共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Peter B. M. Vranas 《Philosophical Studies》2010,150(1):115-121
Kadri Vihvelin, in “What time travelers cannot do” (Philos Stud 81:315–330, 1996), argued that “no time traveler can kill the baby who in fact is her younger self”, because (V1) “if someone would fail to
do something, no matter how hard or how many times she tried, then she cannot do it”, and (V2) if a time traveler tried to
kill her baby self, she would always fail. Theodore Sider (Philos Stud 110:115–138, 2002) criticized Vihvelin’s argument, and Ira Kiourti (Philos Stud 139:343–352, 2008) criticized both Vihvelin’s argument and Sider’s critique. I present a critique of Vihvelin’s argument different from both
Sider’s and Kiourti’s critiques: I argue in a novel way that both V1 and V2 are false. Since Vihvelin’s argument might be
understood as providing a challenge to the possibility of time travel, if my critique succeeds then time travel survives such
a challenge unscathed. 相似文献
2.
Nick Trakakis 《Sophia》2006,45(1):57-77
This paper examines an evidential argument from evil recently defended by William Rowe, one that differs significantly from
the kind of evidential argument Rowe has become renowned for defending. After providing a brief outline of Rowe’s new argument,
I contest its seemingly uncontestable premise that our world is not the best world God could have created. I then engage in
a lengthier discussion of the other key premise in Rowe’s argument, viz., the Leibnizian premise that any world created by
God must be the best world God can create. In particular, I discuss the criticisms raised against this premise by William
Wainwright as well as Rowe’s attempt to meet these criticisms. The Wainwright-Rowe exchange, I argue, highlights some insuperable
difficulties in Rowe’s challenge to theism. 相似文献
3.
Franklin Mason 《Ratio》2000,13(2):175-185
In his ‘Could Extended Objects Be Made Out of Simple Parts?: An Argument for “Atomless Gunk’’, Dean Zimmerman defends the claim that no physical object has a complete decomposition into simples but instead has among its parts a piece of ‘atomless gunk’ His argument for this claim rests in part upon a theory of the impenetrability of physical objects. In that theory, Zimmerman distinguishes ‘[t]he sort of impenetrability that is a part of the concept of’ a physical object from ‘a power to resist the pressure of other objects’. He says that impenetrability is but ‘an essential inability’ of two physical objects to occupy one and the same region of space, an essential inability that is not a power of one physical object to exert repulsive forces on others in its vicinity. I argue that this theory of impenetrability is false and that Zimmerman's argument for the existence of ‘atomless gunk’ fails. 相似文献
4.
5.
B. Brogaard 《Synthese》2006,152(1):47-79
Russell’s new theory of denoting phrases introduced in “On Denoting” in Mind 1905 is now a paradigm of analytic philosophy. The main argument for Russell’s new theory is the so-called ‘Gray’s Elegy’
argument, which purports to show that the theory of denoting concepts (analogous to Frege’s theory of senses) promoted by
Russell in the 1903 Principles of Mathematics is incoherent. The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument rests on the premise that if a denoting concept occurs in a proposition, then
the proposition is not about the concept. I argue that the premise is false. The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument does not exhaust
Russell’s ammunition against the theory of denoting concepts. Another reason Russell rejects the theory is, as he says, that
it cannot provide an adequate account of non-uniquely denoting concepts. In the last section of the paper, I argue that even
though Russell was right in thinking that the theory of denoting concepts cannot provide an adequate account of non-uniquely
denoting concepts, Russell’s new theory does not succeed in eliminating the occurrence of all denoting concepts, as it requires
a commitment to the existence of variables that indirectly denote their values. However, the view that variables are denoting
concepts is unproblematic once the ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument is blocked. 相似文献
6.
Ian Kidd 《Philosophia》2012,40(2):365-377
This paper explores the influence of the fifth-century Christian Neoplatonist Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (Denys) on the
twentieth-century philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend. I argue that the later Feyerabend took from Denys a metaphysical
claim—the ‘doctrine of ineffability’—intended to support epistemic pluralism. The paper has five parts. Part one introduces
Denys and Feyerabend’s common epistemological concern to deny the possibility of human knowledge of ultimate reality. Part
two examines Denys’ arguments for the ‘ineffability’ of God as presented in On the Divine Names. Part three then explores how Feyerabend imported Denys’ account of divine ineffability into his own metaphysics to provide
a novel argument for epistemic pluralism. Part four explains the significance of an appreciation of Dionyius’ influence for
our understanding of Feyerabend. I conclude that Denys was a significant and neglected influence upon the later Feyerabend. 相似文献
7.
Paul C. Anders 《Sophia》2011,50(1):25-37
Many religiously minded materialist philosophers have attempted to understand the doctrine of the survival of death from within
a physicalist approach. Their goal is not to show the doctrine false, but to explain how it can be true. One such approach
has been developed by Peter van Inwagen. After explaining what I call the duplication objection, I present van Inwagen’s proposal
and show how a proponent might attempt to solve the problem of duplication. I argue that the very features of the view that
aid the proponent in responding to the duplication objection entails the possibility of an impossible state of affairs—that
two distinct persons can at the same time be identical with the same bundle of material simples. The religiously minded materialist
is caught between the horns of a dilemma. One’s view regarding human persons must be robust enough to account for personal
identity over time, and so not fall to the duplication objection. At the same time, the view must not entail the possibility
of two persons temporarily having complete coincident existence. 相似文献
8.
Thomas M. Crisp 《Synthese》2010,174(3):355-366
Internalism about epistemic justification (henceforth, ‘internalism’) says that a belief B is epistemically justified for
S only if S is aware of some good-making feature of B, some feature that makes for B’s having positive epistemic status: e.g.,
evidence for B. Externalists with respect to epistemic justification (‘externalists’) deny this awareness requirement. Michael
Bergmann has recently put this dilemma against internalism: awareness admits of a strong and a weak construal; given the strong
construal, internalism is subject to debilitating regress troubles; given the weak construal, internalism is unmotivated;
either way, internalism is in serious trouble. I argue for two claims in this article. First, Bergmann’s dilemma argument
is unmotivated: he’s given no good reason for accepting one of its crucial premises. And second, Bergmann’s dilemma argument
is unsound: the crucial premise in question is false. 相似文献
9.
Nikk Effingham 《Erkenntnis》2011,74(2):225-240
This paper argues that, in light of certain scenarios involving time travel, Sider’s definition of ‘instantaneous temporal
part’ cannot be accepted in conjunction with a semantic thesis that perdurantists often assume. I examine a rejoinder from
Sider, as well as Thomson’s alternative definition of ‘instantaneous temporal part’, and show how neither helps. Given this,
we should give up on the perdurantist semantic thesis. I end by recommending that, once we no longer accept such semantics,
we should accept a new set of definitions, which are superior in certain respects to Sider’s original set. 相似文献
10.
Leigh C. Vicens 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2012,71(2):145-155
In this paper I consider the view, held by some Thomistic thinkers, that divine determinism is compatible with human freedom,
even though natural determinism is not. After examining the purported differences between divine and natural determinism,
I discuss the Consequence Argument, which has been put forward to establish the incompatibility of natural determinism and
human freedom. The Consequence Argument, I note, hinges on the premise that an action ultimately determined by factors outside
of the actor’s control is not free. Since, I argue, divine determinism also entails that human actions are ultimately determined
by factors outside of the actors’ control, I suggest that a parallel argument to the Consequence Argument can be constructed
for the incompatibility of divine determinism and human freedom. I conclude that those who reject natural compatibilism on
the basis of the Consequence Argument should also reject divine compatibilism. 相似文献
11.
Naoaki Kitamura 《Philosophia》2016,44(1):155-165
Recently, Jonathan Tallant has argued that we should reject priority views, which hold that some objects are fundamental and others are dependent. Tallant’s argument relies on two proposed mereological possibilities: a gunky world, where everything has a proper part, and a junky world, where everything is a proper part. In this paper, I criticise Tallant’s argument and argue that neither of these possibilities threaten priority views per se; at most, they threaten only particular forms of priority views that contain a certain independently controversial assumption. First, I defend priority pluralism against the gunk argument: the genuine conceivability of gunk can be plausibly doubted on the basis of a certain principle concerning metaphysical possibility, and even if this principle is false, the possibility of a gunky world poses no devastative problem for pluralism per se because it can be considered to be consistent with nonatomism. Second, I defend priority monism against the junk argument: the possibility of a junky world poses no devastative problem for monism per se because it can be considered to be consistent with nonholism in a twofold sense. Finally, I show that even monism as defined as genuinely holistic can be plausibly defended against the junk argument once the claim of the possible nonexistence of the maximal whole is reinterpreted based on the priority-based conception of existence. 相似文献
12.
Daniel Z. Korman 《Philosophical Studies》2010,149(3):387-393
Kripke maintains that one who stipulatively introduces the term ‘one meter’ as a rigid designator for the length of a certain
stick s at time t is in a position to know a priori that if s exists at t then the length of s at t is one meter. Some (e.g.,
Soames 2003) have objected to this alleged instance of the contingent a priori on the grounds that the stipulator's knowledge
would have to be based in part on substantive metalinguistic knowledge. I examine Soames's argument for the a posteriority
of the relevant metalinguistic knowledge, and I argue that its main premise is false. 相似文献
13.
Jeff A. Snapper 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2011,69(1):45-56
In this paper I show that two arguments for the inconsistency of skeptical theism fail. After setting up the debate in “Introduction”
section, I show in “The initial debate” section why Mylan Engel’s argument (Engel 2004) against skeptical theism does not
succeed. In “COST” section I strengthen the argument so that it both avoids my reply to Engel and parallels Jon Laraudogoitia’s
argument against skeptical theism (Laraudogoitia 2000). In “COST*” section, I provide three replies—one by an evidentialist
theist, one by a closure-denying theist, and one by a necessitarian theist, and argue that the necessitarian’s reply successfully
rebuts the inconsistency charge. I conclude that skeptical theism which accepts God’s necessary existence is immune to both
kinds of arguments for its inconsistency. 相似文献
14.
Anders John 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2012,71(2):137-143
In his “Third Way” Aquinas appears to argue in a way that relies upon shifting quantifiers in a fallacious way. Some have
tried to save this and other parts of the “Third Way” by introducing sophisticated logical and metaphysical machinery. Alternatively,
Aquinas’ apparently fallacious quantifier shift can be seen to be part of a valid argument if we supply a simple premise which
an Aristotelian natural philosopher would surely hold. In this short paper, I consider candidates for this premise, defend
a specific premise, and from that discussion draw a moral about quantifier predicate logic. I conclude that Aristotelian natural
philosophy is more than an historical backdrop to Aquinas’ arguments. 相似文献
15.
Christopher Gregory Weaver 《Synthese》2012,184(3):299-317
I give two arguments for the claim that all events which occur at the actual world and are such that they could be caused,
are also such that they must actually be caused. The first argument is an improvement of a similar argument advanced by Alexander
Pruss, which I show to be invalid. It uses Pruss’s Brouwer Analog for counterfactual logic, and, as a consequence, implies
inconsistency with Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals. While (I suggest) this consequence may not be objectionable, the
argument founders on the fact that Pruss’s Brouwer Analog has a clear counterexample. I thus turn to a second, “Lewisian”
argument, which requires only an affirmation of one element of Lewis’s analysis of causation and one other, fairly weak possibility
claim about the nature of wholly contingent events. The final section of the paper explains how both arguments escape objections
from supposed indeterminacy in quantum physics. 相似文献
16.
John V. Canfield 《Philosophia》2009,37(4):691-712
In ‘Wittgenstein and Qualia’ Ned Block argues for the existence of inverted spectra and those ineffable things, qualia. The
essence of his discussion is a would-be proof, presented through a series of pictures, of the possible existence of an inverted
spectrum. His argument appeals to some remarks by Wittgenstein which, Block holds, commit the former to a certain ‘dangerous
scenario’ wherein inverted spectra, and consequently qualia live and breath. I hold that a key premise of this proof is incoherent.
Furthermore, Block’s dangerous scenario does not follow from Wittgenstein’s innocent one, as Block believes it does, but rather
is in conflict with it. 相似文献
17.
Seth Shabo 《Philosophical Studies》2010,150(3):405-424
In this paper, I distinguish causal from logical versions of the direct argument for incompatibilism. I argue that, contrary
to appearances, causal versions are better equipped to withstand an important recent challenge to the direct-argument strategy.
The challenge involves arguing that support for the argument’s pivotal inference principle falls short just when it is needed
most, namely when a deterministic series runs through an agent’s unimpaired deliberations. I then argue that, while there
are limits to what causal versions can accomplish, they can be used to buttress the ultimacy argument, another important argument
for incompatibilism. 相似文献
18.
Robert J. Howell 《Philosophical Studies》2007,135(2):145-177
In this paper I argue that Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument is better considered not as an argument against physicalism,
but as an argument that objective theories must be incomplete. I argue that despite the apparent diversity of responses to
the knowledge argument, they all boil down to a response according to which genuine epistemic gains are made when an individual
has an experience. I call this the acquaintance response. I then argue that this response violates an intuitive stricture
on the objectivity of theories. Therefore, the knowledge argument does show that objective theories cannot provide a complete
understanding of the world. The result, however, is that both objective dualism and objective physicalism are refuted by the
argument. In the end it is suggested that the notion of “subjective physicalism” is one that should be pursued. 相似文献
19.
There are three major theses in Plantinga’s latest version of his evolutionary argument against naturalism. (1) Given materialism,
the conditional probability of the reliability of human cognitive mechanisms produced by evolution is low; (2) the same conditional
probability given reductive or non-reductive materialism is still low; (3) the most popular naturalistic theories of content
and truth are not admissible for naturalism. I argue that Plantinga’s argument for (1) presupposes an anti-materialistic conception
of content, and it therefore begs the question against materialism. To argue for (2), Plantinga claims that the adaptiveness
of a belief is indifferent to its truth. I argue that this claim is unsupported unless it again assumes an anti-materialistic
conception of content and truth. I further argue that Plantinga’s argument for (3) is not successful either, because an improved
version of teleosemantics can meet his criticisms. Moreover, this version of teleosemantics implies that the truth of a belief
is (probabilistically) positively related to its adaptiveness, at least for simple beliefs about physical objects in human
environments. This directly challenges Plantinga’s claim that adaptiveness is indifferent to truth. 相似文献
20.
Simon Dierig 《Erkenntnis》2010,72(1):73-92
The first explicit argument for the incompatibility of externalism in the philosophy of mind and a priori self-knowledge is
Boghossian’s discrimination argument. In this essay, I oppose the third premise of this argument, trying to show by means
of a thought experiment that possessing the “twater thought” is not an alternative, a fortiori not a relevant alternative,
to having the “water thought.” I then examine a modified version of Boghossian’s argument. The attempt is made to substantiate
the claim that the standard incompatibilist support for its second premise is untenable. Furthermore, a third Boghossian-style
argument is rejected on the ground that either its second premise cannot be warranted in the way suggested by incompatibilists
or its third premise is mistaken because having the “twater thought” instead of the “water thought” is not relevant. Finally,
it is argued that the discrimination argument cannot be saved by invoking closure. The upshot of my discussion is that a compatibilist
can dismiss Boghossian-style arguments for incompatibilism without having to deal with fundamental issues concerning self-knowledge
and the nature of slow switching. 相似文献