Self‐Knowledge Failures and First Person Authority1

Davidson and Burge have claimed that the conditions under which self‐knowledge is possessed are such that externalism poses no obstacle to their being met by ordinary speakers and thinkers. On their accounts, no such person could fail to possess self‐knowledge. But we do from time to time attribute to each other such failures; so we should prefer to their accounts an account that preserves first person authority while allowing us to make sense of what appear to be true attributions of such failures. While the core idea behind Davidson's and Burge's accounts appears ioadequate to this task, I argue that it can be deployed in such a way as to deliver the desired result. What makes this possible is that two attitude‐types can differ as follows: the self‐knowledge required for an utterance to be a Oing that p is different from the self‐knowledge required for it to be a Ψfing that p.     

Reflective Self‐Control in Self‐Control Scholarship: A Peircean Analysis

Vosgerau, Scopelliti, and Huh (this issue) present an important critique of much self‐control research, highlighting some of the ways that our customary operationalizations and methods may have created more confusion than clarity. Their insights, rooted in past literature and new data, offer recommendations that will undoubtedly help us improve our research in consumption self‐control. In this commentary, I frame their work using the thought of Charles Sanders Peirce, a philosopher, mathematician, and logician whose frustration with the management of the self‐control construct and subsequent revision parallels Vosgerau et al's in many ways. Further, his thought proposes that their thought traces the boundary of another type of self‐control problem, which I'll refer to as “reflective self‐control.” Taking together consumption self‐control and reflective self‐control, we're able to address a wide range of human experiences and connect self‐control to ethics, consistent with a long tradition bridging the two. Perhaps most importantly, though, a Peircean analysis suggests that Vosgerau et al's paper—whether we agree or disagree with its conclusions—exemplifies the kind of scholarly self‐control we need to display to make scientific progress, regardless of our specific domain of study.     

Mirror Self‐Recognition and Self‐Identification

That great apes are the only primates to recognise their reflections is often taken to show that they are self‐aware—however, there has been much recent debate about whether the self‐awareness in question is psychological or bodily self‐awareness. This paper argues that whilst self‐recognition does not require psychological self‐awareness, to claim that it requires only bodily self‐awareness would leave something out. That is that self‐recognition requires ‘objective self‐awareness’—the capacity for first person thoughts like ‘that's me’, which involve self‐identification and so are vulnerable to error through misidentification. This objective self‐awareness is distinct from bodily or psychological self‐awareness, requires cognitive sophistication and provides the beginnings of a more conceptual self‐representation which might play a role in planning, mental time travel and theory of mind.     

Self‐Legislation and Self‐Command in Kant's Ethics

In his later writings, Kant distinguishes between autonomy and self‐mastery or self‐command. My article explains the relation between these two ideas, both of which are integral to his understanding of moral agency and the pursuit of virtue. I point to problems with other interpretations of this relation and offer an alternative. On my view, self‐command is a condition or state achieved by those agents who become proficient at solving problems presented by the passions. Such agents are able to stick to the results of self‐legislation over time and thereby achieve a form of temporally extended freedom.     

Self‐Doubt

The need for understanding serves as a theme throughout social and personality psychology. It is reflected in people’s striving toward a shared, social construction of reality (e.g., conformity, uniformity) that runs through so much of the history of theory and research in the field. Stemming from this core motivation, the literature is peppered with illustrations of the preeminence of certainty as a goal (e.g., clarity, consistency, consonance, and related constructs) and the ultimate objective of cultural consensus. Yet, the role of doubt in the form of shaky certainty about the basis for beliefs in attitudes – or doubts about one’s self‐esteem or self‐concept – has increasingly taken center stage. This review takes the self‐competence element (vs. self‐liking element) of self‐worth judgments as its focus and provides an integration of individual difference approaches and experimental investigations of self‐doubt. Long neglected, self‐doubt increasingly appears critical for understanding some of the surprising, ironic, and self‐defeating cognitive, emotional, and behavioral findings seen in the achievement realm.     

Self‐Improvement

This article approaches the topic of improvement from a self‐evaluation perspective, namely the interplay between the self‐improvement motive and social or evaluative feedback. The self‐improvement motive is reflected in conscious desire. It is also reflected in preferences for continuous upward feedback trajectories, upward comparison feedback, and feedback that may be self‐threatening in the present but is likely to be useful in the future. The last type of feedback preference is stronger following a resource‐bolstering experience (e.g., good mood, success feedback, self‐affirmation). Moreover, both direct and indirect activation of the self‐improvement motive facilitates recall of improvement‐oriented feedback. Such feedback is associated with increased satisfaction or positive affect, a pattern qualified by individual differences (e.g., self‐esteem, self‐theories). Finally, improvement‐oriented feedback yields better performance, a pattern also qualified by individual differences (e.g., self‐enhancement, self‐appraisal) as well as feedback attributes (gradual versus sudden). This territory‐mapping review will hopefully prove useful to future theorizing and research.     

Skill Level,Self‐Views and Self‐Theories as Sources of Error in Self‐Assessment

People's impressions of the quality of their performances are often surprisingly inaccurate. In this paper, I discuss three specific factors that contribute to error in self‐assessment. First, at a most basic level, individuals must possess a certain level of knowledge to simply distinguish weak from strong performances. Thus, a lack of skill can contribute to erroneous self‐assessments. Second, even those who possess skill might rely on the wrong information to evaluate their performances. I discuss how relying on preexisting self‐views can lead estimates of one's performance astray. Third, I discuss how motivational forces can play an indirect role in overconfidence. In particular, theories of intelligence that inspire people to think well of themselves also inspire behaviors that contribute to overconfident impressions of how well one has performed on a task. Finally, I discuss how we can draw on this research to improve accuracy in self‐assessments.     

Self‐Handicapping: On the Self‐Perpetuating Nature of Defensive Behavior

The term self‐handicapping was introduced by Jones and Berglas (1978 ) to refer to the creation of barriers to successful performance for the purpose of controlling attributions about the self. In the event of failure, attributions to lack of ability are diminished or discounted because of the handicap and, in the event of success, attributions to ability are enhanced or augmented because of the handicap. This article reviews over 25 years of research on self‐handicapping. A process model is presented in which individual differences in goals and concerns dynamically interact with situational threats to elicit self‐handicapping behavior which produces consequences that perpetuate the use of the behavior in future situations.     

Motivations for Self‐Injury,Affect, and Impulsivity: A Comparison of Individuals with Current Self‐Injury to Individuals with a History of Self‐Injury

Individuals who report nonsuicidal self‐injury (NSSI) are characterized by the tendency to act rashly while experiencing distress (negative urgency), the tendency to act without thinking, and endorsement of both social and affect regulation motives for the behavior. However, very little research has identified characteristics that distinguish current self‐injurers from those with a history of the behavior. The purpose of this study was to compare individuals with current self‐injury to a history of self‐injury on impulsivity‐related personality traits, motives for self‐injury, and distress. Among a sample of 429 undergraduates, 120 reported self‐injury. Among these 120 individuals, 33 endorsed self‐injury within the past month, with a mean frequency of 4.77 acts of NSSI. Within the self‐injury group, current self‐injurers reported higher endorsement of affect regulation motives for NSSI, and higher levels of current negative affect than individuals with a history of self‐injury. There were no differences between current and former self‐injurers on measures of impulsivity, endorsement of social motives for NSSI, or positive affect. We propose that individuals who use NSSI to regulate negative affect may be more likely to repeatedly engage in this behavior over time.     

Deciphering Subjective Trajectories for Life Satisfaction Using Self‐versus‐Normative Other Discrepancies,Self‐esteem and Hope

Drawing on temporal and social comparison perspectives, we examined sources of the widespread belief that life gets better and better over time by determining how young adults evaluate their past, present and anticipated future life satisfaction (LS) relative to beliefs about normative others. We assessed whether patterns of subjective LS trajectories based on self‐versus‐normative other discrepancies varied as a function of self‐esteem and whether such patterns were accounted for by hope, encompassing goal‐related cognitions and motivations. University participants (n = 394) completed measures of their own and normative others' past, present and anticipated future LS, as well as self‐esteem and hope scales. Results from latent growth curve analyses demonstrated that high‐self‐esteem and low‐self‐esteem individuals perceived normative others' LS as progressing on a similar upward subjective temporal trajectory; however, high‐self‐esteem individuals perceived self‐improvement from past to present LS and self‐consistency from present to future LS relative to others. Low‐self‐esteem individuals perceived self‐consistency from past to present LS and self‐improvement from present to future LS relative to others. These associations were accounted for by hope. This research highlights the utility of combining temporal and social comparison perspectives for understanding how people envision their LS unfolding over time. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Stability and Change in Domain‐specific Self‐esteem and Global Self‐esteem

A notable uptick of interest in the stability of self‐esteem has been observed over the past few years. Most researchers, however, have focused on unidimensional rather than multidimensional conceptualizations of self‐esteem. The paucity of empirical research is surprising given conflicting theoretical perspectives on the stability of self‐esteem. The goal of the present study was to thoroughly disentangle different conceptualizations of self‐esteem and test opposing classical theories on (i) the stability and (ii) the direction of mutual influence of these different forms of self‐esteem. We analysed two‐year longitudinal data from participants (N = 644 at T1, N = 241 at T2) with an average age of 47.0 years (SD = 12.4). Analyses using a latent variable approach revealed that the domains of self‐esteem were relatively stable in terms of rank order and mean levels. In fact, the size of the stability coefficients was comparable to that of other trait measures that have been reported in the literature and paralleled the stability observed for global self‐esteem. Results did not provide support for either top‐down or bottom‐up effects between domain‐specific and global self‐esteem. These findings have important theoretical and practical implications regarding the stability and development of self‐esteem in adulthood and advance the understanding of self‐esteem in personality theory. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Self‐Control Inhibits Aggression

Aggression brings tremendous costs to individuals, relationships, and society. Yet, people behave aggressively toward strangers and close others at alarmingly high rates. The current article seeks to unlock part of the mystery of why people behave aggressively. We review evidence that self‐control failure plays an integral role in many acts of aggression and violence. We begin by reviewing theoretical models that emphasize the importance of self‐control processes in understanding aggressive and other criminal behaviors. We also discuss how a theoretical model that originally neglected self‐control processes can be extended to incorporate self‐control theorizing. We then discuss recent empirical evidence (a) showing that self‐control failure is a crucial predictor of aggression toward strangers and romantic partners and (b) identifying the neural processes relevant to the self‐control of aggression. Finally, we review evidence that self‐control processes can also explain why people engage in displaced aggression toward bystanders. By appreciating the importance of self‐control processes, researchers and laypersons can gain a better understanding of why people behave aggressively – and how aggression can be prevented.