人的尊严与生命伦理

“尊严”是频繁出现在生命伦理学中的一个概念,但关国学者麦克琳却在最近认为,尊严在生命伦理学中是个无用的概念,可以毫无损失地用其它概念,比如尊重人的自主性概念所代替。反驳了麦克琳的观点,定义了尊严的含义,认为生命伦理学的使命就是在当代生命科技高度发达的情况下如何尊重和保护人的尊严。     

Basing Science Ethics on Respect for Human Dignity

A “no ethics” principle has long been prevalent in science and has demotivated deliberation on scientific ethics. This paper argues the following: (1) An understanding of a scientific “ethos” based on actual “value preferences” and “value repugnances” prevalent in the scientific community permits and demands critical accounts of the “no ethics” principle in science. (2) The roots of this principle may be traced to a repugnance of human dignity, which was instilled at a historical breaking point in the interrelation between science and ethics. This breaking point involved granting science the exclusive mandate to pass judgment on the life worth living. (3) By contrast, respect for human dignity, in its Kantian definition as “the absolute inner worth of being human,” should be adopted as the basis to ground science ethics. (4) The pathway from this foundation to the articulation of an ethical duty specific to scientific practice, i.e., respect for objective truth, is charted by Karl Popper’s discussion of the ethical principles that form the basis of science. This also permits an integrated account of the “external” and “internal” ethical problems in science. (5) Principles of the respect for human dignity and the respect for objective truth are also safeguards of epistemic integrity. Plain defiance of human dignity by genetic determinism has compromised integrity of claims to knowledge in behavioral genetics and other behavioral sciences. Disregard of the ethical principles that form the basis of science threatens epistemic integrity.     

The implausibility of appeals to human dignity: an investigation into the efficacy of notions of human dignity in the transhumanism debate

In recent decades, recourse to notions of human dignity has increased extensively within the field of bioethics. In particular, the notion has been utilised in arguments that seek to constrain a variety of biotechnological endeavours, examples of which include human cloning and transhumanism. In this regard, transhumanism is frequently described as an affront to human dignity in a manner that appears to be aimed at halting the possibility of further debate. The efficacy of the concept of human dignity has itself, however, been questioned. Criticisms include its ambiguous nature and thus the lack of adequate definition by those who utilise it, its supposedly religious undertones as well as the fact that it may be used to argue for diametrically opposing positions within the same argument, due to the existence of distinct and conflicting interpretations. In this paper, I briefly discuss the aims of the transhumanist movement and explicate the concept of human dignity in order to assess one of the most renowned dignity arguments that has been lodged against transhumanism, namely, the argument of the bioconservative thinker Leon Kass. In addition, I discuss the counter-argument of the transhumanist Nick Bostrom. These findings have implications for the concept's efficacy to adjudicate the complex ethical conundrums posed, not only by transhumanism, but in the bioethics arena in general.     

Death with dignity from the Confucian perspective

Death with dignity is a significant issue in modern bioethics. In modern healthcare, the wide use of new technologies at the end of life has caused heated debate on how to protect human dignity. The key point of contention lies in the different understandings of human dignity and the dignity of death. Human dignity has never been a clear concept in Western ethical explorations, and the dignity of death has given rise to more confusions. Although there is no such term as “dignity” in Confucian ethics, there are discussions of a number of ideas related to human dignity and the dignity of death. Therefore, Confucian bioethics can offer a new perspective for understanding the theoretical difficulties associated with the dignity of death and new methods for solving them. In this article, we attempt to reconstruct Confucian views on human dignity and the dignity of death and, based on those views, to analyze the following issues: the relationship between the dignity of death and biological life, the relationship between the dignity of death and suffering, the relationship between the dignity of death and the autonomy of human beings, and the relationship between the dignity of death and social justice. This article will also compare the Confucian views on these issues with the views of Western philosophers. Confucian ethics can offer distinct answers to the above issues and help resolve some confusions concerning concepts and theories in Western research on the dignity of death.     

Should Inherent Human Dignity Be Considered Intrinsically Heuristic?

What are “human rights” supposed to protect? According to most human rights doctrines, including most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), human rights aim to protect “human dignity.” But what this concept amounts to and what its source is remain unclear. According to Glenn Hughes (2011), human rights theorists ought to consider human dignity as an “intrinsically heuristic concept,” whose content is partially understood but is not fully determined. In this comment, I criticize Hughes's account. On my view, understanding inherent human dignity as an intrinsically heuristic concept tethers it to an “indeterminateness of sense,” which leaves it open to exploitation from theorists unsympathetic to the moral salience of rights and what rights are supposed to protect.     

Defining “Human Dignity” in the Debate Over the (Im)Morality of Physician-Assisted Suicide

Leon Kass's often-cited essay, “Death with Dignity and the Sanctity of Life,” provides the basis for a case study in the rhetorical function of definition in debates concerning bioethics. The study examines the way a particular definition of “human dignity” is used to maintain an advantage of power in the debate over the morality of physician-assisted suicide. It also considers sources of human dignity that are deflected from attention by the rhetoric of Kass's formulation.     

Universalism, particularism and the ethics of dignity.

This paper explores the problem of universalism and particularism in contemporary ethics, and its relationship to Christian bioethics in particular. An ethic of human dignity is outlined, which, it is argued, constrains moral discourse in the broad sense--thus meeting the demands of universalism--but which is at the same time amenable to a variety of particularist interpretations--thus acknowledging the current shift toward historicism, traditionalism, and culture. The particularist interpretations that are of central concern here are those provided by historic Christianity. The eventual goal is to indicate how a Christian conception of human dignity can have universal normative relevance both as a standard against which to assess competing particularist conceptions, and as a practical guide for everyday living. A Christian conception of dignity will in turn have significant implications when addressing contemporary issues in bioethics. These are ambitious goals, and a full explication of the ideas presented will not be possible in this context. Nevertheless, there is value in getting a bird's-eye view of the landscape before one goes about scaling the mountains and exploring the valleys. The present essay is intended as a general geography of the moral terrain in which an ethic of dignity in general, and a Christian perspective on dignity in particular, can provide normative guidance.     

Wittgenstein on the Experience of Meaning and the Meaning of Music

On the basis of some ideas of Wittgenstein’s, an argument is presented to the effect that the ability to feel or to experience meaning conditions the ability to mean, and is thus essential to our notion of meaning. The experience of meaning, as manifested in the “fine shades” of use and behaviour, is central to Wittgenstein’s late conception of meaning. In explicating the basic elements involved here, I first try to clarify the notion of feeling and its relationship to meaning, emphasising its central role in music as explanatory of its use in language. The feeling of words, in this sense, is an objective feature of their meaning and use, and should be distinguished from feelings as psychological processes or experiences that may accompany the use of words. I then explain its philosophical significance by arguing that word‐feeling, and the “experience of meaning,” are basically instances of Wittgenstein’s general conception of aspect and aspect‐perception, which are important elements in his later conception of meaning and of thought. The nature of this experience is explicated in terms of grasping internal relations and relevant comparisons, which is manifested in a “mastery of a technique,” or “feeling at home” in a certain practice. In this sense, I argue, the ability to experience the meaning of a word is essential to the very intentionality of our thought and language. The ability to experience meaning is also a precondition for using words in a “secondary sense,” which is of great significance in itself. I conclude by pointing to the application of these notions of understanding, feeling and experience, as well as their explication in terms of comparisons, internal relations and mastery of technique, to music, where they are so apt and natural.     

A JEWISH CONCEPTION OF HUMAN DIGNITY

This paper depicts the meanings of human dignity as they unfold and evolve in the Bible and the Halakhah. I posit that three distinct features of a Jewish conception of human dignity can be identified in contrast to core characteristics of a liberal conception of human dignity. First, the original source of human dignity is not intrinsic to the human being but extrinsic, namely in God. Second, it is argued that the “dignity of the people” has precedence over personal autonomy and liberty, which are core liberal pillars. The third characteristic pertains to the potential conflict between personal autonomy and liberty, and God's commandments. The theoretical analysis of human dignity is then examined in light of several Supreme Court decisions in Israel during the 1990s. I illustrate that Jewish religious and secular‐liberal conceptions pull in different directions in the rulings of liberal and religious Justices in Israel.     

哈贝马斯关于基因技术应用的人性论论证

现代生物工程技术的迅猛发展使人类对自身生命过程的干预和控制成为可能,与此同时也对人的尊严和价值构成了极大的挑战和冲击。在新的情势下,怎样利用技术才能避免伤害,体现尊重人的精神?哈贝马斯从人性论的角度出发,认为每个人只有将自己看作是人类当中的一个平等的成员,是人种当中的一个份子,才能避免对其他生命控制和操纵,才能避免对待他人的工具化态度。只有从人类学的广阔视野出发,变人与人之间的主客体关系为主体间性关系,才能深刻理解生命伦理学尊重原则的哲学基础和人文内涵,从而为技术的道德化使用指明了方向。     

On the Inadmissibility of Some Historical Information

I argue—from a Humean perspective—for the falsity of what I call the “Admissibility of Historical Information Thesis” (AHIT). According to the AHIT, propositions that describe past events are always admissible with respect to propositions that describe future events. I first demonstrate that this thesis has some counter‐intuitive implications and argue that a Humean can explain the intuitive attractiveness of the AHIT by arguing that it results from a wrong understanding of the concept of chance. I then demonstrate how a Humean “best system” analysis of chance predicts the existence of inadmissible historical information and discuss the implications of this conclusion to the debate between Humeans and non‐Humeans.     

Nominalism and Realism. How Not to Read the Tractatus' Conception of a Name

This paper focuses on a central aspect of the “picture theory” in the Tractatus – the “identity requirement” – namely the idea that a proposition represents elements in reality as combined in the same way as its elements are combined. After introducing the Tractatus' views on the nature of the proposition, I engage with a “nominalist” interpretation, according to which the Tractatus holds that relations are not named in propositions. I claim that the nominalist account can only be maintained by rejecting the “identity requirement.” I then consider an opposite – “realist” – interpretation, according to which Tractarian names include names of properties and relations. I argue that, although it can accommodate the “identity requirement,” the realist interpretation falls short of providing a correct interpretation of the Tractatus' conception of a name. I conclude by presenting an alternative account (to both nominalism and realism) of the Tractatus' conception of a name.     

Kant’s Regulative Metaphysics of God and the Systematic Lawfulness of Nature

In the “Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic” of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant contends that the idea of God has a positive regulative role in the systematization of empirical knowledge. But why is this regulative role assigned to this specific idea? Kant's account is rather opaque, and this question has also not received much attention in the literature. In this article, I argue that an adequate understanding of the regulative role of the idea of God depends on the specific metaphysical content Kant attributes to it in the Critique and other writings. I show that neither a heuristic principle of conceptual systematicity, nor conceiving God as a hypothesis of an intelligent designer, can satisfy the demands of reason to make the unity and necessity of the laws of nature intelligible. Regarding the positive account about the metaphysical content of the idea of God, I support my argument by referring to Kant's precritical discussion of the usefulness of the conception of God for the project of science, and by expounding Kant's critical account of the necessity of the laws of nature. Thus, my account sheds light on the continuity of Kant's conception of God and his appropriation of his own rationalistic metaphysics.     

I through thou,and we through I: Dietrich von Hildebrand and Karol Wojtyla on the personal foundation of community

This article is an attempt to scrutinize the phenomenological social ontology of Dietrich von Hildebrand and Karol Wojtyla by drawing on the particular role and nature of interpersonal relatedness and second-person engagement in the constitution of first-person-plural perspective. Both Hildebrand and Wojtyla endorse the unique value of the person and personality as the foundational principle for different dimensions of community, including the face-to-face “I-thou” way of being together and more complex, even anonymous, we communities. Both philosophers deny the constitutive primacy of first-person plural over first-person singular, the only exception being the mystical body of Christ when “I” is conditioned and formed by “we.” Moreover, what they have in common is the critical reappraisal of one stream in the phenomenological movement, first and foremost associated with Max Scheler's conception of the possibility of a “collective person.” Drawing on Hildebrand's and Wojtyla's accounts, the article endorses the view regarding the relational character of “I,” “thou,” and “we,” claiming that “we” hinges on an experiential dimension of “I.”     

Endless forms most beautiful 1

Beautiful form rather than efficient cause is the crucial category for understanding living processes, especially evolution. Drawing on the fields of non-equilibrium thermodynamics and citing Darwin's own observations, the author proposes a new understanding of form that corresponds to the dynamism present in living forms and overcomes the limitations of other metaphysical notions of form. Form as beautiful “dynamic form” promises an enriched empiricism, which not only can speak “correctly” about nature but also “well” of nature. In other words, an enriched empiricism of beautiful dynamic forms allows for a fruitful dialogue between science and theology. It avoids theological explanations that call for special divine intervention in the world of Nature which threaten the dignity and self-integrity of Creation. It opens up a view, however, of a divine “milieu,” a divine “Openness,” that providentially calls for beautiful dynamic forms to emerge and entangle through the evolutionary process of nature.     

The Forward Edge of Resistance: Toward the Dignity of Human Agency

Psychoanalysts have traditionally viewed the patient’s resistance as an obstacle to treatment progress. In this paper, I will view resistance in relation to the primary asymmetry built into the treatment relationship with regard to help seeking – patients are help seekers and analysts are designated helpers. More specifically, since there is an ethical privilege and power derived from the self-confidence in providing help to another person, there is a subtle hierarchical subject-object relationship that emerges from the relative dignity or indignity with regard to help-seeking. In this view, resistance is seen as the patient’s attempt to reclaim the dignity of his/her agency as a human subject. Since the patient often feels stymied by a fatalistic inertia in living his/her life, the patient’s resistance of “I Won’t,” instead of a fatalistic “I Can’t,” provides a pathway for the analyst to respect the patient’s resistance as a manifestation of the patient’s need for self-determination.     

“Dignity was the First to Leave”:* Godinez V. Moran,Colin Ferguson,and the Trial of Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendants

This article considers the Colin Ferguson trial in the context of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Godinez v. Moran, establishing a unitary standard for the determinations of competence to stand trial, competence to plead guilty, and competence to waive counsel. The Ferguson trial was widely seen as a “charade.” I argue that the Ferguson spectacle was the inevitable denouement of the Godinez decision. I then look at the Ferguson trial (through contemporaneous press and television coverage) under the filters of “sanism” and “pretextuality.” I conclude that the “dignity” value—a prerequisite for a constitutionally-acceptable fair trial—was, as a result of Godinez, lacking in the Ferguson case.     

WHY BIOETHICS NEEDS THE PHILOSOPHY OF MEDICINE: SOME IMPLICATIONS OF REFLECTION ON CONCEPTS OF HEALTH AND DISEASE

Germund Hesslow has argued that concepts of health and disease serve no important scientific, clinical, or ethical function. However, this conclusion depends upon the particular concept of disease he espouses; namely, on Boorse's functional notion. The fact/value split embodied in the functional notion of disease leads to a sharp split between the “science” of medicine and bioethics, making the philosophy of medicine irrelevant for both. By placing this disease concept in the broader context of medical history, I shall show that it does capture an essential part of modern medical ideology. However, it is also a self-contradictory notion. By making explicit the value desiderata of medical nosologies, a reconfiguration of the relation between medicine, bioethics, and the philosophy of medicine is initiated. This, in turn, will involve a recovery of the caring dimensions of medicine, and thus a more humane practice.     

Response to Ranganathan

This essay responds to Bharat Ranganathan's “Comment” on my essay, “The Concept of Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (2011). Addressing key criticisms in this “Comment,” I make the following points. First, neither the idea of inherent dignity being “imparted” to humans, nor the Universal Declaration's implication—through its use of terms such as “inherent” and “inalienable”—that humans participate in transcendent reality, necessarily presuppose a Christian metaphysics. Second, a concept such as “inherent dignity” must be affirmed to be intrinsically heuristic unless we are to assume that its meaning can be completely known within the conditions of existence; but this affirmation does not render such concepts “indeterminate of sense.” Finally, Ranganathan's distinction between“weak” and “strong” senses of transcendence is untenable. If human truths beyond all contingencies are knowable (“weak” transcendence), then there must be a real dimension of meaning that transcends all contingencies (“strong” transcendence).     

Genetics and the Interpersonal Elaboration of Ethics

Confidentiality in genetic testing posesimportant ethical challenges to the currentprimacy of respect for autonomy and patientchoice in health care. It also presents achallenge to approaches to decision-makingemphasising the ethical importance of theconsequences of health care decisions. In thispaper a case is described in which respect forconfidentiality calls both for disclosure andnon-disclosure, and in which respect forpatient autonomy and the demand to avoidcausing harm each appear to call both fortesting without consent, and testing only withconsent. This creates problems not only forclinicians, families and patients, but also forthose who propose clinical bioethics as a toolfor the resolution of such dilemmas.In this paper I propose some practical waysin which ethical issues in clinical geneticsand elsewhere, might be addressed. Inparticular I call for a closer relationshipbetween ethics and communication in health caredecision-making and describe an approach to theethics consultation that places particularemphasis on the value of interpersonaldeliberation in the search for moralunderstanding. I reach these conclusionsthrough an analysis of the concept of `moraldevelopment' in which I argue that theachievement of moral understanding is anecessarily intersubjective project elaboratedby moral persons.