Dynamic,Embodied, Limited-Capacity Attention and Memory: Modeling Cognitive Processing of Mediated Stimuli

Abstract

Human sensory processing does not occur in a vacuum. Instead it unfolds over time and reflects the motivational goals of the person. The perceptual system identifies emotionally relevant stimuli from the world, and these stimuli are processed differently than unemotional stimuli. As the nervous system prepares the body for action, motivated attention is directed to relevant objects in the world. These processes are not separable but rather reflect a unified embodied cognition. When visual information is mediated, the body still responds, and cognition of emotionally charged mediated topics reflects the body's responses. This article outlines a dynamic, embodied approach to the cognitive processing of mediated stimuli, presents a connectionist model to account for the cognitive processing, and compares model predictions with past results. The model is driven by data and theoretical work in communication showing that arousal fundamentally affects processing of and memory for mediated messages.     

Consolidation and translation regulation

mRNA translation, or protein synthesis, is a major component of the transformation of the genetic code into any cellular activity. This complicated, multistep process is divided into three phases: initiation, elongation, and termination. Initiation is the step at which the ribosome is recruited to the mRNA, and is regarded as the major rate-limiting step in translation, while elongation consists of the elongation of the polypeptide chain; both steps are frequent targets for regulation, which is defined as a change in the rate of translation of an mRNA per unit time. In the normal brain, control of translation is a key mechanism for regulation of memory and synaptic plasticity consolidation, i.e., the off-line processing of acquired information. These regulation processes may differ between different brain structures or neuronal populations. Moreover, dysregulation of translation leads to pathological brain function such as memory impairment. Both normal and abnormal function of the translation machinery is believed to lead to translational up-regulation or down-regulation of a subset of mRNAs. However, the identification of these newly synthesized proteins and determination of the rates of protein synthesis or degradation taking place in different neuronal types and compartments at different time points in the brain demand new proteomic methods and system biology approaches. Here, we discuss in detail the relationship between translation regulation and memory or synaptic plasticity consolidation while focusing on a model of cortical-dependent taste learning task and hippocampal-dependent plasticity. In addition, we describe a novel systems biology perspective to better describe consolidation.     

The role of variety in the evolution of information society

Information is power. There are several theoretical considerations which guide the basic research on information society and its evolution. Some of them, worked out in this paper, deal with the role of social variety in the process of post‐industrial evolution. Exploring similarities in bio‐genetic information, the process of social transformation is approached by using social system theory.

With certain analogies to biological transformations—mutations—important elements for the transformation of information‐guided behaviour systems (cultures) may be observed. They create a variety of elements (sub‐systems), which respond for changes in the social layout of all kinds of organisations like states, partys, groups, insofar as these changes aim the optimation of functional effectivity in dependence of the variety and its use by a social system's elements (events, acts).

By information processing, collectivities are able to explote even subtile fluctuations in socio‐cultural information variety to “cause” changes. Collectivities are able to instruct and functionalise emerging information through feedback in such a way, that they get better chances to reach certain local values of selection. They are fitter in the sense of better instructed. This process is self‐organised, based on the principle of selection, so that the system chooses out of a complex landscape of values trough communication of measuring parameters like “good” and “bad”. The value‐system is learned through socialisation and changed by social experience.

If social change and variety are optimised, the replication of the system works close to a “treshold of error”, that means that transformation processes are driven to a dynamic equilibrium between stabiliy and creativity. A variety of new transformation operators emerges. Operators of the former dominant information code are still reproducted, but a lot of other alternatives, stabilised by mutual separation are also represented in a survivable concentration and quantity. The competition between these new operators can be transformed in cooperation by their cyclic boundage in networks.

Concluding the paper argues that social systems which intend an optimation of their power management functions by integration of information variety, take advantage in their development in comparison to those who neglect this aspect. They are prepared to develop in a changing environment. Their optimation is a result of feedback within a variety of leadership‐systems, which may also be seen as competitive lifestyles. At a certain critic point there occurs a break in the symmetry of the dominant organisation: a multipole political leadership system emerges, behaviours are derepressed and activated. Uniformity in social time is broken and with it the linear thinking.     

Function support as an information systems development paradigm

The function support paradigm of information systems development seeks to exploit the potential synergy that can be obtained by making the information processing system an integral part of organizational function. This requires for the information processing system to be embedded into the structure and dynamics underlying the function it supports. This is shown to be the case in natural systems, where the synergy is obtained through the compatibility of information processing with the structure and dynamics of the overall system.

Current approaches to the development of information systems do not consider, in a sufficiently explicit manner, the structure and dynamics of organizations as a determinant of their information processing requirements. As a consequence, the resulting information systems usually do not provide the required level of support. We argue that, to be effective, man‐made information systems must also be compatible with the organizational functions they support. The contribution of the information system to the adaptability of the organization as a whole is proposed as a broad but robust and effective measure of its effectiveness.     

Intelligent action guidance and the use of mixed representational formats

My topic is the intelligent guidance of action. In this paper I offer an empirically grounded case for four ideas: that [a] cognitive processes of practical reasoning play a key role in the intelligent guidance of action, [b] these processes could not do so without significant enabling work done by both perception and the motor system, [c] the work done by perceptual and motor systems can be characterized as the generation of information (often conceptually structured information) specialized for action guidance, which in turn suggests that [d] the cognitive processes of practical reasoning that play a key role in the guidance of intelligent action are not the abstract, syllogistic ones philosophers often treat as the paradigm of practical reasoning. Rather, these cognitive processes are constrained by, and work well with, the specialized concepts outputted by perception and the feedback outputted by sensorimotor processes.

     

Meaning structures and mental representations

This paper argues for a distinction between meaning structure and mental representation, and presents the outlines of a theoretical model of their interrelationship. Meaning structures are defined as structures in the human mind/brain which develop as the combined result of genetic predispositions and individual experience, and lead to relatively stable patterns of perceiving, thinking, feeling, behaving, etc. Mental representation is defined as the aspect of mental processes which involves imagining and thinking of things that are not perceptually present. It is suggested that the mind includes a central network of meaning structures (CNMS) for the storage of information, and a number of other subsystems (e.g., perceptual systems, behavioral systems, and a verbal system) for the processing of externally and internally generated information. Against the dual-coding theory, it is argued that there is one code for the long-term storage of information, but several codes for the processing of information. Mental representations are seen as products of activation that is spread from the CNMS to more peripheral systems. The spread of activation from the CNMS to perceptual systems results in mental imagery; when activation spreads to the verbal system the result is conceptual thinking; and when activation spreads to behavioral systems it produces intentions. It is argued that this conceptual model can help to solve some basic theoretical problems that have plagued cognitive psychology.     

The Explicit and Implicit Domains in Psychoanalytic Change

New research findings of the development and organization of the mind, brain, and behavior bolster the ongoing relational- or intersubjective-field paradigmatic revision of psychoanalytic theory. A multisystems view of learning, memory, and knowledge provide us with a more complex picture of information processing that has fundamental implications for a psychoanalytic theory of therapeutic action.

If the implicit and explicit learning/memory systems are viewed as parallel processes, not easily translatable from one to the other, then new implicit relational experience carries considerably more power as compared to explicit/declarative processing in changing and establishing new implicit mental models. When these cognitive processing systems are viewed as more closely interconnected with a developmental emphasis on connecting them through language, then exploratory/interpretive work becomes more central. REM, dream, infant, and cognitive research evidence suggests that imagistic symbolic capacity exists at birth. Learning and remembering using imagistic symbolic processing could suggest a more easily translatable connection with later developed verbal symbolic processing and a closer, although varied, interconnection between implicit and explicit (symbolic) memory systems.

Explicit attitudes are more directly modifiable through an explicit/declarative focus. Implicit mental models, it is proposed, are variably modifiable through two different change processes: (1) accommodation or transformation of expectancies through new implicit procedural experience (not requiring explicit focus) and (2) diminished activation and increased capacity to deactivate implicit mental models through explicit/declarative processing and the establishment of contrasting implicit models through new implicit procedural experience.     

Differential aspects of visual short and long-term memory

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the decomposition of visual imagery ability in subcomponents. Basically, it is assumed that visual imagery consists of several components which are relatively independent of spatial imagery components (Kosslyn, Brunn, Cave, & Wallach, 1984; Poltrock & Agnoli, 1986; Poltrock & Brown, 1984).

Theoretical assumptions on individual differences in visual imagery are formulated within a framework of general information processing principles. Based on the assumption that data and conceptually driven processes are involved in visual imagery, we turned to the question of whether vivid and non-vivid imagers differ on a primary data or conceptually driven processing level. To induce primary data-driven visual processes, unfamiliar visual patterns were used (Logie, 1986; Phillips, 1983). A visual long-term memory task (Marks, 1973) should involve primary conceptually driven visual processes.

The analysis of relationships between self-report measures of visual imagery ability (VVIQ; Marks, 1973; TVIC; Gordon, 1949) and visual memory performance measures, showed that vivid imagers prefer, when already on a primary data-driven processing level, visual coding strategies that might favour the long-term storage of information contained in real-life pictures.     

Culture,context, and cognition: The Semantic Procedural Interface model of the self

Several studies have found evidence that social information processing is strongly influenced by the person either primarily defining his or her self as an autonomous entity (independent self-construal) or as related to other people (interdependent self-construal). In this chapter, we describe the psychological mechanisms by which independent and interdependent self-construals affect individual experience. We propose the Semantic Procedural Interface (SPI) model of the self, which distinguishes two such mechanisms. In addition to differences in the semantic content areas from which independent and interdependent self-construals arise (semantic application mechanism), there are also different procedural modes of thinking (procedural application mechanism) associated with them. Independent self-definitions coincide with the tendency to process stimuli unaffected by the context in which they appear. Relating the self to the social contexts within interdependent self-construals facilitates context-bounded thinking (i.e., processing stimuli by paying attention to their relation to the given context). The results of several experiments attesting to the value of the differentiation between both application mechanisms are presented. We discuss how far differences in information processing between members of different cultural groups can be traced back to the mechanisms described in the SPI model.     

Toward a theory of automatic information processing in reading

A model of information processing in reading is described in which visual information is transformed through a series of processing stages involving visual, phonological and episodic memory systems until it is finally comprehended in the semantic system. The processing which occurs at each stage is assumed to be learned and the degree of this learning is evaluated with respect to two criteria: accuracy and automaticity. At the accuracy level of performance, attention is assumed to be necessary for processing; at the automatic level it is not. Experimental procedures are described which attempt to measure the degree of automaticity achieved in perceptual and associative learning tasks. Factors which may influence the development of automaticity in reading are discussed.     

Implicit biases in visually guided action

For almost half a century dual-stream advocates have vigorously defended the view that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in the primary visual cortex: a ventral, perception-related ‘conscious’ stream and a dorsal, action-related ‘unconscious’ stream. They furthermore maintain that the perceptual and memory systems in the ventral stream are relatively shielded from the action system in the dorsal stream. In recent years, this view has come under scrutiny. Evidence points to two overlapping action pathways: a dorso-dorsal pathway that calculates features of the object to be acted on, and a ventro-dorsal pathway that transmits stored information about skilled object use from the ventral stream to the dorso-dorsal pathway. This evidence suggests that stored information may exert significantly more influence on visually guided action than hitherto assumed. I argue that this, in turn, supports the notion of skilled automatic action that is nonetheless agential. My focus here will be on actions influenced by implicit biases (stereotypes/prejudices). Action that is biased in this way, I argue, is in an important sense intentional and agential.

     

Freud’s “Project”, Distributed Systems,and Solipsism

Abstract

This paper discusses Freud’s model of the psychical apparatus in the “Project”, and concludes that it is a remarkably sophisticated work which even today is still highly relevant to neuropsychological theorising. Freud rejects the notion that what happens in the brain can be clearly localised in space and time. This anticipates the notion of a distributed system found in recent developments in computing (“neural networks”) and in Derrida’s conception of systems characterised by différance. Every part of such a system is constituted by its relation to the rest of the system. Although such systems are spatio-temporal, processes occurring in them cannot be pinpointed in space and time. Against the common charge that Freud has a passive hydraulic-reflex model of the psychical apparatus, the authors argue that Freud presents it as an open, complex, self-organising system. Ricoeur’s (1972) claim that the model of the psychical apparatus in the “Project” is essentially solipsistic, is accordingly rejected.

In conclusion the authors explain why they prefer the model in the “Project” to the more linear model found in Ch. VII of the Traumdeutung.     

GOD AS A COMMUNICATIVE SYSTEM SUI GENERIS: BEYOND THE PSYCHIC, SOCIAL, PROCESS MODELS OF THE TRINITY

With an aim to develop a public theology for an age of information media (or media theology), this article proposes a new God-concept: God is a communicative system sui generis that autopoietically processes meaning/information in the supratemporal realm via perfect divine media ad intra (Word/Spirit). For this task, Niklas Luhmann's systems theory is critically appropriated in dialogue with theology. First, my working postmetaphysical/epistemological stance is articulated as realistic operational constructivism and functionalism. Second, a series of arguments are advanced to substantiate the thesis: (1) God is an observing system sui generis ; (2) self-referential communication is divine operation; (3) unsurpassable complexity is divine mystery; (4) supratemporal autopoiesis of meaning is divine processing; (5) agape is the symbolic medium of divine communication. Third, this communicative model of God is developed into a trinitarian theology, with a claim that this model offers a viable alternative beyond the standard (psychic, social, process) models. Finally, some implications of this model are explored for constructive theology (conceiving creation as divine mediatization) and for science-and-religion in terms of derivative models: (1) God as a living system sui generis and (2) God as a meaning system sui generis .     

佛教五蕴系统——一种信息加工模型

作为佛教基础教义的“五蕴”是对心理机能尤其是认知过程的高度概括——人类信息加工包括色蕴、受蕴、想蕴、行蕴和识蕴五大机能系统。色蕴对感官信息进行初级加工;受蕴进行信息的情绪编码;随后在想蕴阶段进行高级整合,完成信息的概念语言表征;行蕴则为信息加工提供能量及方向导控;识蕴负责信息储存、监控调节及信息输出,最终形成完整的认知判断。佛教五蕴提供了一种信息加工的新模型。     

The methodological role of mechanistic-computational models in cognitive science

This paper discusses the relevance of models for cognitive science that integrate mechanistic and computational aspects. Its main hypothesis is that a model of a cognitive system is satisfactory and explanatory to the extent that it bridges phenomena at multiple mechanistic levels, such that at least several of these mechanistic levels are shown to implement computational processes. The relevant parts of the computation must be mapped onto distinguishable entities and activities of the mechanism. The ideal is contrasted with two other accounts of modeling in cognitive science. The first has been presented by David Marr in combination with a distinction of “levels of computation”. The second builds on a hierarchy of “mechanistic levels” in the sense of Carl Craver. It is argued that neither of the two accounts secures satisfactory explanations of cognitive systems. The mechanistic-computational ideal can be thought of as resulting from a fusion of Marr’s and Craver’s ideals. It is defended as adequate and plausible in light of scientific practice, and certain metaphysical background assumptions are discussed.

     

A Comparison of Updating and Explanation as Causes of the Incongruity Effect on Person Memory

Abstract

Information that is incongruent with a prior expectancy is remembered better than congruent information. Two explanations were investigated: (a) people attempt to explain incongruent information to understand it, and (b) people use incongruent information to update their expectancies. The common assumption in these two accounts is that the additional cognitive processing stimulated by incongruent information is responsible for the incongruity effect. In this study, U.S. students were explicitly requested to engage in one or the other of these processes. Although both processes resulted in an incongruity effect, there was a positive correlation between recall of expectancy-congruent and expectancy-incongruent items in the impression-updating condition but not in the other condition; those in the impression-updating condition showed greater expectancy change.     

The role of prediction in mental processing: A process approach

Although prediction plays a prominent role in mental processing, we have only limited understanding of how the brain generates and employs predictions. This paper develops a theoretical framework in three steps. First I propose a process model that describes how predictions are produced and are linked to behavior. Subsequently I describe a generative mechanism, consisting of the selective amplification of neural dynamics in the context of boundary conditions. I hypothesize that this mechanism is active as a process engine in every mental process, and that therefore each mental process proceeds in two stages: (i) the formation of process boundary conditions; (ii) the bringing about of the process function by the operation – within the boundary conditions – of a relatively ‘blind’ generative process. Thirdly, from this hypothesis I derive a strategy for describing processes formally. The result is a multilevel framework that may also be useful for studying mental processes in general.     

Brain Systems that Mediate both Emotion and Cognition

Abstract

Neurobiological research with animals strongly suggests that the brain systems which mediate emotion overlap with those that mediate cognition to such a degree that it is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain any clear distinction between them. Possible reasons for this overlap are discussed; and a model of brain systems that simultaneously subserve emotion and cognition is presented. The model postulates the existence of three fundamental systems of this kind in the mammalian brain: a behavioural approach system, a fight/flight system, and a behavioural inhibition system. The neuropsychology of each of these systems is briefly presented.     

The translation and introduction of Mo Yan's works based on neurolinguistics

As an advanced function of the cognitive neural mechanism of human brain, inductive reasoning is an important skill in language communication. Under the background of the development of information intelligence, it is a new research field to effectively display the cognitive neural function of inductive reasoning with the advantage of the logic operation of artificial intelligence algorithm. Therefore, in this paper, based on the neurolinguistics, the translation and introduction of Mo Yan's works were studied. And on the basis of the analysis of the characteristics of the cognitive neural mechanism of sentence inductive reasoning, by using fMR and ERP techniques, the narrowing characteristics of the semantic integrated components in the induction were investigated, and the dual processing model of inductive reasoning was discussed. After that, artificial intelligence particle swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm was introduced, and the problem of alignment in the translation of English and Chinese sentences in Mo Yan's works was transformed into the problem of finding the optimal solution for the corresponding fitness function in Chinese and English sentences in bilingual space. Thus, a scientific mathematical model was used to improve the accuracy of translation. The simulation experiments show that this study can effectively improve the accuracy of the translation and introduction of Mo Yan's works.     

Demythologizing the emotions: adaptation,cognition, and visceral representations of emotion in the nervous system

This article highlights four issues about the neurobiology of emotions: adaptation vs. dysfunction, peripheral and central representations of emotion, the regulation of the internal milieu, and whether emotions are cognitive. It is argued that the emotions evolved to play diverse adaptive roles and are biologically vital sources of information processing. They were not designed as pieces of pathology, though they certainly can underlie some psychophathologies. Emotions are, in part, appraisal systems that are operative at numerous level of the nervous system from the brainstem to the cortex. Like other information processing systems they are not perfect cognitive systems. Emotional systems often utilize somatic and visceral information for appraisals of events to facilitate decisions of whether to approach or avoid objects. The neural systems of emotions traverse the entire neural axis and are linked to the regulation of the internal milieu. Thus, in addition to the experiential aspects of emotions, emotions embody appraisal systems that are pervasive to all levels of the brain to facilitate function, adaptation, and survival.