Moral pedagogy and practical ethics

Online science and engineering ethics (SEE) education can support appropriate goals for SEE and the highly interactive pedagogy that attains those goals. Recent work in moral psychology suggests pedagogical goals for SEE education that are surprisingly similar to goals enunciated by several panels in SEE. Classroom-based interactive study of SEE cases is a suitable method to achieve these goals. Well-designed cases, with appropriate goals and structure can be easily adapted to courses that have online components. It is less clear that exclusively online methods can support the wide range of goals necessary to good moral pedagogy in SEE, though there seems no a priori reason to rule this out. Only careful, goal-based assessment of online case study SEE teaching can resolve this question.     

The question of method in ethics consultation

This paper offers an exposition of what the question of method in ethics consultation involves under two conditions: when ethics consultation is regarded as a practice and when the question of method is treated systematically. It discusses the concept of the practice and the importance of rules in constituting the actions, cognition, and perceptions of practitioners. The main body of the paper focuses on three elements of the question of method: canon, discipline, and history, which are treated heuristically to outline what the question of method in ethics consultation fully involves.     

Phenomenological method and contemporary ethics

Continental Philosophy Review - Following a brief summation of the phenomenological method, the paper considers three metaethical positions adopted by phenomenologists and the implications of those...     

The development of computer ethics: Contributions from business ethics and medical ethics

In this essay, we demonstrate that the field of computer ethics shares many core similarities with two other areas of applied ethics, Academicians writing and teaching in the area of computer ethics, along with practitioners, must address ethical issues that are qualitatively similar in nature to those raised in medicine and business. In addition, as academic disciplines, these three fields also share some similar concerns. For example, all face the difficult challenge of maintaining a credible dialogue with diverse constituents such as academicians of various disciplines, professionals, policymakers, and the general public, Given these similarities, the fields of bioethics and business ethics can serve as useful models for the development of computer ethics. A version of this paper was presented at ETHICOMP98, the Fourth International Conference on Ethical Issues of Information Technology, March 25–27, 1998, Erasmus University, the Netherlands. Kenman Wong, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Business Ethics; Gerhard Steinke, Ph.D., is Professor of Management and Information Systems. Both authors are at Seattle Pacific University's School of Business and Economics.     

Amenable to reason: Aristotle's rhetoric and the moral psychology of practical ethics.

An Aristotelian conception of practical ethics can be derived from the account of practical reasoning that Aristotle articulates in is Rhetoric and this has important implications for the way we understand the nature and limits of practical ethics. an important feature of this conception of practical ethics is its responsiveness to the complex ways in which agents form and maintain moral commitments, and this has important implications for the debate concerning methods of ethics in applied ethics. In particular, this feature enables us to understand casuistry, narrative, and principlism as mutually supportive modes of moral inquiry, rather than divergent and mutually exclusive methods of ethics. As a result, an Aristotelian conception of practical ethics clears the conceptual common ground upon which practical ethicists can forge a stable and realistic self-understanding.     

The ethics of morphing

Here’s one piece of practical reasoning: “If I do this then a person will reap some benefits and suffer some costs. On balance, the benefits outweigh the costs. So I ought to do it.” Here’s another: “If I do this then one person will reap some benefits and another will suffer some costs. On balance, the benefits to the one person outweigh the costs to the other. So I ought to do it.” Many influential philosophers say that there is something dubious about the second piece of reasoning. They say that it makes sense to trade-off costs and benefits within lives, but not across lives. In this paper I make a case for the second piece of reasoning. My case turns on the existence of morphing sequences—sequences of possible states of affairs across which people transform smoothly into other people.

The ethics of poverty

Conclusions The conclusions set forth in this paper are of a highly tentative and even exploratory nature. I am willing to be demonstrated to be wrong at any point and excited by the realization that some of my hunches have been sufficiently far out to prompt confirmatory or invalidating research of a more precise variety. Yet I am willing to stand by my observations as to the relationship between the ethical perspective of the poor to the following seemingly unrelated events: (1) the implosion of these ethical perspectives into the middle classes, (2) through contemporary political uses of the poor by the upper classes, (3) professional interaction with the poverty community, (4) the unconscious moral identification of the middle classes with the ethics of the poor, (5) the transformation of thekinds of emotional disorder from one level of affluence to another by reason of the criterion of work as an indication of mental health, and (6) the ethical issue involved in economic determination of the use of medical and ministerial time in the care of the emotionally disturbed.