Catastrophizing, confounds, and depression: a comment on Sullivan and D'Eon (1990)

Sullivan and D'Eon (1990) concluded that catastrophizing and depression were conceptually and operationally confounded. I argue that (a) the procedures they used to study confounding were suboptimal because multiple measures of depression and catastrophizing were not employed and (b) the distinctiveness of constructs might better be regarded as a continuous rather than all-or-none (having adequate discriminant validity versus being confounded) concept.     

Short-term memory after all: comment on Sederberg, Howard, and Kahana (2008)

P. B. Sederberg, M. W. Howard, and M. J. Kahana have proposed an updated version of the temporal-context model (TCM-A). In doing so, they accepted the challenge of developing a single-store model to account for the dissociations between short- and long-term recency effects that were reviewed by E. J. Davelaar, Y. Goshen-Gottstein, A. Ashkenazi, H. J. Haarmann, and M. Usher (2005). In this commentary, the authors argue that the success of TCM-A in addressing the dissociations is dependent not only on an episodic encoding matrix but--critically--also on its implicit use of a short-term memory store--albeit exponential rather than buffer-like. The authors also highlight some difficulties of TCM-A in accounting for these dissociations, and they argue that TCM-A fails to account for critical data--the presentation-rate effect--that dissociates exponential and buffer-like models.     

Neural nets for generalization and classification: comment on Staddon and Reid (1990)

The neural net model of Staddon and Reid (1990) explains exponential and Gaussian generalization gradients in the same way as the diffusion model of Shepard (1958). The "cognitive" generalization theory of Shepard (1987), which also has been implemented as a connectionist network, goes beyond both of these models in accounting for classification learning.     

Working memory and interference: A comment on Jenkins, Myerson, Hale, and Fry (1999)

Jenkins, Myerson, Hale, and Fry (1999) showed that slopes relating complex spans to simple spans were considerably smaller than one, indicating that persons with higher simple spans suffered more interference when the span task was combined with a processing demand. They argued that this finding ruled out accounts of working memory based on interference and/or inhibition of interfering information. We demonstrate that the effect is mainly an artifact from regression to the mean, owing to the low reliability of span scores as used by Jenkins et al. Data from 133 young adults for two verbal and two spatial span tasks show that the slopes relating complex to simple performance are considerably higher for sum scores than for span scores. Furthermore, an adequate test for an interference or an inhibition account of working memory is to predict interference from complex span tasks, not from simple span tasks. Interference effects in the verbal span tasks were negatively correlated with an independent measure of working memory capacity, consistent with the interference/inhibition account.     

Decision-making models of remember-know judgments: comment on Rotello, Macmillan, and Reeder (2004)

The sum-difference theory of remembering and knowing (STREAK) provides a sophisticated account of many interactions in the remember-know (R-K) area (C. M. Rotello, N. A. Macmillan, & J. A. Reeder, 2004). It assumes 2 orthogonal strength dimensions and oblique criterion planes. Another dual-process model (J. T. Wixted & V. Stretch, 2004) with one decision axis has also been applied to R-K judgments with considerable success and provides new insights into the processes involved. An analysis of the 4 major R-K interactions can also be explained by a simpler one-dimensional signal detection theory (J. C. Dunn, 2004a). However these models do not make contact with standard work on recognition memory, so their scope is limited. To bridge this gap, a global-matching model (a theory of distributed associative memory [TODAM]) for R-K judgments is proposed. This model can produce good fits to the data, and there are established experimental manipulations with which to test it. It provides further support for the idea that R judgments are based on associative information, whereas K judgments are based on item information.     

Expertise effects in memory recall: comment on Vicente and Wang (1998)

K. J. Vicente and J. H. Wang (1998) proposed a "constraint attunement hypothesis" to explain the large effects of domain expertise on memory recall observed in a number of task domains. They claimed to have found serious defects in alternative explanations of these effects, which their theory overcomes. Reexamination of the evidence shows that their theory is not novel but has been anticipated by those they criticized and that other current published theories of the phenomena do not have the defects that Vicente and Wang attributed to them. Vicente and Wang's views reflect underlying differences about (a) emphasis on performance versus process in psychology and (b) how theories and empirical knowledge interact and progress with the development of a science.     

Moving beyond pure signal-detection models: comment on Wixted (2007)

The dual-process signal-detection (DPSD) model assumes that recognition memory is based on recollection of qualitative information or on a signal-detection-based familiarity process. The model has proven useful for understanding results from a wide range of memory research, including behavioral, neuropsychological, electrophysiological, and neuroimaging studies. However, a number of concerns have been raised about the model over the years, and it has been suggested that an unequal-variance signal-detection (UVSD) model that incorporates separate recollection and familiarity processes (J. T. Wixted, 2007) may provide an equally good, or even better, account of the data. In this article, the authors show that the results of studies that differentiate these models support the predictions of the DPSD model and indicate that recognition does not reflect the summing of 2 signal-detection processes, as the new UVSD model assumes. In addition, the assumptions of the DPSD model are clarified in order to address some of the common misconceptions about the model. Although important challenges remain, hybrid models such as this provide a more useful framework within which to understand human memory than do pure signal-detection models.     

The relation between source memory and episodic memory: comment on siedlecki et Al. (2005)

On the basis of an interesting structural equation analysis, K. L. Siedlecki, T. A. Salthouse, and D. E. Berish argued that "it may not be meaningful to refer to source memory as a construct distinct from episodic memory" (p. 31). This commentary highlights that this same point could also be made on conceptual grounds. To suggest that source and episodic memory are distinct concepts would confound tasks with theoretical constructs. All episodic tasks involve making attributions about the origin of mental experiences (source monitoring). Conversely, source memory tasks are designed to investigate episodic memory. No task is special, but each may be useful, depending on the focus of interest.     

Testing mixture models of transitive preference: comment on Regenwetter, Dana, and Davis-Stober (2011)

This article contrasts 2 approaches to analyzing transitivity of preference and other behavioral properties in choice data. The approach of Regenwetter, Dana, and Davis-Stober (see record 2011-00732-003) assumes that on each choice, a decision maker samples randomly from a mixture of preference orders to determine whether A is preferred to B. In contrast, Birnbaum and Gutierrez (2007) assumed that within each block of trials, the decision maker has a true set of preferences and that random errors generate variability of response. In this latter approach, preferences are allowed to differ between people; within-person, they might differ between repetition blocks. Both approaches allow mixtures of preferences, both assume a type of independence, and both yield statistical tests. They differ with respect to the locus of independence in the data. The approaches also differ in the criterion for assessing the success of the models. Regenwetter et al. fitted only marginal choice proportions and assumed that choices are independent, which means that a mixture cannot be identified from the data. Birnbaum and Gutierrez fitted choice combinations with replications; their approach allows estimation of the probabilities in the mixture. It is suggested that researchers should separate tests of the stochastic model from the test of transitivity. Evidence testing independence and stationarity assumptions is presented. Available data appear to fit the assumption that errors are independent better than they fit the assumption that choices are independent.     

Working memory and intelligence--their correlation and their relation: comment on Ackerman, Beier, and Boyle (2005)

On the basis of a meta-analysis of pairwise correlations between working memory tasks and cognitive ability measures, P. L. Ackerman, M. E. Beier, and M. O. Boyle (2005; see record 2004-22408-002) claimed that working memory capacity (WMC) shares less than 25% of its variance with general intelligence (g) and with reasoning ability. In this comment, the authors argue that this is an underestimation because of several methodological shortcomings and biases. A reanalysis of the data reported in Ackerman et al. using the correct statistical procedures demonstrates that g and WMC are very highly correlated. On a conceptual level, the authors point out that WMC should be regarded as an explanatory construct for intellectual abilities. Theories of working memory do not claim that WMC is isomorphic with intelligence factors but that it is a very strong predictor of reasoning ability and also predicts general fluid intelligence and g.     

Reassessing working memory: comment on Just and Carpenter (1992) and Waters and Caplan (1996)

M. A. Just and P. A. Carpenter's (1992) capacity theory of comprehension posits a linguistic working memory functionally separated from the representation of linguistic knowledge. G. S. Waters and D. Caplan's (1996) critique of this approach retained the notion of a separate working memory. In this article, the authors present an alternative account motivated by a connectionist approach to language comprehension. In their view, processing capacity emerges from network architecture and experience and is not a primitive that can vary independently. Individual differences in comprehension do not stem from variations in a separate working memory capacity; instead they emerge from an interaction of biological factors and language experience. This alternative is argued to provide a superior account of comprehension results previously attributed to a separate working memory capacity.     

Working memory capacity and fluid intelligence are strongly related constructs: comment on Ackerman, Beier, and Boyle (2005)

The authors agree with P. L. Ackerman, M. E. Beier, and M. O. Boyle (2005; see record 2004-22408-002) that working memory capacity (WMC) is not isomorphic with general fluid intelligence (Gf) or reasoning ability. However, the WMC and Gf/reasoning constructs are more strongly associated than Ackerman et al. (2005) indicate, particularly when considering the outcomes of latent-variable studies. The authors' reanalysis of 14 such data sets from 10 published studies, representing more than 3,100 young-adult subjects, suggests a strong correlation between WMC and Gf/reasoning factors (median r=.72), indicating that the WMC and Gf constructs share approximately 50% of their variance. This comment also clarifies the authors' "executive attention" view of WMC, it demonstrates that WMC has greater discriminant validity than Ackerman et al. (2005) implied, and it suggests some future directions and challenges for the scientific study of the convergence of WMC, attention control, and intelligence.     

Distinguishing among models and goals in personality science: comment on Ashton and Lee (2005)

This comment notes a misrepresentation of work by Caprara and Cervone (2000) contained in a recent contribution to this journal (Ashton & Lee, 2005 ). This occurrence is taken as an opportunity to highlight a positive development in personality science: investigators' increasing awareness of distinctions among alternative conceptual models that address qualitatively distinct scientific goals that each fall within the confines of the professional field. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Encoding specificity in short-term memory for movement information: a comment on Lee and Hirota (1980)

Lee and Hirota (1980) claimed to provide evidence for the encoding specificity principle for movement information. I argue that their interpretations are confounded by methodological and theoretical factors. I further suggest that their findings are compatible with generation-recognition models of memory retrieval and thus, their study does not provide an adequate test for investigating encoding-retrieval relations. Finally, I discuss the problems and dangers of borrowing theoretical concepts from verbal domain and applying them indiscriminately to the motor domain.     

Cognitive adaptation: spatial memory or attentional processing. a comment on Furley and Memmert (2010)

This commentary considers the paper by Furley and Memmert (2010) who sought to test the respective validities of the specific processing and cognitive adaptation hypotheses. That they found no evidence of a difference between experienced basketball players and nonathletes on the Corsi block task, a measure of spatial memory, led them to infer support for the specific processing hypothesis, namely that differences between experts and novices manifest themselves only in processes related specifically to the domain of expertise. An alternative interpretation is offered, indicating possible confounds and referring to recent research that suggests Corsi block and dynamic spatial tasks depend upon different neuronal networks.     

Context noise and item noise jointly determine recognition memory: a comment on Dennis and Humphreys (2001)

S. Dennis and M. S. Humphreys (see record 2001-17194-007) proposed a model with the strict assumption that recognition memory is not affected by interference from other items. Instead, confusions are due to noise generated by prior contexts in which the test item appeared. This model seems disparate from existing models of recognition memory but is similar in many ways that are not superficially obvious. One difference is the order in which item and context information are used as retrieval cues. A more critical difference is the assertion that only an item's history, and not other items, affects recognition memory. Conceptual arguments along with the results of 2 experiments make a persuasive case that both types of noise affect recognition. To illustrate the approach, the authors fit experimental data with a version of the retrieving effectively from memory model (R. M. Shiffrin & M. Steyvers, 1997) incorporating both sources of noise.     

The fate of memory: comment on McCloskey and Zaragoza

McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) argue that misleading postevent suggestions do not affect the availability of originally encoded information. Their hypothesis stems from empirical work using a modified paradigm in which no effect of postevent information is observed. Although their "no impairment" hypothesis is plausible, careful consideration of the predictions of their experimental test suggests that it may be insufficiently sensitive to reveal the impact of postevent information. A small effect of postevent information can be observed when their paradigm is repeated with a more sensitive recognition test. McCloskey and Zaragoza's no impairment hypothesis is also difficult to reconcile with numerous reports of "blend" memories that reflect a compromise between the original and postevent information.