Productive conflict in group decision making: genuine and contrived dissent as strategies to counteract biased information seeking

Decision-making groups in organizations are often expected to function as a “think tank” and to perform “reality testing” to detect the best alternative. A biased search for information supporting the group's favored alternative impairs a group's ability to fulfill these requirements. In a two-factorial experiment with 201 employees and managers from various economic and public organizations, genuine and contrived dissent were investigated as counterstrategies to biased information seeking. Genuine dissent was manipulated by forming three-person groups whose members either all favored the same alternative individually (homogeneous groups) or consisted of a minority and a majority faction with regard to their favored alternative (heterogeneous groups). Contrived dissent was varied by the use or nonuse of the “devil's advocacy” technique. The results demonstrate that heterogeneity was more effective in preventing a confirmatory information-seeking bias than devil's advocacy was. Confidence was identified as an important mediator. Implications for the design of interventions aimed at facilitating reality testing in group decision making are discussed.     

Hidden consequences of the group-serving bias: Causal attributions and the quality of group decision making

A long stream of research in attribution theory suggests that groups are biased toward attributing their success to factors that are internal to their group. However, the existing research has confounded two types of attributions that are both internal to the group, but theoretically distinct: (1) attributions that differentiate between the contributions made by each individual group member and (2) attributions that focus on the group as a whole. This dichotomy is important because, drawing on theories of social influence, we predict that different types of attributions will have different consequences for the quality of group decision making. In Experiment 1, individually focused attributions for past success caused groups to consider more divergent alternatives prior to making a shared decision. In Experiment 2, individually focused attributions for past success facilitated the sharing of unique information and improved decision accuracy. These findings suggest that the group-serving tendency to internalize success may have important consequences for group performance that have not yet been considered in current research.     

Information search and presentation in advisor–client interactions

When making a decision, people often search for more information supporting than conflicting with their preferred alternative. This can be counterproductive because potential risks and liabilities of the intended decision may be overlooked. However, when confronted with a decision problem, people often turn to advisors for help. We examined what kind of information advisors search for when confronted with a client’s decision problem and what information they present to their clients. Experiment 1 suggested that advisors (participants in the role of travel agents or friends) conducted a more balanced information search than personal decision-makers. However, when presenting information to their client, mock travel agents passed on more information supporting their recommendation than conflicting with it, whereas friends presented information in a balanced way. Experiment 2 replicated the balanced information search of advisors and suggested that this effect was partly mediated by the advisors’ increased accuracy motivation. Practical and theoretical implications are discussed.     

The debiasing effect of counterfactual mind-sets: Increasing the search for disconfirmatory information in group decisions

We hypothesized that the activation of a counterfactual mind-set minimizes decision errors resulting from the failure of groups to seek disconfirming information to test an initial hypothesis. To test this hypothesis, we conducted two experiments examining the decision making processes of groups. The task for both experiments was modeled after the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, and groups had to actively seek disconfirmatory information to make a correct decision. Prior to beginning the group decision making task, groups were exposed to one of two pre-task scenarios in which the salience of counterfactual thoughts was manipulated. In Experiment 1, groups in the counterfactual prime condition were significantly more likely to make the correct decision than groups in the non-counterfactual prime condition. In Experiment 2, we replicated the effect of counterfactual primes on decision accuracy and demonstrated that groups in the counterfactual prime condition were more likely to seek disconfirmatory information than groups in the non-counterfactual prime condition. We also conducted mediation analyses that clarify the decision making process. Implications for group decision making are discussed.     

Giving advice or making decisions in someone else's place: the influence of impression, defense, and accuracy motivation on the search for new information

When making decisions, people have been found predominantly to seek information supporting their preferred choice and to neglect conflicting information. In this article, the authors investigate to what extent different types of advisors, who recommend a choice to someone or make a decision on behalf of someone, show the same confirmatory information search. In Experiment 1, the authors presented participants, in the role of advisors, with a client's decision problem and found that when making a recommendation, advisors conducted a more balanced information search than participants who were making a decision for themselves. However, advisors who had to make a decision on behalf of their clients revealed an increased preference for information supporting their position. Experiment 2 suggested that this confirmatory information search was caused by impression motivation: The advisors bolstered their decision to justify it to the client. The results are discussed within the multiple motive framework of the heuristic systematic model.     

Ostracism Reduces Reliance on Poor Advice from Others during Decision Making

Decision making is rarely context‐free, and often, both social information and non‐social information are weighed into one's decisions. Incorporating information into a decision can be influenced by previous experiences. Ostracism has extensive effects, including taxing cognitive resources and increasing social monitoring. In decision making situations, individuals are often faced with both objective and social information and must choose which information to include or filter out. How will ostracism affect the reliance on objective and social information during decision making? Participants (N = 245) in Experiment 1 were randomly assigned to be included or ostracized in a standardized, group task. They then performed a dynamic decision making task that involved the presentation of either non‐social (i.e. biased reward feedback) or social (i.e., poor advice from a previous participant) misleading information. In Experiment 2, participants (N = 105) completed either the ostracism non‐social condition or social misleading information condition with explicit instructions stating that the advice given was from an individual who did not partake in the group task. Ostracized individuals relied more on non‐social misleading information and performed worse than included individuals. However, ostracized individuals discounted misleading social information and outperformed included individuals. Results of Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1. Across two experiments, ostracized individuals were more critical of advice from others, both individuals who may have ostracized them and unrelated individuals. In other words, compared with included individuals, ostracized individuals underweighted advice from another individual but overweighed non‐social information during decision making. We conclude that when deceptive objective information is present, ostracism results in disadvantageous decision making. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Motivated information processing and group decision-making: Effects of process accountability on information processing and decision quality

Integrating dual-process models [Chaiken, S., & Trope, Y. (Eds.). (1999). Dual-process theories in social psychology. NewYork: Guilford Press] with work on information sharing and group decision-making [Stasser, G., & Titus, W. (1985). Pooling of unshared information in group decision making: biased information sampling during discussion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 1467-1478.], we predicted that groups with high epistemic motivation engage in more information-driven and less preference-driven interaction, and achieve better decisions. An experiment manipulating process accountability showed that groups under process accountability experienced greater need for more information, repeated unshared information more often, and more often chose the correct decision alternative. Mediation analysis established that epistemic motivation produced high quality decisions because it stimulated systematic information processing. Results also revealed that preference heterogeneity stimulated information-driven interaction and led to higher decision quality.     

Empower my decisions: The effects of power gestures on confirmatory information processing

Recent research has shown that social power systematically influences information processing in many ways, and can be induced simply via powerful gestures or postures. The current studies investigated the impact of embodied power on confirmatory information processing after decision making. Based upon previous social power research, we hypothesized that individuals who posed in powerful ways (making a clenched fist or sitting in an open, expansive posture) would systematically prefer decision-consistent over decision-inconsistent information; an effect known as selective exposure, or biased assimilation. Four studies consistently indicated that bodily positioning associated with high levels of power induced greater confirmatory tendencies in the evaluation and search stages of a subsequent, decision-relevant information task (Studies 1–4). This tendency is unlikely to be due to mere physical strain (Study 4), and was mediated by differences in experienced decision certainty (Studies 3 and 4); indicating that the embodiment of high power makes people more confident regarding the validity of their decisions. Consequently, high-power posers systematically prefer information that is consistent with their decision preference.     

Confirmation bias in sequential information search after preliminary decisions: an expansion of dissonance theoretical research on selective exposure to information

Research on selective exposure to information consistently shows that, after having made a decision, people prefer supporting over conflicting information. However, in all of these experiments participants were given an overview of all available pieces of information, selected them simultaneously, and did not process the requested information during the selection phase. In the present research the authors show that an even stronger preference for supporting information arises if information is presented and processed sequentially instead of simultaneously (Experiment 1), and they demonstrate that this stronger confirmation bias is due to sequential presentation and not to sequential processing of information (Experiment 2). The authors provide evidence that the increase in confirmation bias under sequential presentation is caused by heightened commitment due to the participants' increased focusing on their decision (Experiments 3 and 4).     

A Self‐regulation Perspective on Hidden‐profile Problems: If–Then Planning to Review Information Improves Group Decisions

In hidden‐profile (HP) problems, groups squander their potential to make superior decisions because members fail to capitalize on each other's unique knowledge (unshared information). A new self‐regulation perspective suggests that hindrances in goal striving (e.g., failing to seize action opportunities) contribute to this problem. Implementation intentions (if–then plans) are known to help deal with hindrances in goal striving; therefore, supporting decision goals with if–then plans should improve the impact of unshared information on group decisions. Indeed, in line with past research, control participants in two experiments rarely identified the best alternative despite monetary incentives and setting decision goals. In contrast, simply adding if–then plans to review advantages of the non‐preferred alternatives before making the final decision significantly increased solution rates. Process manipulations (Experiment 1) and measures (Experiment 2) indicate that conceptualizing HP problems as a self‐regulation challenge provides explanatory power beyond existing accounts. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of routine strength on adaptation and information search in recurrent decision making

The strength of decision routines was manipulated within a computer-controlled micro world simulation involving recurrent decision making. During a learning phase, participants were led to prefer a certain brand of an industrial good either about 15 times in a weak routine or about 30 times in a strong routine condition. In the test phase of Experiment 1, participants were confronted with changes in the microworld that rendered the routine obsolete. Routine maintenance over a series of repeated acquisition decisions was assessed as the major dependent variable. Although new information clearly suggested that a deviation from the routine would be beneficial, strong routine participants were more likely to maintain the routine compared to weak routine participants and a control group in which a comparable option (same outcome probabilities as the routine) carried an unfamiliar brand label. Experiment 2 investigated the effects of routine strength on information search. After having learned the routine, participants were asked to make one final decision involving the routine. The task was either framed as being similar to the learning task or as being novel. Before making the final decision, participants were asked to consider new information about the alternatives. Strong routine participants in the familiar task condition preferred information that favored the routine and avoided unfavorable information. If the task was framed as being novel, such confirmation biases disappeared completely. In contrast, weak routine participants exhibited a moderate confirmation bias in their searches independent from task framing.     

Excessive confidence in visually-based estimates

People exhibit excessive confidence in visually-based estimates, which in turn biases decision making. Three experiments support this assertion. Experiment 1 shows a strong impact of presentation format on estimation of proportions. Experiment 2 shows that people rely on these erroneous estimates to make incentive-compatible decisions even when objective information can be easily obtained. Experiment 3 demonstrates that the biased decisions disappear when confidence in visually-based estimates is called into question by the perceived complexity of the stimulus.     

The process of selective exposure: Why confirmatory information search weakens over time

The present research investigated whether the tendency to prefer decision-consistent to decision-inconsistent information after making a preliminary choice would vary during the sequential process of searching for additional pieces of decision-relevant information. Specifically, it was tested whether decision makers would be more confirmatory in their information evaluation and search at the commencement rather than end of an information search process. In fact, five studies revealed that participants exhibited stronger confirmatory tendencies in both information evaluation (Studies 2 and 5) and search (Studies 1, 3, and 4) immediately after making a preliminary decision compared to during the later stages of an information search process. With regard to the underlying mechanism, results further revealed that individuals appear to be more motivated to detect the best decision alternative at the beginning (as opposed to the end) of an information search process, which leads to increases in confirmatory information processing during these stages.     

Distortion of probability and outcome information in risky decisions

Substantial evidence indicates that information is distorted during decision making, but very few studies have assessed the distortion of probability and outcome information in risky decisions. In two studies involving six binary decisions (e.g., banning blood donations from people who have visited England, because of “mad cow disease”), student and nonstudent participants distorted their evaluations of probability and outcome information in the direction of their preferred decision alternative and used these biased evaluations to update their preferences. Participants also evaluated the utilities of possible outcomes more positively when the outcomes could follow only from the preferred alternative and more negatively when they could follow only from the competing alternative. Such circular reasoning is antithetical to the normative consequentialist principles underlying decision analysis. Presenting numerical information as precise values or as ranges of values did not significantly affect information distortion, apparently because the manipulation did not affect perceived ambiguity as intended.     

Affective influences on partner choice: role of mood in social decisions.

Does mood influence our information search and decision strategies when choosing a partner? In Experiment 1 (N = 60), sad Ss preferred rewarding to competent partners and remembered information supporting that choice better. In Experiment 2 (N = 96), mood effects on information selectivity, decision speed, and processing strategy in partner choices were found. In Experiment 3 (N = 42), a computerized stimulus presentation revealed mood-induced differences in the latency, self-exposure, and eventual recall of interpersonal information. These results are interpreted as evidence for mood-induced selectivity in information search and decision strategies when making realistic partner choices. The implications of the findings for research on interpersonal relations and for contemporary affect-cognition theories are considered.     

When and why do we want to know? How experienced regret promotes post‐decision information search

The effect of emotional and situational factors on the decision to seek out post‐decision information about un‐chosen alternative was examined in five experiments. Experiment 1 tested participants' willingness to find out the outcome of an un‐chosen investment that was likely to have a higher value than the chosen investment. It was found that participants were more willing to acquire information when they were responsible for the decision. Experiment 2 showed that responsibility affects information seeking, in particular when one suspects that a wrong decision was made. Experiments 3–5 examined the role of regret on information seeking. It was shown that regret about making the wrong investment (Experiment 3), forgetting to send in a lottery ticket (Experiment 4), and missing an opportunity to use a discount card after spending a month in Australia (Experiment 5), mediates the information‐seeking behavior. Experiment 5 also demonstrated that the experience of regret (and not its anticipation) influences post‐decision information seeking even when the information is of no future use. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Controlling the integration of emotion and cognition: the role of frontal cortex in distinguishing helpful from hurtful emotional information

Emotion has been both lauded and vilified for its role in decision making. How are people able to ensure that helpful emotions guide decision making and irrelevant emotions are kept out of decision making? The orbitofrontal cortex has been identified as a neural area involved in incorporating emotion into decision making. Is this area's function specific to the integration of emotion and cognition, or does it more broadly govern whether emotional information should be integrated into cognition? The present research examined the role of orbitofrontal cortex when it was appropriate to control (i.e., prevent) the influence of emotion in decision making (Experiment 1) and to incorporate the influence of emotion in decision making (Experiment 2). Together, the two studies suggest that activity in lateral orbitofrontal cortex is associated with evaluating the contextual relevance of emotional information for decision making.     

The dissemination of critical,unshared information in decision‐making groups: the effects of pre‐discussion dissent

Previous research in group decision making has found that in situations of a hidden profile (i.e. the best choice alternative is hidden from individual members as they consider their pre‐discussion information), unshared information is disproportionately neglected and sub‐optimal group choices are highly likely. In an experimental study, three‐person groups decided which of three candidates to select for a professorial appointment. We hypothesised that minority dissent in pre‐discussion preferences improves the consideration of unshared information in groups and increases the discovery rate of hidden profiles. As predicted, consideration of unshared information increased with minority dissent. The expectation of an improvement of group decision quality was partially supported. In diversity groups (i.e. each member prefers a different alternative) consideration of unshared information and group decision quality was significantly higher than in simple minority groups. Results are discussed in the light of theories of minority influence. The benefits of using the hidden profile paradigm with minority and diversity groups for theory development in the area of group decision making are highlighted. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effects of the Selective Consideration of Alternatives on Consumer Choice and Attitude–Decision Consistency

There are many instances of consumer decision making in which more consideration is given to 1 brand than to others in the choice set. This research explored how selective consideration of a brand affects attitudes toward the brand, relative standing of the focal brand within the choice category, and decision making. Experiment 1 demonstrated that when participants were prompted to consider a randomly determined focal alternative, that alternative was more likely to be chosen than nonfocal alternatives. Moreover, willingness to pay for an alternative was higher if it was the focus of consideration. Attitudinal data suggest that the selective consideration effect occurred because attitudes toward the focal alternative became more positive compared to those toward other alternatives in the choice set. Experiment 2 elucidated this attitudinal effect by demonstrating that selective consideration could cause the extremity of consumers’ attitudes toward a focal brand to become more positive. Experiment 3 explored the potential of the selective consideration of a focal alternative to influence the consistency between consumers’ attitudes and decisions and established that the initial attitude toward a focal alternative moderated the selective consideration effect.     

From thinking about what might have been to sharing what we know: The effects of counterfactual mind-sets on information sharing in groups

We hypothesized that the activation of a counterfactual mind-set minimizes group decision errors caused by the failure of groups to discuss unshared, uniquely held information. In two experiments, we manipulated the salience of counterfactual thoughts in a pre-task scenario and then had groups of three individuals discuss a murder mystery case. In both experiments, counterfactual mind-sets increased the discussion of unshared information and helped groups to identify the correct murder suspect. These results emerged regardless of whether the direction of the counterfactual thoughts was upward (Experiment 1) or downward (Experiment 2), suggesting that it is the process of thinking counterfactually, and not the content of the counterfactuals, that improves group decision making.