Emotions,Attitudes, and Reasons

Our emotional faculties respond to successes, gains, advantages, threats, losses, obstacles, and other personally significant objects or situations, producing positive or negative evaluations of them according to their perceived import. Being an evaluative response is a feature that emotions share with paradigm attitudes (beliefs, intentions, judgments, etc.). However, recently philosophers have been reluctant to treat emotions as attitudes. The usual reasons given have to do with the automaticity of emotions and their occasional recalcitrance. In this article, I argue that these things shouldn't disqualify emotions from counting as genuine attitudes. Our emotions do bear the kind of relationship with our reasons that is characteristic of our attitudes.     

The Dynamics of Emotions and Life Cycle Identity

Emotions are discussed as organizers and motivators in the dynamics of identity across the life span. Discrete emotions, functionalist, and dynamic systems approaches to emotion development are applied to issues of change and continuity in identity, considered within Erikson's psychosocial model of lifespan development (Erikson, 1963). The contributions of emotion to both identity-relevant processes (ex-ploration and commitment) and outcomes (the identity statuses of achievement, moratorium, foreclosure, and diffusion) are discussed. Two main premises guide this discussion. One is that individual differences in emotion help to identify paths along the trajectory of identity emergence, consolidation, and change. Another is that psychosocial transition phases, as marked by Eriksonian theory, are likely to be times of maximal influence between developments in the emotion system and psychosocial identity. A review of emotion development is presented that argues for the continued vitality of the emotion system throughout adulthood and that highlights the importance of negative emotion. As well, suggestions are offered for linking emotion development to adulthood identity stability and change. Excerpts from a biographical case study of Ingmar Bergman (Lahr, 1999) are presented as illustrative examples in the concluding sections.     

How Emotions do not Provide Reasons to Act

If emotions provide reasons for action through their intentional content, as is often argued, where does this leave the role of the affective element of an emotion? Can it be more than a motivator and have significant bearing of its own on our emotional actions, as actions done for reasons? One way it can is through reinforcing other reasons that we might have, as Greenspan (2011) argues. Central to Greenspan’s account is the claim that the affective discomfort of an emotion, as a fact about the agent’s state of being, provides an additional normative reason to act to alleviate the state. This, I argue, is not correct, nor is it the best way to understand emotions as reason-reinforcers. In this paper, I thus do two things: I provide an examination of how and why the affect of emotion could provide reasons to act to alleviate it and I propose that the real way emotions reinforce reasons is through the way they orient our attention onto things that matter, registering them as salient.     

On the Emotions

Art historians and philosophers often talk about the interpretive significance of titles, but few have bothered with their historical origins. This omission has led to the assumption that an artwork's title is its proper name, since names and titles share the essential function of facilitating reference to their bearers. But a closer look at the development of our titling practices shows a significant point of divergence from standard analyses of proper names: the semantic content of a title is often crucial to the identification, individuation, and interpretation of its associated artwork. This paper represents a first step towards an empirically centred study of our titling practices. I argue that, in order to accept titles as proper names, we must first recognize the social, rather than the referential, function of naming.     

自我意识情绪：人类高级情绪

自我意识情绪是个体在具有一定自我评价的基础上,通过自我反思而产生的情绪。自我意识情绪与基本情绪既有区别又有联系。自我表征、自我觉察、自我评价过程的卷入是自我意识情绪产生的重要条件。对个体行为进行自我调节、服务于人际交流、人际互惠和个体心理内部需要是自我意识情绪具有的主要功能。自我意识情绪是随着认知的发展而逐渐形成和发展的,并会受到文化的影响。自我报告、非言语行为编码技术、言语报告和行为编码、神经成像技术是自我意识情绪的主要研究方法。自我意识情绪的普遍性和特殊性需要进一步跨文化研究的验证     

Positive Emotions Speed Recovery from the Cardiovascular Sequelae of Negative Emotions

Two studies tested the hypothesis that certain positive emotions speed recovery from the cardiovascular sequelae of negative emotions. In Study 1, 60 subjects (Ss) viewed an initial fear-eliciting film, and were randomly assigned to view a secondary film that elicited: (a) contentment; (b) amusement; (c) neutrality; or (d) sadness. Compared to Ss who viewed the neutral and sad secondary films, those who viewed the positive films exhibited more rapid returns to pre-film levels of cardiovascular activation. In Study 2, 72 Ss viewed a film known to elicit sadness. Fifty Ss spontaneously smiled at least once while viewing this film. Compared to Ss who did not smile, those who smiled exhibited more rapid returns to pre-film levels of cardiovascular activation. We discuss these findings in terms of emotion theory and possible health-promoting functions of positive emotions.     

Positive Emotions Speed Recovery from the Cardiovascular Sequelae of Negative Emotions

Two studies tested the hypothesis that certain positive emotions speed recovery from the cardiovascular sequelae of negative emotions. In Study 1, 60 subjects (Ss) viewed an initial fear-eliciting film, and were randomly assigned to view a secondary film that elicited: (a) contentment; (b) amusement; (c) neutrality; or (d) sadness. Compared to Ss who viewed the neutral and sad secondary films, those who viewed the positive films exhibited more rapid returns to pre-film levels of cardiovascular activation. In Study 2, 72 Ss viewed a film known to elicit sadness. Fifty Ss spontaneously smiled at least once while viewing this film. Compared to Ss who did not smile, those who smiled exhibited more rapid returns to pre-film levels of cardiovascular activation. We discuss these findings in terms of emotion theory and possible health-promoting functions of positive emotions.     

群际情绪理论及其研究

群际情绪理论认为, 群际情绪是当个体认同某一社会群体, 群体成为自我的一部分时, 个体对内群体和外群体的情绪体验。群际情绪借用社会认同方法, 采用集体自我的概念作为其理论的源点, 认知评价、情绪、行为倾向是群际理论的三件套; 群际水平的情绪不同于个体水平的情绪; 群际情绪取决于群体认同水平; 群际情绪弥散于整个群体; 群际情绪有助于激发和调节群内、群际态度和行为。新近的研究也为群际理论提供了一定的证据, 群际情绪理论为消解偏见和改善群际关系提供了一个崭新的框架。     

Elster on the Emotions

Don Mannison levels three criticisms at the claims I make in ‘Faking Nature’. First, he claims that I argue from (1) X is valued to (2) X has value. I do not. Second, he criticizes an argument of Nelson Goodman's to which I allude. While his criticism has point he misrepresents the role I assign to Goodman's argument. Third, he suggests that there is no need for me to count environmental evaluations as evaluations of the moral kind. However, he offers no account of why I should not and ignores an important consideration that requires that I should.     

Intentionality and Compound Accounts of the Emotions

Most philosophers of emotion endorse a compound account of the emotions: emotions are wholes made of parts; or, as I prefer to put it, emotions are mental states that supervene on other (mental) states. The goal of this paper is to ascertain how the intentionality of these subvening members relates to the intentionality of the emotions. Towards this end, I proceed as follows. First, I discuss the problems with the account Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson offer of the intentionality of the emotions; I argue their account is fundamentally misguided by virtue of being motivated by a misunderstanding of the nature of propositional attitudes. Second, I argue against Peter Goldie's claim that an affective component of an emotion contributes to its intentionality. Third, I offer my own compound account of emotions. I argue (1) emotions are mental states that supervene on other mental states, (2) the mental states that constitute the subvenience base of emotion can have nonconceptual and/or conceptual representational content, and (3) an emotion's intentionality supervenes on (but is often not identical to) the intentionality of only one of its subvening members, specifically, the evaluative representation.