Testing two cognitive theories of insight

Insight in problem solving occurs when the problem solver fails to see how to solve a problem and then--"aha!"--there is a sudden realization how to solve it. Two contemporary theories have been proposed to explain insight. The representational change theory (e.g., G. Knoblich, S. Ohlsson, & G. E. Rainey, 2001) proposes that insight occurs through relaxing self-imposed constraints on a problem and by decomposing chunked items in the problem. The progress monitoring theory (e.g., J. N. MacGregor, T. C. Ormerod, & E. P. Chronicle, 2001) proposes that insight is only sought once it becomes apparent that the distance to the goal is unachievable in the moves remaining. These 2 theories are tested in an unlimited move problem, to which neither theory has previously been applied. The results lend support to both, but experimental manipulations to the problem suggest that the representational change theory is the better indicator of performance. The findings suggest that testable opposing predictions can be made to examine theories of insight and that the use of eye movement data is a fruitful method of both examining insight and testing theories of insight.     

顿悟:是进程监控还是表征转换

当前解释顿悟问题解决机制的理论主要有表征转换理论和进程监控理论。进程监控理论主要解释了顿悟问题为什么困难,但事实上它并没有说明顿悟问题为什么会解决,只回答了在什么情况下被试才会寻求其他的方法,而且它把顿悟问题解决的一般过程看成是同常规问题解决方法相同的过程。而表征转换理论主要解释了顿悟是如何获得的——顿悟的获得是由于问题解决者对问题的表征实现了正确的转变,但它并没有解释表征什么时候、怎么样才能转变?顿悟问题的解决经历了三个认知加工阶段,顿悟问题的解决需要在消除定势情况下激活正确的启发信息(线索),并验证了顿悟问题的原型激活和关键启发信息理论假说。     

顿悟问题解决的心理机制的验证性研究

目前顿悟问题解决的心理机制主要存在两个有争议性的理论：进程监控理论和表征变化理论。现以非限制性的停车场问题为实验材料,检验顿悟问题解决的这两个心理机制。结果发现：（1）进程监控理论可解释顿悟被试的成绩优劣;（2）表征变化理论可对顿悟问题能否解决做出解释。     

A generalization of the representational change theory from insight to non-insight problems: the case of arithmetic word problems

This paper provides evidence for a possible generalization of Knoblich and colleagues’ representational change theory [Knoblich, G., Ohlsson, S., Haider, H., & Rhenius, D. (1999). Constraint relaxation and chunk decomposition in insight problem solving. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 25, 1534-1555; Knoblich, G., Ohlsson, S., & Raney, G. E. (2001). An eye movement study of insight problem. Memory and Cognition, 29, 1000-1009] outside its original scope of application. While this theory has been proposed to explain insight problem solving, we demonstrate here that its main concepts, namely, constraint relaxation and chunk decomposition, are applicable to incremental problem solving. In a first experiment, we confirm, as already shown by problem solving and reasoning researchers, that individuals avoid the construction of alternative representations of the problems when possible. In the second and third experiments, we show that alternative representations of arithmetic problems are easier to construct and maintain when they violate constraints of narrow rather than wide scope. The specificity of insight problem solving is discussed in the light of these new findings.     

认知灵活性和顿悟表征转换：练习类型的影响

以停车场问题为实验材料,以42名大学生为被试,探讨认知灵活性高和低的被试在不同练习类型下顿悟问题表征转换的差异。结果表明：1）不同的练习类型对顿悟表征转换有影响,被试在难度逐渐增加的练习类型下比在简单的练习类型下顿悟产生得更快;2）顿悟表征转换的速度因认知灵活性的不同有差异,在简单的练习类型下,认知灵活性高的被试比认知灵活性低的被试顿悟产生得更早,在难度逐渐增加的练习类型下两者无差异;3）认知灵活性高的被试比认知灵活性低的被试顿悟问题解决更快。     

Investigating the effect of mental set on insight problem solving

Mental set is the tendency to solve certain problems in a fixed way based on previous solutions to similar problems. The moment of insight occurs when a problem cannot be solved using solution methods suggested by prior experience and the problem solver suddenly realizes that the solution requires different solution methods. Mental set and insight have often been linked together and yet no attempt thus far has systematically examined the interplay between the two. Three experiments are presented that examine the extent to which sets of noninsight and insight problems affect the subsequent solutions of insight test problems. The results indicate a subtle interplay between mental set and insight: when the set involves noninsight problems, no mental set effects are shown for the insight test problems, yet when the set involves insight problems, both facilitation and inhibition can be seen depending on the type of insight problem presented in the set. A two process model is detailed to explain these findings that combines the representational change mechanism with that of proceduralization.     

The dynamics of search,impasse, and representational change provide a coherent explanation of difficulty in the nine-dot problem

The nine-dot problem is often used to demonstrate and explain mental impasse, creativity, and out of the box thinking. The present study investigated the interplay of a restricted initial search space, the likelihood of invoking a representational change, and the subsequent constraining of an unrestricted search space. In three experimental conditions, participants worked on different versions of the nine-dot problem that hinted at removing particular sources of difficulty from the standard problem. The hints were incremental such that the first suggested a possible route for a solution attempt; the second additionally indicated the dot at which lines meet on the solution path; and the final condition also provided non-dot locations that appear in the solution path. The results showed that in the experimental conditions, representational change is encountered more quickly and problems are solved more often than for the control group. We propose a cognitive model that focuses on general problem-solving heuristics and representational change to explain problem difficulty.     

工作记忆对顿悟和分析型问题解决的影响

摘要 采用顿悟-分析自我报告范式,以远距离联想任务为实验材料,从工作记忆容量和工作记忆负荷两个角度考察了工作记忆对顿悟和分析型问题解决的影响。结果表明,高工作记忆容量个体分析型问题解决的表现优于低工作记忆容量者,但在顿悟表现上无显著差异;工作记忆负荷较小时个体分析型问题解决表现更佳,但对顿悟表现没有影响。说明通过分析解决创造性问题的表现依赖于工作记忆的支持,而通过顿悟解决问题的表现与工作记忆无关。     

表征变化及其影响因素的微观发生研究

Karmiloff-Smith的表征重述理论认为表征重述是人类获取知识的重要途径,并且表征变化的过程包括程序、元程序和概念化三个阶段。采用微观发生法（包括前测、练习和迁移3个阶段,共8个期间）,以数字分解组合任务为研究材料,探讨了120名小学一、二年级儿童问题解决中的表征变化及所受年龄和练习模式等因素的影响。结果表明,前测中存在发展性差异,即二年级儿童达到概念化阶段的人数显著多于一年级儿童,但前测处于程序阶段的儿童接受5次解题练习过程中以及在近迁移题目上都没有表现出年级差异,而在远迁移题目上二年级儿童的完成情况好于一年级儿童。练习模式对表征变化的影响主要体现在三个方面：（1）从变化的路线看,与简单模式相比,复杂模式更能促进儿童的表征发生变化,而且这时儿童表征变化的路线更丰富,表征变化发生循环的人数比例也更高。（2）从变化的速度看,复杂模式下儿童在插入难题的两次练习期间表征变化比较迅速,其余期间变化较小;简单模式下儿童在第二次和第三次练习期间表征变化比较迅速,随后变化比较平稳。（3）从变化的广度看,练习中所获表征能力（在最后三次练习中达到元程序或概念化阶段）的推广,无论是在近迁移题还是远迁移题上两种练习模式之下的被试没有明显差异;但两组被试在近迁移题上的表现均好于远迁移题     

Working Wonders? Investigating insight with magic tricks

We propose a new approach to differentiate between insight and noninsight problem solving, by introducing magic tricks as problem solving domain. We argue that magic tricks are ideally suited to investigate representational change, the key mechanism that yields sudden insight into the solution of a problem, because in order to gain insight into the magicians’ secret method, observers must overcome implicit constraints and thus change their problem representation. In Experiment 1, 50 participants were exposed to 34 different magic tricks, asking them to find out how the trick was accomplished. Upon solving a trick, participants indicated if they had reached the solution either with or without insight. Insight was reported in 41.1% of solutions. The new task domain revealed differences in solution accuracy, time course and solution confidence with insight solutions being more likely to be true, reached earlier, and obtaining higher confidence ratings. In Experiment 2, we explored which role self-imposed constraints actually play in magic tricks. 62 participants were presented with 12 magic tricks. One group received verbal cues, providing solution relevant information without giving the solution away. The control group received no informative cue. Experiment 2 showed that participants’ constraints were suggestible to verbal cues, resulting in higher solution rates. Thus, magic tricks provide more detailed information about the differences between insightful and noninsightful problem solving, and the underlying mechanisms that are necessary to have an insight.     

Working memory demands in insight versus analytic problem solving

Working memory is one of the cognitive processes thought to differentiate insight and analytic forms of problem solving. The present research examined memory involvement in the solution of insight versus analytic problems. Participants completed verbal and spatial working memory and short-term memory measures and a series of analytic and insight problems. Results demonstrated a relationship between working-memory capacity and the solution of analytic problems and between verbal short-term memory capacity and the solution of insight problems. This distinction was generally though not universally supported when memory was examined in relation to individual problems. Memory involvement in insight problem solving was further examined to clarify whether restructuring in insight is the end result of active memory search or spontaneous processes. The present research supports the theory that differences exist in the cognitive processes underlying insight versus analytic problem solving, and provides support for the spontaneous theory of restructuring in insight.     

Using another's gaze as an explicit aid to insight problem solving

Research has shown that implicitly guiding attention via visual cues or unrelated tasks can increase the likelihood of solving insight problems. We examined whether following another person making specific skin-crossing saccades could induce similar attentional shifts and increase solution rates for Duncker's ((1945)) radiation problem. We presented 150 participants with one of three 30-s eye movement patterns from another problem solver: (a) focusing solely on the central tumour; (b) naturally making skin-crossing saccades between the outside area and the tumour from multiple angles; or (c) making deliberate skin-crossing saccades between the outside area and the tumour from multiple angles. Following another person making skin-crossing saccades increased the likelihood of solving the radiation problem. Our results demonstrate that another person's eye movements can promote attentional shifts that trigger insight problem solving.     

The role of saccade targeting in the transsaccadic integration of object types and tokens

The presence of location-dependent and location-independent benefits on object identification in an eye movement contingent preview paradigm has been taken as support for the transsaccadic integration of object types and object tokens (J. M. Henderson, 1994). A recent study, however, suggests a critical role for saccade targeting in the generation of the 2 preview effects (F. Germeys, De Graef, & Verfaillie, 2002). In the present study, eye movements were monitored in a preview paradigm, and both location-independent and location-dependent preview benefits were observed regardless of the saccade target status of the preview object. The findings support the view that type and token representational systems contribute independently to the integration of object information across eye movements.     

质量表征和眼动过度追踪对表征动量的影响

人们对运动目标最终位置的记忆常常会向运动方向发生偏移, 这种偏移被称为“表征动量”。现有研究对表征动量的解释涉及从低水平的知觉加工到高水平的认知加工等多个方面。本研究采用不同材质和滚动声音的球体作为刺激材料, 考察高水平的质量表征对表征动量的影响以及知觉水平的眼动信息在其中的作用。实验1探讨了对目标质量的主观表征对眼动追踪和表征动量的影响。结果显示, 质量表征会同时影响眼动追踪和表征动量。实验2通过不同的提示线索控制眼动追踪, 进一步探讨眼动过度追踪对表征动量的影响。我们发现, 非自然追踪的条件下, 表征动量会减小, 且质量表征对表征动量的影响不再显著。本研究结果表明, 高水平的质量表征对表征动量的影响会通过知觉水平的眼动过度追踪起作用; 然而, 表征动量还受其它因素影响, 眼动信息并非决定表征动量的唯一因素。     

The Experience of Insight Follows Incubation in the Compound Remote Associates Task

The phenomenon of insight is frequently characterized by the experience of a sudden and certain solution. Anecdotal accounts suggest that insight frequently occurs after the problem solver has taken some time away from the problem (i.e., incubation). However, the mechanism by which incubation may facilitate insight problem‐solving remains unclear. Here, we used compound remote associates problems to explore the likely mechanisms by which incubation may facilitate problem‐solving. First, we manipulated problem fixation to explore whether forgetting can explain incubation effects. Second, leveraging previous work linking the experience of insight to unconscious semantic integration, we asked participants to report their experience of insight after each problem solution, including problems solved after a period of distracted incubation. We hypothesized that incubation was not principally important for forgetting but rather frequently causes a shift to a more unconscious semantic integration strategy. Consistent with this we found that initial problem fixation did not predict the improvement in problem‐solving after incubation and that participants were more likely to report insight on problems solved after incubation. Our findings suggest that incubation may facilitate insight problem‐solving leading to a mind‐set shift to a more unconscious problem‐solving strategy involving semantic integration.     

儿童表征深度的微观变化:路线、速度及来源

以往研究表明,表征深度的发展是一个随年龄增长而单调上升的过程,但这些年龄尺度上的横断研究难以说明表征深度变化的发生过程及其机制.本研究采用微观发生法,以齿轮推断任务为材料,探讨了68名小学五年级儿童表征深度的变化路线、速度及来源.结果表明,在整个实验期间,儿童的表征深度发生了显著变化;其变化路线主要体现为从最基本的一级水平向更高级的二、三级水平的递增过程,但这种变化路线的个体间差异较大;变化速度体现出先快后慢的特点;上述变化特点与练习及自我解释、练习模式的特征以及任务难度等因素有关.     

Three processes underlying the carry effect in addition--evidence from eye tracking

Recent research indicated that processes of unit-decade integration pose particular difficulty on multi-digit addition. In fact, longer response latencies as well as higher error rates have been observed for addition problems involving a carry operation (e.g., 18 +27) compared to problems not requiring a carry (e.g., 13 +32). However, the cognitive instantiation of this carry effect remained unknown. In the current study, this question was pursued by recording participants' eye fixation behaviour during addition problem verification. Analyses of the eye fixation data suggested a prominent role of the unit digits of the summands. The need for a carry seems to be recognized very early during the encoding of the problem after initial unit sum calculation has established the basis for the no carry/carry detection. Additionally, processes related to the actual carry execution seemed to be associated with the processing of the decade digit of the solution probe but were less unambiguous. Taken together, our findings indicate that unit-based calculations and the associated recognition that a carry is needed as well as its completion determine the difficulty of carry addition problems. On a more general level, this study shows how the nature of numerical-cognitive processes can be further differentiated by the evaluation of eye movement measures.     

内隐序列学习表征机制探究：眼动证据

内隐序列学习的表征机制是内隐学习研究领域的基本问题, 还存在争议。采用眼动追踪技术, 通过3个实验探讨内隐序列学习的表征机制。结果发现, 知觉序列混合眼跳和反应序列混合眼跳条件下发生序列学习; 朝向眼跳和反向眼跳条件下发生序列学习; 有、无分心反向眼跳下发生序列学习, 两者序列学习量差异不显著。整个研究表明, 内隐序列学习的表征依赖于序列信息。     

Relations between psychological stress and EEG correlations

In the present study inquiries have been made about the changes EEG cross-correlation in mental activities is subject to. The EEG recordings were made at rest, in visual and acoustical response, when reading and in the solution of an acoustical differentiation problem. In conjunction with plain reflex processes a decline in the intrahemispherical correlation was observed. During complex-structured psycho-request situations dissimilar changes in the EEG correlation have occurred on the scalp. Between the cerebral regions functionally essential for the solution of the problems, an increase in the bio-electric correlation and between other cerebral areas a decline were registered. The findings in conclusion come to realize that the topographic EEG cross-correlation analysis is appropriate to give an insight into the present situation of cerebral functional organization.     

顿悟的大脑机制

自从柯勒1917年提出顿悟的概念以来,这个问题一直吸引着心理学家的关注。但有关顿悟过程的精确的大脑机制却始终未被触及。从心理过程上看,顿悟是一个瞬间实现的、问题解决视角的“新旧交替”过程;它包含两个方面,一是新的有效的问题解决思路如何实现,二是旧的无效的思路如何被抛弃（即打破思维定势）。我们以谜语作为材料,利用功能性磁共振成像（fMRI）技术精确记录了人类的大脑在实现顿悟的一瞬间的活动状况。结果显示顿悟过程激活了包括额叶、颞叶、扣带前回、以及海马在内的广泛脑区。根据各方面的综合证据,本文认为：顿悟过程中,新异而有效的联系的形成依赖于海马,问题表征方式的有效转换依赖于一个“非语言的” 视觉空间信息加工网络,而思维定势的打破与转移则依赖于扣带前回与左腹侧额叶。