Is the face-perception system human-specific at birth?

The present study investigates the human-specificity of the orienting system that allows neonates to look preferentially at faces. Three experiments were carried out to determine whether the face-perception system that is present at birth is broad enough to include both human and nonhuman primate faces. The results demonstrate that the newborns did not show any spontaneous visual preference for the human face when presented simultaneously with a monkey face that shared the same features, configuration, and low-level perceptual properties (Experiment 1). The newborns were, however, able to discriminate between the 2 faces belonging to the 2 different species (Experiment 2). In Experiment 3, the newborns were found to prefer looking at an upright, compared with an inverted, monkey face, as they do for human faces. Overall, the results demonstrate that newborns perceive monkey and human faces in a similar way. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the system underlying face preference at birth is broad enough to bias newborns' attention toward both human and nonhuman primate faces.     

Transitive inference in rats (Rattus norvegicus).

Although Piagetian theory proposes that the ability to make transitive inferences is confined to humans above age 7, recent evidence has suggested that this logical ability may be more broad based. In nonverbal tests, transitive inference has been demonstrated in preschool children and 2 species of nonhuman primates. In these experiments, I demonstrate evidence of transitive inference in rats (Rattus norvegicus). I used an ordered series of 5 olfactory stimuli (A < B < C < D < E) from which correct inferences were made about the novel B versus D pair. Control procedures indicated that performance did not depend on the recency with which the correct answer was rewarded during training and may be disrupted by the addition of logically inconsistent premises (F > E and A > F). The possibility that logical transitivity may reflect a form of spatial paralogic rather than formal deductions from a syllogistic-verbal system is discussed.     

Creating social connection through inferential reproduction: loneliness and perceived agency in gadgets, gods, and greyhounds

People are motivated to maintain social connection with others, and those who lack social connection with other humans may try to compensate by creating a sense of human connection with nonhuman agents. This may occur in at least two ways-by anthropomorphizing nonhuman agents such as nonhuman animals and gadgets to make them appear more humanlike and by increasing belief in commonly anthropomorphized religious agents (such as God). Three studies support these hypotheses both among individuals who are chronically lonely (Study 1) and among those who are induced to feel lonely (Studies 2 and 3). Additional findings suggest that such results are not simply produced by any negative affective state (Study 3). These results have important implications not only for understanding when people are likely to treat nonhuman agents as humanlike (anthropomorphism), but also for understanding when people treat human agents as nonhuman (dehumanization).     

Representational insight in pigeons: comparing subjects with and without real-life experience

Understanding the relation between objects and their pictures at a level beyond mere feature discrimination is by no means a trivial cognitive ability, and support of this is still weak in nonhuman species. Here, we report evidence of representational insight in pigeons. Responding to pictures of human body parts was compared in birds that had extensive pre-experience with live humans and in birds that had never seen any human heads. In a two-alternative forced-choice procedure the pigeons were trained to discriminate between pictures of either handless or headless humans and nonhumans. On test, the birds had to choose (i) between body parts they had already seen in training and the parts that had been missing, (ii) between previously seen parts and arbitrary skin patches, and (iii) between previously missing parts and skin patches. Only the pigeons that lacked experience with real heads and were trained with pictures of headless humans failed to show a significant preference for pictures of missing parts (i.e., heads) over arbitrary skin patches. This demonstrates the importance of individual experience with the real 3D-referents of pictures for classification of the latter and is thereby evidence of representational insight.     

Emergent Simple Discriminations and Conditional Relations in Children, Intellectually Impaired Adults,

Previous research has shown that when, under non-reinforced conditions, stimuli are added to S+ and S- stimuli in simultaneous discrimination tasks, transfer between paired stimuli is likely to occur. The present study examined whether this procedure also leads to the formation of conditional relations between paired stimuli. In Experiments 1, 2, and 3, normal pre-school children were trained on a simultaneous discrimination task with A1 reinforced and A2 not reinforced (A1+/A2- ). Then they received two tests (no programmed consequences): one with B stimuli superimposed on the A stimuli (A1B1/ A2B2), and one with B stimuli only (B1/B2). Subjects who selected A1B1 and B1 also received conditional discrimination tests: one with B1 or B2 as samples and A1 and A2 as comparisons (B-A), and one in which the functions of these stimuli were reversed (A-B). Intellectually impaired adults and normal adults served in Experiments 4 and 5, respectively. These experiments were basically the same except that the subjects were also given the opportunity to demonstrate transfer from B to C via BC (B1C1/B2C2 and C1/C2 tests). Most children (75%) and intellectually impaired adults (75%) treated the conditional discrimination probe tasks as simple discriminations and typically selected the trained and derived S+ stimuli. The remaining children, intellectually impaired adults, and all normal adults related all directly and indirectly linked stimuli of the same functions conditionally to one another (A-B, B-C, A-C, and vice versa). The present findings suggest that, as humans develop, conditional stimulus relations may emerge from tasks and stimulus configurations that are increasingly remote from traditional conditional discrimination tasks.     

Representing visual recursion does not require verbal or motor resources

The ability to form and use recursive representations while processing hierarchical structures has been hypothesized to rely on language abilities. If so, linguistic resources should inevitably be activated while representing recursion in non-linguistic domains. In this study we use a dual-task paradigm to assess whether verbal resources are required to perform a visual recursion task. We tested participants across 4 conditions: (1) Visual recursion only, (2) Visual recursion with motor interference (sequential finger tapping), (3) Visual recursion with verbal interference – low load, and (4) Visual recursion with verbal interference – high load. Our results show that the ability to acquire and use visual recursive representations is not affected by the presence of verbal and motor interference tasks. Our finding that visual recursion can be represented without access to verbal resources suggests that recursion is available independently of language processing abilities.     

Conjunction errors, recollection-based rejections, and forgetting in a continuous recognition task

Six experiments investigated conjunction memory errors (e.g., falsely remembering blackbird after studying parent words blackmail and jailbird) in a continuous recognition procedure with a parent-conjunction lag manipulation. In 4 experiments (1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B) "recollect" judgments, which indexed recall of parent words, showed that participants can use recollection to prevent conjunction errors. "Recollect" judgments, as well as overt recall of parent words (in Experiments 2A and 2B), dropped sharply from a lag of 0 to 1 word, then stabilized from a lag of 1 to 20 words. Thus, the "recollect" responses and overt recall demonstrate a step function of forgetting over short intervals. These data generalized to cued recall in Experiments 3A and 3B with the first morpheme (e.g., black) as the cue, though recall conjunction errors occurred infrequently relative to recognition conjunction errors. Overall, the results support the idea that automatic and controlled processes contribute to memory performance.     

Emergent Simple Discrimination via Transfer from Differentially Reinforced S+ Stimuli: A Further Test of the Stimulus-Response Interaction Model

This study examined emergent form discrimination through contiguity of the forms (B stimuli) with colours (A stimuli) associated with different magnitudes of reinforcement. In Experiment 1, children were trained on two colour discriminations. In both, the colour stimuli had the same form: A1B1/A2B1 and A3B1/A2B1. Responding to A1/B1 was followed by three units of reinforcement, to A3B1 by one unit of reinforcement, and to A2B1 by no reinforcement. There followed five tests in which stimuli were presented without programmed consequences. These assessed: (1) the maintenance of accurate performance on the training tasks; (2) S+ preference (A1B1/A3B1); (3) stimulus generalization (A1B2/A2B3, A3B4/A2B5); (4) S+ preference again (A1B6/A3B6); and (5) transfer from the S+ colours to the forms (A4B2/A4B4). On the final test, seven of the eight subjects selected A4B2. Experiment 2 demonstrated that a preference for A4B2 also occurred when the S+ preference tests were omitted. This preference was also found when the total amounts of reinforcement associated with the S+ colours (A1 and A3) were the same (Experiment 3). These findings: (a) indicate that children can acquire new discriminations under non-reinforced conditions through contiguity with differentially reinforced S+ stimuli; (b) support the Stimulus-Response Interaction model (Smeets, 1993) for specifying transfer.     

The meaning(s) of conditionals: conditional probabilities,mental models,and personal utilities

Five experiments were conducted to test the hypothesis that people understand conditional statements ("if p then q") as indicating a high conditional probability P(q/p). Participants estimated the probability that a given conditional is true (Experiments 1A, 1B, and 3) or judged whether a conditional was true or false (Experiments 2 and 4) given information about the frequencies of the relevant truth table cases. Judgments were strongly influenced by the ratio of pq to p not q cases, supporting the conditional probability account In Experiments 1A, 1B, and 3, judgments were also affected by the frequency of pq cases, consistent with a version of mental model theory. Experiments 3 and 4 extended the results to thematic conditionals and showed that the pragmatic utility associated with believing a statement also affected the degree of belief in conditionals but not in logically equivalent quantified statements.     

Auditory feedback is necessary for the maintenance of stereotyped song in adult zebra finches.

Although songbirds rely on auditory input for normal song development, many species eventually attain adult song patterns that are thought to be maintained without reference to auditory feedback. In such species, it is believed that a central motor program for song is established when the stereotyped adult song pattern is achieved. However, we report here that in the Australian zebra finch, stereotyped song patterns gradually change in adult males following bilateral cochlear removal. By 16 weeks after surgery, deaf birds accurately reproduced only 36% of the song syllables produced prior to surgery. Moreover, on average, the phonology of over 50% of the syllables produced by deaf birds was either only slightly similar or unlike the phonology of any syllable produced prior to surgery. In contrast, control birds accurately retained over 90% of their syllables over a comparable time period and less than 5% of their syllables was unmatched or only slightly similar in phonology to previously recorded syllables. In many of the deafened birds, changes in song patterns were not evident until 6-8 weeks after surgery. These data indicate that continued auditory input is necessary to maintain the patterns of neural organization supporting learned song in zebra finches and raise questions concerning the neural sites and cellular mechanisms that mediate this feedback control.     

Cognitive maps not used by humans (Homo sapiens) during a dynamic navigational task

To account for the impressive navigational ability of animals, some researchers have suggested that animals might use a cognitive map. Two groups of human participants (Homo sapiens) were tested for cognitive mapping using procedures similar to those used by B. M. Gibson and A. C. Kamil (2001). Participants who had to acquire spatial information about a hidden goal from the experimental contingencies alone showed patterns of search most like nutcrackers in the companion study (B. M. Gibson & A. C. Kamil, 2001). Surprisingly, postexperimental questionnaires revealed that most participants used an alternative strategy of vector integration rather than cognitive mapping during search for the hidden goal. The current study and its companion indicate that some simpler mechanisms of navigation are flexible enough to account for what appears to be map-based behavior in human and nonhuman species.     

Transitive inference in pigeons: Control for differential value transfer

Transitive inference (TI) effects have been demonstrated in several nonhuman species using a nonverbal version of the task in which A is better than B is represented in a simple simultaneous discrimination, A+B?. Following five-term training (e.g., A+B?, B+C?, C+D?, D+E?), the choice of B over D on test trials is taken as evidence of TI. Recently, differential value transfer from the S+ to the S? in a simultaneous discrimination has been proposed as a noncognitive basis for these effects. Two experiments were conducted to control for differential value transfer. The results suggest that differential value transfer is not the only basis for nonhuman TI performance. An alternative account based on spatial mapping is discussed.     

Is the asymmetry in young infants’ categorization of humans versus nonhuman animals based on head,body, or global gestalt information?

Quinn and Eimas (1998) reported an asymmetry in the exclusivity of the category representations that young infants form for humans and nonhuman animals: category representations for nonhuman animal species were found to exclude humans, whereas a category representation for humans was found to include nonhuman animal species (i.e., cats, horses). The present experiment utilized the familiarization/novelty-preference procedure with 3- and 4-month-olds to determine the perceptual cues (i.e., whole stimulus, head alone, body alone) that provided the basis for this asymmetry. The data revealed the asymmetry to be observable only with the whole animal stimuli and not when infants were provided with information from just the head or the body of the exemplars. The results indicate that the incorporation of nonhuman animal species into a category representation for humans is based on holistic information.     

A transfer of self-discrimination response functions through equivalence relations

The present study tested the idea that human self-discrimination response functions may transfer through equivalence relations. Four subjects were trained in six symbolic matching-to-sample tasks (if see A1, choose B1; A1-C1, A2-B2, A2-C2, A3-B3, A3-C3) and were then tested for the formation of three equivalence relations (B1-C1, B2-C2, B3-C3). Two of the B stimuli (B1 and B2) were then used to train two different self-discrimination responses using either detailed instructions (Subjects 1 to 3) or minimal instructions (Subject 4) on two complex schedules of reinforcement (i.e., subjects were trained to pick the B1 stimulus if they had not emitted a response, and to pick the B2 stimulus if they had emitted one or more responses on the previous schedule). All 4 subjects showed the predicted transfer of self-discrimination response functions through equivalence relations (i.e., no response on the schedule, pick C1; one or more responses on the schedule, pick C2). Subjects also demonstrated this transfer when they were required to discriminate their schedule performance before exposure to the schedule (i.e., “what I intend to do”). Four control subjects were also used in the study. Two of these (Subjects 5 and 6) were not exposed to any form of matching-to-sample training and testing (nonequivalence controls). The 2 remaining subjects (7 and 8) were exposed to matching-to-sample training and testing that incorporated stimuli not used during the transfer test; C1 and C2 were replaced by N1 and N2 during the matching-to-sample training and testing, but C1 and C2 were used for the transfer tests (equivalence controls). All 4 subjects failed to produce the self-discrimination transfer performances observed with the experimental subjects.     

Spatial integration of boundaries in a 3D virtual environment

Prior research, using two- and three-dimensional environments, has found that when both human and nonhuman animals independently acquire two associations between landmarks with a common landmark (e.g., LM1–LM2 and LM2–LM3), each with its own spatial relationship, they behave as if the two unique LMs have a known spatial relationship despite their never having been paired. Seemingly, they have integrated the two associations to create a third association with its own spatial relationship (LM1–LM3). Using sensory preconditioning (Experiment 1) and second-order conditioning (Experiment 2) procedures, we found that human participants integrated information about the boundaries of pathways to locate a goal within a three-dimensional virtual environment in the absence of any relevant landmarks. Spatial integration depended on the participant experiencing a common boundary feature with which to link the pathways. These results suggest that the principles of associative learning also apply to the boundaries of an environment.     

The evolution of intergroup bias: perceptions and attitudes in rhesus macaques

Social psychologists have learned a great deal about the nature of intergroup conflict and the attitudinal and cognitive processes that enable it. Less is known about where these processes come from in the first place. In particular, do our strategies for dealing with other groups emerge in the absence of human-specific experiences? One profitable way to answer this question has involved administering tests that are conceptual equivalents of those used with adult humans in other species, thereby exploring the continuity or discontinuity of psychological processes. We examined intergroup preferences in a nonhuman species, the rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta). We found the first evidence that a nonhuman species automatically distinguishes the faces of members of its own social group from those in other groups and displays greater vigilance toward outgroup members (Experiments 1-3). In addition, we observed that macaques spontaneously associate novel objects with specific social groups and display greater vigilance to objects associated with outgroup members (Experiments 4-5). Finally, we developed a looking time procedure-the Looking Time Implicit Association Test, which resembles the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995)-and we discovered that macaques, like humans, automatically evaluate ingroup members positively and outgroup members negatively (Experiments 6-7). These field studies represent the first controlled experiments to examine the presence of intergroup attitudes in a nonhuman species. As such, these studies suggest that the architecture of the mind that enables the formation of these biases may be rooted in phylogenetically ancient mechanisms.     

Domestic chicks perceive stereokinetic illusions

Stereokinetic illusions occur when certain 2-D patterns are set in slow rotation in a plane perpendicular to the line of sight. Such phenomena have never been investigated in animal species other than our own. We used the domestic chick (Gallus gallus) to check whether these illusions are experienced by non-human species, taking advantage of filial imprinting. Newly hatched visually naive chicks were individually exposed for 4 h to 2-D stimuli producing, to a human observer, the perception of a stereokinetic cone (experiment 1) or of a stereokinetic cylinder (experiment 2). Thereafter, each chick underwent a free-choice test between a solid 3-D cone and a solid 3-D cylinder. A control group of newly hatched but not imprinted chicks underwent the same testing procedure, to check for the presence of any spontaneous preference for one or other of the two solid objects. Imprinted chicks approached the 3-D stimulus closely resembling the stimulus they had been exposed to during imprinting (the cone in experiment 1 and the cylinder in experiment 2). Non-imprinted chicks did not show any preference. These results suggest that domestic chicks experience stereokinetic illusions.     

Context effects of pictures and words in naming objects,reading words,and generating simple phrases

In five language production experiments it was examined which aspects of words are activated in memory by context pictures and words. Context pictures yielded Stroop-like and semantic effects on response times when participants generated gender-marked noun phrases in response to written words (Experiment 1A). However, pictures yielded no such effects when participants simply read aloud the noun phrases (Experiment 2). Moreover, pictures yielded a gender congruency effect in generating gender-marked noun phrases in response to the written words (Experiments 3A and 3B). These findings suggest that context pictures activate lemmas (i.e., representations of syntactic properties), which leads to effects only when lemmas are needed to generate a response (i.e., in Experiments 1A, 3A, and 3B, but not in Experiment 2). Context words yielded Stroop-like and semantic effects in picture naming (Experiment 1B). Moreover, words yielded Stroop-like but no semantic effects in reading nouns (Experiment 4) and in generating noun phrases (Experiment 5). These findings suggest that context words activate the lemmas and forms of their names, which leads to semantic effects when lemmas are required for responding (Experiment 1B) but not when only the forms are required (Experiment 4). WEAVER++ simulations of the results are presented.     

Sound localization in small birds: absolute localization in azimuth

Nine small birds of 3 species (Melopsittacus undulatus, Serinus canarius, and Poephila guttata) were trained in an operant procedure to fly to sound sources for food reward. The angle between the 2 sound sources was varied on a session-by-session basis, and threshold (i.e., minimum resolvable angle) was taken as the angle that corresponded to a performance level of 75% correct. In all, thresholds were calculated for pure tones of 5 different frequencies, noise bands of 3 different spectral compositions, and species-specific contact or distance calls recorded from each of the 3 species. Thresholds for both simple and complex stimuli were larger than 25 degrees. There were statistically significant species differences for each stimulus set, but these differences were not correlated with species differences in head size. Birds with 1 ear plugged performed as well as binaural birds in this task. Birds deafened in 1 ear, however, performed at chance.     

Six-month-old infants use analog magnitudes to represent duration

While many studies have investigated duration discrimination in human adults and in nonhuman animals, few have investigated this ability in infants. Here, we report findings that 6-month-old infants are able to discriminate brief durations, and, as with other animal species, their discrimination function is characterized by Weber's Law: proportionate difference rather than absolute difference between stimuli determined successful discrimination. Importantly, paralleling results found with nonhuman animals, the Weber function that we found for infants' discrimination of time is the same as that found for their discrimination of number. Infants discriminated durations of an audiovisual event differing by a 1:2 ratio, but not those differing by a 2:3 ratio, over a range of durations. This suggests that (a) in human as in nonhuman animals, the same mental mechanism may underlie the ability to measure duration as to represent number, and (b) we may share this mental mechanism with other animal species.