Deliberative coherence

Choosing the right plan is often choosing the more coherent plan: but what is coherence? We argue that coherence-directed practical inference ought to be represented computationally. To that end, we advance a theory of deliberative coherence, and describe its implementation in a program modelled on Thagard's ECHO. We explain how the theory can be tested and extended, and consider its bearing on instrumentalist accounts of practical rationality.     

Social Psychology,Moral Character,and Moral Fallibility*

In recent years, there has been considerable debate in the literature concerning the existence of moral character. One lesson we should take away from these debates is that the concept of character, and the role it plays in guiding our actions, is far more complex than most of us initially took it to be. Just as Gilbert Harman, for example, makes a serious mistake in insisting, plain and simply, that there is no such thing as character, defenders of character also make a mistake to the extent that they imply there is no problem raised by the psychological literature for either the concept of character or the nature of character‐based ethics. My hope for this paper is to avoid both of these mistakes by first, exploring exactly what is the concept of character that is so firmly rooted in our philosophical and everyday thinking; and second, exploring the implications of the psychological literature for this appropriately understood concept of character. In so doing, I will come to a resolution that vindicates the existence of character, while at the same time calls attention to the real and serious problem suggested by the psychological evidence. This, we will see, is a problem of moral motivation.     

Axioms for Deliberative Stit

Based on a notion of companions to stit formulas applied in other papers dealing with astit logics, we introduce choice formulas and nested choice formulas to prove the completeness theorems for dstit logics in a language with the dstit operator as the only non-truth-functional operator. The main logic discussed in this paper is the basic logic of dstit with multiple agents, other logics discussed include the basic logic of dstit with a single agent and some logics of dstit with multiple agents each of which corresponds to a semantic condition concerning the number of possible choices for agents.     

Empathetic Understanding and Deliberative Democracy

Epistemic democracy is standardly characterized in terms of “aiming at truth”. This presupposes a veritistic conception of epistemic value, according to which truth is the fundamental epistemic goal. I will raise an objection to the standard (veritistic) account of epistemic democracy, focusing specifically on deliberative democracy. I then propose a version of deliberative democracy that is grounded in non-veritistic epistemic goals. In particular, I argue that deliberation is valuable because it facilitates empathetic understanding. I claim that empathetic understanding is an epistemic good that doesn't have truth as its primary goal.     

A Deliberative Approach to Causation

Fundamental physics makes no clear use of causal notions; it uses laws that operate in relevant respects in both temporal directions and that relate whole systems across times. But by relating causation to evidence, we can explain how causation fits in to a physical picture of the world and explain its temporal asymmetry. This paper takes up a deliberative approach to causation, according to which causal relations correspond to the evidential relations we need when we decide on one thing in order to achieve another. Tamsin's taking her umbrella is a cause of her staying dry, for example, if and only if her deciding to take her umbrella for the sake of staying dry is adequate grounds for believing she'll stay dry. This correspondence explains why causation matters: knowledge of causal structure helps us make decisions that are evidence of outcomes we seek. The account also explains why we can control the future and not the past, and why causes come before their effects. When agents properly deliberate, their decisions can never count as evidence for any outcomes they may seek in the past. From this it follows that causal relations don't run backwards. This deliberative asymmetry is itself traced back to asymmetries of evidence and entropy, providing a new way of deriving causal asymmetry from temporally symmetric laws.     

协商民主的路径——公共权力制约的民主选择

协商民主理论主张以沟通、交往的理性实践观来实现公民主体与权力主体的平等交流,强调通过讨论、交流、对话等方式培养交往主体的公共理性精神,实现政治民主.协商民主以理性对话的柔性机制,创新了对公共权力制约的民主形式,符合当代中国政治民主化转型时期社会稳定的需要,可以作为政治民主化改革的重要路径.     

Consensus and Power in Deliberative Democracy

On Certainty can be understood in the light both of criticism of the Tractatus's implication that judgments need the mediation of present experience to apply to the world, and of the Investigations’ remark that the primitive response to the world is not an intuition but an action. Suppose a ‘system of judgments’ is a system of practices (in which judgments are somehow immanent) and the ‘judgments’ in which there is ‘agreement’ are fundamental to the very sense of what we say. To say they were open to the question: True or false? would be to call in question the truth of an entire cultural Weltbild and give ‘truth’ a metaphysical emphasis of which it is not susceptible.