias that are differentially affected by certain factors. Domain knowledge appears to be one of such factors. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

“If it's in your mind,it's in your knowledge”: Children's developing anatomy of identity

Recent work has investigated children's developing understanding of the anatomical locus of identity. In two studies, we extend this work by exploring the role of the mind as opposed to the brain in children's conceptualization of identity. In Experiment 1, an analysis of natural language indicated that adults use the term mind more frequently than the term brain with reference to identity-related mental processes. Children's output displayed a similar bias. In Experiment 2, we compared the judgments of 5- and 7-year-old children to those displayed by adults. Participants heard stories in which a magical transformation resulted in either a creature with a mismatch between brain and body or a creature with a mismatch between mind and body. Children were more accurate in recognizing the enduring identity of this transformed creature when the transformation resulted in a mismatch between mind and body as compared to brain and body.     

Age-related differences in spatial memory: effects of structural and organizational context

The authors examined effects of structural and organizational spatial context on younger and older adults' memory for an arrangement of dollhouse furniture pieces. For half of the participants, landmark objects (Experiment 1) and a floor plan beneath the array (Experiment 2) served as structural context during study and replacement. Organizational context was varied by grouping items randomly or as 6 rooms in a prototypical house. Two study and replacement trials were given. In Experiment 1, landmark structural cues improved younger adults' performance, whereas both age groups benefited from the floor plan in Experiment 2. In both experiments, positive effects of organizational context and trial occurred. Higher order interactions further revealed that structural and organizational context effects varied in size across trials, suggesting that both age groups used spatial contextual cues more effectively with practice. Implications of these results for current views on cognitive compensation in adulthood are discussed.     

Slant perception in near space is categorically biased: Evidence for a vertical tendency

The geographical slants of hills are known to appear quite exaggerated. Here, we examine the visual and haptic perception of the geographical slant of surfaces within reach under full-cue conditions and show that the perceived orientation of even these surfaces is biased. An exaggeration with respect to deviations from horizontal is shown to be present cross-modally. Experiment 1 employed numerical estimation to show the effect for visually observed surfaces, while controlling for verbal numerical bias. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the bias is present even when manual measures show good calibration. Experiment 3 controlled for direction of gaze. Experiment 4 measured the same bias for haptic surfaces. Experiment 5 showed that the bias can also be observed using the nonnumeric task of angle bisection. These results constrain theories of geographical slant perception and appear most consistent with functional scale expansion of deviations from horizontal.     

Calibrating reach distance to visual targets

The authors investigated the calibration of reach distance by gradually distorting the haptic feedback obtained when participants grasped visible target objects. The authors found that the modified relationship between visually specified distance and reach distance could be captured by a straight-line mapping function. Thus, the relation could be described using 2 parameters: bias and slope. The authors investigated whether calibration generalized across reach space with respect to changes in bias and slope. In Experiment 1, the authors showed that both bias and slope recalibrate. In Experiment 2, they tested the symmetries of reach space with respect to changes in bias. They discovered that reach space is asymmetric, with the bias shifting inward more readily than outward. The authors measured how rapidly the system calibrated and the stability of calibration once feedback was removed. In Experiment 3, they showed that bias and slope can be calibrated independently of one another. In Experiment 4, the authors showed that these calibration effects are not cognitively penetrable.     

Developmental changes in predicting one's own span of short-term memory

Developmental changes in the accuracy of predicting one's own recall were studied, using preschool, third grade, and college subjects in Experiment 1 and third grade and college subjects in Experiment 2. Experiment 1 showed that prediction accuracy increased from the preschool to the college years, subjects were not influenced by a potential “expectancy” bias in the procedure, and only third grade subjects were influenced by the presence of norms about peer performance. Experiment 2 showed that third graders and college subjects lower their predictions in the face of “false” norm information, with college subjects being the only group to under predict actual recall in both experiments. Thus, although adults are significantly more accurate than elementary shool children in estimating short-term recall, their susceptibility to norm information suggests that even they have uncertainty about their exact capabilities.